scientific method summary essay

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Scientific Method

Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science (see also the entry on science and pseudo-science ). Others have questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Some reject privileging one view of method as part of rejecting broader views about the nature of science, such as naturalism (Dupré 2004); some reject any restriction in principle (pluralism).

Scientific method should be distinguished from the aims and products of science, such as knowledge, predictions, or control. Methods are the means by which those goals are achieved. Scientific method should also be distinguished from meta-methodology, which includes the values and justifications behind a particular characterization of scientific method (i.e., a methodology) — values such as objectivity, reproducibility, simplicity, or past successes. Methodological rules are proposed to govern method and it is a meta-methodological question whether methods obeying those rules satisfy given values. Finally, method is distinct, to some degree, from the detailed and contextual practices through which methods are implemented. The latter might range over: specific laboratory techniques; mathematical formalisms or other specialized languages used in descriptions and reasoning; technological or other material means; ways of communicating and sharing results, whether with other scientists or with the public at large; or the conventions, habits, enforced customs, and institutional controls over how and what science is carried out.

While it is important to recognize these distinctions, their boundaries are fuzzy. Hence, accounts of method cannot be entirely divorced from their methodological and meta-methodological motivations or justifications, Moreover, each aspect plays a crucial role in identifying methods. Disputes about method have therefore played out at the detail, rule, and meta-rule levels. Changes in beliefs about the certainty or fallibility of scientific knowledge, for instance (which is a meta-methodological consideration of what we can hope for methods to deliver), have meant different emphases on deductive and inductive reasoning, or on the relative importance attached to reasoning over observation (i.e., differences over particular methods.) Beliefs about the role of science in society will affect the place one gives to values in scientific method.

The issue which has shaped debates over scientific method the most in the last half century is the question of how pluralist do we need to be about method? Unificationists continue to hold out for one method essential to science; nihilism is a form of radical pluralism, which considers the effectiveness of any methodological prescription to be so context sensitive as to render it not explanatory on its own. Some middle degree of pluralism regarding the methods embodied in scientific practice seems appropriate. But the details of scientific practice vary with time and place, from institution to institution, across scientists and their subjects of investigation. How significant are the variations for understanding science and its success? How much can method be abstracted from practice? This entry describes some of the attempts to characterize scientific method or methods, as well as arguments for a more context-sensitive approach to methods embedded in actual scientific practices.

1. Overview and organizing themes

2. historical review: aristotle to mill, 3.1 logical constructionism and operationalism, 3.2. h-d as a logic of confirmation, 3.3. popper and falsificationism, 3.4 meta-methodology and the end of method, 4. statistical methods for hypothesis testing, 5.1 creative and exploratory practices.

• 5.2 Computer methods and the ‘new ways’ of doing science

6.1 “The scientific method” in science education and as seen by scientists

6.2 privileged methods and ‘gold standards’, 6.3 scientific method in the court room, 6.4 deviating practices, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

This entry could have been given the title Scientific Methods and gone on to fill volumes, or it could have been extremely short, consisting of a brief summary rejection of the idea that there is any such thing as a unique Scientific Method at all. Both unhappy prospects are due to the fact that scientific activity varies so much across disciplines, times, places, and scientists that any account which manages to unify it all will either consist of overwhelming descriptive detail, or trivial generalizations.

The choice of scope for the present entry is more optimistic, taking a cue from the recent movement in philosophy of science toward a greater attention to practice: to what scientists actually do. This “turn to practice” can be seen as the latest form of studies of methods in science, insofar as it represents an attempt at understanding scientific activity, but through accounts that are neither meant to be universal and unified, nor singular and narrowly descriptive. To some extent, different scientists at different times and places can be said to be using the same method even though, in practice, the details are different.

Whether the context in which methods are carried out is relevant, or to what extent, will depend largely on what one takes the aims of science to be and what one’s own aims are. For most of the history of scientific methodology the assumption has been that the most important output of science is knowledge and so the aim of methodology should be to discover those methods by which scientific knowledge is generated.

Science was seen to embody the most successful form of reasoning (but which form?) to the most certain knowledge claims (but how certain?) on the basis of systematically collected evidence (but what counts as evidence, and should the evidence of the senses take precedence, or rational insight?) Section 2 surveys some of the history, pointing to two major themes. One theme is seeking the right balance between observation and reasoning (and the attendant forms of reasoning which employ them); the other is how certain scientific knowledge is or can be.

Section 3 turns to 20 th century debates on scientific method. In the second half of the 20 th century the epistemic privilege of science faced several challenges and many philosophers of science abandoned the reconstruction of the logic of scientific method. Views changed significantly regarding which functions of science ought to be captured and why. For some, the success of science was better identified with social or cultural features. Historical and sociological turns in the philosophy of science were made, with a demand that greater attention be paid to the non-epistemic aspects of science, such as sociological, institutional, material, and political factors. Even outside of those movements there was an increased specialization in the philosophy of science, with more and more focus on specific fields within science. The combined upshot was very few philosophers arguing any longer for a grand unified methodology of science. Sections 3 and 4 surveys the main positions on scientific method in 20 th century philosophy of science, focusing on where they differ in their preference for confirmation or falsification or for waiving the idea of a special scientific method altogether.

In recent decades, attention has primarily been paid to scientific activities traditionally falling under the rubric of method, such as experimental design and general laboratory practice, the use of statistics, the construction and use of models and diagrams, interdisciplinary collaboration, and science communication. Sections 4–6 attempt to construct a map of the current domains of the study of methods in science.

As these sections illustrate, the question of method is still central to the discourse about science. Scientific method remains a topic for education, for science policy, and for scientists. It arises in the public domain where the demarcation or status of science is at issue. Some philosophers have recently returned, therefore, to the question of what it is that makes science a unique cultural product. This entry will close with some of these recent attempts at discerning and encapsulating the activities by which scientific knowledge is achieved.

Attempting a history of scientific method compounds the vast scope of the topic. This section briefly surveys the background to modern methodological debates. What can be called the classical view goes back to antiquity, and represents a point of departure for later divergences. [ 1 ]

We begin with a point made by Laudan (1968) in his historical survey of scientific method:

Perhaps the most serious inhibition to the emergence of the history of theories of scientific method as a respectable area of study has been the tendency to conflate it with the general history of epistemology, thereby assuming that the narrative categories and classificatory pigeon-holes applied to the latter are also basic to the former. (1968: 5)

To see knowledge about the natural world as falling under knowledge more generally is an understandable conflation. Histories of theories of method would naturally employ the same narrative categories and classificatory pigeon holes. An important theme of the history of epistemology, for example, is the unification of knowledge, a theme reflected in the question of the unification of method in science. Those who have identified differences in kinds of knowledge have often likewise identified different methods for achieving that kind of knowledge (see the entry on the unity of science ).

Different views on what is known, how it is known, and what can be known are connected. Plato distinguished the realms of things into the visible and the intelligible ( The Republic , 510a, in Cooper 1997). Only the latter, the Forms, could be objects of knowledge. The intelligible truths could be known with the certainty of geometry and deductive reasoning. What could be observed of the material world, however, was by definition imperfect and deceptive, not ideal. The Platonic way of knowledge therefore emphasized reasoning as a method, downplaying the importance of observation. Aristotle disagreed, locating the Forms in the natural world as the fundamental principles to be discovered through the inquiry into nature ( Metaphysics Z , in Barnes 1984).

Aristotle is recognized as giving the earliest systematic treatise on the nature of scientific inquiry in the western tradition, one which embraced observation and reasoning about the natural world. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics , Aristotle reflects first on the aims and then the methods of inquiry into nature. A number of features can be found which are still considered by most to be essential to science. For Aristotle, empiricism, careful observation (but passive observation, not controlled experiment), is the starting point. The aim is not merely recording of facts, though. For Aristotle, science ( epistêmê ) is a body of properly arranged knowledge or learning—the empirical facts, but also their ordering and display are of crucial importance. The aims of discovery, ordering, and display of facts partly determine the methods required of successful scientific inquiry. Also determinant is the nature of the knowledge being sought, and the explanatory causes proper to that kind of knowledge (see the discussion of the four causes in the entry on Aristotle on causality ).

In addition to careful observation, then, scientific method requires a logic as a system of reasoning for properly arranging, but also inferring beyond, what is known by observation. Methods of reasoning may include induction, prediction, or analogy, among others. Aristotle’s system (along with his catalogue of fallacious reasoning) was collected under the title the Organon . This title would be echoed in later works on scientific reasoning, such as Novum Organon by Francis Bacon, and Novum Organon Restorum by William Whewell (see below). In Aristotle’s Organon reasoning is divided primarily into two forms, a rough division which persists into modern times. The division, known most commonly today as deductive versus inductive method, appears in other eras and methodologies as analysis/​synthesis, non-ampliative/​ampliative, or even confirmation/​verification. The basic idea is there are two “directions” to proceed in our methods of inquiry: one away from what is observed, to the more fundamental, general, and encompassing principles; the other, from the fundamental and general to instances or implications of principles.

The basic aim and method of inquiry identified here can be seen as a theme running throughout the next two millennia of reflection on the correct way to seek after knowledge: carefully observe nature and then seek rules or principles which explain or predict its operation. The Aristotelian corpus provided the framework for a commentary tradition on scientific method independent of science itself (cosmos versus physics.) During the medieval period, figures such as Albertus Magnus (1206–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292), William of Ockham (1287–1347), Andreas Vesalius (1514–1546), Giacomo Zabarella (1533–1589) all worked to clarify the kind of knowledge obtainable by observation and induction, the source of justification of induction, and best rules for its application. [ 2 ] Many of their contributions we now think of as essential to science (see also Laudan 1968). As Aristotle and Plato had employed a framework of reasoning either “to the forms” or “away from the forms”, medieval thinkers employed directions away from the phenomena or back to the phenomena. In analysis, a phenomena was examined to discover its basic explanatory principles; in synthesis, explanations of a phenomena were constructed from first principles.

During the Scientific Revolution these various strands of argument, experiment, and reason were forged into a dominant epistemic authority. The 16 th –18 th centuries were a period of not only dramatic advance in knowledge about the operation of the natural world—advances in mechanical, medical, biological, political, economic explanations—but also of self-awareness of the revolutionary changes taking place, and intense reflection on the source and legitimation of the method by which the advances were made. The struggle to establish the new authority included methodological moves. The Book of Nature, according to the metaphor of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) or Francis Bacon (1561–1626), was written in the language of mathematics, of geometry and number. This motivated an emphasis on mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important aspects of scientific method. Through figures such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, a neo-Platonic emphasis on the importance of metaphysical reflection on nature behind appearances, particularly regarding the spiritual as a complement to the purely mechanical, remained an important methodological thread of the Scientific Revolution (see the entries on Cambridge platonists ; Boyle ; Henry More ; Galileo ).

In Novum Organum (1620), Bacon was critical of the Aristotelian method for leaping from particulars to universals too quickly. The syllogistic form of reasoning readily mixed those two types of propositions. Bacon aimed at the invention of new arts, principles, and directions. His method would be grounded in methodical collection of observations, coupled with correction of our senses (and particularly, directions for the avoidance of the Idols, as he called them, kinds of systematic errors to which naïve observers are prone.) The community of scientists could then climb, by a careful, gradual and unbroken ascent, to reliable general claims.

Bacon’s method has been criticized as impractical and too inflexible for the practicing scientist. Whewell would later criticize Bacon in his System of Logic for paying too little attention to the practices of scientists. It is hard to find convincing examples of Bacon’s method being put in to practice in the history of science, but there are a few who have been held up as real examples of 16 th century scientific, inductive method, even if not in the rigid Baconian mold: figures such as Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and William Harvey (1578–1657) (see the entry on Bacon ).

It is to Isaac Newton (1642–1727), however, that historians of science and methodologists have paid greatest attention. Given the enormous success of his Principia Mathematica and Opticks , this is understandable. The study of Newton’s method has had two main thrusts: the implicit method of the experiments and reasoning presented in the Opticks, and the explicit methodological rules given as the Rules for Philosophising (the Regulae) in Book III of the Principia . [ 3 ] Newton’s law of gravitation, the linchpin of his new cosmology, broke with explanatory conventions of natural philosophy, first for apparently proposing action at a distance, but more generally for not providing “true”, physical causes. The argument for his System of the World ( Principia , Book III) was based on phenomena, not reasoned first principles. This was viewed (mainly on the continent) as insufficient for proper natural philosophy. The Regulae counter this objection, re-defining the aims of natural philosophy by re-defining the method natural philosophers should follow. (See the entry on Newton’s philosophy .)

To his list of methodological prescriptions should be added Newton’s famous phrase “ hypotheses non fingo ” (commonly translated as “I frame no hypotheses”.) The scientist was not to invent systems but infer explanations from observations, as Bacon had advocated. This would come to be known as inductivism. In the century after Newton, significant clarifications of the Newtonian method were made. Colin Maclaurin (1698–1746), for instance, reconstructed the essential structure of the method as having complementary analysis and synthesis phases, one proceeding away from the phenomena in generalization, the other from the general propositions to derive explanations of new phenomena. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and editors of the Encyclopédie did much to consolidate and popularize Newtonianism, as did Francesco Algarotti (1721–1764). The emphasis was often the same, as much on the character of the scientist as on their process, a character which is still commonly assumed. The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads. It was certainly Voltaire (1694–1778) and du Chatelet (1706–1749) who were most influential in propagating the latter vision of the scientist and their craft, with Newton as hero. Scientific method became a revolutionary force of the Enlightenment. (See also the entries on Newton , Leibniz , Descartes , Boyle , Hume , enlightenment , as well as Shank 2008 for a historical overview.)

Not all 18 th century reflections on scientific method were so celebratory. Famous also are George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) attack on the mathematics of the new science, as well as the over-emphasis of Newtonians on observation; and David Hume’s (1711–1776) undermining of the warrant offered for scientific claims by inductive justification (see the entries on: George Berkeley ; David Hume ; Hume’s Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism ). Hume’s problem of induction motivated Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) to seek new foundations for empirical method, though as an epistemic reconstruction, not as any set of practical guidelines for scientists. Both Hume and Kant influenced the methodological reflections of the next century, such as the debate between Mill and Whewell over the certainty of inductive inferences in science.

The debate between John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and William Whewell (1794–1866) has become the canonical methodological debate of the 19 th century. Although often characterized as a debate between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, the role of the two methods on each side is actually more complex. On the hypothetico-deductive account, scientists work to come up with hypotheses from which true observational consequences can be deduced—hence, hypothetico-deductive. Because Whewell emphasizes both hypotheses and deduction in his account of method, he can be seen as a convenient foil to the inductivism of Mill. However, equally if not more important to Whewell’s portrayal of scientific method is what he calls the “fundamental antithesis”. Knowledge is a product of the objective (what we see in the world around us) and subjective (the contributions of our mind to how we perceive and understand what we experience, which he called the Fundamental Ideas). Both elements are essential according to Whewell, and he was therefore critical of Kant for too much focus on the subjective, and John Locke (1632–1704) and Mill for too much focus on the senses. Whewell’s fundamental ideas can be discipline relative. An idea can be fundamental even if it is necessary for knowledge only within a given scientific discipline (e.g., chemical affinity for chemistry). This distinguishes fundamental ideas from the forms and categories of intuition of Kant. (See the entry on Whewell .)

Clarifying fundamental ideas would therefore be an essential part of scientific method and scientific progress. Whewell called this process “Discoverer’s Induction”. It was induction, following Bacon or Newton, but Whewell sought to revive Bacon’s account by emphasising the role of ideas in the clear and careful formulation of inductive hypotheses. Whewell’s induction is not merely the collecting of objective facts. The subjective plays a role through what Whewell calls the Colligation of Facts, a creative act of the scientist, the invention of a theory. A theory is then confirmed by testing, where more facts are brought under the theory, called the Consilience of Inductions. Whewell felt that this was the method by which the true laws of nature could be discovered: clarification of fundamental concepts, clever invention of explanations, and careful testing. Mill, in his critique of Whewell, and others who have cast Whewell as a fore-runner of the hypothetico-deductivist view, seem to have under-estimated the importance of this discovery phase in Whewell’s understanding of method (Snyder 1997a,b, 1999). Down-playing the discovery phase would come to characterize methodology of the early 20 th century (see section 3 ).

Mill, in his System of Logic , put forward a narrower view of induction as the essence of scientific method. For Mill, induction is the search first for regularities among events. Among those regularities, some will continue to hold for further observations, eventually gaining the status of laws. One can also look for regularities among the laws discovered in a domain, i.e., for a law of laws. Which “law law” will hold is time and discipline dependent and open to revision. One example is the Law of Universal Causation, and Mill put forward specific methods for identifying causes—now commonly known as Mill’s methods. These five methods look for circumstances which are common among the phenomena of interest, those which are absent when the phenomena are, or those for which both vary together. Mill’s methods are still seen as capturing basic intuitions about experimental methods for finding the relevant explanatory factors ( System of Logic (1843), see Mill entry). The methods advocated by Whewell and Mill, in the end, look similar. Both involve inductive generalization to covering laws. They differ dramatically, however, with respect to the necessity of the knowledge arrived at; that is, at the meta-methodological level (see the entries on Whewell and Mill entries).

3. Logic of method and critical responses

The quantum and relativistic revolutions in physics in the early 20 th century had a profound effect on methodology. Conceptual foundations of both theories were taken to show the defeasibility of even the most seemingly secure intuitions about space, time and bodies. Certainty of knowledge about the natural world was therefore recognized as unattainable. Instead a renewed empiricism was sought which rendered science fallible but still rationally justifiable.

Analyses of the reasoning of scientists emerged, according to which the aspects of scientific method which were of primary importance were the means of testing and confirming of theories. A distinction in methodology was made between the contexts of discovery and justification. The distinction could be used as a wedge between the particularities of where and how theories or hypotheses are arrived at, on the one hand, and the underlying reasoning scientists use (whether or not they are aware of it) when assessing theories and judging their adequacy on the basis of the available evidence. By and large, for most of the 20 th century, philosophy of science focused on the second context, although philosophers differed on whether to focus on confirmation or refutation as well as on the many details of how confirmation or refutation could or could not be brought about. By the mid-20 th century these attempts at defining the method of justification and the context distinction itself came under pressure. During the same period, philosophy of science developed rapidly, and from section 4 this entry will therefore shift from a primarily historical treatment of the scientific method towards a primarily thematic one.

Advances in logic and probability held out promise of the possibility of elaborate reconstructions of scientific theories and empirical method, the best example being Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (1928). Carnap attempted to show that a scientific theory could be reconstructed as a formal axiomatic system—that is, a logic. That system could refer to the world because some of its basic sentences could be interpreted as observations or operations which one could perform to test them. The rest of the theoretical system, including sentences using theoretical or unobservable terms (like electron or force) would then either be meaningful because they could be reduced to observations, or they had purely logical meanings (called analytic, like mathematical identities). This has been referred to as the verifiability criterion of meaning. According to the criterion, any statement not either analytic or verifiable was strictly meaningless. Although the view was endorsed by Carnap in 1928, he would later come to see it as too restrictive (Carnap 1956). Another familiar version of this idea is operationalism of Percy William Bridgman. In The Logic of Modern Physics (1927) Bridgman asserted that every physical concept could be defined in terms of the operations one would perform to verify the application of that concept. Making good on the operationalisation of a concept even as simple as length, however, can easily become enormously complex (for measuring very small lengths, for instance) or impractical (measuring large distances like light years.)

Carl Hempel’s (1950, 1951) criticisms of the verifiability criterion of meaning had enormous influence. He pointed out that universal generalizations, such as most scientific laws, were not strictly meaningful on the criterion. Verifiability and operationalism both seemed too restrictive to capture standard scientific aims and practice. The tenuous connection between these reconstructions and actual scientific practice was criticized in another way. In both approaches, scientific methods are instead recast in methodological roles. Measurements, for example, were looked to as ways of giving meanings to terms. The aim of the philosopher of science was not to understand the methods per se , but to use them to reconstruct theories, their meanings, and their relation to the world. When scientists perform these operations, however, they will not report that they are doing them to give meaning to terms in a formal axiomatic system. This disconnect between methodology and the details of actual scientific practice would seem to violate the empiricism the Logical Positivists and Bridgman were committed to. The view that methodology should correspond to practice (to some extent) has been called historicism, or intuitionism. We turn to these criticisms and responses in section 3.4 . [ 4 ]

Positivism also had to contend with the recognition that a purely inductivist approach, along the lines of Bacon-Newton-Mill, was untenable. There was no pure observation, for starters. All observation was theory laden. Theory is required to make any observation, therefore not all theory can be derived from observation alone. (See the entry on theory and observation in science .) Even granting an observational basis, Hume had already pointed out that one could not deductively justify inductive conclusions without begging the question by presuming the success of the inductive method. Likewise, positivist attempts at analyzing how a generalization can be confirmed by observations of its instances were subject to a number of criticisms. Goodman (1965) and Hempel (1965) both point to paradoxes inherent in standard accounts of confirmation. Recent attempts at explaining how observations can serve to confirm a scientific theory are discussed in section 4 below.

The standard starting point for a non-inductive analysis of the logic of confirmation is known as the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method. In its simplest form, a sentence of a theory which expresses some hypothesis is confirmed by its true consequences. As noted in section 2 , this method had been advanced by Whewell in the 19 th century, as well as Nicod (1924) and others in the 20 th century. Often, Hempel’s (1966) description of the H-D method, illustrated by the case of Semmelweiss’ inferential procedures in establishing the cause of childbed fever, has been presented as a key account of H-D as well as a foil for criticism of the H-D account of confirmation (see, for example, Lipton’s (2004) discussion of inference to the best explanation; also the entry on confirmation ). Hempel described Semmelsweiss’ procedure as examining various hypotheses explaining the cause of childbed fever. Some hypotheses conflicted with observable facts and could be rejected as false immediately. Others needed to be tested experimentally by deducing which observable events should follow if the hypothesis were true (what Hempel called the test implications of the hypothesis), then conducting an experiment and observing whether or not the test implications occurred. If the experiment showed the test implication to be false, the hypothesis could be rejected. If the experiment showed the test implications to be true, however, this did not prove the hypothesis true. The confirmation of a test implication does not verify a hypothesis, though Hempel did allow that “it provides at least some support, some corroboration or confirmation for it” (Hempel 1966: 8). The degree of this support then depends on the quantity, variety and precision of the supporting evidence.

Another approach that took off from the difficulties with inductive inference was Karl Popper’s critical rationalism or falsificationism (Popper 1959, 1963). Falsification is deductive and similar to H-D in that it involves scientists deducing observational consequences from the hypothesis under test. For Popper, however, the important point was not the degree of confirmation that successful prediction offered to a hypothesis. The crucial thing was the logical asymmetry between confirmation, based on inductive inference, and falsification, which can be based on a deductive inference. (This simple opposition was later questioned, by Lakatos, among others. See the entry on historicist theories of scientific rationality. )

Popper stressed that, regardless of the amount of confirming evidence, we can never be certain that a hypothesis is true without committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Instead, Popper introduced the notion of corroboration as a measure for how well a theory or hypothesis has survived previous testing—but without implying that this is also a measure for the probability that it is true.

Popper was also motivated by his doubts about the scientific status of theories like the Marxist theory of history or psycho-analysis, and so wanted to demarcate between science and pseudo-science. Popper saw this as an importantly different distinction than demarcating science from metaphysics. The latter demarcation was the primary concern of many logical empiricists. Popper used the idea of falsification to draw a line instead between pseudo and proper science. Science was science because its method involved subjecting theories to rigorous tests which offered a high probability of failing and thus refuting the theory.

A commitment to the risk of failure was important. Avoiding falsification could be done all too easily. If a consequence of a theory is inconsistent with observations, an exception can be added by introducing auxiliary hypotheses designed explicitly to save the theory, so-called ad hoc modifications. This Popper saw done in pseudo-science where ad hoc theories appeared capable of explaining anything in their field of application. In contrast, science is risky. If observations showed the predictions from a theory to be wrong, the theory would be refuted. Hence, scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable. Not only must there exist some possible observation statement which could falsify the hypothesis or theory, were it observed, (Popper called these the hypothesis’ potential falsifiers) it is crucial to the Popperian scientific method that such falsifications be sincerely attempted on a regular basis.

The more potential falsifiers of a hypothesis, the more falsifiable it would be, and the more the hypothesis claimed. Conversely, hypotheses without falsifiers claimed very little or nothing at all. Originally, Popper thought that this meant the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses only to save a theory should not be countenanced as good scientific method. These would undermine the falsifiabililty of a theory. However, Popper later came to recognize that the introduction of modifications (immunizations, he called them) was often an important part of scientific development. Responding to surprising or apparently falsifying observations often generated important new scientific insights. Popper’s own example was the observed motion of Uranus which originally did not agree with Newtonian predictions. The ad hoc hypothesis of an outer planet explained the disagreement and led to further falsifiable predictions. Popper sought to reconcile the view by blurring the distinction between falsifiable and not falsifiable, and speaking instead of degrees of testability (Popper 1985: 41f.).

From the 1960s on, sustained meta-methodological criticism emerged that drove philosophical focus away from scientific method. A brief look at those criticisms follows, with recommendations for further reading at the end of the entry.

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) begins with a well-known shot across the bow for philosophers of science:

History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. (1962: 1)

The image Kuhn thought needed transforming was the a-historical, rational reconstruction sought by many of the Logical Positivists, though Carnap and other positivists were actually quite sympathetic to Kuhn’s views. (See the entry on the Vienna Circle .) Kuhn shares with other of his contemporaries, such as Feyerabend and Lakatos, a commitment to a more empirical approach to philosophy of science. Namely, the history of science provides important data, and necessary checks, for philosophy of science, including any theory of scientific method.

The history of science reveals, according to Kuhn, that scientific development occurs in alternating phases. During normal science, the members of the scientific community adhere to the paradigm in place. Their commitment to the paradigm means a commitment to the puzzles to be solved and the acceptable ways of solving them. Confidence in the paradigm remains so long as steady progress is made in solving the shared puzzles. Method in this normal phase operates within a disciplinary matrix (Kuhn’s later concept of a paradigm) which includes standards for problem solving, and defines the range of problems to which the method should be applied. An important part of a disciplinary matrix is the set of values which provide the norms and aims for scientific method. The main values that Kuhn identifies are prediction, problem solving, simplicity, consistency, and plausibility.

An important by-product of normal science is the accumulation of puzzles which cannot be solved with resources of the current paradigm. Once accumulation of these anomalies has reached some critical mass, it can trigger a communal shift to a new paradigm and a new phase of normal science. Importantly, the values that provide the norms and aims for scientific method may have transformed in the meantime. Method may therefore be relative to discipline, time or place

Feyerabend also identified the aims of science as progress, but argued that any methodological prescription would only stifle that progress (Feyerabend 1988). His arguments are grounded in re-examining accepted “myths” about the history of science. Heroes of science, like Galileo, are shown to be just as reliant on rhetoric and persuasion as they are on reason and demonstration. Others, like Aristotle, are shown to be far more reasonable and far-reaching in their outlooks then they are given credit for. As a consequence, the only rule that could provide what he took to be sufficient freedom was the vacuous “anything goes”. More generally, even the methodological restriction that science is the best way to pursue knowledge, and to increase knowledge, is too restrictive. Feyerabend suggested instead that science might, in fact, be a threat to a free society, because it and its myth had become so dominant (Feyerabend 1978).

An even more fundamental kind of criticism was offered by several sociologists of science from the 1970s onwards who rejected the methodology of providing philosophical accounts for the rational development of science and sociological accounts of the irrational mistakes. Instead, they adhered to a symmetry thesis on which any causal explanation of how scientific knowledge is established needs to be symmetrical in explaining truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success and mistakes, by the same causal factors (see, e.g., Barnes and Bloor 1982, Bloor 1991). Movements in the Sociology of Science, like the Strong Programme, or in the social dimensions and causes of knowledge more generally led to extended and close examination of detailed case studies in contemporary science and its history. (See the entries on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge and social epistemology .) Well-known examinations by Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986), Knorr-Cetina (1981), Pickering (1984), Shapin and Schaffer (1985) seem to bear out that it was social ideologies (on a macro-scale) or individual interactions and circumstances (on a micro-scale) which were the primary causal factors in determining which beliefs gained the status of scientific knowledge. As they saw it therefore, explanatory appeals to scientific method were not empirically grounded.

A late, and largely unexpected, criticism of scientific method came from within science itself. Beginning in the early 2000s, a number of scientists attempting to replicate the results of published experiments could not do so. There may be close conceptual connection between reproducibility and method. For example, if reproducibility means that the same scientific methods ought to produce the same result, and all scientific results ought to be reproducible, then whatever it takes to reproduce a scientific result ought to be called scientific method. Space limits us to the observation that, insofar as reproducibility is a desired outcome of proper scientific method, it is not strictly a part of scientific method. (See the entry on reproducibility of scientific results .)

By the close of the 20 th century the search for the scientific method was flagging. Nola and Sankey (2000b) could introduce their volume on method by remarking that “For some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year’s debate …”.

Despite the many difficulties that philosophers encountered in trying to providing a clear methodology of conformation (or refutation), still important progress has been made on understanding how observation can provide evidence for a given theory. Work in statistics has been crucial for understanding how theories can be tested empirically, and in recent decades a huge literature has developed that attempts to recast confirmation in Bayesian terms. Here these developments can be covered only briefly, and we refer to the entry on confirmation for further details and references.

Statistics has come to play an increasingly important role in the methodology of the experimental sciences from the 19 th century onwards. At that time, statistics and probability theory took on a methodological role as an analysis of inductive inference, and attempts to ground the rationality of induction in the axioms of probability theory have continued throughout the 20 th century and in to the present. Developments in the theory of statistics itself, meanwhile, have had a direct and immense influence on the experimental method, including methods for measuring the uncertainty of observations such as the Method of Least Squares developed by Legendre and Gauss in the early 19 th century, criteria for the rejection of outliers proposed by Peirce by the mid-19 th century, and the significance tests developed by Gosset (a.k.a. “Student”), Fisher, Neyman & Pearson and others in the 1920s and 1930s (see, e.g., Swijtink 1987 for a brief historical overview; and also the entry on C.S. Peirce ).

These developments within statistics then in turn led to a reflective discussion among both statisticians and philosophers of science on how to perceive the process of hypothesis testing: whether it was a rigorous statistical inference that could provide a numerical expression of the degree of confidence in the tested hypothesis, or if it should be seen as a decision between different courses of actions that also involved a value component. This led to a major controversy among Fisher on the one side and Neyman and Pearson on the other (see especially Fisher 1955, Neyman 1956 and Pearson 1955, and for analyses of the controversy, e.g., Howie 2002, Marks 2000, Lenhard 2006). On Fisher’s view, hypothesis testing was a methodology for when to accept or reject a statistical hypothesis, namely that a hypothesis should be rejected by evidence if this evidence would be unlikely relative to other possible outcomes, given the hypothesis were true. In contrast, on Neyman and Pearson’s view, the consequence of error also had to play a role when deciding between hypotheses. Introducing the distinction between the error of rejecting a true hypothesis (type I error) and accepting a false hypothesis (type II error), they argued that it depends on the consequences of the error to decide whether it is more important to avoid rejecting a true hypothesis or accepting a false one. Hence, Fisher aimed for a theory of inductive inference that enabled a numerical expression of confidence in a hypothesis. To him, the important point was the search for truth, not utility. In contrast, the Neyman-Pearson approach provided a strategy of inductive behaviour for deciding between different courses of action. Here, the important point was not whether a hypothesis was true, but whether one should act as if it was.

Similar discussions are found in the philosophical literature. On the one side, Churchman (1948) and Rudner (1953) argued that because scientific hypotheses can never be completely verified, a complete analysis of the methods of scientific inference includes ethical judgments in which the scientists must decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis, which again will depend on the importance of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Others, such as Jeffrey (1956) and Levi (1960) disagreed and instead defended a value-neutral view of science on which scientists should bracket their attitudes, preferences, temperament, and values when assessing the correctness of their inferences. For more details on this value-free ideal in the philosophy of science and its historical development, see Douglas (2009) and Howard (2003). For a broad set of case studies examining the role of values in science, see e.g. Elliott & Richards 2017.

In recent decades, philosophical discussions of the evaluation of probabilistic hypotheses by statistical inference have largely focused on Bayesianism that understands probability as a measure of a person’s degree of belief in an event, given the available information, and frequentism that instead understands probability as a long-run frequency of a repeatable event. Hence, for Bayesians probabilities refer to a state of knowledge, whereas for frequentists probabilities refer to frequencies of events (see, e.g., Sober 2008, chapter 1 for a detailed introduction to Bayesianism and frequentism as well as to likelihoodism). Bayesianism aims at providing a quantifiable, algorithmic representation of belief revision, where belief revision is a function of prior beliefs (i.e., background knowledge) and incoming evidence. Bayesianism employs a rule based on Bayes’ theorem, a theorem of the probability calculus which relates conditional probabilities. The probability that a particular hypothesis is true is interpreted as a degree of belief, or credence, of the scientist. There will also be a probability and a degree of belief that a hypothesis will be true conditional on a piece of evidence (an observation, say) being true. Bayesianism proscribes that it is rational for the scientist to update their belief in the hypothesis to that conditional probability should it turn out that the evidence is, in fact, observed (see, e.g., Sprenger & Hartmann 2019 for a comprehensive treatment of Bayesian philosophy of science). Originating in the work of Neyman and Person, frequentism aims at providing the tools for reducing long-run error rates, such as the error-statistical approach developed by Mayo (1996) that focuses on how experimenters can avoid both type I and type II errors by building up a repertoire of procedures that detect errors if and only if they are present. Both Bayesianism and frequentism have developed over time, they are interpreted in different ways by its various proponents, and their relations to previous criticism to attempts at defining scientific method are seen differently by proponents and critics. The literature, surveys, reviews and criticism in this area are vast and the reader is referred to the entries on Bayesian epistemology and confirmation .

5. Method in Practice

Attention to scientific practice, as we have seen, is not itself new. However, the turn to practice in the philosophy of science of late can be seen as a correction to the pessimism with respect to method in philosophy of science in later parts of the 20 th century, and as an attempted reconciliation between sociological and rationalist explanations of scientific knowledge. Much of this work sees method as detailed and context specific problem-solving procedures, and methodological analyses to be at the same time descriptive, critical and advisory (see Nickles 1987 for an exposition of this view). The following section contains a survey of some of the practice focuses. In this section we turn fully to topics rather than chronology.

A problem with the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification that figured so prominently in philosophy of science in the first half of the 20 th century (see section 2 ) is that no such distinction can be clearly seen in scientific activity (see Arabatzis 2006). Thus, in recent decades, it has been recognized that study of conceptual innovation and change should not be confined to psychology and sociology of science, but are also important aspects of scientific practice which philosophy of science should address (see also the entry on scientific discovery ). Looking for the practices that drive conceptual innovation has led philosophers to examine both the reasoning practices of scientists and the wide realm of experimental practices that are not directed narrowly at testing hypotheses, that is, exploratory experimentation.

Examining the reasoning practices of historical and contemporary scientists, Nersessian (2008) has argued that new scientific concepts are constructed as solutions to specific problems by systematic reasoning, and that of analogy, visual representation and thought-experimentation are among the important reasoning practices employed. These ubiquitous forms of reasoning are reliable—but also fallible—methods of conceptual development and change. On her account, model-based reasoning consists of cycles of construction, simulation, evaluation and adaption of models that serve as interim interpretations of the target problem to be solved. Often, this process will lead to modifications or extensions, and a new cycle of simulation and evaluation. However, Nersessian also emphasizes that

creative model-based reasoning cannot be applied as a simple recipe, is not always productive of solutions, and even its most exemplary usages can lead to incorrect solutions. (Nersessian 2008: 11)

Thus, while on the one hand she agrees with many previous philosophers that there is no logic of discovery, discoveries can derive from reasoned processes, such that a large and integral part of scientific practice is

the creation of concepts through which to comprehend, structure, and communicate about physical phenomena …. (Nersessian 1987: 11)

Similarly, work on heuristics for discovery and theory construction by scholars such as Darden (1991) and Bechtel & Richardson (1993) present science as problem solving and investigate scientific problem solving as a special case of problem-solving in general. Drawing largely on cases from the biological sciences, much of their focus has been on reasoning strategies for the generation, evaluation, and revision of mechanistic explanations of complex systems.

Addressing another aspect of the context distinction, namely the traditional view that the primary role of experiments is to test theoretical hypotheses according to the H-D model, other philosophers of science have argued for additional roles that experiments can play. The notion of exploratory experimentation was introduced to describe experiments driven by the desire to obtain empirical regularities and to develop concepts and classifications in which these regularities can be described (Steinle 1997, 2002; Burian 1997; Waters 2007)). However the difference between theory driven experimentation and exploratory experimentation should not be seen as a sharp distinction. Theory driven experiments are not always directed at testing hypothesis, but may also be directed at various kinds of fact-gathering, such as determining numerical parameters. Vice versa , exploratory experiments are usually informed by theory in various ways and are therefore not theory-free. Instead, in exploratory experiments phenomena are investigated without first limiting the possible outcomes of the experiment on the basis of extant theory about the phenomena.

The development of high throughput instrumentation in molecular biology and neighbouring fields has given rise to a special type of exploratory experimentation that collects and analyses very large amounts of data, and these new ‘omics’ disciplines are often said to represent a break with the ideal of hypothesis-driven science (Burian 2007; Elliott 2007; Waters 2007; O’Malley 2007) and instead described as data-driven research (Leonelli 2012; Strasser 2012) or as a special kind of “convenience experimentation” in which many experiments are done simply because they are extraordinarily convenient to perform (Krohs 2012).

5.2 Computer methods and ‘new ways’ of doing science

The field of omics just described is possible because of the ability of computers to process, in a reasonable amount of time, the huge quantities of data required. Computers allow for more elaborate experimentation (higher speed, better filtering, more variables, sophisticated coordination and control), but also, through modelling and simulations, might constitute a form of experimentation themselves. Here, too, we can pose a version of the general question of method versus practice: does the practice of using computers fundamentally change scientific method, or merely provide a more efficient means of implementing standard methods?

Because computers can be used to automate measurements, quantifications, calculations, and statistical analyses where, for practical reasons, these operations cannot be otherwise carried out, many of the steps involved in reaching a conclusion on the basis of an experiment are now made inside a “black box”, without the direct involvement or awareness of a human. This has epistemological implications, regarding what we can know, and how we can know it. To have confidence in the results, computer methods are therefore subjected to tests of verification and validation.

The distinction between verification and validation is easiest to characterize in the case of computer simulations. In a typical computer simulation scenario computers are used to numerically integrate differential equations for which no analytic solution is available. The equations are part of the model the scientist uses to represent a phenomenon or system under investigation. Verifying a computer simulation means checking that the equations of the model are being correctly approximated. Validating a simulation means checking that the equations of the model are adequate for the inferences one wants to make on the basis of that model.

A number of issues related to computer simulations have been raised. The identification of validity and verification as the testing methods has been criticized. Oreskes et al. (1994) raise concerns that “validiation”, because it suggests deductive inference, might lead to over-confidence in the results of simulations. The distinction itself is probably too clean, since actual practice in the testing of simulations mixes and moves back and forth between the two (Weissart 1997; Parker 2008a; Winsberg 2010). Computer simulations do seem to have a non-inductive character, given that the principles by which they operate are built in by the programmers, and any results of the simulation follow from those in-built principles in such a way that those results could, in principle, be deduced from the program code and its inputs. The status of simulations as experiments has therefore been examined (Kaufmann and Smarr 1993; Humphreys 1995; Hughes 1999; Norton and Suppe 2001). This literature considers the epistemology of these experiments: what we can learn by simulation, and also the kinds of justifications which can be given in applying that knowledge to the “real” world. (Mayo 1996; Parker 2008b). As pointed out, part of the advantage of computer simulation derives from the fact that huge numbers of calculations can be carried out without requiring direct observation by the experimenter/​simulator. At the same time, many of these calculations are approximations to the calculations which would be performed first-hand in an ideal situation. Both factors introduce uncertainties into the inferences drawn from what is observed in the simulation.

For many of the reasons described above, computer simulations do not seem to belong clearly to either the experimental or theoretical domain. Rather, they seem to crucially involve aspects of both. This has led some authors, such as Fox Keller (2003: 200) to argue that we ought to consider computer simulation a “qualitatively different way of doing science”. The literature in general tends to follow Kaufmann and Smarr (1993) in referring to computer simulation as a “third way” for scientific methodology (theoretical reasoning and experimental practice are the first two ways.). It should also be noted that the debates around these issues have tended to focus on the form of computer simulation typical in the physical sciences, where models are based on dynamical equations. Other forms of simulation might not have the same problems, or have problems of their own (see the entry on computer simulations in science ).

In recent years, the rapid development of machine learning techniques has prompted some scholars to suggest that the scientific method has become “obsolete” (Anderson 2008, Carrol and Goodstein 2009). This has resulted in an intense debate on the relative merit of data-driven and hypothesis-driven research (for samples, see e.g. Mazzocchi 2015 or Succi and Coveney 2018). For a detailed treatment of this topic, we refer to the entry scientific research and big data .

6. Discourse on scientific method

Despite philosophical disagreements, the idea of the scientific method still figures prominently in contemporary discourse on many different topics, both within science and in society at large. Often, reference to scientific method is used in ways that convey either the legend of a single, universal method characteristic of all science, or grants to a particular method or set of methods privilege as a special ‘gold standard’, often with reference to particular philosophers to vindicate the claims. Discourse on scientific method also typically arises when there is a need to distinguish between science and other activities, or for justifying the special status conveyed to science. In these areas, the philosophical attempts at identifying a set of methods characteristic for scientific endeavors are closely related to the philosophy of science’s classical problem of demarcation (see the entry on science and pseudo-science ) and to the philosophical analysis of the social dimension of scientific knowledge and the role of science in democratic society.

One of the settings in which the legend of a single, universal scientific method has been particularly strong is science education (see, e.g., Bauer 1992; McComas 1996; Wivagg & Allchin 2002). [ 5 ] Often, ‘the scientific method’ is presented in textbooks and educational web pages as a fixed four or five step procedure starting from observations and description of a phenomenon and progressing over formulation of a hypothesis which explains the phenomenon, designing and conducting experiments to test the hypothesis, analyzing the results, and ending with drawing a conclusion. Such references to a universal scientific method can be found in educational material at all levels of science education (Blachowicz 2009), and numerous studies have shown that the idea of a general and universal scientific method often form part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science (see, e.g., Aikenhead 1987; Osborne et al. 2003). In response, it has been argued that science education need to focus more on teaching about the nature of science, although views have differed on whether this is best done through student-led investigations, contemporary cases, or historical cases (Allchin, Andersen & Nielsen 2014)

Although occasionally phrased with reference to the H-D method, important historical roots of the legend in science education of a single, universal scientific method are the American philosopher and psychologist Dewey’s account of inquiry in How We Think (1910) and the British mathematician Karl Pearson’s account of science in Grammar of Science (1892). On Dewey’s account, inquiry is divided into the five steps of

(i) a felt difficulty, (ii) its location and definition, (iii) suggestion of a possible solution, (iv) development by reasoning of the bearing of the suggestions, (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection. (Dewey 1910: 72)

Similarly, on Pearson’s account, scientific investigations start with measurement of data and observation of their correction and sequence from which scientific laws can be discovered with the aid of creative imagination. These laws have to be subject to criticism, and their final acceptance will have equal validity for “all normally constituted minds”. Both Dewey’s and Pearson’s accounts should be seen as generalized abstractions of inquiry and not restricted to the realm of science—although both Dewey and Pearson referred to their respective accounts as ‘the scientific method’.

Occasionally, scientists make sweeping statements about a simple and distinct scientific method, as exemplified by Feynman’s simplified version of a conjectures and refutations method presented, for example, in the last of his 1964 Cornell Messenger lectures. [ 6 ] However, just as often scientists have come to the same conclusion as recent philosophy of science that there is not any unique, easily described scientific method. For example, the physicist and Nobel Laureate Weinberg described in the paper “The Methods of Science … And Those By Which We Live” (1995) how

The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend. (1995: 8)

Interview studies with scientists on their conception of method shows that scientists often find it hard to figure out whether available evidence confirms their hypothesis, and that there are no direct translations between general ideas about method and specific strategies to guide how research is conducted (Schickore & Hangel 2019, Hangel & Schickore 2017)

Reference to the scientific method has also often been used to argue for the scientific nature or special status of a particular activity. Philosophical positions that argue for a simple and unique scientific method as a criterion of demarcation, such as Popperian falsification, have often attracted practitioners who felt that they had a need to defend their domain of practice. For example, references to conjectures and refutation as the scientific method are abundant in much of the literature on complementary and alternative medicine (CAM)—alongside the competing position that CAM, as an alternative to conventional biomedicine, needs to develop its own methodology different from that of science.

Also within mainstream science, reference to the scientific method is used in arguments regarding the internal hierarchy of disciplines and domains. A frequently seen argument is that research based on the H-D method is superior to research based on induction from observations because in deductive inferences the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. (See, e.g., Parascandola 1998 for an analysis of how this argument has been made to downgrade epidemiology compared to the laboratory sciences.) Similarly, based on an examination of the practices of major funding institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Biomedical Sciences Research Practices (BBSRC) in the UK, O’Malley et al. (2009) have argued that funding agencies seem to have a tendency to adhere to the view that the primary activity of science is to test hypotheses, while descriptive and exploratory research is seen as merely preparatory activities that are valuable only insofar as they fuel hypothesis-driven research.

In some areas of science, scholarly publications are structured in a way that may convey the impression of a neat and linear process of inquiry from stating a question, devising the methods by which to answer it, collecting the data, to drawing a conclusion from the analysis of data. For example, the codified format of publications in most biomedical journals known as the IMRAD format (Introduction, Method, Results, Analysis, Discussion) is explicitly described by the journal editors as “not an arbitrary publication format but rather a direct reflection of the process of scientific discovery” (see the so-called “Vancouver Recommendations”, ICMJE 2013: 11). However, scientific publications do not in general reflect the process by which the reported scientific results were produced. For example, under the provocative title “Is the scientific paper a fraud?”, Medawar argued that scientific papers generally misrepresent how the results have been produced (Medawar 1963/1996). Similar views have been advanced by philosophers, historians and sociologists of science (Gilbert 1976; Holmes 1987; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Schickore 2008; Suppe 1998) who have argued that scientists’ experimental practices are messy and often do not follow any recognizable pattern. Publications of research results, they argue, are retrospective reconstructions of these activities that often do not preserve the temporal order or the logic of these activities, but are instead often constructed in order to screen off potential criticism (see Schickore 2008 for a review of this work).

Philosophical positions on the scientific method have also made it into the court room, especially in the US where judges have drawn on philosophy of science in deciding when to confer special status to scientific expert testimony. A key case is Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92–102, 509 U.S. 579, 1993). In this case, the Supreme Court argued in its 1993 ruling that trial judges must ensure that expert testimony is reliable, and that in doing this the court must look at the expert’s methodology to determine whether the proffered evidence is actually scientific knowledge. Further, referring to works of Popper and Hempel the court stated that

ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge … is whether it can be (and has been) tested. (Justice Blackmun, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals; see Other Internet Resources for a link to the opinion)

But as argued by Haack (2005a,b, 2010) and by Foster & Hubner (1999), by equating the question of whether a piece of testimony is reliable with the question whether it is scientific as indicated by a special methodology, the court was producing an inconsistent mixture of Popper’s and Hempel’s philosophies, and this has later led to considerable confusion in subsequent case rulings that drew on the Daubert case (see Haack 2010 for a detailed exposition).

The difficulties around identifying the methods of science are also reflected in the difficulties of identifying scientific misconduct in the form of improper application of the method or methods of science. One of the first and most influential attempts at defining misconduct in science was the US definition from 1989 that defined misconduct as

fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community . (Code of Federal Regulations, part 50, subpart A., August 8, 1989, italics added)

However, the “other practices that seriously deviate” clause was heavily criticized because it could be used to suppress creative or novel science. For example, the National Academy of Science stated in their report Responsible Science (1992) that it

wishes to discourage the possibility that a misconduct complaint could be lodged against scientists based solely on their use of novel or unorthodox research methods. (NAS: 27)

This clause was therefore later removed from the definition. For an entry into the key philosophical literature on conduct in science, see Shamoo & Resnick (2009).

The question of the source of the success of science has been at the core of philosophy since the beginning of modern science. If viewed as a matter of epistemology more generally, scientific method is a part of the entire history of philosophy. Over that time, science and whatever methods its practitioners may employ have changed dramatically. Today, many philosophers have taken up the banners of pluralism or of practice to focus on what are, in effect, fine-grained and contextually limited examinations of scientific method. Others hope to shift perspectives in order to provide a renewed general account of what characterizes the activity we call science.

One such perspective has been offered recently by Hoyningen-Huene (2008, 2013), who argues from the history of philosophy of science that after three lengthy phases of characterizing science by its method, we are now in a phase where the belief in the existence of a positive scientific method has eroded and what has been left to characterize science is only its fallibility. First was a phase from Plato and Aristotle up until the 17 th century where the specificity of scientific knowledge was seen in its absolute certainty established by proof from evident axioms; next was a phase up to the mid-19 th century in which the means to establish the certainty of scientific knowledge had been generalized to include inductive procedures as well. In the third phase, which lasted until the last decades of the 20 th century, it was recognized that empirical knowledge was fallible, but it was still granted a special status due to its distinctive mode of production. But now in the fourth phase, according to Hoyningen-Huene, historical and philosophical studies have shown how “scientific methods with the characteristics as posited in the second and third phase do not exist” (2008: 168) and there is no longer any consensus among philosophers and historians of science about the nature of science. For Hoyningen-Huene, this is too negative a stance, and he therefore urges the question about the nature of science anew. His own answer to this question is that “scientific knowledge differs from other kinds of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, primarily by being more systematic” (Hoyningen-Huene 2013: 14). Systematicity can have several different dimensions: among them are more systematic descriptions, explanations, predictions, defense of knowledge claims, epistemic connectedness, ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, representation of knowledge and critical discourse. Hence, what characterizes science is the greater care in excluding possible alternative explanations, the more detailed elaboration with respect to data on which predictions are based, the greater care in detecting and eliminating sources of error, the more articulate connections to other pieces of knowledge, etc. On this position, what characterizes science is not that the methods employed are unique to science, but that the methods are more carefully employed.

Another, similar approach has been offered by Haack (2003). She sets off, similar to Hoyningen-Huene, from a dissatisfaction with the recent clash between what she calls Old Deferentialism and New Cynicism. The Old Deferentialist position is that science progressed inductively by accumulating true theories confirmed by empirical evidence or deductively by testing conjectures against basic statements; while the New Cynics position is that science has no epistemic authority and no uniquely rational method and is merely just politics. Haack insists that contrary to the views of the New Cynics, there are objective epistemic standards, and there is something epistemologically special about science, even though the Old Deferentialists pictured this in a wrong way. Instead, she offers a new Critical Commonsensist account on which standards of good, strong, supportive evidence and well-conducted, honest, thorough and imaginative inquiry are not exclusive to the sciences, but the standards by which we judge all inquirers. In this sense, science does not differ in kind from other kinds of inquiry, but it may differ in the degree to which it requires broad and detailed background knowledge and a familiarity with a technical vocabulary that only specialists may possess.

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Scientific Method: Role and Importance Essay

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The scientific method is a problem-solving strategy that is at the heart of biology and other sciences. There are five steps included in the scientific method that is making an observation, asking a question, forming a hypothesis or an explanation that could be tested, and predicting the test. After that, in the feedback step that is iterating, the results are used to make new predictions. The scientific method is almost always an iterative process. In other words, rather than a straight line, it is a cycle. The outcome of one round of questioning generates feedback that helps to enhance the next round of questioning.

Science is an activity that involves the logical explanation, prediction, and control of empirical phenomena. The concepts of reasoning applicable to the pursuit of this endeavor are referred to as scientific reasoning (Cowles, 2020). They include topics such as experimental design, hypothesis testing, and data interpretation. All sciences, including social sciences, follow the scientific method (Cowles, 2020). Different questions and tests are asked and performed by scientists in various domains. They do, however, have a common approach to finding logical and evidence-based answers.

Scientific reasoning is fundamental for all types of scientific study, not simply institutional research. Scientists do employ specific ideas that non-scientists do not have to use in everyday life. However, many reasoning principles are useful in everyday life. Even if one is not a scientist, they must use excellent reasoning to understand, anticipate, and regulate the events that occur in the environment. When one wants to start their careers, preserve their finances, or enhance their health, they need to acquire evidence to determine the most effective method for achieving our goals. Good scientific thinking skills come in handy in all of these situations.

Experiments, surveys, case studies, descriptive studies, and non-descriptive studies are all forms of research used in the scientific method. In an experiment, a researcher manipulates certain factors in a controlled environment and assesses their impact on other variables (Black, 2018). Descriptive research focuses on the nature of the relationship between the variables being studied rather than on cause and effect. A case study is a detailed examination of a single instance in which something unexpected has occurred. This is normally done with a single individual in extreme or exceptional instances. Large groups of individuals are polled to answer questions about certain topics in surveys. Correlational approaches are used in non-descriptive investigations to anticipate the link between two or more variables.

The Lau and Chan technique describes how to assess the validity of a theory or hypothesis using the scientific method, also known as the hypothetical-deductive method (Lau & Chan, 2017). For testing theories or hypotheses, the hypothetical-deductive technique (HD method) is highly useful. It is sometimes referred to as “scientific procedure.” This is not quite right because science can’t possibly employ only one approach. However, the HD technique is critical since it is one of the most fundamental approaches used in many scientific disciplines, including economics, physics, and biochemistry. Its implementation can be broken down into four stages. The stages include using the hypothetical-deductive method, identifying the testable hypothesis, generating the predictions according to the hypothesis, and using experiments in order to check the predictions (Cowles, 2020). If the predictions that are tested turn out to be correct, the hypothesis will be confirmed. Suppose the results are incorrect; the hypothesis would be disconfirmed.

The HD method instructs us on how to test a hypothesis, and each scientific theory must be testable.

One cannot discover evidence to illustrate whether a theory is likely or not if it cannot be tested. It cannot be considered scientific information in that circumstance. Consider the possibility that there are ghosts that people cannot see, cannot communicate with, and cannot be detected directly or indirectly. This hypothesis is defined in such a way that testing is not possible. It could still be real, and there could be such ghosts, but people would never know; thus, this cannot be considered a scientific hypothesis. In general, validating a theory’s predictions raises the likelihood that it is right. However, this does not establish definitively that the theory is right in and of itself. When given additional assumptions, a hypothesis frequently creates a prediction. When a forecast fails in this way, the theory may still be valid.

When a theory makes a faulty prediction, it might be difficult to determine whether the theory should be rejected or whether the auxiliary assumptions are flawed. Astronomers in the 19th century, for example, discovered that Newtonian physics could not adequately explain the orbit of the planet Mercury. This is due to the fact that Newtonian physics is incorrect, and you require relativity to get a more accurate orbit prediction. When astronomers discovered Uranus in 1781, they discovered that its orbit did not match Newtonian physics predictions. However, astronomers concluded that it could be explained if Uranus was being affected by another planet, and Neptune was discovered as a result.

I had several instances where I have made assumptions on an important issue regardless of evidence. Once I have prepared the work on the topic of power distribution in the workplace and its relation to gender, I have assumed that possibly because of the general feminine traits, women are less likely to create a strong image of power in comparison with men. In fact, such a hypothesis needs to be tested, and it is testable. For example, I could first define what is meant by feminine traits by collecting data from different biological and psychological sources. After that, I could observe the information regarding what factors or behavior patterns contribute to establishing power in the workplace. If I found the correlation between the feminine character traits, communication style, and behavioral patterns with the distribution of power in the workplace, then I could confirm my hypothesis.

Thus, applying the scientific method can help to improve critical reasoning by using tools from scientific reasoning. By supporting the provided hypothesis with evidence from scientific research and statistical data, one can make their claim more valuable and objective. The scientific method is essential for the creation of scientific theories that explain information and ideas in a scientifically rational manner. In a typical scientific method application, a researcher makes a hypothesis, tests it using various methods, and then alters it based on the results of the tests and experiments. The new hypothesis is then retested, further changed, and retested until it matches observable events and testing results. Hypotheses serve as tools for scientists to collect data in this way. Scientists can build broad general explanations, or scientific theories, based on that evidence and the numerous scientific experiments conducted to investigate possibilities. In conclusion, a scientific method is an important approach to examining the hypothesis. By using the tools of the scientific method, the inferences become rational and objective.

Black, M. (2018). Critical thinking: An introduction to logic and scientific method . Pickle Partners Publishing.

Cowles, H. M. (2020). The Scientific Method . Harvard University Press.

Lau, J., & Chan, J. (2017). Scientific methodology: Tutorials 1-9 .

• Market Research Experiment: Developing and Testing Hypothesis Statements
• Credible Findings of Statistical Studies
• The Cosmic Dance of Siva
• A Trip to Mars: Approximate Time, Attaining Synchrony & Parking Orbit
• Social Research Conduction
• Pragmatic Development Description and Explanation
• Outreach Chicago's Study Variables and Research Design
• Types of Studies for the Outreach Chicago Firm
• Nobel Prize for Natural Experiments
• System Dynamics and Soft Systems and Action Research
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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What is the Scientific Method: How does it work and why is it important?

The scientific method is a systematic process involving steps like defining questions, forming hypotheses, conducting experiments, and analyzing data. It minimizes biases and enables replicable research, leading to groundbreaking discoveries like Einstein's theory of relativity, penicillin, and the structure of DNA. This ongoing approach promotes reason, evidence, and the pursuit of truth in science.

Updated on November 18, 2023

Beginning in elementary school, we are exposed to the scientific method and taught how to put it into practice. As a tool for learning, it prepares children to think logically and use reasoning when seeking answers to questions.

Rather than jumping to conclusions, the scientific method gives us a recipe for exploring the world through observation and trial and error. We use it regularly, sometimes knowingly in academics or research, and sometimes subconsciously in our daily lives.

In this article we will refresh our memories on the particulars of the scientific method, discussing where it comes from, which elements comprise it, and how it is put into practice. Then, we will consider the importance of the scientific method, who uses it and under what circumstances.

What is the scientific method?

The scientific method is a dynamic process that involves objectively investigating questions through observation and experimentation . Applicable to all scientific disciplines, this systematic approach to answering questions is more accurately described as a flexible set of principles than as a fixed series of steps.

The following representations of the scientific method illustrate how it can be both condensed into broad categories and also expanded to reveal more and more details of the process. These graphics capture the adaptability that makes this concept universally valuable as it is relevant and accessible not only across age groups and educational levels but also within various contexts.

Steps in the scientific method

While the scientific method is versatile in form and function, it encompasses a collection of principles that create a logical progression to the process of problem solving:

• Define a question : Constructing a clear and precise problem statement that identifies the main question or goal of the investigation is the first step. The wording must lend itself to experimentation by posing a question that is both testable and measurable.
• Gather information and resources : Researching the topic in question to find out what is already known and what types of related questions others are asking is the next step in this process. This background information is vital to gaining a full understanding of the subject and in determining the best design for experiments. 
• Form a hypothesis : Composing a concise statement that identifies specific variables and potential results, which can then be tested, is a crucial step that must be completed before any experimentation. An imperfection in the composition of a hypothesis can result in weaknesses to the entire design of an experiment.
• Perform the experiments : Testing the hypothesis by performing replicable experiments and collecting resultant data is another fundamental step of the scientific method. By controlling some elements of an experiment while purposely manipulating others, cause and effect relationships are established.
• Analyze the data : Interpreting the experimental process and results by recognizing trends in the data is a necessary step for comprehending its meaning and supporting the conclusions. Drawing inferences through this systematic process lends substantive evidence for either supporting or rejecting the hypothesis.
• Report the results : Sharing the outcomes of an experiment, through an essay, presentation, graphic, or journal article, is often regarded as a final step in this process. Detailing the project's design, methods, and results not only promotes transparency and replicability but also adds to the body of knowledge for future research.
• Retest the hypothesis : Repeating experiments to see if a hypothesis holds up in all cases is a step that is manifested through varying scenarios. Sometimes a researcher immediately checks their own work or replicates it at a future time, or another researcher will repeat the experiments to further test the hypothesis.

Where did the scientific method come from?

Oftentimes, ancient peoples attempted to answer questions about the unknown by:

• Making simple observations
• Discussing the possibilities with others deemed worthy of a debate
• Drawing conclusions based on dominant opinions and preexisting beliefs

For example, take Greek and Roman mythology. Myths were used to explain everything from the seasons and stars to the sun and death itself.

However, as societies began to grow through advancements in agriculture and language, ancient civilizations like Egypt and Babylonia shifted to a more rational analysis for understanding the natural world. They increasingly employed empirical methods of observation and experimentation that would one day evolve into the scientific method . 

In the 4th century, Aristotle, considered the Father of Science by many, suggested these elements , which closely resemble the contemporary scientific method, as part of his approach for conducting science:

• Study what others have written about the subject.
• Look for the general consensus about the subject.
• Perform a systematic study of everything even partially related to the topic.

By continuing to emphasize systematic observation and controlled experiments, scholars such as Al-Kindi and Ibn al-Haytham helped expand this concept throughout the Islamic Golden Age . 

In his 1620 treatise, Novum Organum , Sir Francis Bacon codified the scientific method, arguing not only that hypotheses must be tested through experiments but also that the results must be replicated to establish a truth. Coming at the height of the Scientific Revolution, this text made the scientific method accessible to European thinkers like Galileo and Isaac Newton who then put the method into practice.

As science modernized in the 19th century, the scientific method became more formalized, leading to significant breakthroughs in fields such as evolution and germ theory. Today, it continues to evolve, underpinning scientific progress in diverse areas like quantum mechanics, genetics, and artificial intelligence.

Why is the scientific method important?

The history of the scientific method illustrates how the concept developed out of a need to find objective answers to scientific questions by overcoming biases based on fear, religion, power, and cultural norms. This still holds true today.

By implementing this standardized approach to conducting experiments, the impacts of researchers’ personal opinions and preconceived notions are minimized. The organized manner of the scientific method prevents these and other mistakes while promoting the replicability and transparency necessary for solid scientific research.

The importance of the scientific method is best observed through its successes, for example: 

• “ Albert Einstein stands out among modern physicists as the scientist who not only formulated a theory of revolutionary significance but also had the genius to reflect in a conscious and technical way on the scientific method he was using.” Devising a hypothesis based on the prevailing understanding of Newtonian physics eventually led Einstein to devise the theory of general relativity .
• Howard Florey “Perhaps the most useful lesson which has come out of the work on penicillin has been the demonstration that success in this field depends on the development and coordinated use of technical methods.” After discovering a mold that prevented the growth of Staphylococcus bacteria, Dr. Alexander Flemimg designed experiments to identify and reproduce it in the lab, thus leading to the development of penicillin .
• James D. Watson “Every time you understand something, religion becomes less likely. Only with the discovery of the double helix and the ensuing genetic revolution have we had grounds for thinking that the powers held traditionally to be the exclusive property of the gods might one day be ours. . . .” By using wire models to conceive a structure for DNA, Watson and Crick crafted a hypothesis for testing combinations of amino acids, X-ray diffraction images, and the current research in atomic physics, resulting in the discovery of DNA’s double helix structure .

Final thoughts

As the cases exemplify, the scientific method is never truly completed, but rather started and restarted. It gave these researchers a structured process that was easily replicated, modified, and built upon. 

While the scientific method may “end” in one context, it never literally ends. When a hypothesis, design, methods, and experiments are revisited, the scientific method simply picks up where it left off. Each time a researcher builds upon previous knowledge, the scientific method is restored with the pieces of past efforts.

By guiding researchers towards objective results based on transparency and reproducibility, the scientific method acts as a defense against bias, superstition, and preconceived notions. As we embrace the scientific method's enduring principles, we ensure that our quest for knowledge remains firmly rooted in reason, evidence, and the pursuit of truth.

The AJE Team

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Perspective: Dimensions of the scientific method

Eberhard o. voit.

Department of Biomedical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology and Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America

The scientific method has been guiding biological research for a long time. It not only prescribes the order and types of activities that give a scientific study validity and a stamp of approval but also has substantially shaped how we collectively think about the endeavor of investigating nature. The advent of high-throughput data generation, data mining, and advanced computational modeling has thrown the formerly undisputed, monolithic status of the scientific method into turmoil. On the one hand, the new approaches are clearly successful and expect the same acceptance as the traditional methods, but on the other hand, they replace much of the hypothesis-driven reasoning with inductive argumentation, which philosophers of science consider problematic. Intrigued by the enormous wealth of data and the power of machine learning, some scientists have even argued that significant correlations within datasets could make the entire quest for causation obsolete. Many of these issues have been passionately debated during the past two decades, often with scant agreement. It is proffered here that hypothesis-driven, data-mining–inspired, and “allochthonous” knowledge acquisition, based on mathematical and computational models, are vectors spanning a 3D space of an expanded scientific method. The combination of methods within this space will most certainly shape our thinking about nature, with implications for experimental design, peer review and funding, sharing of result, education, medical diagnostics, and even questions of litigation.

The traditional scientific method: Hypothesis-driven deduction

Research is the undisputed core activity defining science. Without research, the advancement of scientific knowledge would come to a screeching halt. While it is evident that researchers look for new information or insights, the term “research” is somewhat puzzling. Never mind the prefix “re,” which simply means “coming back and doing it again and again,” the word “search” seems to suggest that the research process is somewhat haphazard, that not much of a strategy is involved in the process. One might argue that research a few hundred years ago had the character of hoping for enough luck to find something new. The alchemists come to mind in their quest to turn mercury or lead into gold, or to discover an elixir for eternal youth, through methods we nowadays consider laughable.

Today’s sciences, in stark contrast, are clearly different. Yes, we still try to find something new—and may need a good dose of luck—but the process is anything but unstructured. In fact, it is prescribed in such rigor that it has been given the widely known moniker “scientific method.” This scientific method has deep roots going back to Aristotle and Herophilus (approximately 300 BC), Avicenna and Alhazen (approximately 1,000 AD), Grosseteste and Robert Bacon (approximately 1,250 AD), and many others, but solidified and crystallized into the gold standard of quality research during the 17th and 18th centuries [ 1 – 7 ]. In particular, Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650) are often considered the founders of the scientific method, because they insisted on careful, systematic observations of high quality, rather than metaphysical speculations that were en vogue among the scholars of the time [ 1 , 8 ]. In contrast to their peers, they strove for objectivity and insisted that observations, rather than an investigator’s preconceived ideas or superstitions, should be the basis for formulating a research idea [ 7 , 9 ].

Bacon and his 19th century follower John Stuart Mill explicitly proposed gaining knowledge through inductive reasoning: Based on carefully recorded observations, or from data obtained in a well-planned experiment, generalized assertions were to be made about similar yet (so far) unobserved phenomena [ 7 ]. Expressed differently, inductive reasoning attempts to derive general principles or laws directly from empirical evidence [ 10 ]. An example is the 19th century epigram of the physician Rudolf Virchow, Omnis cellula e cellula . There is no proof that indeed “every cell derives from a cell,” but like Virchow, we have made the observation time and again and never encountered anything suggesting otherwise.

In contrast to induction, the widely accepted, traditional scientific method is based on formulating and testing hypotheses. From the results of these tests, a deduction is made whether the hypothesis is presumably true or false. This type of hypotheticodeductive reasoning goes back to William Whewell, William Stanley Jevons, and Charles Peirce in the 19th century [ 1 ]. By the 20th century, the deductive, hypothesis-based scientific method had become deeply ingrained in the scientific psyche, and it is now taught as early as middle school in order to teach students valid means of discovery [ 8 , 11 , 12 ]. The scientific method has not only guided most research studies but also fundamentally influenced how we think about the process of scientific discovery.

Alas, because biology has almost no general laws, deduction in the strictest sense is difficult. It may therefore be preferable to use the term abduction, which refers to the logical inference toward the most plausible explanation, given a set of observations, although this explanation cannot be proven and is not necessarily true.

Over the decades, the hypothesis-based scientific method did experience variations here and there, but its conceptual scaffold remained essentially unchanged ( Fig 1 ). Its key is a process that begins with the formulation of a hypothesis that is to be rigorously tested, either in the wet lab or computationally; nonadherence to this principle is seen as lacking rigor and can lead to irreproducible results [ 1 , 13 – 15 ].

The central concept of the traditional scientific method is a falsifiable hypothesis regarding some phenomenon of interest. This hypothesis is to be tested experimentally or computationally. The test results support or refute the hypothesis, triggering a new round of hypothesis formulation and testing.

Going further, the prominent philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper argued that a scientific hypothesis can never be verified but that it can be disproved by a single counterexample. He therefore demanded that scientific hypotheses had to be falsifiable, because otherwise, testing would be moot [ 16 , 17 ] (see also [ 18 ]). As Gillies put it, “successful theories are those that survive elimination through falsification” [ 19 ]. Kelley and Scott agreed to some degree but warned that complete insistence on falsifiability is too restrictive as it would mark many computational techniques, statistical hypothesis testing, and even Darwin’s theory of evolution as nonscientific [ 20 ].

While the hypothesis-based scientific method has been very successful, its exclusive reliance on deductive reasoning is dangerous because according to the so-called Duhem–Quine thesis, hypothesis testing always involves an unknown number of explicit or implicit assumptions, some of which may steer the researcher away from hypotheses that seem implausible, although they are, in fact, true [ 21 ]. According to Kuhn, this bias can obstruct the recognition of paradigm shifts [ 22 ], which require the rethinking of previously accepted “truths” and the development of radically new ideas [ 23 , 24 ]. The testing of simultaneous alternative hypotheses [ 25 – 27 ] ameliorates this problem to some degree but not entirely.

The traditional scientific method is often presented in discrete steps, but it should really be seen as a form of critical thinking, subject to review and independent validation [ 8 ]. It has proven very influential, not only by prescribing valid experimentation, but also for affecting the way we attempt to understand nature [ 18 ], for teaching [ 8 , 12 ], reporting, publishing, and otherwise sharing information [ 28 ], for peer review and the awarding of funds by research-supporting agencies [ 29 , 30 ], for medical diagnostics [ 7 ], and even in litigation [ 31 ].

A second dimension of the scientific method: Data-mining–inspired induction

A major shift in biological experimentation occurred with the–omics revolution of the early 21st century. All of a sudden, it became feasible to perform high-throughput experiments that generated thousands of measurements, typically characterizing the expression or abundances of very many—if not all—genes, proteins, metabolites, or other biological quantities in a sample.

The strategy of measuring large numbers of items in a nontargeted fashion is fundamentally different from the traditional scientific method and constitutes a new, second dimension of the scientific method. Instead of hypothesizing and testing whether gene X is up-regulated under some altered condition, the leading question becomes which of the thousands of genes in a sample are up- or down-regulated. This shift in focus elevates the data to the supreme role of revealing novel insights by themselves ( Fig 2 ). As an important, generic advantage over the traditional strategy, this second dimension is free of a researcher’s preconceived notions regarding the molecular mechanisms governing the phenomenon of interest, which are otherwise the key to formulating a hypothesis. The prominent biologists Patrick Brown and David Botstein commented that “the patterns of expression will often suffice to begin de novo discovery of potential gene functions” [ 32 ].

Data-driven research begins with an untargeted exploration, in which the data speak for themselves. Machine learning extracts patterns from the data, which suggest hypotheses that are to be tested in the lab or computationally.

This data-driven, discovery-generating approach is at once appealing and challenging. On the one hand, very many data are explored simultaneously and essentially without bias. On the other hand, the large datasets supporting this approach create a genuine challenge to understanding and interpreting the experimental results because the thousands of data points, often superimposed with a fair amount of noise, make it difficult to detect meaningful differences between sample and control. This situation can only be addressed with computational methods that first “clean” the data, for instance, through the statistically valid removal of outliers, and then use machine learning to identify statistically significant, distinguishing molecular profiles or signatures. In favorable cases, such signatures point to specific biological pathways, whereas other signatures defy direct explanation but may become the launch pad for follow-up investigations [ 33 ].

Today’s scientists are very familiar with this discovery-driven exploration of “what’s out there” and might consider it a quaint quirk of history that this strategy was at first widely chastised and ridiculed as a “fishing expedition” [ 30 , 34 ]. Strict traditionalists were outraged that rigor was leaving science with the new approach and that sufficient guidelines were unavailable to assure the validity and reproducibility of results [ 10 , 35 , 36 ].

From the view point of philosophy of science, this second dimension of the scientific method uses inductive reasoning and reflects Bacon’s idea that observations can and should dictate the research question to be investigated [ 1 , 7 ]. Allen [ 36 ] forcefully rejected this type of reasoning, stating “the thinking goes, we can now expect computer programs to derive significance, relevance and meaning from chunks of information, be they nucleotide sequences or gene expression profiles… In contrast with this view, many are convinced that no purely logical process can turn observation into understanding.” His conviction goes back to the 18th century philosopher David Hume and again to Popper, who identified as the overriding problem with inductive reasoning that it can never truly reveal causality, even if a phenomenon is observed time and again [ 16 , 17 , 37 , 38 ]. No number of observations, even if they always have the same result, can guard against an exception that would violate the generality of a law inferred from these observations [ 1 , 35 ]. Worse, Popper argued, through inference by induction, we cannot even know the probability of something being true [ 10 , 17 , 36 ].

Others argued that data-driven and hypothesis-driven research actually do not differ all that much in principle, as long as there is cycling between developing new ideas and testing them with care [ 27 ]. In fact, Kell and Oliver [ 34 ] maintained that the exclusive acceptance of hypothesis-driven programs misrepresents the complexities of biological knowledge generation. Similarly refuting the prominent rule of deduction, Platt [ 26 ] and Beard and Kushmerick [ 27 ] argued that repeated inductive reasoning, called strong inference, corresponds to a logically sound decision tree of disproving or refining hypotheses that can rapidly yield firm conclusions; nonetheless, Platt had to admit that inductive inference is not as certain as deduction, because it projects into the unknown. Lander compared the task of obtaining causality by induction to the problem of inferring the design of a microprocessor from input-output readings, which in a strict sense is impossible, because the microprocessor could be arbitrarily complicated; even so, inference often leads to novel insights and therefore is valuable [ 39 ].

An interesting special case of almost pure inductive reasoning is epidemiology, where hypothesis-driven reasoning is rare and instead, the fundamental question is whether data-based evidence is sufficient to associate health risks with specific causes [ 31 , 34 ].

Recent advances in machine learning and “big-data” mining have driven the use of inductive reasoning to unprecedented heights. As an example, machine learning can greatly assist in the discovery of patterns, for instance, in biological sequences [ 40 ]. Going a step further, a pithy article by Andersen [ 41 ] proffered that we may not need to look for causality or mechanistic explanations anymore if we just have enough correlation: “With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves, correlation replaces causation, and science can advance even without coherent models or unified theories.”

Of course, the proposal to abandon the quest for causality caused pushback on philosophical as well as mathematical grounds. Allen [ 10 , 35 ] considered the idea “absurd” that data analysis could enhance understanding in the absence of a hypothesis. He felt confident “that even the formidable combination of computing power with ease of access to data cannot produce a qualitative shift in the way that we do science: the making of hypotheses remains an indispensable component in the growth of knowledge” [ 36 ]. Succi and Coveney [ 42 ] refuted the “most extravagant claims” of big-data proponents very differently, namely by analyzing the theories on which machine learning is founded. They contrasted the assumptions underlying these theories, such as the law of large numbers, with the mathematical reality of complex biological systems. Specifically, they carefully identified genuine features of these systems, such as nonlinearities, nonlocality of effects, fractal aspects, and high dimensionality, and argued that they fundamentally violate some of the statistical assumptions implicitly underlying big-data analysis, like independence of events. They concluded that these discrepancies “may lead to false expectations and, at their nadir, even to dangerous social, economical and political manipulation.” To ameliorate the situation, the field of big-data analysis would need new strong theorems characterizing the validity of its methods and the numbers of data required for obtaining reliable insights. Succi and Coveney go as far as stating that too many data are just as bad as insufficient data [ 42 ].

While philosophical doubts regarding inductive methods will always persist, one cannot deny that -omics-based, high-throughput studies, combined with machine learning and big-data analysis, have been very successful [ 43 ]. Yes, induction cannot truly reveal general laws, no matter how large the datasets, but they do provide insights that are very different from what science had offered before and may at least suggest novel patterns, trends, or principles. As a case in point, if many transcriptomic studies indicate that a particular gene set is involved in certain classes of phenomena, there is probably some truth to the observation, even though it is not mathematically provable. Kepler’s laws of astronomy were arguably derived solely from inductive reasoning [ 34 ].

Notwithstanding the opposing views on inductive methods, successful strategies shape how we think about science. Thus, to take advantage of all experimental options while ensuring quality of research, we must not allow that “anything goes” but instead identify and characterize standard operating procedures and controls that render this emerging scientific method valid and reproducible. A laudable step in this direction was the wide acceptance of “minimum information about a microarray experiment” (MIAME) standards for microarray experiments [ 44 ].

A third dimension of the scientific method: Allochthonous reasoning

Parallel to the blossoming of molecular biology and the rapid rise in the power and availability of computing in the late 20th century, the use of mathematical and computational models became increasingly recognized as relevant and beneficial for understanding biological phenomena. Indeed, mathematical models eventually achieved cornerstone status in the new field of computational systems biology.

Mathematical modeling has been used as a tool of biological analysis for a long time [ 27 , 45 – 48 ]. Interesting for the discussion here is that the use of mathematical and computational modeling in biology follows a scientific approach that is distinctly different from the traditional and the data-driven methods, because it is distributed over two entirely separate domains of knowledge. One consists of the biological reality of DNA, elephants, and roses, whereas the other is the world of mathematics, which is governed by numbers, symbols, theorems, and abstract work protocols. Because the ways of thinking—and even the languages—are different in these two realms, I suggest calling this type of knowledge acquisition “allochthonous” (literally Greek: in or from a “piece of land different from where one is at home”; one could perhaps translate it into modern lingo as “outside one’s comfort zone”). De facto, most allochthonous reasoning in biology presently refers to mathematics and computing, but one might also consider, for instance, the application of methods from linguistics in the analysis of DNA sequences or proteins [ 49 ].

One could argue that biologists have employed “models” for a long time, for instance, in the form of “model organisms,” cell lines, or in vitro experiments, which more or less faithfully reflect features of the organisms of true interest but are easier to manipulate. However, this type of biological model use is rather different from allochthonous reasoning, as it does not leave the realm of biology and uses the same language and often similar methodologies.

A brief discussion of three experiences from our lab may illustrate the benefits of allochthonous reasoning. (1) In a case study of renal cell carcinoma, a dynamic model was able to explain an observed yet nonintuitive metabolic profile in terms of the enzymatic reaction steps that had been altered during the disease [ 50 ]. (2) A transcriptome analysis had identified several genes as displaying significantly different expression patterns during malaria infection in comparison to the state of health. Considered by themselves and focusing solely on genes coding for specific enzymes of purine metabolism, the findings showed patterns that did not make sense. However, integrating the changes in a dynamic model revealed that purine metabolism globally shifted, in response to malaria, from guanine compounds to adenine, inosine, and hypoxanthine [ 51 ]. (3) Data capturing the dynamics of malaria parasites suggested growth rates that were biologically impossible. Speculation regarding possible explanations led to the hypothesis that many parasite-harboring red blood cells might “hide” from circulation and therewith from detection in the blood stream. While experimental testing of the feasibility of the hypothesis would have been expensive, a dynamic model confirmed that such a concealment mechanism could indeed quantitatively explain the apparently very high growth rates [ 52 ]. In all three cases, the insights gained inductively from computational modeling would have been difficult to obtain purely with experimental laboratory methods. Purely deductive allochthonous reasoning is the ultimate goal of the search for design and operating principles [ 53 – 55 ], which strives to explain why certain structures or functions are employed by nature time and again. An example is a linear metabolic pathway, in which feedback inhibition is essentially always exerted on the first step [ 56 , 57 ]. This generality allows the deduction that a so far unstudied linear pathway is most likely (or even certain to be) inhibited at the first step. Not strictly deductive—but rather abductive—was a study in our lab in which we analyzed time series data with a mathematical model that allowed us to infer the most likely regulatory structure of a metabolic pathway [ 58 , 59 ].

A typical allochthonous investigation begins in the realm of biology with the formulation of a hypothesis ( Fig 3 ). Instead of testing this hypothesis with laboratory experiments, the system encompassing the hypothesis is moved into the realm of mathematics. This move requires two sets of ingredients. One set consists of the simplification and abstraction of the biological system: Any distracting details that seem unrelated to the hypothesis and its context are omitted or represented collectively with other details. This simplification step carries the greatest risk of the entire modeling approach, as omission of seemingly negligible but, in truth, important details can easily lead to wrong results. The second set of ingredients consists of correspondence rules that translate every biological component or process into the language of mathematics [ 60 , 61 ].

This mathematical and computational approach is distributed over two realms, which are connected by correspondence rules.

Once the system is translated, it has become an entirely mathematical construct that can be analyzed purely with mathematical and computational means. The results of this analysis are also strictly mathematical. They typically consist of values of variables, magnitudes of processes, sensitivity patterns, signs of eigenvalues, or qualitative features like the onset of oscillations or the potential for limit cycles. Correspondence rules are used again to move these results back into the realm of biology. As an example, the mathematical result that “two eigenvalues have positive real parts” does not make much sense to many biologists, whereas the interpretation that “the system is not stable at the steady state in question” is readily explained. New biological insights may lead to new hypotheses, which are tested either by experiments or by returning once more to the realm of mathematics. The model design, diagnosis, refinements, and validation consist of several phases, which have been discussed widely in the biomathematical literature. Importantly, each iteration of a typical modeling analysis consists of a move from the biological to the mathematical realm and back.

The reasoning within the realm of mathematics is often deductive, in the form of an Aristotelian syllogism, such as the well-known “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” However, the reasoning may also be inductive, as it is the case with large-scale Monte-Carlo simulations that generate arbitrarily many “observations,” although they cannot reveal universal principles or theorems. An example is a simulation randomly drawing numbers in an attempt to show that every real number has an inverse. The simulation will always attest to this hypothesis but fail to discover the truth because it will never randomly draw 0. Generically, computational models may be considered sets of hypotheses, formulated as equations or as algorithms that reflect our perception of a complex system [ 27 ].

Impact of the multidimensional scientific method on learning

Almost all we know in biology has come from observation, experimentation, and interpretation. The traditional scientific method not only offered clear guidance for this knowledge gathering, but it also fundamentally shaped the way we think about the exploration of nature. When presented with a new research question, scientists were trained to think immediately in terms of hypotheses and alternatives, pondering the best feasible ways of testing them, and designing in their minds strong controls that would limit the effects of known or unknown confounders. Shaped by the rigidity of this ever-repeating process, our thinking became trained to move forward one well-planned step at a time. This modus operandi was rigid and exact. It also minimized the erroneous pursuit of long speculative lines of thought, because every step required testing before a new hypothesis was formed. While effective, the process was also very slow and driven by ingenuity—as well as bias—on the scientist’s part. This bias was sometimes a hindrance to necessary paradigm shifts [ 22 ].

High-throughput data generation, big-data analysis, and mathematical-computational modeling changed all that within a few decades. In particular, the acceptance of inductive principles and of the allochthonous use of nonbiological strategies to answer biological questions created an unprecedented mix of successes and chaos. To the horror of traditionalists, the importance of hypotheses became minimized, and the suggestion spread that the data would speak for themselves [ 36 ]. Importantly, within this fog of “anything goes,” the fundamental question arose how to determine whether an experiment was valid.

Because agreed-upon operating procedures affect research progress and interpretation, thinking, teaching, and sharing of results, this question requires a deconvolution of scientific strategies. Here I proffer that the single scientific method of the past should be expanded toward a vector space of scientific methods, with spanning vectors that correspond to different dimensions of the scientific method ( Fig 4 ).

The traditional hypothesis-based deductive scientific method is expanded into a 3D space that allows for synergistic blends of methods that include data-mining–inspired, inductive knowledge acquisition, and mathematical model-based, allochthonous reasoning.

Obviously, all three dimensions have their advantages and drawbacks. The traditional, hypothesis-driven deductive method is philosophically “clean,” except that it is confounded by preconceptions and assumptions. The data-mining–inspired inductive method cannot offer universal truths but helps us explore very large spaces of factors that contribute to a phenomenon. Allochthonous, model-based reasoning can be performed mentally, with paper and pencil, through rigorous analysis, or with a host of computational methods that are precise and disprovable [ 27 ]. At the same time, they are incomparable faster, cheaper, and much more comprehensive than experiments in molecular biology. This reduction in cost and time, and the increase in coverage, may eventually have far-reaching consequences, as we can already fathom from much of modern physics.

Due to its long history, the traditional dimension of the scientific method is supported by clear and very strong standard operating procedures. Similarly, strong procedures need to be developed for the other two dimensions. The MIAME rules for microarray analysis provide an excellent example [ 44 ]. On the mathematical modeling front, no such rules are generally accepted yet, but trends toward them seem to emerge at the horizon. For instance, it seems to be becoming common practice to include sensitivity analyses in typical modeling studies and to assess the identifiability or sloppiness of ensembles of parameter combinations that fit a given dataset well [ 62 , 63 ].

From a philosophical point of view, it seems unlikely that objections against inductive reasoning will disappear. However, instead of pitting hypothesis-based deductive reasoning against inductivism, it seems more beneficial to determine how the different methods can be synergistically blended ( cf . [ 18 , 27 , 34 , 42 ]) as linear combinations of the three vectors of knowledge acquisition ( Fig 4 ). It is at this point unclear to what degree the identified three dimensions are truly independent of each other, whether additional dimensions should be added [ 24 ], or whether the different versions could be amalgamated into a single scientific method [ 18 ], especially if it is loosely defined as a form of critical thinking [ 8 ]. Nobel Laureate Percy Bridgman even concluded that “science is what scientists do, and there are as many scientific methods as there are individual scientists” [ 8 , 64 ].

Combinations of the three spanning vectors of the scientific method have been emerging for some time. Many biologists already use inductive high-throughput methods to develop specific hypotheses that are subsequently tested with deductive or further inductive methods [ 34 , 65 ]. In terms of including mathematical modeling, physics and geology have been leading the way for a long time, often by beginning an investigation in theory, before any actual experiment is performed. It will benefit biology to look into this strategy and to develop best practices of allochthonous reasoning.

The blending of methods may take quite different shapes. Early on, Ideker and colleagues [ 65 ] proposed an integrated experimental approach for pathway analysis that offered a glimpse of new experimental strategies within the space of scientific methods. In a similar vein, Covert and colleagues [ 66 ] included computational methods into such an integrated approach. Additional examples of blended analyses in systems biology can be seen in other works, such as [ 43 , 67 – 73 ]. Generically, it is often beneficial to start with big data, determine patterns in associations and correlations, then switch to the mathematical realm in order to filter out spurious correlations in a high-throughput fashion. If this procedure is executed in an iterative manner, the “surviving” associations have an increased level of confidence and are good candidates for further experimental or computational testing (personal communication from S. Chandrasekaran).

If each component of a blended scientific method follows strict, commonly agreed guidelines, “linear combinations” within the 3D space can also be checked objectively, per deconvolution. In addition, guidelines for synergistic blends of component procedures should be developed. If we carefully monitor such blends, time will presumably indicate which method is best for which task and how the different approaches optimally inform each other. For instance, it will be interesting to study whether there is an optimal sequence of experiments along the three axes for a particular class of tasks. Big-data analysis together with inductive reasoning might be optimal for creating initial hypotheses and possibly refuting wrong speculations (“we had thought this gene would be involved, but apparently it isn’t”). If the logic of an emerging hypotheses can be tested with mathematical and computational tools, it will almost certainly be faster and cheaper than an immediate launch into wet-lab experimentation. It is also likely that mathematical reasoning will be able to refute some apparently feasible hypothesis and suggest amendments. Ultimately, the “surviving” hypotheses must still be tested for validity through conventional experiments. Deconvolving current practices and optimizing the combination of methods within the 3D or higher-dimensional space of scientific methods will likely result in better planning of experiments and in synergistic blends of approaches that have the potential capacity of addressing some of the grand challenges in biology.

Acknowledgments

The author is very grateful to Dr. Sriram Chandrasekaran and Ms. Carla Kumbale for superb suggestions and invaluable feedback.

Funding Statement

This work was supported in part by grants from the National Science Foundation ( https://www.nsf.gov/div/index.jsp?div=MCB ) grant NSF-MCB-1517588 (PI: EOV), NSF-MCB-1615373 (PI: Diana Downs) and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences ( https://www.niehs.nih.gov/ ) grant NIH-2P30ES019776-05 (PI: Carmen Marsit). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Six Steps of the Scientific Method

Learn What Makes Each Stage Important

ThoughtCo. / Hugo Lin 

• Scientific Method
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• Ph.D., Biomedical Sciences, University of Tennessee at Knoxville
• B.A., Physics and Mathematics, Hastings College

The scientific method is a systematic way of learning about the world around us. The key difference between the scientific method and other ways of acquiring knowledge is that, when using the scientific method, we make hypotheses and then test them with an experiment.

Anyone can use the scientific method to acquire knowledge by asking questions and then working to find the answers to those questions. Below are the six steps involved in the scientific method and variables you may encounter when working with this method.

The Six Steps

The number of steps in the scientific method can vary from one description to another (which mainly happens when data and analysis are separated into separate steps), however, below is a fairly standard list of the six steps you'll likely be expected to know for any science class:

• Purpose/Question Ask a question.
• Research Conduct background research. Write down your sources so you can cite your references. In the modern era, you might conduct much of your research online. As you read articles and papers online, ensure you scroll to the bottom of the text to check the author's references. Even if you can't access the full text of a published article, you can usually view the abstract to see the summary of other experiments . Interview experts on a topic. The more you know about a subject, the easier it'll be to conduct your investigation.
• Hypothesis Propose a hypothesis . This is a sort of educated guess about what you expect your research to reveal. A hypothesis is a statement used to predict the outcome of an experiment. Usually, a hypothesis is written in terms of cause and effect. Alternatively, it may describe the relationship between two phenomena. The null hypothesis or the no-difference hypothesis is one type of hypothesis that's easy to test because it assumes changing a variable will not affect the outcome. In reality, you probably expect a change, but rejecting a hypothesis may be more useful than accepting one.
• Experiment Design and experiment to test your hypothesis. An experiment has an independent and dependent variable. You change or control the independent variable and record the effect it has on the dependent variable . It's important to change only one variable for an experiment rather than try to combine the effects of variables in an experiment. For example, if you want to test the effects of light intensity and fertilizer concentration on the growth rate of a plant, you're looking at two separate experiments.
• Data/Analysis Record observations and analyze the meaning of the data. Often, you'll prepare a table or graph of the data. Don't throw out data points you think are bad or that don't support your predictions. Some of the most incredible discoveries in science were made because the data looked wrong! Once you have the data, you may need to perform a mathematical analysis to support or refute your hypothesis.
• Conclusion Conclude whether to accept or reject your hypothesis. There's no right or wrong outcome to an experiment, so either result is fine. Accepting a hypothesis doesn't necessarily mean it's correct! Sometimes repeating an experiment may give a different result. In other cases, a hypothesis may predict an outcome, yet you might draw an incorrect conclusion. Communicate your results. You can compile your results into a lab report or formally submit them as a paper . Whether you accept or reject the hypothesis, you likely learned something about the subject and may wish to revise the original hypothesis or form a new one for a future experiment.

Scientific Method Steps in Psychology Research

Steps, Uses, and Key Terms

Verywell / Theresa Chiechi

How do researchers investigate psychological phenomena? They utilize a process known as the scientific method to study different aspects of how people think and behave.

When conducting research, the scientific method steps to follow are:

• Observe what you want to investigate
• Ask a research question and make predictions
• Test the hypothesis and collect data
• Examine the results and draw conclusions
• Report and share the results 

This process not only allows scientists to investigate and understand different psychological phenomena but also provides researchers and others a way to share and discuss the results of their studies.

Generally, there are five main steps in the scientific method, although some may break down this process into six or seven steps. An additional step in the process can also include developing new research questions based on your findings.

What Is the Scientific Method?

What is the scientific method and how is it used in psychology?

The scientific method consists of five steps. It is essentially a step-by-step process that researchers can follow to determine if there is some type of relationship between two or more variables.

By knowing the steps of the scientific method, you can better understand the process researchers go through to arrive at conclusions about human behavior.

Scientific Method Steps

While research studies can vary, these are the basic steps that psychologists and scientists use when investigating human behavior.

The following are the scientific method steps:

Step 1. Make an Observation

Before a researcher can begin, they must choose a topic to study. Once an area of interest has been chosen, the researchers must then conduct a thorough review of the existing literature on the subject. This review will provide valuable information about what has already been learned about the topic and what questions remain to be answered.

A literature review might involve looking at a considerable amount of written material from both books and academic journals dating back decades.

The relevant information collected by the researcher will be presented in the introduction section of the final published study results. This background material will also help the researcher with the first major step in conducting a psychology study: formulating a hypothesis.

Step 2. Ask a Question

Once a researcher has observed something and gained some background information on the topic, the next step is to ask a question. The researcher will form a hypothesis, which is an educated guess about the relationship between two or more variables

For example, a researcher might ask a question about the relationship between sleep and academic performance: Do students who get more sleep perform better on tests at school?

In order to formulate a good hypothesis, it is important to think about different questions you might have about a particular topic.

You should also consider how you could investigate the causes. Falsifiability is an important part of any valid hypothesis. In other words, if a hypothesis was false, there needs to be a way for scientists to demonstrate that it is false.

Step 3. Test Your Hypothesis and Collect Data

Once you have a solid hypothesis, the next step of the scientific method is to put this hunch to the test by collecting data. The exact methods used to investigate a hypothesis depend on exactly what is being studied. There are two basic forms of research that a psychologist might utilize: descriptive research or experimental research.

Descriptive research is typically used when it would be difficult or even impossible to manipulate the variables in question. Examples of descriptive research include case studies, naturalistic observation , and correlation studies. Phone surveys that are often used by marketers are one example of descriptive research.

Correlational studies are quite common in psychology research. While they do not allow researchers to determine cause-and-effect, they do make it possible to spot relationships between different variables and to measure the strength of those relationships. 

Experimental research is used to explore cause-and-effect relationships between two or more variables. This type of research involves systematically manipulating an independent variable and then measuring the effect that it has on a defined dependent variable .

One of the major advantages of this method is that it allows researchers to actually determine if changes in one variable actually cause changes in another.

While psychology experiments are often quite complex, a simple experiment is fairly basic but does allow researchers to determine cause-and-effect relationships between variables. Most simple experiments use a control group (those who do not receive the treatment) and an experimental group (those who do receive the treatment).

Step 4. Examine the Results and Draw Conclusions

Once a researcher has designed the study and collected the data, it is time to examine this information and draw conclusions about what has been found.  Using statistics , researchers can summarize the data, analyze the results, and draw conclusions based on this evidence.

So how does a researcher decide what the results of a study mean? Not only can statistical analysis support (or refute) the researcher’s hypothesis; it can also be used to determine if the findings are statistically significant.

When results are said to be statistically significant, it means that it is unlikely that these results are due to chance.

Based on these observations, researchers must then determine what the results mean. In some cases, an experiment will support a hypothesis, but in other cases, it will fail to support the hypothesis.

So what happens if the results of a psychology experiment do not support the researcher's hypothesis? Does this mean that the study was worthless?

Just because the findings fail to support the hypothesis does not mean that the research is not useful or informative. In fact, such research plays an important role in helping scientists develop new questions and hypotheses to explore in the future.

After conclusions have been drawn, the next step is to share the results with the rest of the scientific community. This is an important part of the process because it contributes to the overall knowledge base and can help other scientists find new research avenues to explore.

Step 5. Report the Results

The final step in a psychology study is to report the findings. This is often done by writing up a description of the study and publishing the article in an academic or professional journal. The results of psychological studies can be seen in peer-reviewed journals such as  Psychological Bulletin , the  Journal of Social Psychology ,  Developmental Psychology , and many others.

The structure of a journal article follows a specified format that has been outlined by the  American Psychological Association (APA) . In these articles, researchers:

• Provide a brief history and background on previous research
• Present their hypothesis
• Identify who participated in the study and how they were selected
• Provide operational definitions for each variable
• Describe the measures and procedures that were used to collect data
• Explain how the information collected was analyzed
• Discuss what the results mean

Why is such a detailed record of a psychological study so important? By clearly explaining the steps and procedures used throughout the study, other researchers can then replicate the results. The editorial process employed by academic and professional journals ensures that each article that is submitted undergoes a thorough peer review, which helps ensure that the study is scientifically sound.

Once published, the study becomes another piece of the existing puzzle of our knowledge base on that topic.

Before you begin exploring the scientific method steps, here's a review of some key terms and definitions that you should be familiar with:

• Falsifiable : The variables can be measured so that if a hypothesis is false, it can be proven false
• Hypothesis : An educated guess about the possible relationship between two or more variables
• Variable : A factor or element that can change in observable and measurable ways
• Operational definition : A full description of exactly how variables are defined, how they will be manipulated, and how they will be measured

Uses for the Scientific Method

The  goals of psychological studies  are to describe, explain, predict and perhaps influence mental processes or behaviors. In order to do this, psychologists utilize the scientific method to conduct psychological research. The scientific method is a set of principles and procedures that are used by researchers to develop questions, collect data, and reach conclusions.

Goals of Scientific Research in Psychology

Researchers seek not only to describe behaviors and explain why these behaviors occur; they also strive to create research that can be used to predict and even change human behavior.

Psychologists and other social scientists regularly propose explanations for human behavior. On a more informal level, people make judgments about the intentions, motivations , and actions of others on a daily basis.

While the everyday judgments we make about human behavior are subjective and anecdotal, researchers use the scientific method to study psychology in an objective and systematic way. The results of these studies are often reported in popular media, which leads many to wonder just how or why researchers arrived at the conclusions they did.

Examples of the Scientific Method

Now that you're familiar with the scientific method steps, it's useful to see how each step could work with a real-life example.

Say, for instance, that researchers set out to discover what the relationship is between psychotherapy and anxiety .

• Step 1. Make an observation : The researchers choose to focus their study on adults ages 25 to 40 with generalized anxiety disorder.
• Step 2. Ask a question : The question they want to answer in their study is: Do weekly psychotherapy sessions reduce symptoms in adults ages 25 to 40 with generalized anxiety disorder?
• Step 3. Test your hypothesis : Researchers collect data on participants' anxiety symptoms . They work with therapists to create a consistent program that all participants undergo. Group 1 may attend therapy once per week, whereas group 2 does not attend therapy.
• Step 4. Examine the results : Participants record their symptoms and any changes over a period of three months. After this period, people in group 1 report significant improvements in their anxiety symptoms, whereas those in group 2 report no significant changes.
• Step 5. Report the results : Researchers write a report that includes their hypothesis, information on participants, variables, procedure, and conclusions drawn from the study. In this case, they say that "Weekly therapy sessions are shown to reduce anxiety symptoms in adults ages 25 to 40."

Of course, there are many details that go into planning and executing a study such as this. But this general outline gives you an idea of how an idea is formulated and tested, and how researchers arrive at results using the scientific method.

Erol A. How to conduct scientific research ? Noro Psikiyatr Ars . 2017;54(2):97-98. doi:10.5152/npa.2017.0120102

University of Minnesota. Psychologists use the scientific method to guide their research .

Shaughnessy, JJ, Zechmeister, EB, & Zechmeister, JS. Research Methods In Psychology . New York: McGraw Hill Education; 2015.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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The 6 Scientific Method Steps and How to Use Them

General Education

When you’re faced with a scientific problem, solving it can seem like an impossible prospect. There are so many possible explanations for everything we see and experience—how can you possibly make sense of them all? Science has a simple answer: the scientific method.

The scientific method is a method of asking and answering questions about the world. These guiding principles give scientists a model to work through when trying to understand the world, but where did that model come from, and how does it work?

In this article, we’ll define the scientific method, discuss its long history, and cover each of the scientific method steps in detail.

What Is the Scientific Method?

At its most basic, the scientific method is a procedure for conducting scientific experiments. It’s a set model that scientists in a variety of fields can follow, going from initial observation to conclusion in a loose but concrete format.

The number of steps varies, but the process begins with an observation, progresses through an experiment, and concludes with analysis and sharing data. One of the most important pieces to the scientific method is skepticism —the goal is to find truth, not to confirm a particular thought. That requires reevaluation and repeated experimentation, as well as examining your thinking through rigorous study.

There are in fact multiple scientific methods, as the basic structure can be easily modified.  The one we typically learn about in school is the basic method, based in logic and problem solving, typically used in “hard” science fields like biology, chemistry, and physics. It may vary in other fields, such as psychology, but the basic premise of making observations, testing, and continuing to improve a theory from the results remain the same.

The History of the Scientific Method

The scientific method as we know it today is based on thousands of years of scientific study. Its development goes all the way back to ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, and India.

The Ancient World

In ancient Greece, Aristotle devised an inductive-deductive process , which weighs broad generalizations from data against conclusions reached by narrowing down possibilities from a general statement. However, he favored deductive reasoning, as it identifies causes, which he saw as more important.

Aristotle wrote a great deal about logic and many of his ideas about reasoning echo those found in the modern scientific method, such as ignoring circular evidence and limiting the number of middle terms between the beginning of an experiment and the end. Though his model isn’t the one that we use today, the reliance on logic and thorough testing are still key parts of science today.

The Middle Ages

The next big step toward the development of the modern scientific method came in the Middle Ages, particularly in the Islamic world. Ibn al-Haytham, a physicist from what we now know as Iraq, developed a method of testing, observing, and deducing for his research on vision. al-Haytham was critical of Aristotle’s lack of inductive reasoning, which played an important role in his own research.

Other scientists, including Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Sina, and Robert Grosseteste also developed models of scientific reasoning to test their own theories. Though they frequently disagreed with one another and Aristotle, those disagreements and refinements of their methods led to the scientific method we have today.

Following those major developments, particularly Grosseteste’s work, Roger Bacon developed his own cycle of observation (seeing that something occurs), hypothesis (making a guess about why that thing occurs), experimentation (testing that the thing occurs), and verification (an outside person ensuring that the result of the experiment is consistent).

After joining the Franciscan Order, Bacon was granted a special commission to write about science; typically, Friars were not allowed to write books or pamphlets. With this commission, Bacon outlined important tenets of the scientific method, including causes of error, methods of knowledge, and the differences between speculative and experimental science. He also used his own principles to investigate the causes of a rainbow, demonstrating the method’s effectiveness.

Scientific Revolution

Throughout the Renaissance, more great thinkers became involved in devising a thorough, rigorous method of scientific study. Francis Bacon brought inductive reasoning further into the method, whereas Descartes argued that the laws of the universe meant that deductive reasoning was sufficient. Galileo’s research was also inductive reasoning-heavy, as he believed that researchers could not account for every possible variable; therefore, repetition was necessary to eliminate faulty hypotheses and experiments.

All of this led to the birth of the Scientific Revolution , which took place during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 1660, a group of philosophers and physicians joined together to work on scientific advancement. After approval from England’s crown , the group became known as the Royal Society, which helped create a thriving scientific community and an early academic journal to help introduce rigorous study and peer review.

Previous generations of scientists had touched on the importance of induction and deduction, but Sir Isaac Newton proposed that both were equally important. This contribution helped establish the importance of multiple kinds of reasoning, leading to more rigorous study.

As science began to splinter into separate areas of study, it became necessary to define different methods for different fields. Karl Popper was a leader in this area—he established that science could be subject to error, sometimes intentionally. This was particularly tricky for “soft” sciences like psychology and social sciences, which require different methods. Popper’s theories furthered the divide between sciences like psychology and “hard” sciences like chemistry or physics.

Paul Feyerabend argued that Popper’s methods were too restrictive for certain fields, and followed a less restrictive method hinged on “anything goes,” as great scientists had made discoveries without the Scientific Method. Feyerabend suggested that throughout history scientists had adapted their methods as necessary, and that sometimes it would be necessary to break the rules. This approach suited social and behavioral scientists particularly well, leading to a more diverse range of models for scientists in multiple fields to use.

The Scientific Method Steps

Though different fields may have variations on the model, the basic scientific method is as follows:

#1: Make Observations 

Notice something, such as the air temperature during the winter, what happens when ice cream melts, or how your plants behave when you forget to water them.

#2: Ask a Question

Turn your observation into a question. Why is the temperature lower during the winter? Why does my ice cream melt? Why does my toast always fall butter-side down?

This step can also include doing some research. You may be able to find answers to these questions already, but you can still test them!

#3: Make a Hypothesis

A hypothesis is an educated guess of the answer to your question. Why does your toast always fall butter-side down? Maybe it’s because the butter makes that side of the bread heavier.

A good hypothesis leads to a prediction that you can test, phrased as an if/then statement. In this case, we can pick something like, “If toast is buttered, then it will hit the ground butter-first.”

#4: Experiment

Your experiment is designed to test whether your predication about what will happen is true. A good experiment will test one variable at a time —for example, we’re trying to test whether butter weighs down one side of toast, making it more likely to hit the ground first.

The unbuttered toast is our control variable. If we determine the chance that a slice of unbuttered toast, marked with a dot, will hit the ground on a particular side, we can compare those results to our buttered toast to see if there’s a correlation between the presence of butter and which way the toast falls.

If we decided not to toast the bread, that would be introducing a new question—whether or not toasting the bread has any impact on how it falls. Since that’s not part of our test, we’ll stick with determining whether the presence of butter has any impact on which side hits the ground first.

#5: Analyze Data

After our experiment, we discover that both buttered toast and unbuttered toast have a 50/50 chance of hitting the ground on the buttered or marked side when dropped from a consistent height, straight down. It looks like our hypothesis was incorrect—it’s not the butter that makes the toast hit the ground in a particular way, so it must be something else.

Since we didn’t get the desired result, it’s back to the drawing board. Our hypothesis wasn’t correct, so we’ll need to start fresh. Now that you think about it, your toast seems to hit the ground butter-first when it slides off your plate, not when you drop it from a consistent height. That can be the basis for your new experiment.

#6: Communicate Your Results

Good science needs verification. Your experiment should be replicable by other people, so you can put together a report about how you ran your experiment to see if other peoples’ findings are consistent with yours.

This may be useful for class or a science fair. Professional scientists may publish their findings in scientific journals, where other scientists can read and attempt their own versions of the same experiments. Being part of a scientific community helps your experiments be stronger because other people can see if there are flaws in your approach—such as if you tested with different kinds of bread, or sometimes used peanut butter instead of butter—that can lead you closer to a good answer.

A Scientific Method Example: Falling Toast

We’ve run through a quick recap of the scientific method steps, but let’s look a little deeper by trying again to figure out why toast so often falls butter side down.

#1: Make Observations

At the end of our last experiment, where we learned that butter doesn’t actually make toast more likely to hit the ground on that side, we remembered that the times when our toast hits the ground butter side first are usually when it’s falling off a plate.

The easiest question we can ask is, “Why is that?”

We can actually search this online and find a pretty detailed answer as to why this is true. But we’re budding scientists—we want to see it in action and verify it for ourselves! After all, good science should be replicable, and we have all the tools we need to test out what’s really going on.

Why do we think that buttered toast hits the ground butter-first? We know it’s not because it’s heavier, so we can strike that out. Maybe it’s because of the shape of our plate?

That’s something we can test. We’ll phrase our hypothesis as, “If my toast slides off my plate, then it will fall butter-side down.”

Just seeing that toast falls off a plate butter-side down isn’t enough for us. We want to know why, so we’re going to take things a step further—we’ll set up a slow-motion camera to capture what happens as the toast slides off the plate.

We’ll run the test ten times, each time tilting the same plate until the toast slides off. We’ll make note of each time the butter side lands first and see what’s happening on the video so we can see what’s going on.

When we review the footage, we’ll likely notice that the bread starts to flip when it slides off the edge, changing how it falls in a way that didn’t happen when we dropped it ourselves.

That answers our question, but it’s not the complete picture —how do other plates affect how often toast hits the ground butter-first? What if the toast is already butter-side down when it falls? These are things we can test in further experiments with new hypotheses!

Now that we have results, we can share them with others who can verify our results. As mentioned above, being part of the scientific community can lead to better results. If your results were wildly different from the established thinking about buttered toast, that might be cause for reevaluation. If they’re the same, they might lead others to make new discoveries about buttered toast. At the very least, you have a cool experiment you can share with your friends!

Key Scientific Method Tips

Though science can be complex, the benefit of the scientific method is that it gives you an easy-to-follow means of thinking about why and how things happen. To use it effectively, keep these things in mind!

Don’t Worry About Proving Your Hypothesis

One of the important things to remember about the scientific method is that it’s not necessarily meant to prove your hypothesis right. It’s great if you do manage to guess the reason for something right the first time, but the ultimate goal of an experiment is to find the true reason for your observation to occur, not to prove your hypothesis right.

Good science sometimes means that you’re wrong. That’s not a bad thing—a well-designed experiment with an unanticipated result can be just as revealing, if not more, than an experiment that confirms your hypothesis.

Be Prepared to Try Again

If the data from your experiment doesn’t match your hypothesis, that’s not a bad thing. You’ve eliminated one possible explanation, which brings you one step closer to discovering the truth.

The scientific method isn’t something you’re meant to do exactly once to prove a point. It’s meant to be repeated and adapted to bring you closer to a solution. Even if you can demonstrate truth in your hypothesis, a good scientist will run an experiment again to be sure that the results are replicable. You can even tweak a successful hypothesis to test another factor, such as if we redid our buttered toast experiment to find out whether different kinds of plates affect whether or not the toast falls butter-first. The more we test our hypothesis, the stronger it becomes!

What’s Next?

Want to learn more about the scientific method? These important high school science classes will no doubt cover it in a variety of different contexts.

Test your ability to follow the scientific method using these at-home science experiments for kids !

Need some proof that science is fun? Try making slime

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Melissa Brinks graduated from the University of Washington in 2014 with a Bachelor's in English with a creative writing emphasis. She has spent several years tutoring K-12 students in many subjects, including in SAT prep, to help them prepare for their college education.

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Scientific Methods

What is scientific method.

The Scientific method is a process with the help of which scientists try to investigate, verify, or construct an accurate and reliable version of any natural phenomena. They are done by creating an objective framework for the purpose of scientific inquiry and analysing the results scientifically to come to a conclusion that either supports or contradicts the observation made at the beginning.

Scientific Method Steps

The aim of all scientific methods is the same, that is, to analyse the observation made at the beginning. Still, various steps are adopted per the requirement of any given observation. However, there is a generally accepted sequence of steps in scientific methods.

• Observation and formulation of a question:  This is the first step of a scientific method. To start one, an observation has to be made into any observable aspect or phenomena of the universe, and a question needs to be asked about that aspect. For example, you can ask, “Why is the sky black at night? or “Why is air invisible?”
• Data Collection and Hypothesis:  The next step involved in the scientific method is to collect all related data and formulate a hypothesis based on the observation. The hypothesis could be the cause of the phenomena, its effect, or its relation to any other phenomena.
• Testing the hypothesis:  After the hypothesis is made, it needs to be tested scientifically. Scientists do this by conducting experiments. The aim of these experiments is to determine whether the hypothesis agrees with or contradicts the observations made in the real world. The confidence in the hypothesis increases or decreases based on the result of the experiments.
• Analysis and Conclusion:  This step involves the use of proper mathematical and other scientific procedures to determine the results of the experiment. Based on the analysis, the future course of action can be determined. If the data found in the analysis is consistent with the hypothesis, it is accepted. If not, then it is rejected or modified and analysed again.

It must be remembered that a hypothesis cannot be proved or disproved by doing one experiment. It needs to be done repeatedly until there are no discrepancies in the data and the result. When there are no discrepancies and the hypothesis is proved, it is accepted as a ‘theory’.

Scientific Method Examples

Following is an example of the scientific method:

Growing bean plants:

• What is the purpose: The main purpose of this experiment is to know where the bean plant should be kept inside or outside to check the growth rate and also set the time frame as four weeks.
• Construction of hypothesis: The hypothesis used is that the bean plant can grow anywhere if the scientific methods are used.
• Executing the hypothesis and collecting the data: Four bean plants are planted in identical pots using the same soil. Two are placed inside, and the other two are placed outside. Parameters like the amount of exposure to sunlight, and amount of water all are the same. After the completion of four weeks, all four plant sizes are measured.
• Analyse the data:  While analysing the data, the average height of plants should be taken into account from both places to determine which environment is more suitable for growing the bean plants.
• Conclusion:  The conclusion is drawn after analyzing the data.
• Results:  Results can be reported in the form of a tabular form.

Frequently Asked Questions – FAQs

What is scientific method, what is hypothesis, give an example of a simple hypothesis., define complex hypothesis., what are the steps of the scientific method, what is the aim of scientific methods, state true or false: observation and formulation of a question is the third step of scientific method, explain the step: analysis and conclusion..

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Baconian method

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Baconian method , methodical observation of facts as a means of studying and interpreting natural phenomena. This essentially empirical method was formulated early in the 17th century by Francis Bacon , an English philosopher, as a scientific substitute for the prevailing systems of thought, which, to his mind, relied all to often on fanciful guessing and the mere citing of authorities to establish truths of science . After first dismissing all prejudices and preconceptions, Bacon’s method, as explained in Novum Organum (1620; “New Instrument”), consisted of three main steps: first, a description of facts; second, a tabulation, or classification, of those facts into three categories—instances of the presence of the characteristic under investigation, instances of its absence, or instances of its presence in varying degrees; third, the rejection of whatever appears, in the light of these tables, not to be connected with the phenomenon under investigation and the determination of what is connected with it.

Bacon may be credited with recognizing, in their essence, the method of agreement, the joint method, and the method of concomitant variations. His emphasis on the exhaustive cataloguing of facts, however, has since been replaced as a scientific method , for it provided no means of bringing investigation to an end or of insightful delimitation of the problem by creative use of hypotheses .

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• How to Write a Summary | Guide & Examples

How to Write a Summary | Guide & Examples

Published on November 23, 2020 by Shona McCombes . Revised on May 31, 2023.

Summarizing , or writing a summary, means giving a concise overview of a text’s main points in your own words. A summary is always much shorter than the original text.

There are five key steps that can help you to write a summary:

• Read the text
• Break it down into sections
• Identify the key points in each section
• Write the summary
• Check the summary against the article

Writing a summary does not involve critiquing or evaluating the source . You should simply provide an accurate account of the most important information and ideas (without copying any text from the original).

Table of contents

When to write a summary, step 1: read the text, step 2: break the text down into sections, step 3: identify the key points in each section, step 4: write the summary, step 5: check the summary against the article, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about summarizing.

There are many situations in which you might have to summarize an article or other source:

• As a stand-alone assignment to show you’ve understood the material
• To keep notes that will help you remember what you’ve read
• To give an overview of other researchers’ work in a literature review

When you’re writing an academic text like an essay , research paper , or dissertation , you’ll integrate sources in a variety of ways. You might use a brief quote to support your point, or paraphrase a few sentences or paragraphs.

But it’s often appropriate to summarize a whole article or chapter if it is especially relevant to your own research, or to provide an overview of a source before you analyze or critique it.

In any case, the goal of summarizing is to give your reader a clear understanding of the original source. Follow the five steps outlined below to write a good summary.

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The AI-powered Citation Checker helps you avoid common mistakes such as:

• Missing commas and periods
• Incorrect usage of “et al.”
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You should read the article more than once to make sure you’ve thoroughly understood it. It’s often effective to read in three stages:

• Scan the article quickly to get a sense of its topic and overall shape.
• Read the article carefully, highlighting important points and taking notes as you read.
• Skim the article again to confirm you’ve understood the key points, and reread any particularly important or difficult passages.

There are some tricks you can use to identify the key points as you read:

• Start by reading the abstract . This already contains the author’s own summary of their work, and it tells you what to expect from the article.
• Pay attention to headings and subheadings . These should give you a good sense of what each part is about.
• Read the introduction and the conclusion together and compare them: What did the author set out to do, and what was the outcome?

To make the text more manageable and understand its sub-points, break it down into smaller sections.

If the text is a scientific paper that follows a standard empirical structure, it is probably already organized into clearly marked sections, usually including an introduction , methods , results , and discussion .

Other types of articles may not be explicitly divided into sections. But most articles and essays will be structured around a series of sub-points or themes.

Now it’s time go through each section and pick out its most important points. What does your reader need to know to understand the overall argument or conclusion of the article?

Keep in mind that a summary does not involve paraphrasing every single paragraph of the article. Your goal is to extract the essential points, leaving out anything that can be considered background information or supplementary detail.

In a scientific article, there are some easy questions you can ask to identify the key points in each part.

If the article takes a different form, you might have to think more carefully about what points are most important for the reader to understand its argument.

In that case, pay particular attention to the thesis statement —the central claim that the author wants us to accept, which usually appears in the introduction—and the topic sentences that signal the main idea of each paragraph.

Prevent plagiarism. Run a free check.

Now that you know the key points that the article aims to communicate, you need to put them in your own words.

To avoid plagiarism and show you’ve understood the article, it’s essential to properly paraphrase the author’s ideas. Do not copy and paste parts of the article, not even just a sentence or two.

The best way to do this is to put the article aside and write out your own understanding of the author’s key points.

Examples of article summaries

Let’s take a look at an example. Below, we summarize this article , which scientifically investigates the old saying “an apple a day keeps the doctor away.”

Davis et al. (2015) set out to empirically test the popular saying “an apple a day keeps the doctor away.” Apples are often used to represent a healthy lifestyle, and research has shown their nutritional properties could be beneficial for various aspects of health. The authors’ unique approach is to take the saying literally and ask: do people who eat apples use healthcare services less frequently? If there is indeed such a relationship, they suggest, promoting apple consumption could help reduce healthcare costs.

The study used publicly available cross-sectional data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Participants were categorized as either apple eaters or non-apple eaters based on their self-reported apple consumption in an average 24-hour period. They were also categorized as either avoiding or not avoiding the use of healthcare services in the past year. The data was statistically analyzed to test whether there was an association between apple consumption and several dependent variables: physician visits, hospital stays, use of mental health services, and use of prescription medication.

Although apple eaters were slightly more likely to have avoided physician visits, this relationship was not statistically significant after adjusting for various relevant factors. No association was found between apple consumption and hospital stays or mental health service use. However, apple eaters were found to be slightly more likely to have avoided using prescription medication. Based on these results, the authors conclude that an apple a day does not keep the doctor away, but it may keep the pharmacist away. They suggest that this finding could have implications for reducing healthcare costs, considering the high annual costs of prescription medication and the inexpensiveness of apples.

However, the authors also note several limitations of the study: most importantly, that apple eaters are likely to differ from non-apple eaters in ways that may have confounded the results (for example, apple eaters may be more likely to be health-conscious). To establish any causal relationship between apple consumption and avoidance of medication, they recommend experimental research.

An article summary like the above would be appropriate for a stand-alone summary assignment. However, you’ll often want to give an even more concise summary of an article.

For example, in a literature review or meta analysis you may want to briefly summarize this study as part of a wider discussion of various sources. In this case, we can boil our summary down even further to include only the most relevant information.

Using national survey data, Davis et al. (2015) tested the assertion that “an apple a day keeps the doctor away” and did not find statistically significant evidence to support this hypothesis. While people who consumed apples were slightly less likely to use prescription medications, the study was unable to demonstrate a causal relationship between these variables.

Citing the source you’re summarizing

When including a summary as part of a larger text, it’s essential to properly cite the source you’re summarizing. The exact format depends on your citation style , but it usually includes an in-text citation and a full reference at the end of your paper.

You can easily create your citations and references in APA or MLA using our free citation generators.

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Finally, read through the article once more to ensure that:

• You’ve accurately represented the author’s work
• You haven’t missed any essential information
• The phrasing is not too similar to any sentences in the original.

If you’re summarizing many articles as part of your own work, it may be a good idea to use a plagiarism checker to double-check that your text is completely original and properly cited. Just be sure to use one that’s safe and reliable.

If you want to know more about ChatGPT, AI tools , citation , and plagiarism , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

• ChatGPT vs human editor
• ChatGPT citations
• Is ChatGPT trustworthy?
• Using ChatGPT for your studies
• What is ChatGPT?
• Chicago style
• Paraphrasing

 Plagiarism

• Types of plagiarism
• Self-plagiarism
• Avoiding plagiarism
• Academic integrity
• Consequences of plagiarism
• Common knowledge

A summary is a short overview of the main points of an article or other source, written entirely in your own words. Want to make your life super easy? Try our free text summarizer today!

A summary is always much shorter than the original text. The length of a summary can range from just a few sentences to several paragraphs; it depends on the length of the article you’re summarizing, and on the purpose of the summary.

You might have to write a summary of a source:

• As a stand-alone assignment to prove you understand the material
• For your own use, to keep notes on your reading
• To provide an overview of other researchers’ work in a literature review
• In a paper , to summarize or introduce a relevant study

To avoid plagiarism when summarizing an article or other source, follow these two rules:

• Write the summary entirely in your own words by paraphrasing the author’s ideas.
• Cite the source with an in-text citation and a full reference so your reader can easily find the original text.

An abstract concisely explains all the key points of an academic text such as a thesis , dissertation or journal article. It should summarize the whole text, not just introduce it.

An abstract is a type of summary , but summaries are also written elsewhere in academic writing . For example, you might summarize a source in a paper , in a literature review , or as a standalone assignment.

All can be done within seconds with our free text summarizer .

Cite this Scribbr article

If you want to cite this source, you can copy and paste the citation or click the “Cite this Scribbr article” button to automatically add the citation to our free Citation Generator.

McCombes, S. (2023, May 31). How to Write a Summary | Guide & Examples. Scribbr. Retrieved September 9, 2024, from https://www.scribbr.com/working-with-sources/how-to-summarize/

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Scientific Method: Step 6: CONCLUSION

• Step 1: QUESTION
• Step 2: RESEARCH
• Step 3: HYPOTHESIS
• Step 4: EXPERIMENT
• Step 5: DATA
• Step 6: CONCLUSION

Step 6: Conclusion

Finally, you've reached your conclusion. Now it is time to summarize and explain what happened in your experiment. Your conclusion should answer the question posed in step one. Your conclusion should be based solely on your results.

Think about the following questions:

• Was your hypothesis correct?
• If your hypothesis wasn't correct, what can you conclude from that?
• Do you need to run your experiment again changing a variable?
• Is your data clearly defined so everyone can understand the results and follow your reasoning?

Remember, even a failed experiment can yield a valuable lesson.  

Draw your conclusion

• Conclusion Sections in Scientific Research Reports (The Writing Center at George Mason)
• Sample Conclusions (Science Buddies)
• << Previous: Step 5: DATA
• Next: Resources >>
• Last Updated: Aug 26, 2024 10:04 AM
• URL: https://harford.libguides.com/scientific_method

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Using the scientific method, about author, summary, q & a | for 2nd year students.

About Authors

Darrel bernard:.

Chairman of the department of science education at school of education at New York University, New York.

Lon Edwards:

 Chairman of science Department at Danbury State teachers college in Danbury.

Both supervised the teachers of science College High School, Colorado State College of Education. They are co-authors of the famous book “The new basic science “that was published in 1956. Using the Scientific Method is taken from this book.

At the start, first, we see what the scientific method is? We can divide it into six points

• Make an observation
• Inquire questions about the observation and collect information
• Form a hypothesis
• Test the hypothesis in an experiment
• Analyze the data and draw conclusions; accept or reject the hypothesis or modify it if necessary
• Reproduce the experiment until there are found no discrepancies between observation and theory.

This is an explanatory and factual essay by Darrel Barnard & and Lon Edwards. The authors have delineated in detail how our lives have been modified by using the scientific method. Science has provided the solution to the many problems that we faced before the invention of scientific procedures. Science has revolutionized our lives and we are being benefitted by scientific use.

The writers describe in their essay that science did marvelous in the field of health. It has assisted us in better control of diseases. Science has discovered the causes of many fatal diseases. In the past, babies became the victims of many fatal diseases and died before reaching their 1 st birthday.

 Human beings had to face epidemics and no vaccine was there to save their lives and they died due to the diseases. Life was uncertain and unsure.  The new scientific method has helped us in controlling diseases and human beings are vaccinated now. They are now safe and the life expectancy of people is enhanced. The average age of human beings is now extended to 70 years.

Our sanitary conditions were not good in the past. The houses were narrow and dark. The roads were unpaved, uneven, and rough. There was no system for the drainage of dirty water and people threw garbage on the streets. Now science has addressed the issues relating to hygienic and sanitary conditions. Roads are paved and the water supply is good.

Now here is a proper system of water drainage and people are aware that dirty water becomes the cause of spreading diseases. Now clean water is everywhere and people use it for their households. The water supply is enough for domestic purposes. Science did wonderful in providing good sanitary conditions.

The issue of the scarcity of water is solved. People brought water from far-off places for their use. People use water spendthriftly. But now science has resolved this issue and the availability of water is possible. The scarcity of water is not found now the scientific method also solved the problem of scarcity of food.

 We can obtain fresh food throughout the year. Now, man is fully aware of the preservation method to get fresh fruits, vegetables, seafood, and meat. He is acquainted with the drying method and can use canned food. Their nutritional value is also maintained.

Science has enlightened human minds. Modern people have overcome prejudiced and superstitious thoughts. Now they judge the circumstances logically. Those who think the diseases are caused by evil spirits are fewer in number. Although fortune-tellers are performing their practices yet they affect less the lives of few people.

Now science has changed their way of thinking and attitudes to develop open-mindedness in human beings. Today’s men don’t believe in superstitions. He knows that every incident has cause for its happening. They are no more scared of the black cat, mirror breaking, and with number 13.

They have changed their stale old concepts and are open-hearted and open-minded. They look forward to new things rather to get afraid. Many of their problems are resolved now due to the scientific method.                            

Answers to the Questions

Ans 1: In the past, people died of fatal diseases like yellow fever, typhus, cholera, typhoid fever, measles, and whooping cough. With the use of the scientific method, we can fight against the disease. This all occurred with the invention of modern medicine and epidemic control.

Ans 2: Sanitary conditions in our larger cities, one hundred years ago, were very poor and unhygienic, but today our city streets are paved, well-drained, and well cleaned. Sewage from all the parts of the city is carried through sealed pipes. Clean water is supplied to the people now.

Ans 3: In our villages, sanitary conditions are not good. Streets are not paved and well-drained. The system of sewerage is not proper. We can bring improvement in managed planning and by making people conscious about their health. Streets must be paved. Garbage must be removed.

Ans 4: It has been made possible to increase the production of food by using various fertilizers and pesticides prepared by the scientific method. Moreover, the scientific method has also enabled us to find new ways of preservation of food, dehydration, and quick freeze methods which increase the quality of food.

Ans 5: We are now generally less fearful than our ancestors because they believed in the signs of good or bad luck. They were afraid of black cats, broken mirrors and the number 13. They wore different kinds of charms to avoid bad luck.

Ans 6: superstitious beliefs are got over by the use of the scientific method which has shown that there is no sound basis for them. It has taught us that there is always a good natural reasons for everything that happens.

Ans 7: Astrology and fortune-telling affected the lives of people greatly in the past. People attributed both good and bad to stars. They consulted astrologers before doing anything.

Ans 8: There are a lot of superstitions in our country. People have a strong belief in evil and wrong things. Business of fortune-telling is in all areas of Pakistan. Some people plan their activities in the light of the signs of good and bad luck even.

Anila Ibrahim

An educationist, web content writer, equipped with an LLB and a Master’s degree in English Literature, as well as a Master of Philosophy in Entrepreneurship. I have a comprehensive understanding of both the English language and the educational landscape. This academic background empowers Anila to deliver content that is not only informative but also thoroughly researched.

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GPT-fabricated scientific papers on Google Scholar: Key features, spread, and implications for preempting evidence manipulation

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Academic journals, archives, and repositories are seeing an increasing number of questionable research papers clearly produced using generative AI. They are often created with widely available, general-purpose AI applications, most likely ChatGPT, and mimic scientific writing. Google Scholar easily locates and lists these questionable papers alongside reputable, quality-controlled research. Our analysis of a selection of questionable GPT-fabricated scientific papers found in Google Scholar shows that many are about applied, often controversial topics susceptible to disinformation: the environment, health, and computing. The resulting enhanced potential for malicious manipulation of society’s evidence base, particularly in politically divisive domains, is a growing concern.

Swedish School of Library and Information Science, University of Borås, Sweden

Department of Arts and Cultural Sciences, Lund University, Sweden

Division of Environmental Communication, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden

Research Questions

• Where are questionable publications produced with generative pre-trained transformers (GPTs) that can be found via Google Scholar published or deposited?
• What are the main characteristics of these publications in relation to predominant subject categories?
• How are these publications spread in the research infrastructure for scholarly communication?
• How is the role of the scholarly communication infrastructure challenged in maintaining public trust in science and evidence through inappropriate use of generative AI?

research note Summary

• A sample of scientific papers with signs of GPT-use found on Google Scholar was retrieved, downloaded, and analyzed using a combination of qualitative coding and descriptive statistics. All papers contained at least one of two common phrases returned by conversational agents that use large language models (LLM) like OpenAI’s ChatGPT. Google Search was then used to determine the extent to which copies of questionable, GPT-fabricated papers were available in various repositories, archives, citation databases, and social media platforms.
• Roughly two-thirds of the retrieved papers were found to have been produced, at least in part, through undisclosed, potentially deceptive use of GPT. The majority (57%) of these questionable papers dealt with policy-relevant subjects (i.e., environment, health, computing), susceptible to influence operations. Most were available in several copies on different domains (e.g., social media, archives, and repositories).
• Two main risks arise from the increasingly common use of GPT to (mass-)produce fake, scientific publications. First, the abundance of fabricated “studies” seeping into all areas of the research infrastructure threatens to overwhelm the scholarly communication system and jeopardize the integrity of the scientific record. A second risk lies in the increased possibility that convincingly scientific-looking content was in fact deceitfully created with AI tools and is also optimized to be retrieved by publicly available academic search engines, particularly Google Scholar. However small, this possibility and awareness of it risks undermining the basis for trust in scientific knowledge and poses serious societal risks.

Implications

The use of ChatGPT to generate text for academic papers has raised concerns about research integrity. Discussion of this phenomenon is ongoing in editorials, commentaries, opinion pieces, and on social media (Bom, 2023; Stokel-Walker, 2024; Thorp, 2023). There are now several lists of papers suspected of GPT misuse, and new papers are constantly being added. 1 See for example Academ-AI, https://www.academ-ai.info/ , and Retraction Watch, https://retractionwatch.com/papers-and-peer-reviews-with-evidence-of-chatgpt-writing/ . While many legitimate uses of GPT for research and academic writing exist (Huang & Tan, 2023; Kitamura, 2023; Lund et al., 2023), its undeclared use—beyond proofreading—has potentially far-reaching implications for both science and society, but especially for their relationship. It, therefore, seems important to extend the discussion to one of the most accessible and well-known intermediaries between science, but also certain types of misinformation, and the public, namely Google Scholar, also in response to the legitimate concerns that the discussion of generative AI and misinformation needs to be more nuanced and empirically substantiated  (Simon et al., 2023).

Google Scholar, https://scholar.google.com , is an easy-to-use academic search engine. It is available for free, and its index is extensive (Gusenbauer & Haddaway, 2020). It is also often touted as a credible source for academic literature and even recommended in library guides, by media and information literacy initiatives, and fact checkers (Tripodi et al., 2023). However, Google Scholar lacks the transparency and adherence to standards that usually characterize citation databases. Instead, Google Scholar uses automated crawlers, like Google’s web search engine (Martín-Martín et al., 2021), and the inclusion criteria are based on primarily technical standards, allowing any individual author—with or without scientific affiliation—to upload papers to be indexed (Google Scholar Help, n.d.). It has been shown that Google Scholar is susceptible to manipulation through citation exploits (Antkare, 2020) and by providing access to fake scientific papers (Dadkhah et al., 2017). A large part of Google Scholar’s index consists of publications from established scientific journals or other forms of quality-controlled, scholarly literature. However, the index also contains a large amount of gray literature, including student papers, working papers, reports, preprint servers, and academic networking sites, as well as material from so-called “questionable” academic journals, including paper mills. The search interface does not offer the possibility to filter the results meaningfully by material type, publication status, or form of quality control, such as limiting the search to peer-reviewed material.

To understand the occurrence of ChatGPT (co-)authored work in Google Scholar’s index, we scraped it for publications, including one of two common ChatGPT responses (see Appendix A) that we encountered on social media and in media reports (DeGeurin, 2024). The results of our descriptive statistical analyses showed that around 62% did not declare the use of GPTs. Most of these GPT-fabricated papers were found in non-indexed journals and working papers, but some cases included research published in mainstream scientific journals and conference proceedings. 2 Indexed journals mean scholarly journals indexed by abstract and citation databases such as Scopus and Web of Science, where the indexation implies journals with high scientific quality. Non-indexed journals are journals that fall outside of this indexation. More than half (57%) of these GPT-fabricated papers concerned policy-relevant subject areas susceptible to influence operations. To avoid increasing the visibility of these publications, we abstained from referencing them in this research note. However, we have made the data available in the Harvard Dataverse repository.

The publications were related to three issue areas—health (14.5%), environment (19.5%) and computing (23%)—with key terms such “healthcare,” “COVID-19,” or “infection”for health-related papers, and “analysis,” “sustainable,” and “global” for environment-related papers. In several cases, the papers had titles that strung together general keywords and buzzwords, thus alluding to very broad and current research. These terms included “biology,” “telehealth,” “climate policy,” “diversity,” and “disrupting,” to name just a few.  While the study’s scope and design did not include a detailed analysis of which parts of the articles included fabricated text, our dataset did contain the surrounding sentences for each occurrence of the suspicious phrases that formed the basis for our search and subsequent selection. Based on that, we can say that the phrases occurred in most sections typically found in scientific publications, including the literature review, methods, conceptual and theoretical frameworks, background, motivation or societal relevance, and even discussion. This was confirmed during the joint coding, where we read and discussed all articles. It became clear that not just the text related to the telltale phrases was created by GPT, but that almost all articles in our sample of questionable articles likely contained traces of GPT-fabricated text everywhere.

Evidence hacking and backfiring effects

Generative pre-trained transformers (GPTs) can be used to produce texts that mimic scientific writing. These texts, when made available online—as we demonstrate—leak into the databases of academic search engines and other parts of the research infrastructure for scholarly communication. This development exacerbates problems that were already present with less sophisticated text generators (Antkare, 2020; Cabanac & Labbé, 2021). Yet, the public release of ChatGPT in 2022, together with the way Google Scholar works, has increased the likelihood of lay people (e.g., media, politicians, patients, students) coming across questionable (or even entirely GPT-fabricated) papers and other problematic research findings. Previous research has emphasized that the ability to determine the value and status of scientific publications for lay people is at stake when misleading articles are passed off as reputable (Haider & Åström, 2017) and that systematic literature reviews risk being compromised (Dadkhah et al., 2017). It has also been highlighted that Google Scholar, in particular, can be and has been exploited for manipulating the evidence base for politically charged issues and to fuel conspiracy narratives (Tripodi et al., 2023). Both concerns are likely to be magnified in the future, increasing the risk of what we suggest calling evidence hacking —the strategic and coordinated malicious manipulation of society’s evidence base.

The authority of quality-controlled research as evidence to support legislation, policy, politics, and other forms of decision-making is undermined by the presence of undeclared GPT-fabricated content in publications professing to be scientific. Due to the large number of archives, repositories, mirror sites, and shadow libraries to which they spread, there is a clear risk that GPT-fabricated, questionable papers will reach audiences even after a possible retraction. There are considerable technical difficulties involved in identifying and tracing computer-fabricated papers (Cabanac & Labbé, 2021; Dadkhah et al., 2023; Jones, 2024), not to mention preventing and curbing their spread and uptake.

However, as the rise of the so-called anti-vaxx movement during the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing obstruction and denial of climate change show, retracting erroneous publications often fuels conspiracies and increases the following of these movements rather than stopping them. To illustrate this mechanism, climate deniers frequently question established scientific consensus by pointing to other, supposedly scientific, studies that support their claims. Usually, these are poorly executed, not peer-reviewed, based on obsolete data, or even fraudulent (Dunlap & Brulle, 2020). A similar strategy is successful in the alternative epistemic world of the global anti-vaccination movement (Carrion, 2018) and the persistence of flawed and questionable publications in the scientific record already poses significant problems for health research, policy, and lawmakers, and thus for society as a whole (Littell et al., 2024). Considering that a person’s support for “doing your own research” is associated with increased mistrust in scientific institutions (Chinn & Hasell, 2023), it will be of utmost importance to anticipate and consider such backfiring effects already when designing a technical solution, when suggesting industry or legal regulation, and in the planning of educational measures.

Recommendations

Solutions should be based on simultaneous considerations of technical, educational, and regulatory approaches, as well as incentives, including social ones, across the entire research infrastructure. Paying attention to how these approaches and incentives relate to each other can help identify points and mechanisms for disruption. Recognizing fraudulent academic papers must happen alongside understanding how they reach their audiences and what reasons there might be for some of these papers successfully “sticking around.” A possible way to mitigate some of the risks associated with GPT-fabricated scholarly texts finding their way into academic search engine results would be to provide filtering options for facets such as indexed journals, gray literature, peer-review, and similar on the interface of publicly available academic search engines. Furthermore, evaluation tools for indexed journals 3 Such as LiU Journal CheckUp, https://ep.liu.se/JournalCheckup/default.aspx?lang=eng . could be integrated into the graphical user interfaces and the crawlers of these academic search engines. To enable accountability, it is important that the index (database) of such a search engine is populated according to criteria that are transparent, open to scrutiny, and appropriate to the workings of  science and other forms of academic research. Moreover, considering that Google Scholar has no real competitor, there is a strong case for establishing a freely accessible, non-specialized academic search engine that is not run for commercial reasons but for reasons of public interest. Such measures, together with educational initiatives aimed particularly at policymakers, science communicators, journalists, and other media workers, will be crucial to reducing the possibilities for and effects of malicious manipulation or evidence hacking. It is important not to present this as a technical problem that exists only because of AI text generators but to relate it to the wider concerns in which it is embedded. These range from a largely dysfunctional scholarly publishing system (Haider & Åström, 2017) and academia’s “publish or perish” paradigm to Google’s near-monopoly and ideological battles over the control of information and ultimately knowledge. Any intervention is likely to have systemic effects; these effects need to be considered and assessed in advance and, ideally, followed up on.

Our study focused on a selection of papers that were easily recognizable as fraudulent. We used this relatively small sample as a magnifying glass to examine, delineate, and understand a problem that goes beyond the scope of the sample itself, which however points towards larger concerns that require further investigation. The work of ongoing whistleblowing initiatives 4 Such as Academ-AI, https://www.academ-ai.info/ , and Retraction Watch, https://retractionwatch.com/papers-and-peer-reviews-with-evidence-of-chatgpt-writing/ . , recent media reports of journal closures (Subbaraman, 2024), or GPT-related changes in word use and writing style (Cabanac et al., 2021; Stokel-Walker, 2024) suggest that we only see the tip of the iceberg. There are already more sophisticated cases (Dadkhah et al., 2023) as well as cases involving fabricated images (Gu et al., 2022). Our analysis shows that questionable and potentially manipulative GPT-fabricated papers permeate the research infrastructure and are likely to become a widespread phenomenon. Our findings underline that the risk of fake scientific papers being used to maliciously manipulate evidence (see Dadkhah et al., 2017) must be taken seriously. Manipulation may involve undeclared automatic summaries of texts, inclusion in literature reviews, explicit scientific claims, or the concealment of errors in studies so that they are difficult to detect in peer review. However, the mere possibility of these things happening is a significant risk in its own right that can be strategically exploited and will have ramifications for trust in and perception of science. Society’s methods of evaluating sources and the foundations of media and information literacy are under threat and public trust in science is at risk of further erosion, with far-reaching consequences for society in dealing with information disorders. To address this multifaceted problem, we first need to understand why it exists and proliferates.

Finding 1: 139 GPT-fabricated, questionable papers were found and listed as regular results on the Google Scholar results page. Non-indexed journals dominate.

Most questionable papers we found were in non-indexed journals or were working papers, but we did also find some in established journals, publications, conferences, and repositories. We found a total of 139 papers with a suspected deceptive use of ChatGPT or similar LLM applications (see Table 1). Out of these, 19 were in indexed journals, 89 were in non-indexed journals, 19 were student papers found in university databases, and 12 were working papers (mostly in preprint databases). Table 1 divides these papers into categories. Health and environment papers made up around 34% (47) of the sample. Of these, 66% were present in non-indexed journals.

Finding 2: GPT-fabricated, questionable papers are disseminated online, permeating the research infrastructure for scholarly communication, often in multiple copies. Applied topics with practical implications dominate.

The 20 papers concerning health-related issues are distributed across 20 unique domains, accounting for 46 URLs. The 27 papers dealing with environmental issues can be found across 26 unique domains, accounting for 56 URLs.  Most of the identified papers exist in multiple copies and have already spread to several archives, repositories, and social media. It would be difficult, or impossible, to remove them from the scientific record.

As apparent from Table 2, GPT-fabricated, questionable papers are seeping into most parts of the online research infrastructure for scholarly communication. Platforms on which identified papers have appeared include ResearchGate, ORCiD, Journal of Population Therapeutics and Clinical Pharmacology (JPTCP), Easychair, Frontiers, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer (IEEE), and X/Twitter. Thus, even if they are retracted from their original source, it will prove very difficult to track, remove, or even just mark them up on other platforms. Moreover, unless regulated, Google Scholar will enable their continued and most likely unlabeled discoverability.

A word rain visualization (Centre for Digital Humanities Uppsala, 2023), which combines word prominences through TF-IDF 5 Term frequency–inverse document frequency , a method for measuring the significance of a word in a document compared to its frequency across all documents in a collection. scores with semantic similarity of the full texts of our sample of GPT-generated articles that fall into the “Environment” and “Health” categories, reflects the two categories in question. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, it also reveals overlap and sub-areas. The y-axis shows word prominences through word positions and font sizes, while the x-axis indicates semantic similarity. In addition to a certain amount of overlap, this reveals sub-areas, which are best described as two distinct events within the word rain. The event on the left bundles terms related to the development and management of health and healthcare with “challenges,” “impact,” and “potential of artificial intelligence”emerging as semantically related terms. Terms related to research infrastructures, environmental, epistemic, and technological concepts are arranged further down in the same event (e.g., “system,” “climate,” “understanding,” “knowledge,” “learning,” “education,” “sustainable”). A second distinct event further to the right bundles terms associated with fish farming and aquatic medicinal plants, highlighting the presence of an aquaculture cluster.  Here, the prominence of groups of terms such as “used,” “model,” “-based,” and “traditional” suggests the presence of applied research on these topics. The two events making up the word rain visualization, are linked by a less dominant but overlapping cluster of terms related to “energy” and “water.”

The bar chart of the terms in the paper subset (see Figure 2) complements the word rain visualization by depicting the most prominent terms in the full texts along the y-axis. Here, word prominences across health and environment papers are arranged descendingly, where values outside parentheses are TF-IDF values (relative frequencies) and values inside parentheses are raw term frequencies (absolute frequencies).

Finding 3: Google Scholar presents results from quality-controlled and non-controlled citation databases on the same interface, providing unfiltered access to GPT-fabricated questionable papers.

Google Scholar’s central position in the publicly accessible scholarly communication infrastructure, as well as its lack of standards, transparency, and accountability in terms of inclusion criteria, has potentially serious implications for public trust in science. This is likely to exacerbate the already-known potential to exploit Google Scholar for evidence hacking (Tripodi et al., 2023) and will have implications for any attempts to retract or remove fraudulent papers from their original publication venues. Any solution must consider the entirety of the research infrastructure for scholarly communication and the interplay of different actors, interests, and incentives.

We searched and scraped Google Scholar using the Python library Scholarly (Cholewiak et al., 2023) for papers that included specific phrases known to be common responses from ChatGPT and similar applications with the same underlying model (GPT3.5 or GPT4): “as of my last knowledge update” and/or “I don’t have access to real-time data” (see Appendix A). This facilitated the identification of papers that likely used generative AI to produce text, resulting in 227 retrieved papers. The papers’ bibliographic information was automatically added to a spreadsheet and downloaded into Zotero. 6 An open-source reference manager, https://zotero.org .

We employed multiple coding (Barbour, 2001) to classify the papers based on their content. First, we jointly assessed whether the paper was suspected of fraudulent use of ChatGPT (or similar) based on how the text was integrated into the papers and whether the paper was presented as original research output or the AI tool’s role was acknowledged. Second, in analyzing the content of the papers, we continued the multiple coding by classifying the fraudulent papers into four categories identified during an initial round of analysis—health, environment, computing, and others—and then determining which subjects were most affected by this issue (see Table 1). Out of the 227 retrieved papers, 88 papers were written with legitimate and/or declared use of GPTs (i.e., false positives, which were excluded from further analysis), and 139 papers were written with undeclared and/or fraudulent use (i.e., true positives, which were included in further analysis). The multiple coding was conducted jointly by all authors of the present article, who collaboratively coded and cross-checked each other’s interpretation of the data simultaneously in a shared spreadsheet file. This was done to single out coding discrepancies and settle coding disagreements, which in turn ensured methodological thoroughness and analytical consensus (see Barbour, 2001). Redoing the category coding later based on our established coding schedule, we achieved an intercoder reliability (Cohen’s kappa) of 0.806 after eradicating obvious differences.

The ranking algorithm of Google Scholar prioritizes highly cited and older publications (Martín-Martín et al., 2016). Therefore, the position of the articles on the search engine results pages was not particularly informative, considering the relatively small number of results in combination with the recency of the publications. Only the query “as of my last knowledge update” had more than two search engine result pages. On those, questionable articles with undeclared use of GPTs were evenly distributed across all result pages (min: 4, max: 9, mode: 8), with the proportion of undeclared use being slightly higher on average on later search result pages.

To understand how the papers making fraudulent use of generative AI were disseminated online, we programmatically searched for the paper titles (with exact string matching) in Google Search from our local IP address (see Appendix B) using the googlesearch – python library(Vikramaditya, 2020). We manually verified each search result to filter out false positives—results that were not related to the paper—and then compiled the most prominent URLs by field. This enabled the identification of other platforms through which the papers had been spread. We did not, however, investigate whether copies had spread into SciHub or other shadow libraries, or if they were referenced in Wikipedia.

We used descriptive statistics to count the prevalence of the number of GPT-fabricated papers across topics and venues and top domains by subject. The pandas software library for the Python programming language (The pandas development team, 2024) was used for this part of the analysis. Based on the multiple coding, paper occurrences were counted in relation to their categories, divided into indexed journals, non-indexed journals, student papers, and working papers. The schemes, subdomains, and subdirectories of the URL strings were filtered out while top-level domains and second-level domains were kept, which led to normalizing domain names. This, in turn, allowed the counting of domain frequencies in the environment and health categories. To distinguish word prominences and meanings in the environment and health-related GPT-fabricated questionable papers, a semantically-aware word cloud visualization was produced through the use of a word rain (Centre for Digital Humanities Uppsala, 2023) for full-text versions of the papers. Font size and y-axis positions indicate word prominences through TF-IDF scores for the environment and health papers (also visualized in a separate bar chart with raw term frequencies in parentheses), and words are positioned along the x-axis to reflect semantic similarity (Skeppstedt et al., 2024), with an English Word2vec skip gram model space (Fares et al., 2017). An English stop word list was used, along with a manually produced list including terms such as “https,” “volume,” or “years.”

• Artificial Intelligence
• / Search engines

Cite this Essay

Haider, J., Söderström, K. R., Ekström, B., & Rödl, M. (2024). GPT-fabricated scientific papers on Google Scholar: Key features, spread, and implications for preempting evidence manipulation. Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review . https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-156

• / Appendix B

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This research has been supported by Mistra, the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research, through the research program Mistra Environmental Communication (Haider, Ekström, Rödl) and the Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation [2020.0004] (Söderström).

Competing Interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

The research described in this article was carried out under Swedish legislation. According to the relevant EU and Swedish legislation (2003:460) on the ethical review of research involving humans (“Ethical Review Act”), the research reported on here is not subject to authorization by the Swedish Ethical Review Authority (“etikprövningsmyndigheten”) (SRC, 2017).

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are properly credited.

Data Availability

All data needed to replicate this study are available at the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WUVD8X

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the article manuscript as well as the editorial group of Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review for their thoughtful feedback and input.

• Open access
• Published: 07 September 2024

Reclaiming mendelian randomization from the deluge of papers and misleading findings

• Stefan Stender 1 , 2 ,
• Helene Gellert-Kristensen 1 , 2 &
• George Davey Smith 3 , 4  

Lipids in Health and Disease volume  23 , Article number:  286 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

Metrics details

Mendelian randomization (MR) is a powerful epidemiological method for causal inference. However, its recent surge in popularity has brought two concerning trends. First, the public availability of summary results from genome-wide association studies has led to an explosion of low-quality two-sample mendelian randomization (2SMR) studies. These studies add minimal – if any – value and overwhelm reviewers and journals. Second, the availability of large datasets with individual-level genotype data, like UK Biobank, has spurred the development and use of novel MR methods. However, some methods are being applied without proper testing, leading to misleading results, as exemplified by recent spurious findings that are being retracted and/or corrected relating to vitamin D. What can editors and peer reviewers do to handle the deluge of 2SMR studies and the premature application of highly complex MR methods? We advise editors to simply reject papers that only report 2SMR findings, with no additional supporting evidence. For reviewers receiving such papers, we provide a template for rejection. In addition, reviewers should demand rigorous testing of novel methods, including through the use of positive and negative controls before they are applied. Rejecting non-contributory 2SMR papers and imposing intensive scrutiny to novel methods is crucial if the scientific community is to reclaim MR.

Mendelian randomization (MR) is an epidemiological method that uses genetic variation to infer causal effects of modifiable exposures on outcomes [ 1 ]. The method relies on the use of genetic variants that associate with an exposure of interest as proxies for that exposure. If the genetic variants associated with the exposure can be robustly linked to an outcome, this strengthens evidence that the exposure itself plays a causal role in that outcome. This inference is predicated on the fact that genetic variants are less prone to confounding and are not influenced by reverse causation—sources of error that are difficult to fully address in conventional epidemiological studies.

One of the most notable successes of MR has been in confirming and refuting causal relationships between various circulating biomarkers and atherosclerosis. MR studies have accurately recapitulated the efficacy of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) lowering drugs such as statins and PCSK9 inhibitors, and correctly predicted the lack of effect for other targets like vitamin D and high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C) [ 2 , 3 ].

The MR toolkit has expanded in parallel with the documented success of the methodology. Among the many methods is two-sample MR (2SMR), where the exposure and outcome are derived from summary results from two separate studies. Two-sample MR was applied in 2003 in the first extended exposition of MR [ 4 ]. Since its inception the approach has been greatly facilitated by the public sharing of summary results from thousands of genome-wide association studies (GWAS). These data have been collated into accessible databases, allowing 2SMR analyses to be performed online with a few clicks of the mouse (e.g., https://app.mrbase.org/ ) [ 5 ]. Additionally, the data can be easily imported and analyzed using user-friendly packages in R, such as TwoSampleMR [ 5 ] and MendelianRandomization [ 6 ]. In short, 2SMR has democratized the use of MR, making the method accessible to a broader audience, including non-experts.

Unfortunately, this accessibility has led to an explosion in the number of 2SMR studies, often characterized by poor quality and a lack of scientific rigor, which was predicted in the early years of the take-off [ 7 ]. Some of these studies are being produced in papermill-like factories that help generate – at a cost – 2SMR studies, apparently for accreditation and career advancement purposes.

The problem with the abundance of low-quality 2SMR studies is now glaringly apparent [ 8 ]. A decade ago, there were about 100 MR papers published annually. In 2023, this number exceeded 3,000, and it will reach almost 5,000 in 2024 (Fig.  1 ). Most of these are 2SMR studies. This surge is overwhelming peer reviewers, editors, and journals. For example, Lipids in Health and Disease alone receives about 60 2SMR studies monthly, and between them the authors of this comment receive more than 30 requests for peer review of this type of study weekly.

Number of papers identified using the search term ‘Mendelian randomization’ in PubMed, stratified by year. The light blue bar for 2024 indicates the projected number for the last four months of the year

What can editors and peer reviewers do to handle the deluge of 2SMR studies? We recommend that editors simply reject submitted papers that only report 2SMR with no other supportive data. One rationale behind this recommendation is that all combinations of exposure and outcome results based on data available in IEU openGWAS ( https://gwas.mrcieu.ac.uk/ ) can be browsed online on epigraphDB.org [ 9 , 10 ]. In other words, these results are, in effect, already published. Reporting them again in a scientific paper adds nothing to what can be looked up online in minutes. For peer reviewers receiving such 2SMR papers for review, we recommend using a template review for quickly dealing with them. For example:

‘A general comment regarding this type of 2-sample Mendelian randomization (2SMR) studies is that they have become very easy to do , owing to publicly available GWAS results and ready-to-use R-packages. The result is a tsunami of 2SMR studies being produced and submitted for publication. Many of these stem from research papermills that churn out papers using identical methods and analytical pipelines , only changing the exposure and outcome between each paper. These papers add little - if anything - of scientific value , and they are a huge burden on journals , editors , and peer reviewers. I recommend that the editors of [insert journal name] reject these papers without sending them for peer review in the future. ’

The reader is, of course, free to use or modify this template, or parts of it, in her or his own future reviews of low-quality 2SMR papers. This could be helpful to journals in alerting their editors to this problem, although the publication of many 2SMR papers in predatory or near-predatory journals mitigates against the success of this approach.

The ready availability of individual level genotyped data from large population studies – in particular UK Biobank (UKB) – is leading to a second epidemic of papers, which can in principle investigate more interesting hypotheses than can stand-alone 2SMR studies. This has led to new methods emerging for extending MR analyses, which may become valuable tools for causal inference in population biology. Each approach will require additional assumptions, beyond those now well described in conventional MR [ 1 ]. The methods should be thoroughly tested before being rolled out, including through the use of negative and positive controls, when possible. A cautionary tale relates to vitamin D, shown by many randomized controlled trials and substantial conventional MR evidence to be unlikely to majorly modify risk of most common complex diseases at a population level [ 2 , 11 ]. Applying a method purporting to be able to identify the non-linear causal effect of vitamin D modification across the range of vitamin D within UKB suggested substantial benefit in relation to cardiovascular and all cause mortality in several widely cited studies [ 12 , 13 ]. Unfortunately, these findings were literally impossible [ 14 , 15 ], and the first paper has been retracted and replaced with a null paper in agreement with the prior conventional MR studies [ 16 ] and for the second an editorial expression of concern has been published [ 17 ]. The approach used appears to often simply replicate observational associations, and unsurprisingly a paper applying it has appeared suggesting that raising HDL-C would reduce coronary heart disease risk in 70% of the UKB population [ 18 ]. The spurious non-linear MR papers of vitamin D have received an order of magnitude more citations since their publication than have conventional MR papers of vitamin D reporting null effects, an example of what has been called “the natural selection of bad science” [ 19 ].

The issue with MR studies applying inadequately tested complex methods is very different to that of the paper-mill produced 2SMR studies, as there will be few reviewers who could truly evaluate them. The simple application of negative controls would have thrown serious doubt on the reliability of the method – applying it to UKB suggests that vitamin D has a causal effect on the age and chromosomal sex of participants, an obviously nonsensical finding [ 20 ]. Body mass index – the topic of another misleading non-linear MR paper [ 21 ] – demonstrates similar nonsensical apparent causal effects when applying a non-linear MR approach [ 20 , 22 ]. Such testing of the method should have been applied before it was rolled out as it was. Reviewers should ask searching questions of papers that extend MR to new domains and consider whether adequate methodological work has been done before they are implemented.

Sadly, MR has run off the rails. What is at heart a powerful and elegant scientific method for assessing causality in epidemiology is now being exploited for mass production of low-quality research, and is also reporting misleading findings, including ones that falsely repudiate the very valuable findings of earlier, veridical, MR studies. Rejecting non-contributory 2SMR papers and imposing intensive scrutiny to novel methods is imperative if the scientific community is to reclaim MR [ 8 ].

Data availability

No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Abbreviations

• Mendelian randomization

Genome-wide association study

Two-sample Mendelian randomization

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SS has received grants from Independent Research Fund Denmark and the Novo Nordisk Foundation. GDS works within the MRC Integrative Epidemiology Unit at the University of Bristol, which is supported by the Medical Research Council (MC_UU_00032/01). None of the funders had a specific role in the conceptualization, design, data collection, analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

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Stender, S., Gellert-Kristensen, H. & Smith, G.D. Reclaiming mendelian randomization from the deluge of papers and misleading findings. Lipids Health Dis 23 , 286 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12944-024-02284-w

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