epistemic concepts of critical thinking

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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Original research article, epistemic emotions and epistemic cognition predict critical thinking about socio-scientific issues.

• Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

When thinking critically about socio-scientific issues, individuals’ expectations about the nature of knowledge and knowing, as well as their emotions when these expectations are met or not, may play an important role in critical thinking. In this study, we examined the role of epistemic emotions in mediating the effects of epistemic cognition on critical thinking when contending with conflicting information about genetically modified foods. Two hundred four university students completed a prior knowledge test on genetically modified foods, and then reported their epistemic beliefs about genetically modified foods. Participants then read a text that presented advantages and disadvantages of genetically modified foods, and reported the epistemic emotions they experienced during reading of that text. Participants then composed an argumentative essay about genetically modified foods, which were coded for critical thinking. Results from path analysis revealed that a belief in complex knowledge predicted less surprise and confusion, but more enjoyment. For the source of knowledge, a belief in the active construction of knowledge predicted less surprise and enjoyment. For justification for knowing, a belief that knowledge should be critically evaluated positively predicted curiosity, and negatively predicted confusion and boredom. Moreover, beliefs that knowledge about genetically modified foods is complex and uncertain positively predicted critical thinking. Confusion and anxiety also positively predicted critical thinking, whereas frustration negatively predicted critical thinking. Lastly, confusion mediated relations between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking. Results suggest complex relations between epistemic cognition, epistemic emotions, and critical thinking that have implications for educational practice as well as for future research on epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions.

Introduction

The information landscape in the 21st century is one of contrast. On the one hand, the Internet and social media provide an unprecedented wealth of diverse and accessible information from around the world. On the other hand, the structure of social networks and algorithmic filtering (e.g., news feeds and recommendations) have considerably narrowed the breadth of content that individuals consume, making it increasingly difficult to escape echo chambers and challenge one’s views with new information. In this context, any topic is likely to become the object of controversy. Topics of personal and global relevance such as ways to combat climate change or the safety of infant vaccines appear to be politically controversial, dividing the public’s opinion on what is considered accurate information, and stifling political action. To make informed decisions individually and collectively, the challenge lies in overcoming personal biases, and weighing the pros and cons of conflicting perspectives to reconcile views ( Noroozi et al., 2018 ). This is one aspect of the process known as critical thinking ( Kuhn, 2018 ).

There is little debate over the idea that society benefits when individuals are able to think deeply and critically about important issues (e.g., Dewey, 1933 ; Halpern, 2014 ). Educating people to become critical thinkers is of vital importance for the well-being of future generations. Accordingly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; Tremblay et al., 2012 ) has made teaching critical thinking a priority for higher education. However, empirical research shows that teaching critical thinking skills is arduous and often unyielding ( Abrami et al., 2008 ; Niu et al., 2013 ; Huber and Kuncel, 2015 ), with up to 45% of students completing post-secondary degrees lacking these essential skills ( Arum and Roksa, 2011 ). In light of these observations, many have suggested that to improve critical thinking outcomes, empirical work is needed to achieve a greater understanding of the underlying cognitive, motivational, and affective mechanisms that enable critical thinking ( Alexander, 2014 ; Greene and Yu, 2014 ; Bråten, 2016 ).

Socio-scientific topics are often characterized by the presence of opposing views that offer conflicting explanations to complex and multifaceted phenomena ( Levinson, 2006 ). Deciding what to believe or what to do about these topics requires that individuals engage with the underlying issues of knowledge that characterizes these topics: What counts as knowledge? How certain are the facts? Who can be trusted to provide a clear perspective on the topic? In other words, thinking critically about socio-scientific topics requires thinking about the knowledge- and knowing-related aspects of these issues ( Greene and Yu, 2014 ), a process termed epistemic cognition ( Greene et al., 2016 ). However, when engaged with complex and conflicting issues, individuals’ expectations about the nature of knowledge and knowing may be challenged, and in turn elicit emotions such as surprise, curiosity, confusion, frustration, or anxiety ( Muis et al., 2018 ).

Common understandings of critical thinking assume that emotions have no role to play in critical thinking, except perhaps to introduce unwarranted bias ( Kahneman, 2011 ). However, knowing and feeling 1 are closely related, and emotions may play a significant role in helping individuals disentangle the two ( Brun and Kuenzle, 2008 ). For example, Tiedens and Linton (2001) suggest that emotions can serve as information about the state of certainty. To illustrate, when presented with a knowledge claim, feelings of uncertainty may lead an individual to doubt the veracity of that claim. This uncertainty may then lead to a more thorough treatment of information and a greater attention to the quality of arguments over the source’s characteristics. Nonetheless, little is known about how cognitive and affective processes interact to predict critical thinking. As such, the aim of the current study is to shed light on the role that epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions play when thinking critically about socio-scientific issues. In the following sections, we define the concepts of critical thinking, epistemic cognition, and epistemic emotions, and review theoretical and empirical work that informed the hypotheses of the current study.

Thinking Critically About Controversial Topics

Critical thinking is regarded as one of the most important skills that individuals can develop and is a fundamental aim of education ( Bailin and Siegel, 2003 ; Halpern, 2014 ). Though several definitions of critical thinking are offered in the literature (e.g., Kurfiss, 1988 ; Siegel, 1988 ; Facione, 1990 ; Scriven and Paul, 1996 ; Litman, 2008 ; Ennis, 2018 ), Ennis (2018) argued that they do not significantly differ from each other. Drawing from these definitions, we define critical thinking as purposeful, reasonable and reflective thinking that enables individuals to decide what to believe or what to do when faced with complex and conflicting issues ( Facione, 1990 ; Ennis, 2018 ). Following Kuhn (2018) , we further define critical thinking as incorporating two key dimensions: inquiry (input), and argument (output).

According to Kuhn (2018) , these two key dimensions of critical thinking can be delineated as an input phase and an output phase. Inquiry, the input phase, captures what an individual does as they are faced with complex and conflicting issues. Critical thinking during this phase includes skills like identifying pertinent information, evaluating claims, identifying counter-arguments, and critically analyzing and synthesizing information. These processes are carried out for the ultimate purpose of bringing this newly synthesized information to bear on a claim, which leads to the second dimension of critical thinking: argument.

Argument refers to a product that is constructed in written or oral form by an individual, which consists of a claim and one or more supporting reasons or evidence that are connected to the claim with warrants ( Toulmin, 2003 ). Argumentation refers to the dynamic process that captures what is done to create the argument ( Kuhn et al., 2015 ). As such, the output phase refers to the actions or processes of reasoning systematically in support of an idea, action or theory. Argumentation can be captured via dialogic methods ( Kuhn, 2018 ) or via argumentative essay writing ( Noroozi et al., 2018 ; Latifi et al., 2019 ; Valero Haro et al., 2019 ). For example, high-quality argumentative essays encompass a clear claim supported by evidence and reason, followed by acknowledgments of counter-arguments against the original claim, and integration of the arguments and counter-arguments which eventually lead to the final conclusion ( Noroozi et al., 2016 ). The goal is to provide strong evidence to support one argument over another by weakening the other position ( Kuhn, 2018 ).

Recent research has shown that critical thinking skills differ across academic disciplines ( Gordon, 2000 ) given that various disciplines have different argumentation structures, epistemologies, and rules and goals ( Noroozi et al., 2016 ). For instance, in nursing, critical thinking is concerned with rigorous investigation and reflection on all aspects of a clinical situation to decide on an appropriate course of action ( Simpson and Courtney, 2002 ). In engineering, critical thinking consists of considering assumptions in problem-solving, selecting appropriate methods for experiments, structuring open-ended design problems, and assessing social impacts ( Claris and Riley, 2012 ). When it comes to taking a position on a socio-scientific issue such as genetically modified foods, the task of critical thinking rests on identifying opposing arguments, assumptions, and evidence, evaluating the credibility, reliability, and relevance of claims, producing valid explanations and arguments, and making decisions or drawing valid conclusions ( Facione, 1990 ; Kuhn and Crowell, 2011 ; Noroozi et al., 2016 ; Latifi et al., 2019 ).

Bailin and Siegel (2003) , as well as other philosophical theorists of critical thinking (e.g., Paul, 1990 ), emphasized the importance of generalizable abilities such as assessing reasons, evaluating claims, identifying underlying assumptions, and recognizing and applying valid forms of justification. They argue that what is “critical” about critical thinking is the use of a criterion—an epistemic criterion—for evaluating reasons and making sound judgments. The generalizable reasoning abilities described by Bailin and Siegel (2003) have long been studied by educational and developmental psychologists in the field of epistemic cognition (e.g., King and Kitchener, 2002 ; Chinn et al., 2011 ; Hofer and Bendixen, 2012 ; Greene et al., 2016 ). Epistemic cognition concerns individuals’ thoughts and beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the process of knowing ( Hofer and Pintrich, 1997 ). From the perspective of educational development, Kuhn (1991 , 1999) identified the development of epistemic cognition as perhaps the most central underpinning of critical thinking.

The Role of Epistemic Cognition in Critical Thinking

Epistemic cognition.

Epistemic cognition refers to how individuals vet, acquire, understand, justify, and use knowledge ( Greene et al., 2016 ). Specifically, individuals engage in epistemic cognition when they activate personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing (i.e., epistemic beliefs), define epistemic aims and criteria for knowing, and use evaluation and justification strategies to address issues of knowledge and knowing ( Chinn et al., 2011 ; Barzilai and Zohar, 2014 ; Muis et al., 2018 ). The vast majority of research on epistemic cognition has focused on epistemic beliefs, which refer to individuals’ personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the process of knowing ( Hofer and Pintrich, 1997 ). Hofer and Pintrich (1997) proposed that epistemic beliefs comprise four dimensions: (1) the complexity of knowledge, ranging from the belief that knowledge consists of a simple accumulation of facts, to the belief that knowledge consists of a complex structure of interrelated propositions; (2) the uncertainty of knowledge, ranging from the belief that knowledge is certain and unchanging, to the belief that knowledge is tentative and evolving; (3) the sources of knowing, ranging from the view that knowledge resides in external authorities, to the view that individuals are knowers who actively construct knowledge; and (4) the justification for knowing, which addresses how individuals evaluate knowledge claims, from an unquestioning reliance on authorities, to the evaluation and integration of evidence and arguments from various sources.

Numerous empirical studies have shown that individuals who adopt more constructivist epistemic cognition (e.g., who believe that knowledge is complex, tentative, actively constructed, and justified via evaluation) use better learning strategies ( Chiu et al., 2013 ; Muis et al., 2015 ), show better self-regulation during problem solving ( Muis et al., 2015 ), and attain greater academic performance ( Bråten et al., 2014 ) than those who adopt less constructivist epistemic cognition (i.e., who believe that knowledge is simple, certain, handed down from, and justified by authorities).

Relations Between Epistemic Cognition and Critical Thinking

Across multiple studies, more constructivist epistemic cognition has been positively associated with critical thinking. Specifically, constructivists are better at identifying the elements of discourse (i.e., assumptions, evidence, arguments; Mason and Boscolo, 2004 ) and understanding authors’ viewpoints ( Barzilai and Eshet-Alkalai, 2015 ) when reading texts that comprise conflicting perspectives, compared to individuals with less constructivist epistemic cognition. Similarly, when contending with multiple sources of information, individuals who engage in more constructivist epistemic cognition performed better at evaluating the trustworthiness and credibility of information using the features of the sources, distinguishing between types of sources, making associations between a source and its content, using criteria to evaluate the trustworthiness of sources, and using source integration strategies than those with less constructivist views ( Barzilai and Zohar, 2012 ; Bråten et al., 2014 ; Strømsø and Bråten, 2014 ; McGinnis, 2016 ).

More constructivist beliefs about the justification for knowing have been associated with the use of more competent criteria to evaluate the trustworthiness of sources ( Strømsø et al., 2011 ). Moreover, learners with more constructivist epistemic cognition have been found to possess greater argumentative skills ( Mason and Boscolo, 2004 ; Yang and Tsai, 2010 ; Noroozi, 2018 ). Constructivists are also better able to support their statements with acceptable, relevant, and multiple justifications ( Mason and Scirica, 2006 ). In sum, individuals who engage in more constructivist epistemic cognition are more likely to possess the cognitive skills necessary to think critically. In support of this, Muis and Duffy (2013) found that graduate students who received an intervention designed to develop more constructivist epistemic beliefs over the course of a semester also showed more critical thinking when learning statistics.

Research has also shown that, compared to less constructivist epistemic cognition, more constructivist epistemic cognition has been related to the will to take on multiple perspectives, reconsider one’s own thinking when drawing conclusions about controversial issues ( Schommer-Aikins and Hutter, 2002 ), engage in effortful thinking ( Hyytinen et al., 2014 ), and display skepticism toward unreliable sources ( McGinnis, 2016 ). Though motivational and affective dispositions have theoretically been proposed to support critical thinking within the epistemic cognition literature ( Chinn et al., 2011 ; Muis et al., 2015 , 2018 ), little research has been conducted to understand how epistemic cognition relates to the affective states that dispose learners to think critically.

Epistemic Emotions and Critical Thinking

There is increasing evidence for the important role of emotions for learning processes and outcomes. Empirical research has related emotions to academic motivation, knowledge building and revision, as well as academic performance ( Pekrun and Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2014 ). Broadly, emotions are defined by interrelated psychological processes that include affective (e.g., feeling nervous), cognitive (e.g., ruminating thoughts), motivational (e.g., a desire to escape), expressive (e.g., displaying a frown), and physiological (e.g., increased heart rate) components ( Ellsworth, 2013 ; Shuman and Scherer, 2014 ). Emotions can generally be classified in terms of valence, where pleasant emotions are positive and unpleasant emotions are negative (e.g., enjoyment is positive, surprise is neutral, frustration is negative), and level of activation (e.g., anxiety is activating, boredom is deactivating; see Pekrun and Stephens, 2012 ).

In educational psychology, one important line of research has concerned achievement emotions, that is, emotions that are tied to achievement activities (e.g., studying) or achievement outcomes (success or failure), such as anxiety, pride, or shame. However, not all emotions triggered in educational settings are related to achievement. Notably, Pekrun and Stephens (2012) distinguished topic emotions, social emotions, as well as epistemic emotions. Topic emotions relate to the content of learning (e.g., pride when learning about the American space conquest), whereas social emotions focus on relations to others in the learning context (e.g., compassion, gratitude; Weiner, 2007 ). Of particular relevance to critical thinking, epistemic emotions relate to the perceived quality of knowledge and the processing of information ( Pekrun and Stephens, 2012 ).

Muis et al. (2018) proposed that epistemic emotions arise as the result of appraisals of alignment or misalignment between the characteristics of incoming messages and individuals’ cognitive characteristics, including prior knowledge, epistemic beliefs, and epistemic aims. In the context of contending with socio-scientific issues such as climate change, vaccination, or genetically modified foods, incoming messages are likely to be characterized by knowledge claims that are complex that also include a degree of uncertainty ( Levinson, 2006 ). For individuals seeking simple and certain answers, engaging with such content may trigger a variety of epistemic emotions such as confusion, frustration, or anxiety. However, faced with the same content, individuals who expect knowledge to be uncertain and tentative, and who see value in consulting multiple sources before coming to a conclusion, may experience curiosity and enjoyment ( Muis et al., 2015 ). When presented with tasks that engage individuals’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing, frequently occurring epistemic emotions include surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, frustration, anxiety, and boredom ( Muis et al., 2015 ; Pekrun et al., 2017 ).

Surprise is likely to occur when individuals appraise new information as unexpected ( Meyer et al., 1997 ) or when they are unable to generate an explanation for the new information ( Foster and Keane, 2015 ). Mildly surprising information can lead to deep processing and integration of information, whereas information that is greatly surprising can be regarded as implausible and new information may fail to be integrated ( Munnich and Ranney, 2018 ). When information is not overly complex or perceived as relatively comprehensible, curiosity may arise. Litman (2008) proposes that epistemic curiosity arises in one of two forms: as a pleasant desire for information (i.e., interest-type curiosity), or as an unpleasant urge to obtain information to close the gap between what one knows and what one wants to know (e.g., deprivation-type curiosity; see also Loewenstein, 1994 ; Markey and Loewenstein, 2014 ). If the course of curiosity is followed, enjoyment may ensue, for instance, when validation or verification of a hypothesis is achieved ( Brun and Kuenzle, 2008 ), or when an epistemic aim is achieved ( Chinn et al., 2011 ; Muis et al., 2018 ). Confusion, on the other hand, follows from a lack of understanding when novel and complex information is perceived as incomprehensible ( Muis et al., 2018 ). Confusion can also arise in the face of severe discrepancies or contradictions, or from disruptions of goals or sequences of action ( D’Mello and Graesser, 2012 ). If an individual repeatedly fails to resolve the discrepancy causing confusion, frustration may arise ( D’Mello and Graesser, 2012 ; Di Leo et al., 2019 ; Munzar et al., 2021 ). Frustration can be described as a blend of anger and disappointment and, as such, can be an activating emotion when closer to anger, or deactivating if closer to disappointment ( Pekrun et al., 2002 ).

Another negative emotion is anxiety, which arises when a message implicates knowledge that is core to one’s identity. Individuals may begin to doubt or feel uncertain about their beliefs in a proposition, and feel that their identity is threatened ( Hookway, 2008 ). Pekrun (2006) described anxiety as a “complex” emotion that can either benefit or hinder motivation to engage in effortful thinking. On the one hand, anxiety can reduce cognitive resources such as memory, leading to poor performance on complex or difficult tasks, as well as poor academic achievement (see Pekrun et al., 2002 ; Zeidner, 2014 ). However, for some individuals, anxiety can increase extrinsic motivation to invest effort in complex processes such as analytical and critical thinking to avoid goal-related failure. Lastly, boredom may arise when information is unchallenging or when an intense negative emotion like frustration or anxiety precipitates disengagement ( D’Mello et al., 2014 ).

Consequences of Epistemic Emotions

Pekrun ( Pekrun et al., 2002 ; Pekrun, 2006 ; Pekrun and Perry, 2014 ) proposed that individuals process information in emotion-congruent ways. Specifically, Pekrun and colleagues proposed that positive emotions (e.g., interest-type curiosity and enjoyment) signal that the object of judgment is valuable, leading to more positive evaluations, greater efforts to engage, more elaboration of content, and more purposeful thinking than negative emotions. On the other hand, negative emotions (e.g., frustration, anxiety, and boredom) have been related to more negative evaluations, less efforts to engage (anxiety may be an exception), less elaboration of content, and more irrelevant thinking (see Pekrun et al., 2002 for a review). Further, positive emotions have been found to facilitate holistic, intuitive, and creative ways of thinking, whereas negative emotions have been associated to more focused, detail-oriented, analytical, and rigid modes of processing information (e.g., Bless et al., 1996 ).

Thus, critical thinking is theorized to be facilitated by optimal levels of surprise and positive emotions such as curiosity and enjoyment and hindered by certain negative emotions such as frustration and boredom. On the other hand, other negative emotions such as anxiety and confusion may be beneficial for critical thinking: D’Mello and Graesser (2014) argued that confusion is central to complex learning activities such as problem-solving and generating cohesive arguments. As such, confusion is expected to be beneficial to critical thinking because it signals that there is something wrong with the current state of affairs, which can precipitate critical thinking. However, this expectation holds only if individuals resolve confusion when it arises ( D’Mello and Graesser, 2014 ; Munzar et al., 2021 ). Indeed, as previous research has shown, when confusion is not resolved, this leads to frustration and disengagement from the task and can lower achievement outcomes ( Munzar et al., 2021 ). Similarly, anxiety in the face of complex and conflicting information may motivate critical thinking via effortful thinking to reduce the discomfort of anxiety but may also result in a decrease in critical thinking if anxiety consumes cognitive resources ( Meinhardt and Pekrun, 2003 ).

Empirical Evidence

To date, little theoretical and empirical work has explored how epistemic cognition relates to epistemic emotions experienced when contending with complex or conflicting information. To address this gap, Muis et al. (2015) examined relations between epistemic cognition, epistemic emotions, learning strategies—including critical thinking—and learning achievement in the context of learning about climate change. They hypothesized that individuals with more constructivist beliefs would experience more positive emotions given the consistency between the to-be-learned content and their epistemic beliefs, whereas individuals with less constructivist beliefs would experience more negative emotions given the conflicting perspectives presented to them on the causes and consequences of climate change. Results from path analyses revealed that individuals who espoused more constructivist epistemic beliefs about the justification for knowing used more critical thinking strategies, and that this relationship was mediated by curiosity: The more learners believed that knowledge is justified by systematic inquiry and integration of sources of information, the more they experienced curiosity and, in turn, the more they used critical thinking and attained greater learning achievement. They also found that surprise negatively predicted critical thinking, but surprise was not predicted by any epistemic belief dimension.

In sum, significant relations between epistemic cognition, epistemic emotions, and critical thinking are suggested in the literature. However, the studies reviewed were predominately designed to assess relations between epistemic beliefs, epistemic emotions, and critical thinking during learning; they did not instruct participants to think critically. As Greene et al. (2014) argued, the study of epistemic cognition and critical thinking should involve the need to argue for, and justify, conclusions drawn across sources and perspectives. As such, to fully understand the role of epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions in critical thinking, more research is needed wherein individuals are asked to engage in critical thinking during a complex learning task. We address this gap in the literature.

The Current Study

On the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations from Muis et al. (2015 , 2018) , Pekrun ( Pekrun et al., 2002 , 2017 ; Pekrun, 2006 ), as well as from the work of D’Mello and colleagues ( D’Mello and Graesser, 2012 ; D’Mello et al., 2014 ), we propose the following hypotheses: (1) Epistemic beliefs will predict critical thinking. Specifically, more constructivist beliefs will positively predict critical thinking. (2) Epistemic beliefs will predict epistemic emotions. Specifically, more constructivist epistemic beliefs will positively predict positive epistemic emotions, including interest-type curiosity and enjoyment, and negatively predict surprise and negative emotions, including confusion, frustration, anxiety and boredom. (3) Epistemic emotions will predict critical thinking. Specifically, surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, and anxiety will positively predict critical thinking, whereas frustration and boredom will negatively predict critical thinking. (4) Epistemic emotions will mediate relations between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking.

Materials and Methods

To test these hypotheses, we designed a study that specifically embedded a task that challenged individuals to critically evaluate knowledge claims from opposing perspectives, and to take a position on the topic in the form of an argumentative essay. The topic selected was genetically modified foods. Participants first took a knowledge assessment test to assess baseline knowledge about genetically modified foods, reported their epistemic beliefs about genetically modified foods, and then read a text on genetically modified foods that was comprised of two parts. The first part of the text was informative in nature and written in the style of a refutation text to ensure that all participants would engage in essay writing with good baseline knowledge about the nature of genetically modified foods. Refutation texts address commonly held misconceptions and directly refute them by presenting correct scientific explanations ( Sinatra and Broughton, 2011 ). The effectiveness of refutation texts for facilitating the revision of misconceptions has been well documented (see Tippett, 2010 ). The second part of the text was argumentative in nature and presented a series of points in favor for and against genetically modified foods. These points were supported by evidence that varied in strength and degree of certainty, but all information provided was valid. After having read the experimental text, participants wrote an argumentative essay of their choice in favor for or against genetically modified foods.

Participants were recruited from three research-intensive universities from Eastern Canada (40.7%), Western Canada (26.5%), and the Southern United States (32.8%). Ethics approval was first obtained by the ethics review board for each participating university. To recruit participants, flyers were posted around university campuses, advertisements were posted on university websites, and subject pools from psychology courses were used. Participants provided informed consent to participate in the study and then completed a prior knowledge test and the Topic-Specfic Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire ( Bråten and Strømsø, 2009 ) to assess epistemic beliefs about genetically modified foods. Participants were then randomly assigned to read a version of the text that presented the advantages of genetically modified foods first ( n = 102), or the disadvantages of genetically modified foods first ( n = 102). After reading, participants completed the Epistemic Emotions Survey ( Pekrun et al., 2017 ) to capture the epistemic emotions they experienced while reading. Lastly, participants composed an argumentative essay and then completed a demographics questionnaire to conclude the study. Participants were compensated for their time with $15 cash, a $10 gift card, or course credit, depending on the university from which the participant was recruited. Figure 1 provides an overview of the procedure.

Figure 1. Overview of procedure.

Participants

Two hundred four university students from three universities across Canada and the United States participated. See Table 1 for a breakdown of all demographic characteristics of the sample by gender, year in university, race, and first language spoken. No differences between groups were found on any of the variables of interest as a function of university location, gender, year in university, or first language spoken. Participants studied a variety of domains (e.g., business administration, social sciences, natural sciences, computer sciences, psychology, linguistics, and arts) and reported an average GPA of 3.24 out 4.0 (SD = 0.55). Participants from the Western Canadian institution reported significantly lower GPA ( M = 2.97, SD = 0.67) than participants from the Eastern Canadian ( M = 3.43, SD = 0.44) and Southern American institutions [ M = 3.30, SD = 0.39; F (2, 124) = 10.02, p < 0.001]. Overall, no significant differences were observed between Canadian ( M = 3.23, SD = 0.60) versus American ( M = 3.30, SD = 0.39) participants in terms of reported GPA. Participants were 21.46 years of age on average (SD = 4.28).

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the sample.

Experimental Text

Participants were given a text that first presented factual information about genetically modified foods, followed by a portion that presented advantages and disadvantages of genetically modified foods. The first half of the text was adapted from Heddy et al. (2017) and focused on debunking four common misconceptions about genetically modified foods by presenting accurate scientific explanations. Erroneous conceptions included the notion that genetically modifying food is the same process as cloning, that it involves injecting hormones into a plant or animal, that it only occurs in laboratories by scientists, and that it is the product of contemporary scientific research.

The second part of the text presented four advantages of, and four criticisms against genetically modified foods. It was written by the first author and adapted from content published by the Canadian Standards Association ( Whitman, 2000 ). To counterbalance a possible effect of text order with regard to the presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of genetically modified foods, two versions of the text were created: one version presented the advantages first, followed by the disadvantages, and the other version presented the disadvantages first, then the advantages. The text contained 1,295 words in total, including the informative and argumentative sections, with a Flesch-Kincaid index of grade 12.7 and a Flesch Reading Ease index of 37.7 (see Kincaid et al., 1975 ).

Prior Knowledge Test

Participants’ prior knowledge about genetically modified foods was measured with a 10-item multiple-choice test adapted from Heddy et al. (2017) . Each question presented four possible choices and participants were instructed to select the best answer. Examples of items include: “Cross-pollination is considered to be a process through which plants can be… (a) genetically modified. (b) cloned. (c) hormone injected. (d) exactly replicated.” “Methods that are NOT used in producing genetically modified foods include which of the following? (a) Gene cloning methods. (b) Hormone injection. (c) Cross pollination. (d) selective pollination.” Correct answers were given a score of 1 and incorrect answers were given a score of 0. Scores were then added to create a total sum, then a percentage, which was used as an indicator of prior knowledge.

A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to examine the factor structure of the prior knowledge test using Mplus Version 7.11 ( Muthén and Muthén, 2015 ). The initial model revealed a poor fit, χ 2 = 103.94, df = 35, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.05, and CFI = 0.88. An analysis of item loadings revealed low loadings for two items; therefore, these items were deleted. The final model (with the remaining eight items) resulted in a good fit, χ 2 = 64.14, df = 20, p < 0.01, CFI = 0.94 and RMSEA = 0.04. Cronbach’s reliability coefficient was acceptable, α = 0.79.

Epistemic Beliefs

Epistemic beliefs about genetically modified foods were measured with a version of the Topic-Specific Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire (TSEBQ; Bråten and Strømsø, 2009 ) adapted to this topic. The TSEBQ comprises 24 items that participants rate on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Four dimensions of epistemic beliefs were measured: six items assessed beliefs about the complexity of knowledge (e.g., “Knowledge about genetic modification is primarily characterized by a large amount of detailed information”), six items assessed beliefs about the uncertainty of knowledge (e.g., “Certain knowledge about genetic modification is rare”), five items assessed beliefs about the source of knowing (e.g., “I often feel that I just have to accept that what I read about genetic modification problems can be trusted”), and seven items assessed beliefs about justification for knowing (e.g., “When I read about issues concerning genetic modification, I evaluate whether the content seems logical”).

A CFA was conducted to examine the factorial validity of scores for the instrument using Mplus7. The initial model (with 24 items) showed poor fit, χ 2 = 419.25, df = 246, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.06, and CFI = 0.78. Due to low loadings, 10 items were deleted: three items were removed from the uncertainty subscale, three from the complexity subscale, two from the source subscale, and three from the justification subscale. The final model (with 14 dimensions) resulted in good fit, χ 2 = 102.31, df = 71, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.05, and CFI = 0.93. Cronbach’s reliability coefficients were acceptable, α = 0.79 for the uncertainty subscale, α = 0.78 for the complexity subscale, α = 0.78 for the source subscale, and 0.76 for the justification subscale.

Epistemic Emotions

Epistemic emotions experienced while reading the experimental text were measured with the Epistemic Emotions Survey (EES; Pekrun et al., 2017 ). This questionnaire comprises 21 items that measure seven epistemic emotions, including: surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, frustration, anxiety, and boredom. Each item consisted of a single word describing one emotion, with three descriptors per emotion (e.g., “anxious,” “nervous,” and “worried” measured anxiety). Participants rated the intensity of their emotional responses to the text using a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” to “Very strong.” The scores for the descriptors of each emotion were averaged to represent each emotion. Cronbach’s reliability coefficients were acceptable, α = 0.78 for surprise; α = 0.76 for curiosity; α = 0.84 for enjoyment; α = 0.77 for confusion; α = 0.83 for frustration; α = 0.85 for anxiety; and α = 0.80 for boredom.

To assess critical thinking, we chose to measure argumentation, the second key dimension of critical thinking ( Kuhn, 2018 ). Accordingly, participants were instructed to compose an argumentative essay of their choice in favor for or against genetically modified foods and to justify their position. Instructions were as follows: “Based on the content you just read, write a brief (2–3 paragraphs) argument for or against genetically modified foods. Explain how you came to form and justify your point of view. You can refer back to the text you read, and include your judgment of the arguments, evidence, and conclusions it presented.” Critical thinking was assessed using a coding scheme developed for this purpose.

Coding critical thinking in essays

A coding scheme was developed by the second author to assess critical thinking in argumentative essays. The coding scheme was informed by the work of Facione and Facione (2014) , which outlines the development and use of a scoring rubric for evaluating critical thinking (see Table 2 for full descriptions and examples). Five elements were targeted via the coding scheme: taking a position, presenting supportive arguments in favor of a position, acknowledging an alternative perspective, evaluating the validity of claims on both sides of the issue, and integrating arguments from opposing viewpoints into a coherent perspective or conclusion. One point was attributed if participants took a position; no points were attributed if participants did not take a position. One point was attributed if participants supported their position with valid arguments, evidence, facts or reasons; no points were attributed if no arguments were presented in support of their position or if arguments were invalid. One point was attributed if participants acknowledged and presented an alternative perspective on genetically modified foods; no points were attributed if participants only presented arguments in favor of one perspective. One point was attributed if participants evaluated claims or arguments before accepting them as valid; no points were attributed if participants expediently accepted or dismissed claims or arguments without evaluation. Lastly, one point was attributed if participants reconciled or integrated perspectives; no points were attributed if the conclusion was one-sided, categorical, or failed to acknowledge the validity of any counter-argument. Points were summed to create a total score on five.

Table 2. Coding scheme for critical thinking in argumentative essays.

The coding scheme was tested by the second and third authors using 31 transcripts (15% of the sample), and inter-rater reliability for the first round was established at 75%. All disagreements were resolved through discussion and were used to update the coding scheme. A second round of coding was performed with an additional 31 transcripts (new 15% of the sample), and final inter-rater reliability was established at 88%. The second author then coded the remainder of the essays.

Preliminary Analyses

Prior to conducting full analyses, all variables were inspected for skewness and kurtosis. Based on Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2013) recommendations, acceptable ranges of ±3 for skewness and ±8 for kurtosis were used to investigate the relative normality of the distributions for each variable. Analyses revealed that the distributions for confusion (4.45), frustration (7.28), anxiety (3.73), and boredom (6.10) were positively skewed; however, given the nature of emotions, normal distributions for these variables are unlikely, so the variables were retained for subsequent analyses. Examination of text order (i.e., advantages of genetically modified foods first or disadvantages of genetically modified foods first) showed no or order effects on any variable. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 3 and correlations between variables are presented in Table 4 .

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables.

Table 4. Correlations between variables.

To check for univariate outliers, each variable was converted to a standardized z -score. Any z -scores exceeding critical cut-offs of ±3.3 was considered an outlier ( Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013 ). Results revealed univariate outliers for justification ( n = 2, z = −3.36 to −5.53) and frustration ( n = 1, z = 3.51). Instead of deletion, all cases were retained given the values were not extreme and did not exceed more than 2% of cases for each variable (see Cohen et al., 2003 ). To check for multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distances were calculated based on a χ 2 distribution with 12 degrees of freedom and a critical cut-off point of 32.91 (α = 0.001; see Meyers et al., 2017 ; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013 ). No multivariate outliers were found.

Mediation Path Analysis

To test the hypothesized mediation model, we conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes (2018) PROCESS macro for SPSS, which is recommended for testing complex mediational models and maintaining high power while controlling for Type I error rates (see Hayes, 2018 ). Bootstrap sampling was used (with 10,000 bootstraps), which does not require assumptions of normality and which was appropriate given a few slightly skewed variables. A power analysis using G ∗ Power ( Faul and Erdfelder, 1992 ; for a full description, see Erdfelder et al., 1996 ) with power (1–β) set at.80 and α set at 0.05 revealed a required sample size of 218 for the present analysis. Given a sample of 204, the analysis would be underpowered. As such, we adjusted the level of the confidence intervals to 90% for the bootstrap sampling, which required a sample size of 180. The final model is depicted in Figure 2 with standardized effects.

Figure 2. Final model with standardized coefficients. Only significant paths are represented. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

We first examined the total effects model, which expresses the sum of the direct and indirect effects of epistemic beliefs on critical thinking scores to determine the predictive relations between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking, independent of the effects of mediational variables. We next calculated the direct effects of epistemic beliefs on epistemic emotions, the direct effects of epistemic beliefs on critical thinking, and the indirect effects of epistemic beliefs on critical thinking via epistemic emotions. At each step, we controlled for the effects of prior knowledge.

Complexity beliefs (β = 0.16, SE = 0.06, t = 2.06, p = 0.04) and uncertainty beliefs (β = 0.14, SE = 0.07, t = 2.07, p = 0.04) were direct predictors of critical thinking. For direct effects of epistemic beliefs on epistemic emotions, complexity beliefs predicted surprise (β = -0.24, SE = 0.07, t = −3.52, p = 0.0005), enjoyment (β = 0.15, SE = 0.07, t = 2.04, p = 0.04) and confusion (β = −0.28, SE = 0.07, t = −4.02, p = 0.0001); source beliefs predicted surprise (β = −0.15, SE = 0.07, t = −2.21 p = 0.02), and enjoyment (β = −0.18, SE = 0.07, t = −2.59, p = 0.03); and justification beliefs predicted curiosity (β = 0.14, SE = 0.07, t = 2.02, p = 0.04), confusion (β = −0.14, SE = 0.07, t = −2.01, p = 0.04), and boredom (β = −0.15, SE = 0.06, t = −2.02, p = 0.04). For the direct effects of epistemic emotions on critical thinking, confusion (β = 0.24, SE = 0.10, t = 2.30, p = 0.02) and anxiety (β = 0.18, SE = 0.10, t = 2.17, p = 0.03) were significant positive predictors, and frustration (β = −0.24, SE = 0.10, t = −2.40, p = 0.01) was a significant negative predictor of critical thinking. Finally, for indirect effects of epistemic beliefs on critical thinking via epistemic emotions, results showed that the effect of complexity beliefs on critical thinking was mediated by confusion, with a point estimate of −0.07 and bias corrected bootstrapped confidence interval (90%) of −0.12 to −0.02.

Two Illustrative Cases

The following cases reflect examples of how epistemic beliefs and epistemic emotions related to critical thinking for different individuals. These cases were chosen as they represent individuals with similar demographic profiles and levels of prior knowledge about genetically modified foods, but whose epistemic beliefs and emotions as well as critical thinking skills present an interesting contrast.

Case 1 was a 24-year-old female in the 3rd year of an environmental sciences degree with a self-reported GPA representing an academic average between 80–84% (or A-). Her prior knowledge about genetically modified foods was below average (test score = 20%). She reported epistemic beliefs that were slightly less constructivist than average on the complexity subscale (score = 3.33/7.00), less constructivist than average by more than two standard deviations on the uncertainty subscale (score = 2.83/7.00), and less constructivist than average on the source subscale by one standard deviation (score = 2.60/7.00). For epistemic emotions, she reported slightly less confusion than average (score = 1.33/5.00), slightly more frustration than average (score = 2.00/5.00), more anxiety than average by more than one standard deviation (score = 3.33/5.00), and more boredom than average by more than a standard deviation (score = 3.00/5.00).

Our analysis of Case 1’s essay indicated little critical thinking (score = 2/5) and reflected a one-sided view of genetically modified foods. Her essay included a well-positioned positive stance on genetically modified foods (“Genetically modified food is the way of the future”) as well as a few arguments in its support (“For instance, rice can be GM to have more nutrients, thus preventing millions of people from starvation” and “Already there are many third world nations that have hungry and malnourished populations. Genetically modified foods can help them by modifying their staple of food grown there.”) However, Case 1 did not identify nor engage with arguments from the opposing position. No arguments against genetically modified foods were specifically identified. Only the fact that genetically modified foods could have detrimental health effects was alluded to in a sentence that quickly dismissed the counter-argument with a statement that was justified by means of not having directly observed any opposing evidence: “Every day, there are hundreds of foods being bought in grocery stores that are GM and so far there have been no real significant downside to eating it (detrimental). In fact, I’m sure you’ve even eaten something that’s been GM this week!” Further, no conclusions were reached that hinted to an integration or reconciliation of perspectives. A conclusive statement was offered that solidified a position in favor of genetically modified foods (“Our knowledge is meant to be passed on to others so they can benefit from the fortunes that we are so lucky to have.”). Overall, Case 1 is representative of individuals with less constructivist epistemic beliefs who did not present elaborate critical thinking. Further, though prior knowledge was low, Case 1 reported little confusion. She also reported high levels of frustration, anxiety, and boredom. For Case 1, it may be the case that the presentation of opposing arguments led to more frustration and anxiety given her less constructivist beliefs about genetically modified foods. That is, consistent with Muis et al. (2018) , the nature of the information presented to her was in stark contrast to her epistemic beliefs, thus triggering negative epistemic emotions. She expected knowledge about genetically modified foods to be certain and simple but was presented as uncertain and complex. This increase in frustration and anxiety may have then led her to focus solely on one side of the argument, resulting in lower performance on the task.

Case 2 was a 24-year-old female in the 2nd year of a degree in psychology. She reported a GPA representing an academic average between 85–89% (or A). Akin to Case 1, Case 2’s prior knowledge about genetically modified foods was below average (test score = 20%). She reported epistemic beliefs that were more constructivist than average by more than one standard deviation on the uncertainty subscale (score = 5.00/7.00), more constructivist than average by more than one standard deviation on the uncertainty subscale (score = 5.83/7.00), and slightly less constructivist than average on the source subscale (score = 4.00/7.00). For epistemic emotions, she reported more confusion than average by more than one standard deviation (score = 3.00/5.00), more frustration than average by more than one standard deviation (score = 2.67/5.00), slightly more anxiety than average (score = 3.00/5.00), and slightly less boredom than average (score = 1.67/5.00).

Case 2’s essay reflected an integrated perspective on genetically modified foods. Case 2 first assumed a cautiously positive stance on genetically modified foods: “Though the use of genetically modified foods may present possible solutions to certain of the world’s problems, there is insufficient research on the matter and, more specifically, evidence supporting its proposed benefits.” She then presented some of benefits of genetically modified foods: “Genetically modified foods have been proposed to aid in addressing the many problems tied to the ever-growing population of the world, including malnutrition and land usage” and then exposed some criticism, pointing to a lack of supportive evidence, “However, these are mere propositions based on hypothetical scenarios, i.e., there is no evidence to show that certain foods can be genetically modified to provide additional vitamins and minerals - what has been proposed is a hypothetical solution.” The same pattern was repeated with the opposing perspective: Case 2 first presented arguments against genetically modified foods: “Meanwhile, a growing body of research is pointing to evidence supporting its harmful side-effects. For instance, a causal link was found between the presence of the modified B.t. corn and death of monarch butterfly caterpillars. Research has also shown that GM fed rats had digestive tracts that differed to rats fed unmodified foods”, then identified limitations, “While research on the effects of GM foods in humans is still rather limited, such animal studies are an important start.” A full reconciliation of perspectives was not reached, but a conclusion was drawn that followed the aforementioned evaluations and identified a lack of evidence as a halt to fully embracing the benefits of genetically modified foods: “Overall, the research on genetically modified foods remains inconsistent and limited. There is insufficient evidence to show that the benefits of genetically modified foods could outweigh its costs.” It may be the case that an optimal level of anxiety and confusion, combined with low boredom, motivated Case 2 to exert efforts to analyze each perspective on genetically modified foods to better understand their characteristics and nuances, resulting in observable critical thoughts.

Socio-scientific issues such as genetically modified foods are often depicted as controversial by influencers who are either in favor or against the propositions of scientific expertise. In the face of such issues, successful critical thinking occurs when individuals purposefully decide what to believe or what to do by evaluating knowledge claims and reconciling opposing views, taking relevant evidence and context into account ( Ennis, 1987 ; Facione, 1990 ). Prior theoretical and empirical work suggests that individuals’ thoughts and beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing play an important role in supporting critical thinking. However, little is known about the role that knowing-related emotions may play in critical thinking and the effects of epistemic cognition on such thinking. We hypothesized that epistemic cognition supports critical thinking via epistemic emotions.

This research contributes to the literature on epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions by empirically testing Muis et al. (2015) and Muis et al. (2018) model of epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions, and by providing new findings concerning relations between epistemic cognition, epistemic emotions, and critical thinking. Further, this study is the first to explore these relations in the context of an elaborate critical thinking task where participants were asked to decide what to believe about a socio-scientific issue on the basis of conflicting evidence. Specifically, results showed that a belief in complex and uncertain knowledge directly predicted critical thinking (Hypothesis 1). Complexity, source, and justification beliefs also predicted epistemic emotions, including surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, and boredom (Hypothesis 2), and epistemic emotions, confusion, frustration, and anxiety, in turn predicted critical thinking (Hypothesis 3). Lastly, confusion mediated relations between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking (Hypothesis 4). Next, we interpret each of the results described above and conclude with a discussion of limitations and directions for future research.

The Role of Epistemic Beliefs When Facing Socio-Scientific Issues

In support of our hypothesis, more constructivist epistemic beliefs about the nature of knowledge (complexity and uncertainty dimensions) significantly predicted critical thinking, indicating that the more individuals believed in complex and tentative knowledge, the more they presented support for arguments, acknowledged alternatives, evaluated claims, and drew balanced conclusions. However, epistemic beliefs about the nature of knowing (beliefs about the sources of, and justification for knowing) were not significantly related to critical thinking. It should be mentioned that it is frequent in epistemic belief research that not all belief dimensions are salient in a given situation, depending on the nature of the task ( Hammer and Elby, 2002 ; Greene et al., 2010 ). Similar to this study, Strømsø et al. (2011) examined relations between epistemic beliefs and undergraduate students’ evaluations of documents’ trustworthiness and found that source beliefs significantly predicted evaluation of conflicting claims, but justification beliefs did not contribute significantly to trustworthiness scores.

For our study, three dimensions of epistemic beliefs were found to have direct effects on five epistemic emotions. In particular, in line with hypotheses, the more individuals believed that knowledge about genetically modified foods is complex, the less likely there were to experience surprise and confusion, and the more likely they were to experience enjoyment. This supports the notion that epistemic beliefs shape individuals’ assumptions about the nature of knowledge ( Bromme et al., 2010 ), such that those who expected knowledge about genetically modified foods to be simple may have experienced dissonance related to the complex nature of information presented in the text. Individuals who expected knowledge to be complex, when presented with conflicting information, were not surprised by this conflict nor were they confused about the conflicting information. Moreover, consistent with hypotheses, more constructivist complexity beliefs predicted more enjoyment when reading about advantages and disadvantages of genetically modified foods.

Following Muis et al. (2015) and Muis et al. (2018) model of epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions, we hypothesized that enjoyment would stem from an alignment between epistemic beliefs that are congruent with the nature of science (i.e., more constructivist epistemic beliefs) and the epistemic nature of the material presented. Similarly, Franco et al. (2012) found that when individuals’ epistemic beliefs are consistent with the knowledge representations in complex learning material, they perform better on various measures, including deep processing of information, text recall, and changes in misconceptions. However, Muis et al. (2018) suggested that epistemic emotions have more antecedents than were measured here, including perceptions of control and task value, as well as information novelty and complexity. They argued that if an individual with more constructivist epistemic beliefs has low perceived control or assigns little value to the task at hand, then he or she may experience lower levels of enjoyment. This suggests that epistemic beliefs alone cannot fully predict the type of epistemic emotions that are likely to arise in a given situation. As such, to fully understand the relationship between epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions more broadly, future work should include other epistemic emotion antecedents and take further contextual elements into account.

Additionally, those who viewed personal interpretations and judgments as the main sources of knowledge about genetically modified foods experienced less surprise but also less enjoyment during learning when reading contradictory perspectives about the value and usefulness of genetically modified foods. This result is consistent with findings from Strømsø et al. (2011) who found that the more students viewed the self as a meaning maker, the less they trusted texts written by climate change experts. Similarly, Kardash and Scholes (1996) found that the less students believed in external authority as a source of knowledge, the stronger their opinions about the HIV-AIDS relationship.

It could be the case that individuals who believe that knowledge resides within the self (and who have low prior knowledge) also prefer to fall back on their own opinions and find it less enjoyable to have to consider the point of view of others. Traditionally, the belief that knowledge originates from external authorities has been viewed as “naïve,” whereas the conception of self as a knower has been viewed as “sophisticated” ( Hofer and Pintrich, 1997 ). However, researchers have called into question the assumption that more constructivist beliefs are better to espouse in all situations (see Bromme et al., 2008 ; Greene et al., 2010 ; Greene and Yu, 2014 ). Indeed, when novices face a complex topic such as genetically modified foods, it may be adaptive to assume that experts are trustworthy and to balance one’s own judgments with reliance on external expert sources.

Moreover, when individuals are presented with conflicting information about a topic, it is beneficial to evaluate and integrate evidence and arguments. That is, individuals who believed that knowledge is justified through a process of critical evaluation and integration of information experienced more curiosity and less confusion and boredom compared to individuals who believed in an unquestioning reliance on authorities. In the case of the texts presented to participants in this study, authorities reported both pros and cons about genetically modified foods. Under this condition, individuals are likely more confused given that they may be uncertain as to which authority to trust, may find the task too challenging, and then experience greater boredom. However, as previous research has shown ( D’Mello et al., 2014 ), confusion can be beneficial for learning by increasing critical thinking. We describe relations between emotions and critical thinking next.

The Role of Epistemic Emotions in Critical Thinking

Consistent with the contention that confusion can be beneficial for complex cognitive tasks, confusion was found to be a positive predictor of critical thinking. Also consistent with hypotheses, confusion was negatively predicted by complexity and justification beliefs and, as such, fully mediated relations between these beliefs and critical thinking. Although the full mediation effect seems to suggest that more constructivist beliefs are detrimental to critical thinking via decreased levels of confusion, we suggest that effects revealed here are more complex than they appear. It might be the case that compared to individuals with less constructivist epistemic beliefs, those who espouse more constructivist beliefs experience less confusion related to the complex nature of genetically modified foods knowledge, but nevertheless perceive discrepancies between perspectives that can trigger lower levels of confusion associated with beneficial effects. Indeed, philosophers such as Morton (2010) and Elgin (2008) have argued that epistemic emotions such as surprise and confusion can draw attention to the object of the emotion, which can lead to deep processing of information as well as metacognitive self-regulation ( Muis et al., 2015 ). Moreover, two of the epistemic belief dimensions directly positively predicted critical thinking. As such, it may be the case that individuals with more constructivist epistemic beliefs experience less confusion, but still directly engage in critical thinking given that they believe that knowledge must be critically evaluated and that perspectives must be weighed before coming to a specific conclusion on an issue.

In contrast to confusion, frustration was found to be a negative predictor of critical thinking. Frustration is an intense negative emotion that can overtake the cognitive system ( Rosenberg, 1998 ), and is linked to a reduction of effortful thinking and an increase of rigid and shallow processing of information (see Pekrun et al., 2011 ; Pekrun and Stephens, 2012 ). D’Mello and Graesser (2012) proposed that frustration can lead to boredom and ultimately, disengagement from task. Moreover, we observed a significant positive relationship between anxiety and critical thinking, suggesting that anxiety may be beneficial for critical thinking. This result was expected and is consistent with Muis et al.’s (2015) results, who also noted a significant positive path from anxiety to critical thinking. In the present study, anxiety was unrelated to epistemic beliefs but may have been related to epistemic aims such as to understand the content or find the truth about genetically modified foods. Measuring epistemic aims as antecedents of epistemic emotions will be an important avenue to understand the conditions under which anxiety can benefit critical thinking, and those under which it does not.

In terms of positive emotions, in this study, we did not find significant predictive relationships between enjoyment and critical thinking. Therefore, the current results do not replicate prior work by Muis et al. (2015) , who found curiosity to predict critical thinking. Muis et al. (2018) proposed that curiosity and confusion are similar in that they both result from surprise triggered by dissonance, incongruity, or uncertainty. They proposed that the complexity of information or of a task predicts whether curiosity or confusion follows surprise. Specifically, they argued that when complexity is high, surprise may turn into confusion, whereas curiosity is more likely to ensue in cases where discrepancies can be easily revolved. In the current study, it appears that curiosity and confusion highly co-occurred. More research is needed to better understand how individuals experience curiosity and confusion when trying to determine what is true or what to believe about a complex and controversial topic.

Overall, the current study provided support for many of the predictions posited in the epistemic cognition and emotion literature, yet also provided new insights into the epistemic and affective nature of critical thinking. Specifically, the notion that more constructivist epistemic cognition promotes critical thinking was generally supported, as was the contention that epistemic emotions mediate relations between epistemic cognition and cognitive processes. Further, results supported the idea that milder forms of negative emotions such as anxiety and confusion can be beneficial for critical thinking, whereas intense activating negative emotions (i.e., activating forms of frustration) are detrimental for critical thinking. However, results also challenged the assumptions that positive emotions are required for critical thinking to occur. Lastly, our results challenge dominant conceptions about beliefs in the self as the primary source of knowledge as being beneficial for critical thinking. Our counter-hypothetical results provide additional support for the idea that there is a need to reconsider and reinvestigate how individuals productively conceive of and justify knowledge (see Greene et al., 2008 ; Chinn et al., 2011 ; Greene and Yu, 2014 ). Overall, findings from the current study support the notion that critical thinking is not necessarily something that feels good ( Danvers, 2016 ), yet suggest that espousing more constructivist beliefs about the nature of knowledge may benefit critical thinking by tampering certain difficult emotions and supporting the use of critical thinking.

Educational Implications

The results obtained in the present study have several implications for educational interventions aimed at increasing critical thinking about socio-scientific issues. First, findings support the notion that knowledge- and knowing-related issues should be highlighted and discussed in educational settings, with the aim of developing more constructivist forms of epistemic cognition. Notably, discussions surrounding the complex and tentative nature of scientific knowledge may be beneficial to shaping individuals’ expectations about the issues they will be called upon to reflect and act on during their lifetime. Barnett (2004) , a prominent philosopher of higher education, has described the mission of university education as preparing students for a complex and uncertain future: For individuals to prosper, make decisions, and come to a position of security amid multiple interpretations, individuals must come not only to learn for uncertainty, but to learn to live with uncertainty. Barnett contends that no risk-free curricular approach can achieve this; instead, he calls for a curriculum that aims at educational transformation through exposure to dilemmas and uncertainties. This may include, for instance, confronting students with the limits of knowing in a field and with the limitations of the field as such. In addition to uncertainty- and complexity-focused curricula, Muis et al. (2016) proposed that to achieve epistemic change, epistemic climates are needed that involve constructivist pedagogical approaches (e.g., inquiry-based learning, apprenticeship, collaborative learning, knowledge building, and communities of practice), decentralized authority structures, open-ended assessment practices, and appropriate levels of teacher support, as students experience the sometimes difficult process of belief change.

Second, findings from the present study suggest that to develop critical thinking about socio-scientific issues, learning environments should be supportive of students’ emotional responses. In particular, for students with less constructivist epistemic cognition, being exposed to complex and conflicting information may trigger surprise, confusion, and frustration. We argue that such emotions should be welcomed without judgment by teachers and peers, and that these emotional experiences should be normalized ( Di Leo and Muis, 2020 ). Further, teachers should discuss their own epistemic emotions and model appropriate emotion regulation strategies ( Gross, 2014 ). Related to confusion, students may have a tendency to want to avoid confusion by seeking out tasks with minimal intellectual challenges (situation selection), seeking help when challenged (situation modification), or intentionally ignoring or misattributing the cause of discrepant events to avoid confusion (reappraisal; D’Mello and Graesser, 2014 ; Gross, 2014 ; Harley et al., 2019 ). However, teachers can discuss the drawback of these strategies, and further suggest and model a different set of emotion regulation strategies, including choosing to engage in tasks that are intellectually challenging (situation selection), open up to perspectives that do not at first flatter their preferred position (situation modification), and help students build competencies for critical reflection (competence enhancement). By reinforcing the latter strategies, students may become what Clifford (1988) describes as “academic risk takers,” who are more tolerant to uncertainty and failure.

Third and relatedly, given observed relations between beliefs, confusion and critical thinking, we suggest that students with less constructivist epistemic beliefs may benefit from learning materials that trigger mild confusion, but without giving way to frustration. To this end, D’Mello and Graesser (2012) suggest pedagogical practices where misconceptions are exposed, where complexity is embraced, and where less cohesive texts and lectures replace the polished deliveries of textbooks and formal lectures. However, to avoid confusion turning into frustration or disengagement ( D’Mello and Graesser, 2012 ; Munzar et al., 2021 ), teachers should support the development of students’ critical thinking skills and resolution strategies by scaffolding and modeling these abilities ( Muis and Duffy, 2013 ; Di Leo and Muis, 2020 ), so that students become able to productively engage with confusion-inducing materials, to the benefit of deep and critical thinking.

Finally, it is also important to note that all students could benefit from being taught how to write argumentative essays; the task we used to capture the output dimension of critical thinking ( Kuhn, 2018 ). As previous research has shown, undergraduate and graduate students typically perform below the expected level for argumentative essay writing tasks ( Kellogg and Whiteford, 2009 ). Our sample was no different, with an average of just over 53%. Clearly, beyond focusing on epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions in the classroom, students could benefit from direct instruction on argumentative writing. One method that has been effective in improving students’ argumentative essay writing is via scaffolding through adaptive fading ( Noroozi et al., 2018 ), and worked examples and peer feedback ( Latifi et al., 2019 ; Noroozi and Hatami, 2019 ; Valero Haro et al., 2019 ). Indeed, as Muis (2007) argued, it may be the case the teaching students these skills may also help to improve their epistemic cognition. Of course, one could also argue that we measured only one key dimension of critical thinking. Future research should also measure the inquiry dimension of critical thinking to assess whether results from our study replicate. Importantly, relations between constructs may differ depending on how critical thinking is measured. We address limitations next.

Limitations and Future Directions

Several concerns may limit the results presented herein. First, the analysis used correlational associations of the study variables over time but did not experimentally manipulate the predictor variables. As such, future research should complement the approach used here with experimental studies. However, this may be easier to do with emotions, which can to some extent be manipulated experimentally, than with more stable epistemic beliefs. A second limitation concerns the rubric employed to capture critical thinking in essays. Specifically, we opted for a quantitative approach to coding critical thinking by attributing one point for the presence of each component of critical thinking. However, a weighted coding scheme or a holistic rubric are two other modes of critical thinking assessment that include qualitative elements of analysis that could have yielded different results. Third, epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions were measured via self-report, which also have inherent limitations (see, for example, DeBacker et al., 2008 ). Therefore, future research is needed to replicate the findings presented here using alternative methods, which we delineate below.

The current findings have important implications for future research on epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions. Specifically, to fully understand how epistemic cognition supports critical thinking, future research should explore the role that other facets of epistemic cognition play in mediating this relationship. For instance, how do individuals’ knowledge of epistemic strategies shape critical thinking, and do these abilities influence the arousal of epistemic emotions in the face of complex and conflicting information? And how might epistemic aims moderate these relations? Prior work has shown that these other epistemic facets play a significant role in epistemic emotion arousal and researchers have called for more research on epistemic cognition that conceptualize and operationalize the construct beyond the sole notion of epistemic beliefs ( Greene et al., 2016 ).

Lastly, in light of the findings revealed herein, we contend that one important avenue for future work will be to investigate how different intensities of positive, neutral, and negative epistemic emotions influence information processing and critical thinking. To this end, we believe that the self-report measurement of epistemic cognition and emotions can be complemented by and triangulated with trace data collected by think-aloud or emote-aloud protocols (e.g., Craig et al., 2008 ; Di Leo and Muis, 2020 ), physiological measures of emotions such as analysis of facial expression, electrocardiograms, and galvanic skin responses ( Azevedo et al., 2013 ; D’Mello et al., 2014 ), and qualitative work. In sum, by broadening conceptual horizons and employing advanced methodologies, we believe that future research will provide a rich portrait of the ways in which epistemic cognition and epistemic emotions support critical thinking.

Data Availability Statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

Ethics Statement

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by McGill University Research Ethics Board. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author Contributions

KM developed the larger program of study, designed the materials and research questions, cleaned and analyzed the data, and wrote the manuscript. MC helped develop the research questions, collected the data, cleaned the data, developed the coding scheme for the essays, coded the essays, analyzed the data, and wrote the manuscript. CD helped collect the data, coded the essays, and helped in writing the manuscript. KL helped collect the data and wrote the manuscript. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

Funding for this work was provided by a grant to KM from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (435-2014-0155), and from the Canada Research Chair program. Correspondence concerning this article can be addressed to KM, Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology, Faculty of Education, McGill University, 3,700 McTavish Street, Montreal, QC, H3A 1Y2, or via email at [email protected] .

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

• ^ Feelings can be emotional or non-emotional. Non-emotional feelings include physiologically derived feelings like pain, hunger, or thirst, as well as cognitive and metacognitive feelings such as judgments of knowing or learning. Emotions compose feelings but also include other components as noted in the definition.

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Keywords : epistemic cognition, epistemic emotions, critical thinking, argumentation, socio-scientific issues

Citation: Muis KR, Chevrier M, Denton CA and Losenno KM (2021) Epistemic Emotions and Epistemic Cognition Predict Critical Thinking About Socio-Scientific Issues. Front. Educ. 6:669908. doi: 10.3389/feduc.2021.669908

Received: 19 February 2021; Accepted: 25 March 2021; Published: 14 April 2021.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2021 Muis, Chevrier, Denton and Losenno. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Krista R. Muis, [email protected]

Educating Critical Thinkers: The Role of Epistemic Cognition

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Title: Educating Critical Thinkers: The Role of Epistemic Cognition Authors: Jeffrey A. Greene, Seung B. Yu

Proliferating information and viewpoints in the 21st century require an educated citizenry with the ability to think critically about complex, controversial issues. Critical thinking requires epistemic cognition: the ability to construct, evaluate, and use knowledge. Epistemic dispositions and beliefs predict many academic outcomes, as well as whether people use their epistemic cognition skills, for example, scrutinizing methods in science and evaluating sources in history. The evidence supporting the importance of epistemic cognition, inside and outside of the classroom, has led to a growing body of intervention research. However, more research can reveal how to best position teachers and students to develop and enact productive epistemic cognition. Promising directions for future research and policy include developing learning environments that promote students’ epistemic cognition and subsequent critical thinking, as well as incorporating this work into educator preparation programs.

Greene, J. A., & Yu, S. B., (2016). Educating critical thinkers: The role of epistemic cognition. Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(1), 45-53.

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• v.7(12); 2021 Dec

Psychology students' attitudes towards research: the role of critical thinking, epistemic orientation, and satisfaction with research courses

Miguel landa-blanco.

a Universidad Internacional Iberoamericana, Mexico

b Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Honduras

Antonio Cortés-Ramos

c Universidad de Málaga, Spain

Associated Data

Data will be made available on request.

The current study aimed to determine how attitudes towards research are related to epistemic orientation, critical thinking, and satisfaction with research courses in psychology university students. Control variables included respondents' gender, current academic degree (undergraduate or postgraduate), number of research methods courses completed, number of research projects completed, and academic score. A quantitative, cross-sectional design was used, with a non-probabilistic sample size of 137 students. Correlational findings suggest that students with high scores in critical thinking domains and empiric and rational dispositions, tend to achieve higher academic grades. Rationality and reflexive skepticism were related to the number of research projects completed by the student. While an intuitive disposition is inversely related to academic scores and the number of research courses completed. Results from a hierarchical linear regression model suggest that attitudes towards research are significantly and positively affected by students' satisfaction with research courses, empiric epistemic orientation, and critical openness. On the other hand, an intuitive epistemic orientation has significant detrimental effects on attitudes towards research. Rational epistemic orientation and skeptic reflexiveness yielded non-significant coefficients. Overall, the model containing all independent variables accounted for 47.4% of the variance in attitudinal scores; this constitutes a large effect size. Results are discussed in light of previous research and their implications for the teaching of psychology in higher education.

Scientific attitudes, Critical thinking, Epistemology, Student research.

1. Introduction

Attitudes are defined as a cognitive preference and behavioral predisposition towards an object, thus resulting in a favorable or unfavorable evaluation regarding a specific stimulus ( Eagly and Chaiken, 1993 ). Attitudes play an important role in predicting behavior ( Glasman and Albarracín, 2006 ), and consequently are a recurrent topic in educational and psychological studies. The present article will focus specifically on psychology students' attitudes towards research.

Research skills play an important role in higher education ( Lambie et al., 2014 ) and the psychological sciences ( Veilleux and Chapman, 2017 ). In higher education, specific competencies within psychology include the epistemic comprehension of science, critical scientific thinking, as well as the capability to design, execute and understand research ( American Psychological Association, 2011 ). However, on many occasions, psychology students dislike research methods courses ( Ciarocco et al., 2012 ). This might be due to the fact that students perceived disconnection between research courses content and its applicability to their professional field. A semantic analysis found that university students tend to consider psychology as a science, but less than natural sciences. Moreover, the term "psychology" and "science" were semantically linked by concepts related to research ( Richardson and Lacroix, 2021 ). Additionally, undergraduate psychology students tend to be more interested in practitioner activities than in scientific/research activities ( Holmes, 2014 ).

Students report several factors that dissuade them from doing research; these include considering that research activities are time-consuming, difficulties associated with the lack of mentorship and funding ( AlGhamdi et al., 2014 ; Siemens et al., 2010 ). Instructors of research methods classes often report that students have negative attitudes and disinterest in such courses ( Gurung and Stoa, 2020 ). In part, attitudes towards research can be explained by variables such as research anxiety, the perceived importance and usefulness students attribute to research, and believing that research has an unbiased nature ( Gredig and Bartelsen-Raemy, 2018 ). In this last regard, it is important to consider students' epistemic orientation.

Epistemic orientation refers to the individuals' preferences on how to gain and use knowledge ( Silva Palma et al., 2018 ). One taxonomy of epistemic orientations identifies three main preferences ( Royce, 1975 ; Silva Palma et al., 2018 ; Wilkinson and Migotsky, 1994 ): intuitive, rational, and empirical. The intuitive orientation assumes that knowledge is subjective and might be attained through metaphors and symbolisms. On the other hand, a rational orientation uses logic to evaluate arguments as true or false. An empiric orientation assumes that knowledge can only be attained through structured observations and experimentation. Science is greatly based on a combination of rational and empiric orientations.

Critical thinking is the process in which a person elaborates conclusions based on evidence ( Wallmann and Hoover, 2012 ), focusing on argumentation and reasoning. This requires synthetic, introspective skills, skepticism, openness to new arguments or evidence, evaluating different options and their ramifications, dialogical thinking, self-questioning, self-monitoring, self-criticism ( Garrett and Cutting, 2017 ; Reznitskaya and Sternberg, 2012 ; Sosu, 2013 ; Sternberg, 1987 ). Critical thinking is an essential element of scientific thinking ( Shargel and Twiss, 2019 ), and an essential skill in the academic formation of psychologists. Consequently, students are, ideally, trained to admit the role of randomness, evaluate the methodological quality of arguments, understand the differences between correlation and causality, acknowledge the complex and multicausal nature of events, and understand the importance of falsification ( Lawson, 1999 ; Lawson et al., 2015 ). Therefore it is evident that there is a link between critical thinking and research within the psychological sciences ( Meltzoff and Cooper, 2018 ).

Recent studies have found that research and statistics courses may enhance students' knowledge of the topic without increasing their interest ( Sizemore and Lewandowski, 2009 ). Specifically, teachers play an important role in developing students' research competencies, including its attitudinal component ( Udompong et al., 2014 ). Students' satisfaction with university courses is related to teaching quality and expertise ( Green et al., 2015 ). As such, it is vital to determine the role satisfaction with research courses plays in students' attitudes towards research.

The National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH) offers psychology programs in undergraduate (BA) and postgraduate (master's) degrees. The undergraduate program consists of 45 courses, of which 4 are mandatory-sequential Research Methods classes ( UNAH, 2019 ). By the end of the degree, students are expected to be competent in elaborating research proposals, literature reviews, the basic design of quantitative and qualitative instruments, applying descriptive and basic inferential statistics, and writing technical reports. On the other hand, the postgraduate degree has 18 compulsory courses, of which 4 are mandatory research classes ( UNAH, 2021 ). Their content is thesis-oriented, as it is a graduation requirement for the postgraduate programs of the UNAH.

Considering this, the purpose of our exploratory study was to test the following hypothesis: attitudes towards research are related to epistemic orientation, critical thinking, and satisfaction with research courses in psychology university students of Honduras. This while controlling for respondents' gender, current academic degree (undergraduate or postgraduate), number of research methods courses completed, number of research projects completed, and academic score.

2.1. Participants

The current study included students in the final year of their bachelor's degree, and students enrolled in a master's degree psychology program at a public university in Honduras. The sample was collected online through a non-probabilistic approach using volunteer and snowball sampling. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all university courses are held exclusively online. Considering this, invitations to participate in the study were sent via email to all 603 undergraduate students coursing final year classes and internships. Similarly, emails invitations were sent to all 62 masters' degree students. However, due to low response rates, students who completed the survey were also asked to send the email invitation to fellow students.

This resulted in a final sample size of 137 participants, of which 75.91% ( n = 104) were undergraduate students, accounting for 17.24% of the population of undergraduate students. On the other hand, 24.09% ( n = 33) were enrolled in a master's degree, representing 53.22% of the postgraduate population. Most respondents ( n = 113; 82.48%) were female, while male students only accounted for 17.52% of the total sample ( n = 24). The gender distribution in the sample is coherent with the population's demographic characteristics, in which 76.24% are female students, and 23.76% are male ( National Autonomous University of Honduras, 2021 ).

The mean academic score was 83.75% ( SD = 7.11); this represents the weighted average from all academic courses completed by the students. Students had completed an average of 5.08 research courses ( SD = 1.96) and participated in an average of 4.18 research projects ( SD = 2.86). The overall age of the respondents was 28.20 years ( SD = 7.61). Specifically, undergraduate students had a mean age of 26 years ( SD = 5.46), while master's degree students had a mean age of 35.12 years ( SD = 9.23).

2.2. Variables and measures

2.2.1. attitudes towards research.

Data was collected using the Attitudes Towards Research Scale-Revised (EACIN-R) ( Aldana de Becerra et al., 2020 ), a revised version of the original EACIN ( Aldana de Becerra et al., 2016 ). It consists of 28 items, with a five-point Likert-type response set, with scores varying from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), with higher scores indicating more favorable attitudes towards research. Some items included in the EACIN-R are: "All professionals should know how to do research", "I do not believe research should be taught at universities" and "I am interested in doing research activities". As measured by Cronbach's Alpha, the internal consistency for this sample was 0.89, 95% CI [0.86; 0.91].

2.2.2. Epistemic orientation

The Epistemic Orientation Short Scale (EOSS) consists of 11 items with a five-point Likert-type response set, with scores varying from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), with higher scores indicating a more prevalent epistemic orientation. The EOSS measures the following subscales: rationalism ( α = 0.71), intuitivism ( α = 0.77), and empiricism ( α = 0.72) ( Silva Palma et al., 2018 ). The current study determined the internal consistency coefficients for each dimension: rationalism, α = 0.83, 95% CI [0.78; 0.87]; intuitivism, α = 0.65, 95% CI [0.54; 0.73]; empiricism α = 0.64, 95% CI [0.52; 0.73]. Some items from the EOSS include: "My opinions are commonly based on feelings and intuitions" (intuitivism), "I tend to make decisions based on reasons I can clearly explain" (rationalism), and "I tend to make decisions based on my experiences and practical situations" (empiricism).

2.2.3. Critical thinking

The Critical Thinking Disposition Scale (CTDS) is an 11-item instrument with a five-point Likert-type response set, with scores varying from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), with higher scores indicating higher self-reported critical thinking disposition. The CTDS has a bi-dimensional structure consisting of two factors: critical openness and reflective skepticism. Previous research reported an overall Cronbach's alpha of 0.81 ( Sosu, 2013 ), similar to the one found in the current study, α = 0.86, 95% CI [0.82; 0.89]. Some items included in the CTDS are: "I sometimes find a good argument that challenges some of my firmly held beliefs" (Critical Openness) and "I usually check the credibility of the source of information before making judgments" (reflective skepticism).

2.2.4. Satisfaction with University Research Courses

The authors of the current study elaborated the Satisfaction with University Research Courses Scale (SURCS). Items were built by the authors and later sent to three Research Methods university professors who revised the wording and validity of every item. The experts rated each question on a 5-point scale according to their importance, pertinence, and wording; items with low scores were rephrased according to the experts' opinions. The final version of the SURCS consists of 12 Likert-type items with a five-point response set, with scores varying from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) . Higher scores indicate higher satisfaction with research university courses. The items reflects course content-related satisfaction, teacher satisfaction, perceived importance of the Research Methods courses, and personal satisfaction with such courses.

The instrument had an overall internal reliability of 0.91, 95% CI [0.89; 0.93], the average inter-item correlation was of 0.48, 95% CI [0.41; 0.54], Table 1 details the reliability for each item included in the SRUCS. Some of the items included in the SURCS are: "I enjoyed taking the Research Methods courses", "I believe my teachers of Research Methods courses had plenty experience as researchers", "I believe the content of the Research Methods courses is relevant".

Table 1

Item reliability for the satisfaction with University Research Courses Scale.

Note. Item 5 was inversely recoded.

2.2.5. Demographic and educational questionnaire

Additional demographic and educational data were collected through a questionnaire that gathered information regarding respondents' gender (0 = male, 1 = female), age, current academic degree (0 = undergraduate, 1 = postgraduate), number of research methods courses completed, number of research projects completed, and self-reported academic grade. On this last point, students were asked to enter the academic grade as reported in their official university online certification. The academic grade is a score that ranges between 0 and 100.

2.3. Data analysis

Items were averaged to determine the total for each scale. An exploratory correlational analysis, using Pearson's r , was used to assess inter-variable dynamics. Comparisons between undergraduate and postgraduate students were made by using Student's t-test, a power analysis with its corresponding confidence intervals was also made. Later, a hierarchical linear regression model was used to explain the scores students achieved at the Attitudes Towards Research Scale-Revised (EACIN-R). The independent variables tested included: EOSS-rational, EOSS-intuitive, EOSS-empiric, CTDS-critical openness, CTDS-reflexive skepticism, and satisfaction with research courses. This while controlling for: gender, current academic degree, number of research methods courses completed, number of research projects completed, and academic grade. A post-hoc analysis was used to determine the achieved power of the regression model. An α = 0.05 was used as a significance threshold. Participants were required to answer all items; therefore, no missing data were included in the study. All statistical analyses were made using JASP ( JASP Team, 2020 ).

2.4. Ethical considerations

The study design and execution were approved by the Ethical Committee of the Universidad Internacional Iberoamericana (UNINI), under certificate N˚ CE-025. All potential participants were presented with an Informed Consent form that included the study's purpose, confidentiality agreement, voluntary participation clause, data management, etc. Agreeing to the Informed Consent was required to allow students to participate in the study.

Results indicate that students had an average score of 3.87 ( SD = 0.50) in the Attitudes Towards Research Scale-Revised. The mean of the Satisfaction with Research University Courses Scale was 4.04 ( SD = 0.71). The most prevalent epistemic orientation was the EOSS-Empiric disposition ( M = 4.09; SD = 0.65), followed by EOSS-Rational ( M = 3.87; SD = 0.73), and EOSS-Intuitive as less prevalent disposition ( M = 3.40; SD = 0.75). Regarding critical thinking, CTDS-Reflexive-Skepticism scores ( M = 4.31; SD = 0.69) were higher than CTDS-Critical Openness ( M = 4.19; SD = 0.54).

Satisfaction with research courses and attitudes towards research were significantly higher for postgraduate students than for undergraduate respondents. Such differences are not only statistically significant ( p < 0.01), but also achieve medium effect sizes ( d = -0.64). Empiric and rational epistemic orientations are similarly scored by undergraduate and postgraduate students ( p > .05); however, intuitive orientation is significantly lower for postgraduate respondents ( p = 0.04). Critical thinking disposition subscales do not vary significantly between undergraduate and postgraduate students ( p > .05). Table 2 provides a detailed description of mean differences, significance, and effect size.

Table 2

Score comparisons between undergraduate and postgraduate students.

Note. df = 135.

A relational analysis determined that academic score is significantly and positively correlated ( p < 0.05) with CTDS-Critical Openness, CTDS Reflexive Skepticism, EOSS-Empiric, EOSS-Rational, satisfaction with research courses, and attitudes towards research. On the other hand, EOSS-Intuitive is inversely related to academic scores and the number of research courses completed. The number of research projects completed was significantly and positively associated with CTDS-Reflexive Skepticism, EOSS-Rational, satisfaction with research courses, and attitudes towards research. Additionally, both rational and empiric orientations correlate positively with critical thinking domains. Attitudes towards research also have positive relationships with EOSS-Rational and EOSS Empiric, but are inversely related with EOSS-Intuitive, see Table 3 .

Table 3

Correlational analysis between educational variables, critical thinking, and epistemic orientation.

Note. Correlation coefficients were calculated through Pearson's r . Significant p -values (<0.05) are presented in bold letters.

Furthermore, a hierarchical regression model was used to determine how attitudes towards research are explained by critical thinking, epistemic orientation, and satisfaction with research courses. The base model, containing control variables, had an r 2 of .197, F (5, 131) = 6.411, p < .001. The final model, containing all independent variables, had an r 2 of .474, F (11, 125) = 10.229, p < 0.001, this constitutes a large effect size ( Cohen, 1992 ), f 2 = .901, with a high power >0.99. The changes between the base and final model are statistically significant, r 2 Δ = .277, FΔ = 3.818, p < 0.001.

While controlling for the academic degree, number of research courses completed, number of completed research projects, academic grade and gender, the following independent variables had a significant effect on attitudes towards research: satisfaction with research courses ( β = 0.256, p = 0.001), empiric epistemic orientation ( β = 0.254, p = 0.003), intuitive epistemic orientation ( β = -0.149, p = 0.039) and critical openness ( β = 0.197, p = 0.049). Rational epistemic orientation ( β = 088, p = 0.32) and skeptic reflexiveness ( β = -0.043, p = 0.665) yielded non-significant coefficients ( p > 0.05), see Table 4 .

Table 4

Regression model explaining students' attitudes towards research.

Note. Significant p -values (<0.05) are presented in bold letters. All Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) scores range from 1.09 to 2.35, indicating no collinearity issues.

4. Discussion

The current research provides evidence that suggests that attitudes towards research are positively and significantly affected by students' satisfaction with research courses, empiric epistemic orientation, and critical openness. On the other hand, an intuitive epistemic orientation has significant detrimental effects on attitudes towards research. Students with high scores in critical thinking domains and empiric and rational dispositions, tend to achieve higher academic grades. Rationality and reflexive skepticism were related to the number of research projects completed by the student. While an intuitive disposition is inversely related to academic scores and the number of research courses completed.

Considering this, our study indicates that students' attitudes towards research could improve by reinforcing the quality of research methods courses, promoting empirical epistemic values and critical openness. On the first topic, knowledge of research methods is a premise of scientific thinking; therefore, effective research training should promote scientific thinking skills while considering students' epistemic beliefs ( Murtonen and Salmento, 2019 ). Teaching students how to evaluate the credibility and validity of information sources is a key component to promote critical thinking ( Carlson, 1995 ). Teachers should also promote inquiry-based activities in their classes; these include: students creating and answering their own questions, reciprocal peer questioning and, including questions that require holistic-integrative responses ( King, 1995 ). Such methods should enhance critical thinking and rational epistemic orientation.

Defining questions and hypotheses, critical thinking, and epistemic understanding are vital to overcoming intuitive-based decisions and non-scientific beliefs, leading to an evidence-based approach to problem-solving ( Murtonen and Salmento, 2019 ). An empiric epistemic orientation has significant effects on attitude towards research. Empiricism is highly driven by observational and experimental reports ( American Psychological Association, 2020 ), and is an essential pillar of scientific research.

Our study provides evidence that an intuitive epistemic orientation has detrimental effects on students' attitudes towards scientific research. This finding is coherent with previous research made in a sample of psychotherapists, in which intuitive thinking was related to negative attitudes towards research, as well as more resistance to adopting evidence-based treatments in their professional practice. Psychotherapists with higher intuitive thinking were more willing to endorse alternative therapies and misconceptions about health ( Gaudiano et al., 2011 ).

Likewise, critical openness was found to be a significant predictor of students' attitudes towards research. Considering that critical openness refers to the willingness to explore new or alternative arguments ( Sosu, 2013 ), it is logical that such openness was a significant predictor of students' attitudes towards research. In this sense, prior research has determined that scientists, in contrast to non-scientists, report significantly higher scores on openness ( Sato, 2016 ). Contemplating and evaluating new or alternative arguments is a key component to promote scientific development, and as such, these skills should be promoted in higher education settings. Teachers play an important part in enhancing students' critical thinking skills, playing a facilitator role, emphasizing the analytical process related to decision making, promoting discussion among peers, autonomous learning, and dialogical thinking ( Reznitskaya and Sternberg, 2012 ; Sternberg, 1987 ).

Our findings indicate that the number of research courses completed by the students does not influence their attitudes towards research. This finding is coherent with Sizemore and Lewandowsk (2009) , who concluded that completing research and statistics courses may enhance students' knowledge on the topic, without necessarily increasing their interest. Therefore, to better understand students' attitudes towards research, the focus should not reside on the number of research courses completed by the students, but rather on their satisfaction with such classes.

Satisfaction with research courses plays an important role in developing students' attitudes towards research. Thus, such courses should be taught by teachers highly trained in research and teaching skills, with updated, relevant, and applicable content that captures students' interest in research methods. This suggestion is in line with previous research, which identifies that teaching quality and expertise promote students' satisfaction with research courses ( Green et al., 2015 ). In this sense, teacher engagement has significant effects on student engagement ( Cardwell, 2011 ).

Overall, teachers should explicitly state and evidence the relationship between scientific thinking and research skills, as well as their application beyond academic activities. Students should also have clarity about the research process and what is expected of them as researchers. In this sense, quality feedback, adequate mentorship, peer support, and collaborative learning may enhance favorable attitudes towards the research process ( Balloo, 2019 ).

Future studies should consider using qualitative and mixed methods designs to understand students' epistemic beliefs better, further exploring the meaning of psychology as a science. On the other hand, additional studies could specifically focus on postgraduate students and their attitudes and experiences on research activities, such as thesis writing.

The present study is not without limitations. The non-probabilistic selection process and the limited sample size may restrict the representativeness of the results. The nature of the epistemic, scientific, and attitudinal variables also possess an issue because it requires the respondents to have acquired a certain level of epistemic maturity ( Murtonen and Salmento, 2019 ). Such awareness and metacognitive capabilities might not be adequately developed in all students. Additionally, the relatively low reliability of the EOSS subscales of Intuitivism ( α = 0.65) and Empiricism ( α = 0.64) is a limitation to consider when interpreting our research results. Future studies should also investigate further the psychometric properties of the SURCS. Finally, high scores in the EACIN-R indicate favorable attitudes towards research, and low scores indicate unfavorable attitudes. However, the EACIN-R lacks a system to categorize attitudinal scores through cut-off values ( Aldana de Becerra et al., 2020 ). In this sense, more research is yet needed to further validate the scale in university populations.

Declarations

Author contribution statement.

Miguel Landa-Blanco and Antonio Cortés-Ramos: Conceived and designed the experiments; Performed the experiments; Analyzed and interpreted the data; Contributed reagents, materials, analysis tools or data; Wrote the paper.

Funding statement

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Data availability statement

Declaration of interests statement.

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Additional information

No additional information is available for this paper.

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7 Critical Thinking and the Intellectual Virtues

• Published: September 2017
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In this chapter I address four (clusters of) questions: (1) Are the dispositions, habits of mind, and character traits constitutive of the “critical spirit” rightly conceived as intellectual virtues? What is gained and/or lost by so conceiving them? (2) Do the intellectual virtues include abilities as well as dispositions, or should we maintain the distinction, embraced by many accounts of critical thinking, between abilities of reason assessment and the critical spirit? (3) Should we be externalists/reliabilists or responsibilists with respect to the intellectual virtues? (4) What is the connection between virtue and reason ? Is a virtuous intellect eo ipso a rational one? I will argue that a virtuous intellect is not necessarily a rational one, and that in addition to the intellectual virtues, rational abilities—those captured by the reason assessment component of critical thinking—are required.

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A Crash Course in Critical Thinking

What you need to know—and read—about one of the essential skills needed today..

Posted April 8, 2024 | Reviewed by Michelle Quirk

• In research for "A More Beautiful Question," I did a deep dive into the current crisis in critical thinking.
• Many people may think of themselves as critical thinkers, but they actually are not.
• Here is a series of questions you can ask yourself to try to ensure that you are thinking critically.

Conspiracy theories. Inability to distinguish facts from falsehoods. Widespread confusion about who and what to believe.

These are some of the hallmarks of the current crisis in critical thinking—which just might be the issue of our times. Because if people aren’t willing or able to think critically as they choose potential leaders, they’re apt to choose bad ones. And if they can’t judge whether the information they’re receiving is sound, they may follow faulty advice while ignoring recommendations that are science-based and solid (and perhaps life-saving).

Moreover, as a society, if we can’t think critically about the many serious challenges we face, it becomes more difficult to agree on what those challenges are—much less solve them.

On a personal level, critical thinking can enable you to make better everyday decisions. It can help you make sense of an increasingly complex and confusing world.

In the new expanded edition of my book A More Beautiful Question ( AMBQ ), I took a deep dive into critical thinking. Here are a few key things I learned.

First off, before you can get better at critical thinking, you should understand what it is. It’s not just about being a skeptic. When thinking critically, we are thoughtfully reasoning, evaluating, and making decisions based on evidence and logic. And—perhaps most important—while doing this, a critical thinker always strives to be open-minded and fair-minded . That’s not easy: It demands that you constantly question your assumptions and biases and that you always remain open to considering opposing views.

In today’s polarized environment, many people think of themselves as critical thinkers simply because they ask skeptical questions—often directed at, say, certain government policies or ideas espoused by those on the “other side” of the political divide. The problem is, they may not be asking these questions with an open mind or a willingness to fairly consider opposing views.

When people do this, they’re engaging in “weak-sense critical thinking”—a term popularized by the late Richard Paul, a co-founder of The Foundation for Critical Thinking . “Weak-sense critical thinking” means applying the tools and practices of critical thinking—questioning, investigating, evaluating—but with the sole purpose of confirming one’s own bias or serving an agenda.

In AMBQ , I lay out a series of questions you can ask yourself to try to ensure that you’re thinking critically. Here are some of the questions to consider:

• Why do I believe what I believe?
• Are my views based on evidence?
• Have I fairly and thoughtfully considered differing viewpoints?
• Am I truly open to changing my mind?

Of course, becoming a better critical thinker is not as simple as just asking yourself a few questions. Critical thinking is a habit of mind that must be developed and strengthened over time. In effect, you must train yourself to think in a manner that is more effortful, aware, grounded, and balanced.

For those interested in giving themselves a crash course in critical thinking—something I did myself, as I was working on my book—I thought it might be helpful to share a list of some of the books that have shaped my own thinking on this subject. As a self-interested author, I naturally would suggest that you start with the new 10th-anniversary edition of A More Beautiful Question , but beyond that, here are the top eight critical-thinking books I’d recommend.

The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark , by Carl Sagan

This book simply must top the list, because the late scientist and author Carl Sagan continues to be such a bright shining light in the critical thinking universe. Chapter 12 includes the details on Sagan’s famous “baloney detection kit,” a collection of lessons and tips on how to deal with bogus arguments and logical fallacies.

Clear Thinking: Turning Ordinary Moments Into Extraordinary Results , by Shane Parrish

The creator of the Farnham Street website and host of the “Knowledge Project” podcast explains how to contend with biases and unconscious reactions so you can make better everyday decisions. It contains insights from many of the brilliant thinkers Shane has studied.

Good Thinking: Why Flawed Logic Puts Us All at Risk and How Critical Thinking Can Save the World , by David Robert Grimes

A brilliant, comprehensive 2021 book on critical thinking that, to my mind, hasn’t received nearly enough attention . The scientist Grimes dissects bad thinking, shows why it persists, and offers the tools to defeat it.

Think Again: The Power of Knowing What You Don't Know , by Adam Grant

Intellectual humility—being willing to admit that you might be wrong—is what this book is primarily about. But Adam, the renowned Wharton psychology professor and bestselling author, takes the reader on a mind-opening journey with colorful stories and characters.

Think Like a Detective: A Kid's Guide to Critical Thinking , by David Pakman

The popular YouTuber and podcast host Pakman—normally known for talking politics —has written a terrific primer on critical thinking for children. The illustrated book presents critical thinking as a “superpower” that enables kids to unlock mysteries and dig for truth. (I also recommend Pakman’s second kids’ book called Think Like a Scientist .)

Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters , by Steven Pinker

The Harvard psychology professor Pinker tackles conspiracy theories head-on but also explores concepts involving risk/reward, probability and randomness, and correlation/causation. And if that strikes you as daunting, be assured that Pinker makes it lively and accessible.

How Minds Change: The Surprising Science of Belief, Opinion and Persuasion , by David McRaney

David is a science writer who hosts the popular podcast “You Are Not So Smart” (and his ideas are featured in A More Beautiful Question ). His well-written book looks at ways you can actually get through to people who see the world very differently than you (hint: bludgeoning them with facts definitely won’t work).

A Healthy Democracy's Best Hope: Building the Critical Thinking Habit , by M Neil Browne and Chelsea Kulhanek

Neil Browne, author of the seminal Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking, has been a pioneer in presenting critical thinking as a question-based approach to making sense of the world around us. His newest book, co-authored with Chelsea Kulhanek, breaks down critical thinking into “11 explosive questions”—including the “priors question” (which challenges us to question assumptions), the “evidence question” (focusing on how to evaluate and weigh evidence), and the “humility question” (which reminds us that a critical thinker must be humble enough to consider the possibility of being wrong).

Warren Berger is a longtime journalist and author of A More Beautiful Question .

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Epistemic Beliefs as a Means of Understanding Critical Thinking in a Socioscientific Environmental Debate

• First Online: 28 February 2022

Cite this chapter

• Kévin De Checchi 20 ,
• Gabriel Pallarès 20 ,
• Valérie Tartas 21 &
• Manuel Bächtold 20  

Part of the book series: Contributions from Biology Education Research ((CBER))

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Environmental and sustainability issues are of decisive importance for our society. As future citizens, students need to be able to take part in an informed way in debates on environmental socioscientific issues (SSIs) and to think and argue critically. Developing students’ critical thinking (CT) about science and its links to societal issues has thus become a major challenge (Hazelkorn et al., 2015). Environmental SSIs are complex (Morin et al., 2017), as students need to combine knowledge from different disciplines with values and other people’s opinions, in order to adopt an enlightened position and engage in critical argumentation. Learners also need to deal with knowledge uncertainties (Kampourakis, 2018), as these are a distinctive feature of SSIs. Lastly, students need to be aware of the openness of these issues: there are numerous reasonable answers to an SSI, none of them is self-evident and all must be argued (Oulton et al., 2004).

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Kévin De Checchi, Gabriel Pallarès & Manuel Bächtold

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Valérie Tartas

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Appendix: Questions of the Interview Guide

Q1: What do you think about the statement? Do you agree?

Q2: Would you say your opinion about this subject is certain?

Q3: Who might have the best opinion on this?

Q4: How can we obtain the best opinion/least bad opinion?

Q5: What are the differences and similarities between an opinion and knowledge? What is knowledge?

Q6: Is knowledge certain or uncertain?

Q7: In comparison, is an opinion certain or uncertain?

Q8: Does knowledge change over time?

Q9: Does an opinion change over time?

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De Checchi, K., Pallarès, G., Tartas, V., Bächtold, M. (2022). Epistemic Beliefs as a Means of Understanding Critical Thinking in a Socioscientific Environmental Debate. In: Puig, B., Jiménez-Aleixandre, M.P. (eds) Critical Thinking in Biology and Environmental Education. Contributions from Biology Education Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92006-7_13

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