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Course: US history   >   Unit 3

• The Articles of Confederation
• What was the Articles of Confederation?
• Shays's Rebellion
• The Constitutional Convention
• The US Constitution

The Federalist Papers

• The Bill of Rights
• Social consequences of revolutionary ideals
• The presidency of George Washington
• Why was George Washington the first president?
• The presidency of John Adams
• Regional attitudes about slavery, 1754-1800
• Continuity and change in American society, 1754-1800
• Creating a nation

• The Federalist Papers was a collection of essays written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton in 1788.
• The essays urged the ratification of the United States Constitution, which had been debated and drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
• The Federalist Papers is considered one of the most significant American contributions to the field of political philosophy and theory and is still widely considered to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

The Articles of Confederation and Constitutional Convention

• In Federalist No. 10 , Madison reflects on how to prevent rule by majority faction and advocates the expansion of the United States into a large, commercial republic.
• In Federalist No. 39 and Federalist 51 , Madison seeks to “lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,” emphasizing the need for checks and balances through the separation of powers into three branches of the federal government and the division of powers between the federal government and the states. 4 ‍  
• In Federalist No. 84 , Hamilton advances the case against the Bill of Rights, expressing the fear that explicitly enumerated rights could too easily be construed as comprising the only rights to which American citizens were entitled.

What do you think?

• For more on Shays’s Rebellion, see Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).
• Bernard Bailyn, ed. The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Anti-Federalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification; Part One, September 1787 – February 1788 (New York: Penguin Books, 1993).
• See Federalist No. 1 .
• See Federalist No. 51 .
• For more, see Michael Meyerson, Liberty’s Blueprint: How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the World (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

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Federalist Papers

George Washington  was sent draft versions of the first seven essays on November 18, 1787 by James Madison, who revealed to Washington that he was one of the anonymous writers. Washington agreed to secretly transmit the drafts to his in-law David Stuart in Richmond, Virginia so the essays could be more widely published and distributed. Washington explained in a letter to David Humphreys that the ratification of the Constitution would depend heavily "on literary abilities, & the recommendation of it by good pens," and his efforts to proliferate the Federalist Papers reflected this feeling. 1

Washington was skeptical of Constitutional opponents, known as Anti-Federalists, believing that they were either misguided or seeking personal gain. He believed strongly in the goals of the Constitution and saw The Federalist Papers and similar publications as crucial to the process of bolstering support for its ratification. Washington described such publications as "have thrown new lights upon the science of Government, they have given the rights of man a full and fair discussion, and have explained them in so clear and forcible a manner as cannot fail to make a lasting impression upon those who read the best publications of the subject, and particularly the pieces under the signature of Publius." 2

Although Washington made few direct contributions to the text of the new Constitution and never officially joined the Federalist Party, he profoundly supported the philosophy behind the Constitution and was an ardent supporter of its ratification.

The philosophical influence of the Enlightenment factored significantly in the essays, as the writers sought to establish a balance between centralized political power and individual liberty. Although the writers sought to build support for the Constitution, Madison, Hamilton, and Jay did not see their work as a treatise, per se, but rather as an on-going attempt to make sense of a new form of government.

The Federalist Paper s represented only one facet in an on-going debate about what the newly forming government in America should look like and how it would govern. Although it is uncertain precisely how much The Federalist Papers affected the ratification of the Constitution, they were considered by many at the time—and continue to be considered—one of the greatest works of American political philosophy.

Adam Meehan The University of Arizona

Notes: 1. "George Washington to David Humphreys, 10 October 1787," in George Washington, Writings , ed. John Rhodehamel (New York: Library of America, 1997), 657.

2. "George Washington to John Armstrong, 25 April 1788," in George Washington, Writings , ed. John Rhodehamel (New York: Library of America, 1997), 672.

Bibliography: Chernow, Ron. Washington: A Life . New York: Penguin, 2010.

Epstein, David F. The Political Theory of The Federalist . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

Furtwangler, Albert. The Authority of Publius: A Reading of the Federalist Papers . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

George Washington, Writings , ed. John Rhodehamel. New York: Library of America, 1997.

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Federalist papers

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• Khan Academy - The Federalist Papers
• Digital History - Federalist Papers
• Online Library of Liberty - Quentin Taylor, “The Federalist Papers: America’s Political Classic”
• Constitutional Rights Foundation - The Federalist Papers
• Social Science LibreTexts - Federalist Papers #10 and #51
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• Library of Congress Research Guides - Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History
• Yale Law School - Lillian Goldman Law Library - The Avalon Project - The Federalist Papers
• Federalist Papers - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
• Federalist papers - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)

Federalist papers , series of 85 essays on the proposed new Constitution of the United States and on the nature of republican government , published between 1787 and 1788 by Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay in an effort to persuade New York state voters to support ratification. Seventy-seven of the essays first appeared serially in New York newspapers, were reprinted in most other states, and were published in book form as The Federalist on May 28, 1788; the remaining eight essays appeared in New York newspapers between June 14 and August 16, 1788.

All the papers appeared over the signature “Publius,” and the authorship of some of the papers was once a matter of scholarly dispute . However, computer analysis and historical evidence has led nearly all historians to assign authorship in the following manner: Hamilton wrote numbers 1, 6–9, 11–13, 15–17, 21–36, 59–61, and 65–85; Madison , numbers 10, 14, 18–20, 37–58, and 62–63; and Jay, numbers 2–5 and 64.

The authors of the Federalist papers presented a masterly defense of the new federal system and of the major departments in the proposed central government. They also argued that the existing government under the Articles of Confederation , the country’s first constitution, was defective and that the proposed Constitution would remedy its weaknesses without endangering the liberties of the people.

As a general treatise on republican government, the Federalist papers are distinguished for their comprehensive analysis of the means by which the ideals of justice , the general welfare , and the rights of individuals could be realized. The authors assumed that people’s primary political motive is self-interest and that people—whether acting individually or collectively—are selfish and only imperfectly rational. The establishment of a republican form of government would not of itself provide protection against such characteristics: the representatives of the people might betray their trust; one segment of the population might oppress another; and both the representatives and the public might give way to passion or caprice . The possibility of good government, they argued, lay in the crafting of political institutions that would compensate for deficiencies in both reason and virtue in the ordinary conduct of politics. This theme was predominant in late 18th-century political thought in America and accounts in part for the elaborate system of checks and balances that was devised in the Constitution.

The authors of the Federalist papers argued against the decentralization of political authority under the Articles of Confederation. They worried, for example, that national commercial interests suffered from intransigent economic conflicts between states and that federal weakness undermined American diplomatic efforts abroad. Broadly, they argued that the government’s impotence under the Articles of Confederation obstructed America’s emergence as a powerful commercial empire.

The authors were also critical of the power assumed by state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation—and of the characters of the people serving in those assemblies. In the authors’ view, the farmers and artisans who rose to power in postrevolutionary America were too beholden to narrow economic and regional interests to serve the broader public good. Of particular concern to the authors was the passage by state legislatures of pro-debtor legislation and paper money laws that threatened creditors’ property rights . Unlike most Americans of the period, who typically worried about the conspiracies of the elite few against the liberties of the people, the authors were concerned about tyrannical legislative majorities threatening the rights of propertied minorities. The Articles of Confederation, in their view, had provided no safeguards against the vices of the people themselves, and the American Revolution’s enthusiasm for liberty had diminished popular appreciation of the need for good governance. The Federalist papers presented the 1786–87 insurrection of debtor farmers in western Massachusetts— Shays’s Rebellion —as a symptom of this broader crisis.

The authors of the Federalist papers argued for an increase in the “energy” of the federal government to respond to this crisis. However, the national government’s increased power would have to be based in republican principles and retain a federal distribution of power; there would be no return to monarchical rule or consolidation of central authority.

In one of the most notable essays, “Federalist 10,” Madison rejected the then common belief that republican government was possible only for small states. He argued that stability, liberty, and justice were more likely to be achieved in a large area with a numerous and heterogeneous population. Although frequently interpreted as an attack on majority rule, the essay is in reality a defense of both social, economic, and cultural pluralism and of a composite majority formed by compromise and conciliation. Decision by such a majority, rather than by a monistic one, would be more likely to accord with the proper ends of government. This distinction between a proper and an improper majority typifies the fundamental philosophy of the Federalist papers; republican institutions, including the principle of majority rule, were not considered good in themselves but were good because they constituted the best means for the pursuit of justice and the preservation of liberty.

The Federalist Papers

Appearing in New York newspapers as the New York Ratification Convention met in Poughkeepsie, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison wrote as Publius and addressed the citizens of New York through the Federalist Papers.  These essays subsequently circulated and were reprinted throughout the states as the Ratification process unfolded in other states.  Initially appearing as individual items in several New York newspapers, all eighty-five essays were eventually combined and published as The Federalist .  Click here to view a chronology of the Printing and Reprintings of The Federalist .   

Considerable debate has surrounded these essays since their publication. Many suggest they represent the best exposition of the Constitution to date. Their conceptual design would affirm this view.  Others contend that they were mere propaganda to allay fears of the opposition to the Constitution. Regardless, they are often included in the canon of the world’s great political writings. A complete introduction exploring the purpose, authorship, circulation, and reactions to The Federalist  can be found here.

General Introduction

• No. 1 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 27 October 1787

Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

• No. 2 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 31 October 1787
• No. 3 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 3 November 1787
• No. 4 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 7 November 1787
• No. 5 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 10 November 1787

Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States

• No. 6 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 14 November 1787
• No. 7 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 17 November 1787
• No. 8 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 20 November 1787
• No. 9 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 21 November 1787

The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

• No. 10 (Madison) New York Daily Advertiser , 22 November 1787

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

• No. 11 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 24 November 1787

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue

• No. 12 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 27 November 1787

Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

• No. 13 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 28 November 1787

Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered

• No. 14 (Madison) New York Packet , 30 November 1787

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

• No. 15 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 1 December 1787
• No. 16 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 4 December 1787
• No. 17 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 5 December 1787
• No. 18 (Madison with Hamilton) New York Packet , 7 December 1787
• No. 19 (Madison with Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 8 December 1787
• No. 20 (Madison with Hamilton) New York Packet , 11 December 1787
• No. 21 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 12 December 1787
• No. 22 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 14 December 1787

The Necessity of Energetic Government to Preserve of the Union

• No. 23 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 18 December 1787

Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

• No. 24 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 19 December 1787
• No. 25 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 21 December 1787

Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense

• No. 26 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 22 December 1787
• No. 27 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 25 December 1787
• No. 28 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 26 December 1787

Concerning the Militia

• No. 29 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 9 January 1788

Concerning the General Power of Taxation

• No. 30 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 28 December 1787
• No. 31 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 1 January 1788
• Nos. 32–33 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 2 January 1788
• No. 34 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 4 January 1788
• No. 35 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 5 January 1788
• No. 36 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 8 January 1788

The Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government

• No. 37 (Madison) New York Daily Advertiser , 11 January 1788
• No. 38 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 12 January 1788

The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

• No. 39 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 16 January 1788

The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined

• No. 40 (Madison) New York Packet , 18 January 1788

General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution

• No. 41 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 19 January 1788
• No. 42 (Madison) New York Packet , 22 January 1788
• No. 43 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 23 January 1788

Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States

• No. 44 (Madison) New York Packet , 25 January 1788

Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments

• No. 45 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 26 January 1788

Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

• No. 46 (Madison) New York Packet , 29 January 1788

Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Powers

• No. 47 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 30 January 1788

Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated

• No. 48 (Madison) New York Packet , 1 February 1788

Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government

• No. 49 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 2 February 1788

Periodic Appeals to the People Considered

• No. 50 (Madison) New York Packet , 5 February 1788

Structure of Government Must Furnish Proper Checks and Balances

• No. 51 (Madison) New York Independent Journal , 6 February 1788

The House of Representatives

• No. 52 (Madison?) New York Packet , 8 February 1788
• No. 53 (Madison or Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 9 February 1788

The Apportionment of Members Among the States

• No. 54 (Madison) New York Packet , 12 February 1788

The Total Number of the House of Representatives

• No. 55 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 13 February 1788
• No. 56 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 16 February 1788

The Alleged Tendency of the Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many

• No. 57 (Madison?) New York Packet , 19 February 1788

Objection That the Numbers Will Not Be Augmented as Population Increases

• No. 58 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 20 February 1788

Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

• No. 59 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 22 February 1788
• No. 60 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 23 February 1788
• No. 61 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 26 February 1788
• No. 62 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 27 February 1788
• No. 63 (Madison?) New York Independent Journal , 1 March 1788
• No. 64 (Jay) New York Independent Journal , 5 March 1788
• No. 65 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 7 March 1788

Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments

• No. 66 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 8 March 1788

The Executive Department

• No. 67 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 11 March 1788

The Mode of Electing the President

• No. 68 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 12 March 1788

The Real Character of the Executive

• No. 69 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 14 March 1788

The Executive Department Further Considered

• No. 70 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 15 March 1788

The Duration in Office of the Executive

• No. 71 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 18 March 1788

Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered

• No. 72 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 19 March 1788

Provision for The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

• No. 73 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 21 March 1788

The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power

• No. 74 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 25 March 1788

The Treaty Making Power of the Executive

• No. 75 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 26 March 1788

The Appointing Power of the Executive

• No. 76 (Hamilton) New York Packet , 1 April 1788

Appointing Power and Other Powers of the Executive Considered

• No. 77 (Hamilton) New York Independent Journal , 2 April 1788

The Judiciary Department

• No. 78 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788
• No. 79 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Powers of the Judiciary

• No. 80 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority

• No. 81 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Judiciary Continued

• No. 82 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury

• No. 83 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered

• No. 84 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

Concluding Remarks

• No. 85 (Hamilton) Book Edition, Volume II, 28 May 1788

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The Federalist Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay | Published 1787-1788

The Federalist  is the title given to a series of essays by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay defending the Constitution to New Yorkers in an effort to promote its ratification.  The Federalist  stands as the most comprehensive and systematic articulation by the Founders of the reasoning behind the design of the United States Constitution. The second to last essay in the  Federalist  (No. 84) offers a defense of the Constitutional Convention’s unpopular decision to omit a bill of rights, and therefore not to recognize explicitly the freedom of speech or press.

The Argument Against the Bill of Rights

In  Federalist  No. 84 , Alexander Hamilton, under the pseudonym “Publius,” argues that a bill of rights is not only unnecessary in a well designed constitution but is even dangerous. These arguments reflect a consistent theme in the  The Federalist  that the principal means of protecting the liberty of the individual are institutions of government designed in such a manner as to limit and frustrate its power to infringe on such liberties. The two most famous examples of this kind of institutional thinking in the  Federalist  are its defense of checks and balances and its defense of the large republic as a measure against majority faction. By granting each branch of government a certain limited power over other branches, the Constitution channels the ambition of office-holders, which normally causes them to abuse their power and exceed their lawful limits, toward guarding their powers against the illegitimate expansion of the  other  branches of government. As each branch jealously prevents the other branches from usurping any power not lawfully granted to it, the whole government is kept within its limited mandate. Similarly, by enlarging the representatives’ districts and the total number of representatives, the Constitution uses the dangerous narrow-minded tendencies of political actors against themselves. As the number of narrow and frequently selfish interest groups multiplies, it becomes more difficult for any one of them to dominate an election or to seize control over any part of the government.

In general, then, the Constitution as understood by the  Federalist  does not primarily aim at articulating the legal rights of individuals but at limiting the government’s ability to exceed the narrow boundaries of the powers that are entrusted to it. For this reason, the Constitution seeks to be clear about which specific powers the government  does  have, on the understanding that it does  not  have  any  powers beyond these. Thus, Hamilton argues in  Federalist  84 that to include a bill of rights would suggest, by implication, that if the bill of rights were not there, the government would be permitted to infringe on those rights. It would suggest, in other words, that the government has a great deal of power that is nowhere granted to it in the Constitution.

Justice Scalia on the Federalists’ view of the Bill of Rights

1.   Federalist No. 84

2.   Federalist  No. 38

3.   Federalist  No. 10

4.   Federalist No. 51

5.  Recommended Editions

6.  Footnotes

Federalist  No. 84: “Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered” (Alexander Hamilton)

The text below is courtesy of the Avalon Project . A two-page edited version focusing on the freedom of the press that is suitable for classroom use can be found in The First Amendment: Freedom of the Press. Edited by Garrett Epps. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2008.   Find it on Amazon.  It is also in The Founders’ Constitution. Vol. 5 (Doc. 4). Edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.  Read it online at the Founder’s Constitution through the Liberty Fund , or  Find it on Amazon .

To the People of the State of New York:

IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.

The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked that the constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament. I add that New York is of the number. And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things: one is that, though the constitution of New York has no bill of rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance amount to the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not expressed in it, are equally secured.

To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the convention contains, as well as the constitution of this State, a number of such provisions.

Independent of those which relate to the structure of the government, we find the following: Article 1, section 3, clause 7 “Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.” Section 9, of the same article, clause 2 “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” Clause 3 “No bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be passed.” Clause 7 “No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.” Article 3, section 2, clause 3 “The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.” Section 3, of the same article “Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.” And clause 3, of the same section “The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.”

It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the whole, of equal importance with any which are to be found in the constitution of this State. The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex-post-facto laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, TO WHICH WE HAVE NO CORRESPONDING PROVISION IN OUR CONSTITUTION, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone,[Footnote 1] in reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital: “To bereave a man of life, says he, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore A MORE DANGEROUS ENGINE of arbitrary government.” And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas-corpus act, which in one place he calls “the BULWARK of the British Constitution.”[Footnote 2]

Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.

To the second that is, to the pretended establishment of the common and state law by the Constitution, I answer, that they are expressly made subject “to such alterations and provisions as the legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same.” They are therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction. The only use of the declaration was to recognize the ancient law and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned by the Revolution. This consequently can be considered as no part of a declaration of rights, which under our constitutions must be intended as limitations of the power of the government itself.

It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the PETITION OF RIGHT assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of particular reservations. “WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ORDAIN and ESTABLISH this Constitution for the United States of America.” Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But the truth is, that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.

I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.

On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of this State; in the next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in that of any other State, amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration, that “the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved”? What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government.[Footnote 3] And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.

There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point. The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely the constitution of each State is its bill of rights. And the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the Union. Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government? This is done in the most ample and precise manner in the plan of the convention; comprehending various precautions for the public security, which are not to be found in any of the State constitutions. Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private concerns? This we have seen has also been attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough, though it will not be easy to make this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended that there is no such thing. It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the government. And hence it must be apparent, that much of what has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.

Another objection which has been made, and which, from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is of this nature: “It is improper Õsay the objectorsÃ¥ to confer such large powers, as are proposed, upon the national government, because the seat of that government must of necessity be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative body.” This argument, if it proves any thing, proves that there ought to be no general government whatever. For the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite control. But there are satisfactory reasons to show that the objection is in reality not well founded. There is in most of the arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the imagination. What are the sources of information by which the people in Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of the conduct of their representatives in the State legislature? Of personal observation they can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the spot. They must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how must these men obtain their information? Evidently from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from correspondences with theirrepresentatives, and with other persons who reside at the place of their deliberations. This does not apply to Montgomery County only, but to all the counties at any considerable distance from the seat of government.

It is equally evident that the same sources of information would be open to the people in relation to the conduct of their representatives in the general government, and the impediments to a prompt communication which distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State governments. The executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the national administration; and as it will be in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their constituents in the national councils, and can readily communicate the same knowledge to the people. Their disposition to apprise the community of whatever may prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power. And we may conclude with the fullest assurance that the people, through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than they can be by any means they now possess of that of their State representatives.

It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the country at and near the seat of government will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest with those who are at a distance, and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.

Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable is derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts due TO the United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. The newspapers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the of

fspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe that as it is a plain dictate of common-sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that “STATES NEITHER LOSE ANY OF THEIR RIGHTS, NOR ARE DISCHARGED FROM ANY OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS, BY A CHANGE IN THE FORM OF THEIR CIVIL GOVERNMENT.”4 The last objection of any consequence, which I at present recollect, turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan.

The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced, that Union is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved under the present system, nor without radical alterations; that new and extensive powers ought to be granted to the national head, and that these require a different organization of the federal government a single body being an unsafe depositary of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, the question of expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand. The two branches of the legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons, which is the same number of which Congress, under the existing Confederation, may be composed. It is true that this number is intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the progress of the population and resources of the country. It is evident that a less number would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe, and that a continuance of the present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very inadequate representation of the people.

Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new government. Let us examine this a little.

It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present government, are the same which will be required under the new. There are now a Secretary of War, a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury, consisting of three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, etc. These officers are indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new as well as the old. As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other difference than to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a very considerable addition to the number of federal officers; but it will not follow that this will occasion an increase of public expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State for national officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance, the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The States individually will stand in no need of any for this purpose. What difference can it make in point of expense to pay officers of the customs appointed by the State or by the United States? There is no good reason to suppose that either the number or the salaries of the latter will be greater than those of the former.

Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to us? The chief item which occurs to me respects the support of the judges of the United States. I do not add the President, because there is now a president of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any thing, short of those which will be incurred on account of the President of the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.

Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed government. The first thing which presents itself is that a great part of the business which now keeps Congress sitting through the year will be transacted by the President. Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident that a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives; we may suppose about a fourth for the latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra business of treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the Senate. From this circumstance we may infer that, until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, there will be a considerable saving of expense from the difference between the constant session of the present and the temporary session of the future Congress.

But there is another circumstance of great importance in the view of economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied the State legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it has happened that the sessions of the State legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the mere local business of the States. More than half their time has been frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. Now the members who compose the legislatures of the several States amount to two thousand and upwards, which number has hitherto performed what under the new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth or fifth of that number. The Congress under the proposed government will do all the business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of the State legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in any proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference in the time of the sessions of the State legislatures will be clear gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.

The result from these observations is that the sources of additional expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution are much fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.

Federalist  No. 38: “…the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed” (James Madison)

The following are two excerpts from Federalist No. 38 that touch on Anti-federalist complaints about the absence of a bill of rights in the Constitution. They are edited from the text found on  the Avalon Project.

[Of the Anti-federalists:]

This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a government over individuals. Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election.

It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please, and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the federal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress.  Is a bill of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights.  Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.

Federalist  No. 10: “…The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection” (James Madison)

The text below is  courtesy of the Avalon Project.

AMONG the  numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,–is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

Federalist  No. 51: “The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments” (James Madison)

The text below is  courtesy of the Avalon Project .

TO WHAT expedient , then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.

An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.

There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.

There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.

In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.

It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.

[Link]  Transcription courtesy of the Avalon Project .

Recommended Editions

Kesler, Charles R. and Clinton Rossiter, eds.  The Federalist Papers.  New York: Signet Classics, 2003.

Recommended print edition of the complete  Federalist .

Find it on Amazon.

The complete  Federalist  online.

Read it at the Avalon Project.

[Footnote 1] Vide Blackstone’s “Commentaries,” vol. 1., p. 136.

[Footnote 2] Vide Blackstone’s “Commentaries,” vol. iv., p. 438.

[Footnote 3] To show that there is a power in the Constitution by which the liberty of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to the power of taxation. It is said that duties may be laid upon the publications so high as to amount to a prohibition. I know not by what logic it could be maintained, that the declarations in the State constitutions, in favor of the freedom of the press, would be a constitutional impediment to the imposition of duties upon publications by the State legislatures. It cannot certainly be pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an abridgment of the liberty of the press. We know that newspapers are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is notorious that the press nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that country. And if duties of any kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend on legislative discretion, respecting the liberty of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have without them. The same invasions of it may be effected under the State constitutions which contain those declarations through the means of taxation, as under the proposed Constitution, which has nothing of the kind. It would be quite as significant to declare that government ought to be free, that taxes ought not to be excessive, etc., as that the liberty of the press ought not to be restrained.

Weiner, Greg. “Federalist 84: Completing the Declaration of Independence.”  Library of Law and Liberty . July 17, 2017.

Read it at the Library of Law and Liberty.

Gotchy, Joseph R. “Federalists and Anti-Federalists: Is a Bill of Rights Essential to a Free Society?”  OAH Magazine of History  8, no. 4 (1994): 45-48.

This is a lesson plan meant to introduce students to the controversial origins of the bill of rights.

Find it on JSTOR (restricted access).

Rakove, Jack N. “James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Broader Context.”  Presidential Studies Quarterly  22, no. 4 (1992): 667-677.

This article examines Madison’s attitudes toward the bill of rights in comparison with the other federalists, and therefore touches upon Hamilton’s argument from  Federalist  84.

Find it on JSTOR (free access).

Slonim, Shlomo. “The  Federalist Papers  and the Bill of Rights.”  Constitutional Commentary  20 (2003): 151-161.

Download from the University of Montana Digital Conservancy (pdf).

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The first amendment, we the people, james madison, ratification, and the federalist papers.

September 16, 2021

September 17 is Constitution Day—the anniversary of the framers signing the Constitution in 1787. This week’s episode dives into what happened after the Constitution was signed—when it had to be approved by “we the people,” a process known as ratification—and the arguments made on behalf of the Constitution. A major collection of those arguments came in the form of a series of essays, today often referred to as The Federalist Papers, which were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay using the pen name Publius and published initially in newspapers in New York. Guests Judge Gregory Maggs, author of the article “A Concise Guide to The Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution,” and Colleen Sheehan, professor and co-editor of The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist, shed light on the questions: What do The Federalist Papers say? What did their writers set out to achieve by writing them? How do they explain the ideas behind the Constitution’s structure and design—and where did those ideas come from? And why is it important to read The Federalist Papers today?

FULL PODCAST

This episode was produced by Jackie McDermott and engineered by Kevin Kilbourne. Research was provided by Sam Desai, John Guerra, and Lana Ulrich.

PARTICIPANTS

Colleen Sheehan is the Director of Graduate Studies at the Arizona State School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership. She is author of numerous books, including several on James Madison, and she co-edited The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist .

Judge Gregory E. Maggs is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. He was a member of the full-time faculty at GW Law School from 1993 to 2018. He is the author of numerous works including the article “A Concise Guide to The Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution.”

Jeffrey Rosen   is the president and CEO of the National Constitution Center, a nonpartisan nonprofit organization devoted to educating the public about the U.S. Constitution. Rosen is also professor of law at The George Washington University Law School and a contributing editor of  The Atlantic .

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Questions or comments about the show? Email us at [email protected] .

Continue today’s conversation on Facebook and Twitter using  @ConstitutionCtr .

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Please subscribe to  We the People   and  L ive at the National Constitution Center   on Apple Podcasts ,  Stitcher , or your favorite podcast app.

This transcript may not be in its final form, accuracy may vary, and it may be updated or revised in the future.

 [00:00:00] Jeffrey Rosen: I'm Jeffrey Rosen, President and CEO of the National Constitution Center, and welcome to We the People, a weekly show of constitutional debate. The National Constitution Center is a nonpartisan, nonprofit chartered by Congress to increase awareness and understanding of the constitution among the American people. September 17th is Constitution Day, the anniversary of the framers signing of the constitution in 1787.

This week, we dive into the philosophy of the Federalist Papers written by Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay to support the ratification of the constitution after it was signed. I'm so excited to be joined by two of America's leading experts on the Federalist Papers. Colleen Sheehan is director of graduate studies at the Arizona State School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership. She's the author of many books, including several on James Madison, and she co-edited The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist. Colleen, it is wonderful to have you back on the show.

[00:01:05] Colleen Sheehan: Always happy to be here with you, Jeff.

[00:01:07] Jeffrey Rosen: And Judge Gregory Maggs is a judge on the US court of appeals for the armed forces. He was my colleague as a member of the full-time faculty of GW Law School from 1993 to 2018, still teaches. And he's the author of many works including the article, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution. Greg, thank you so much for joining.

[00:01:34] Gregory Maggs: I'm delighted to be here. Thank you for inviting me.

[00:01:36] Jeffrey Rosen: Colleen, in your wonderful essay in the Cambridge Companion to the Federalist Papers, you write that the Federalist Papers can be traced back to Aristotle and the declaration of independence. And for Madison and Jefferson, you write, the freedom of the mind is the basis of all other liberties and rights. Each person has the right and responsibility to exercise freedom in a manner that accords with reason and manages to govern passions. And therefore, you say the rightful exercise of majority rule as described by the Federalist Papers is the accomplishment of the cool and deliberate sense of the community or the reason of the public. Tell us, distill the essence of the Federalist Papers and its classical antithesis between reason and passion.

[00:02:28] Colleen Sheehan: Well, that's a small question to start with. Thank you, Jeff. [laughs]

[00:02:32] Jeffrey Rosen: That, that's why I ask it.

[00:02:33] Colleen Sheehan: ... So the reason it goes back to Aristotle is because Aristotle comprehensively looked at the problems of politics, and the problems of politics have to do with human nature, that we don't always get along with each other, and that if we're gonna live in some kind of community so that there could be something more than just mere survival, but possibly more than safety, possibly freedom, even possibly happiness or the pursuit of happiness, then we have to find ways to live together. We have to do the kind of things that lawyers wanna do, make laws. But of course, not all laws are good laws not all laws are just.

And as Publius says in Federalist 51, justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained or until liberty will be lost in its pursuit. And that's the challenge. How do we live together in such a way that we treat each other decently, fairly, justly? Well, if we want to have free government, government based on consent of the governed, on what we might call popular government or democratic republicanism, then the majority is going to rule. But of course, the age old problem is that a majority can be just as unjust as one individual. And when they have, when you have power in your hands, it's likely to be abused.

So the challenge Publius sets out for himself if we wanna speak of him, the three of them as one person, because they all signed the, the Federalist Papers under one name, Publius then we have to see that their challenge is they're, they're dedicated to the people ruling, government by the people, but it has to be also government for the people that is for all the people for the common good. So that's the challenge Publius sets for himself. And in other words, what we have to do is find a way for the majority to rule not on the basis of mere interest, self-interest, not on the basis of mere passion and prejudice, but on the basis of justice and the general good that is reasoning the, the thing that human beings have that the other animals don't have, that we can reason together to come to understand not simply what this abstract idea of justice is, because justice is really about it's, it's the social virtue. It's how we treat one another.

The American Republic that Publius is trying to describe as they've thought about it and framed at the Constitutional Convention in that long, hot summer of 1787 in Independence Hall was really about one thing, how can the people govern themselves, genuinely govern themselves? That is in such a way that they treat one another well. That's the American experiment.

[00:05:44] Jeffrey Rosen: Beautiful [inaudible 00:05:51]. And thank you so much for that. Greg, why should we care about the Federalist Papers as a legal source? In your important article in the Boston University Law Review, The Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, you respond to the familiar arguments about why the Federalist Papers are not a good source of original meaning, including the idea that delegates to the state ratifying conventions didn't read many of them, they're often self-contradictory and so forth. You run through the objections and you refute them. Tell us why the Federalist Papers are a reliable guide to be original meaning of the constitution according to several different definitions of original meaning and original understanding.

[00:06:35] Gregory Maggs: Well, first of all, I, I don't think I refute the counter-arguments. There are arguments against it. I, I, I merely point out that it's sort of a mixed bag, that the Federalist Papers are a very important source of the original meaning of the constitution, but they are certainly not a perfect source and they are subject to many, very valid obje- claims made based on them are subject to many, very valid objections. However these objections also have counter-arguments which sort of mix the picture together.

You know, I think building on what Professor Sheehan said the Federalist Papers is a rich source of political philosophy. And I think one of the genius aspects of this was that the framer that the Madison and Hamilton and just sponsors and Jay, they had one mission, which was to convince the people of New York to ratify the constitution. And in order to do that, they had to take certain practical steps. They had to explain why the Articles of Confederation were problematic. They had to explain why we needed an important strong union. They had to explain the structure of the government, that it wasn't going to be a national government, it wasn't gonna be a federation. It was gonna be a federal system.

They had to also describe the Senate, describe the house, describe the judiciary and so forth. And at the same time, they included all the kinds of very important philosophical and political science arguments that Professor Sheehan remarked, so sort of ingenious meshing together of the two things. Well, in the process of doing this, they describe nearly every aspect of the constitution. And so if you're interested in knowing something about the original meaning of the constitution a source that is perhaps the most frequently cited source is the Federalist Papers because nearly everything that we talk about today has something said about it in the Federalist Papers.

Now, I should point out though it is not necessarily a perfect source. So for example, many people cite the Federalist Papers as a source of evidence of the original understanding of the constitution. That is to say, well, what did the people who ratified the constitution at the various state ratifying conventions, what did they think it meant? And I think a strong counterargument is most of them didn't read the Federalist Papers. In fact, half of the Federalist Papers weren't written until over half of the states had already ratified it. And one of the most cited papers paper number 78, it wasn't written until after eight of the states had already ratified the constitution.

But, you know, I think a counterargument to that is that it is a repository of the arguments that supporters of the constitution were making. And we know that the supporters won the day and something must have persuaded the ratifiers to adopt the constitution, and it was probably something similar to the arguments that were in the Federalist Papers. In other words, even if people didn't directly read the Federalist Papers, the Federalist Papers is a repository of the kinds of arguments that strong supporters of the constitution were making. And of course, ultimately the constitution was ratified.

[00:09:33] Jeffrey Rosen: Colleen, you have honored the NCC by joining a really exciting project called The Founders Library. We're putting online the sources that inspired the founders, and having the pleasure of learning from you about what Madison read before the convention and while writing the Federalist Papers, and how that influenced his distinctive understanding of faction as the triumph of, of, of passion over reason, of self interest over devotion to public good. We were brainstorming this now, but give we the people listeners a sense of some of the main books that Madison read before and during and after the convention that influenced the Federalist Papers.

[00:10:14] Colleen Sheehan: Sure. Before, before I talk about that, Jeff, let me just follow up on the, the last question momentarily. Jefferson said about the Federalist Papers that they're the best commentary on the principles of government that were ever written. And so I agree with Judge Maggs that you have to look deeper than just one argument here or there in terms of what people at the ratifying conventions were talking about and whether or not they'd read the Federalist Papers or any one particular one was published yet, because what Hamilton, Madison and Jay, mostly Hamilton and Madison did was they understood the principles that they were, that, that they at the federal convention were trying to implement into this document.

You know, it's not just words on paper. Those words are there for a purpose, are meant to accomplish something. And the Federalist Papers has a depth of commentary that's more than just describing article one, article two, article three. It's telling us what they are trying to accomplish and how the founders went about that. And I don't know a better commentary than the Federalist Papers that does that in terms of the purpose and design, the argument and action of the United States constitution. So what did Madison read? Madison read most everything. He, he, he didn't read every book in Jefferson's library, but he was constantly borrowing books from Jefferson's library whenever they lived in the same city.

For example, in Philadelphia when the, when the new government was just started Jefferson as was, was [inaudible 00:12:16] had to remodel his rental, rental property. And he built a whole library in it. And Madison was constantly borrowing books from him, in addition to the hundreds of books Madison had packed and taken with him. Imagine that, how, how long it took to get from Montpelier to Phi- Philadelphia. And what you take with you mostly is your books. I mean, that's Madison. He had a rented room in Mrs. Houses boarding house, because he's a bachelor. He's there in this boarding house with all these other folks. And, and basically his room is just full of books.

Madison was the scholar scholar of all the founders. John Adams wanted to be, but I think it's Madison who truly was. He read Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides for, for as examples of the classics, Cicero. He read, oh, he really studied Montesquieu. Of course, Locke, Hufendor, Sydney. The list goes on and on. They all read Hobbes and didn't like him that, that... and, and, and Madison comments on, on Rousseau once, and in not very kind terms. He didn't care much for Rousseau. So Madison's idea of how the majority rules is not the Rousseau in general will. He thought about all these things and he agreed with some people about some things and, and disagreed about other things, but he also had this independence thought, this spark of brilliance, and which he's the one, I believe, and I'd love to hear what Judge Maggs says Madison thinks that what he's discovered is a way to make popular government good government.

In other words, they talked about liberty hangs in the balance. The eyes of the world are upon us. We are engaged in the great experiment of self-government. And what that means is can a people govern themselves in a way that truly respects one another? And it's not just majority faction injustice and oppression. Madison thinks that he's found a way to do that, and has to do as you know, Jeff with this idea of an extensive territory and a larger number of population. And so the faction can counteract faction.

But it's more than just that negative faction counteracting faction. That's a big part of it, but there's a reason you want factions to be thwarted. It's so that the ma- there's time for the majority to refine and enlarge its views, to refine and enlarge the public views so that justice will reign rather than injustice. That's the goal of that Publius sets for himself in the Federalist Papers to show that Republican government can really work. And that when the eyes of the world are upon America, we're going to show the world as Robert Frost once put it not just how things work, but how democracy is meant.

[00:15:12] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. Greg, do you agree with Colleen's statement that Madison discovered for the first time in the history of the world a way of making popular government by good governments, and the way that he did that was by floating factions to give majorities time to refine and enlarge the public views of the justice and reason could prevail? And then after you tell us whether you, you agree with that, or wanna amplify on it, maybe introduce us to the idea of how Madison achieved that goal.

[00:15:43] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know there, there are probably s- I, I do agree with it, and I think there are probably several examples that could be given. But I think perhaps the best one concerns the idea of federalism. And Madison's idea or at least explanation of the idea that having two governments rather than one preserves individual liberty. It's been a very influential idea an idea that Justice Kennedy cited in various ways. And it seems counterintuitive when you first hear about it, that well, all of a sudden, there's gonna be two governments regulating. But when you realize that certain things will be left to the national government and others will be left to the states you realize that this has a tendency to break apart factions but to still allow local interests to be governed.

And, you know, we really didn't have a federal system of the kind that was developed in the world before this. And certainly, there wasn't a political science experiment or explication of this system until the Madison described what the different theory would be. In addition, there were of course, many debates about whether you could have a Republican government in a large country as opposed to say a small city state, and Madison of course, came up with the idea that well, actually, it's gonna work better in a large territory, because it'll have the the benefit of breaking apart factions. We'll have delegates who have to represent many people, and it will be difficult for factions to control in such an area.

I mean, again, I think this was original thought. This was, this was not something that had been tried and done before. And certainly the theory behind it hadn't been explained. Now, whether Madison completely invented it, or whether it's a joint product of all the people at the convention you know, I think that's a fair subject of, of debate. I don't think Madison claimed to be the sole inventor but I think he was one of the original explainers of the system and perhaps the best advocate for the system.

You know, just and I mentioned in my article that courts often cite the Federalist Papers, and there seem to be two sort of strands of citations at the Supreme Court. Some justices like Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas look at it for details. You know, when they use the word commerce, do they just mean trade or do they mean something broader? And then there are others like Justice Kennedy, who's obviously now retired but he looked at it for the big principles. He looked at it for questions of state sovereignty, of of federalism, of what was the overall picture of what they were trying to accomplish. And I think that's probably most in line with the kinds of things that Madison was trying to get at in his essays.

[00:18:20] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. Colleen, Greg mentions Madison's refinement of Montesquieu's view that a Republic is only possible in a small territory. You've written a wonderful article, Madison and the French Enlightenment. The Authority of Public Opinion, where you describe the influence of his thought on thinkers, including one you've recently called my attention to [foreign language 00:19:39]. So we'd love you to help us understand what Madison was reading that influenced his view of public opinion and how that affected his refinement of Montesquieu, and whether or not that was original Madison or not.

[00:19:01] Colleen Sheehan: Yeah. So, so Jefferson is in Paris as minister to France, right, in the late 1780s. And he's there. Well, Madison is with everyone else at the Philadelphia convention framing the constitution, and Jefferson will come back after the formation of the new government under President Washington. So during that time, Jefferson is sending cargo box, boxes full of books to Madison. And Madison is not just reading, but as Hamilton might have said, imbibing that French philosophy, the, the, that Jefferson and Madison have drunk too deeply from the well of French philosophy, Hamilton once said. And Madison was doing that and he wasn't agreeing with all of it, but there was a whole group of French thinkers, especially in the 1770s, 1780s, who were developing this new theory called a theory of public opinion, the opinion publique, that public opinion is queen of the world, because there's actually this new phenomenon called the public.

Why? What makes this different in the, in the, in the history of all the world? It has to do with communication, not just the commerce of goods, but the commerce of ideas, that you can spread ideas more than just from in one assembly in ancient Greece, for example, or just one salon in Paris. But through the printed word, you can get these ideas out to a much broader audience, a much broader public that can then communicate and have an influence on the center of government. And so the, the kings and queens of France had to watch out because there was a new power in the world, and it was predicted that it would be more powerful than anything else, and it's called public opinion. And it paved the way for what Tocqueville would later talk about in terms of public opinion when by then, by the late 1820s and 1830s, it's clear that public opinion is queen of the world, and that equality is a well-known irresistible principle of modern times.

And so Madison is reading all of this, and it's, he said, Montesquieu has a glimp- had a glimpse of it, but he lived a little too early and he really didn't quite understand the ramifications of it, that more than just the institutional arrangements of government checks and balances separation of powers, all those things are important, but there's something even more important going on here, and it has to do with not just stifling unjust opinion, but actually building, educating, shaping, forming the public into one that is not only clean of the world, but deserves to be queen of the world, capable, a people.

Think of that, a people coming into their own, a people capable of governing themselves. And this had never been possible in the history of the world before. This is partly why it's so new and why Madison is so excited about the discovery, how these things can work together, because you couldn't have government by the people over a large territory before this ability to communicate through the printed word because all large governments were considered empires, and empires, as Montesquieu said, tend to be despotic. But communication, the commerce of ideas changes the face of politics, the potential for, for popular government actually being successful in the modern world.

[00:23:01] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. I'm just reading your article on Rousseau now, and it's so exciting to see the connection between Rousseau's conclusion, public opinion has its source in the opinion of enlightened men, where we're in some gains partisans and becomes the general conviction. And Madison's conclusions, as you say, in his national gazette essays in 1791 that enlightened journalists and literati would communicate with the public through essays like the Federalist Papers and, and other 18th century version of long Atlantic articles, and would refine public opinion so it's guided by reason rather than passion.

Greg as, as you hear Madison's theory of public opinion as, as Colleen has helped us understand it w- w- wa- was it vindicated first of all in, in Madison's era by the thoughtful debates over ramification, where people actually did read the Federalist Papers and were guide and, and were able to engage complicated arguments? And, and does it seem too optimistic today in the age of Twitter?

[00:24:03] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know it's interesting if you if you look at the commentary on the Federalist Papers at the time they were written it was very mixed. They were recognized as being very scholarly. They the Supreme Court cited them and, and Chief Justice Marshall said that there's no greater explanation of our government than you'll find there by no greater minds. And, and yet when you look at other commentary there were people who said, well, they're kind of hard to get through. They're kind of boring. They're kind of long. I really doubt anybody has been able to read and digest all of them. Some said, for educated people, they don't really add that much, and for uneducated they're just too difficult to read.

So, you know, I again I, I think it's somewhat of a mixed picture. Certainly, their views did carry a lot of weight. We, we, we created the government according to the structure that they had adopted that they had proposed when we had the debates in Congress and the first cons- in the first Congress they passed, I don't know, about 80 or 90 laws in which they set up the structure of government, and they were all influenced by these ideas that were expressed in the Federalist Papers. Whether they actually read the Federalist papers or not they were certainly influenced by those kinds of thinking.

So, you know, whether everybody was able to read the printed word and, and learn about these ideas and the possibility of communication, we don't know. Interesting one scholar wrote a very interesting paper called Publius in the Provinces, and look to see where the Federalist Papers actually penetrated. And about half the states, none of the essays were ever reprinted. And maybe some of them were mailed there. We know that Madison and Hamilton took copies of the Federalists and mailed them to Virginia and elsewhere, but communication was still very difficult at the time. One estimate is that the newspapers that published the Federalist Papers only could print about 600 copies, 'cause that's, that's, it was a daily paper. And and the daily paper just physically could print 600 copies. And that's not a lot of copies.

Now, they floated around they floated around taverns and other places where people could read them. I think people who were interested could find them. Whether there was the penetration that would be ideal I don't think there was. I mean, I again, I think it's not so much the Federalist Papers were actually read by a large number of people and influence them as opposed to just the idea that they are repository of the kinds of arguments that were circulating, and that ultimately did pers- turn out to be persuasive.

[00:26:38] Jeffrey Rosen: Colleen, the greatest challenge to Madison's definition of both faction as any group of majority or a minority animated by passion rather than reason devoted to self-interest rather than the public good w- was the rise of political parties. And of course, Madison played a central role in the rise of the, the first party, the, the Republican Democratic Party. And yet, Madison had a philosophical defense of the rise of parties that he managed to reconcile with his views about public opinion and the refining powers of reason. Tell us how Madison justified the rise of political parties that seem to clash with this definition of faction.

[00:27:16] Colleen Sheehan: Ah, that's a great question. I ha- I have to say when, when Judge Maggs was talking about some, sometimes some people thought that the Federalist Papers are a little hard to get through, a little boring. I had to laugh to myself. We've heard that in the classroom from our students once or twice, haven't we, [laughs] when we teach the Federalists. But hopefully is that they get into the text. It's a little bit like Shakespeare. It seems foreign at first, but when you see there's actually a story there about a people, and let it, let the texts come alive, because I think the Federalist Papers are a vision for America, not just about the nuts and bolts of government. That's one thing, but the nuts and bolts are there to make them, to make this machine in this country full of this dynamic people to set forth the environment that allows us to live a certain kind of life, an ethos, to be a certain kind of people.

So I, I try to, try to get the students to see that there's more there than some 18th century tough language, but I admit it's a challenge. So, so all factions are parties. They're a part, not a whole. But not all parties are factions. That is a faction by definition whether a majority or minority is adverse to the rights of others or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community. So faction is unjust or contrary to the common good by definition.

When Madison, who is one of the founders, he and Jefferson, the founders of the first Republican Party in the United States, the Federalist Party really becomes a party in the 1790s with the rise of the Republican Party. The Republican Party makes these federalists into a party, I would say. It's the Republicans who, who it's Jefferson and Madison, right, actually think it's led by Madison in the beginning more than Jefferson. In, in the spring of 1792, Madison is talking about the Republican cause, and he finally says, okay, it's the Republican Party we're talking about. It has to be an organized opposition to what he sees as the Hamiltonian plan of government that is focused on the money men in New York city. And he says, Hamilton is trying to interpret this constitution in the way he sees fit whereas what we have to do like it or not is understand those who ratified it and abide by that fundamental opinion of the American people as they understood this document.

In other words, Madison is taking seriously from day one that who... he asks the question, who are the best keepers of the people's liberties? And his answer is the people themselves. They are not just to have confidence in their rulers, submit and obey, which he thought some of the federalists believed was the, their understanding of representative government. Madison said, no, the people have to actually be their own governors. They have to be a part. They have to participate. They have to be attached to this government, which is of their own making. And then those laws that are made, they obey.

And so it really had to do the difference between the re- this newly established Republican Party and the federalist opposition had to do with what is the role of the people themselves as Larry Kramer put it in a wonderful article, the people themselves, what is the role of the people themselves in this new republic? Is it a ghostly body politic where we talk about popular sovereignty, but in the end, it's really a few elites ruling? Well, some of the federalists thought that was really the best way to go. I mean, Reed Fisher Ames, his speech at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, and he, you know, your people, sir, your people, sir, can be a great beast. We need we need a sober second thought. We've gotta be so careful of thi- this thing we call the people.

So there was a lot of skepticism about the people. Madison had his own skepticism, and he's not in favor of fleeting passions and interests ruling in the form of factions. That's why this whole processes of what we might call deliberative republicanism, where the space and time that he sees built into the American constitutional system is there for a reason. It's there... How do we refine and enlarge the public views? Well, in newspapers, as you said, Jeff, newspapers circulate laying among the great body of the people.

And look at the newspapers that are developing in the early 1790s in all the, the major cities across the 13 states. It's between the representatives and the people going back and forth to Congress. It's within Congress within the house itself, within the Senate, between the house and Senate, between the Congress and the presidency, between the presidency and the people. So this is great amount of communication that is happening over a period of time, because it takes a while to build a coalition of the majority. And during that time, people are talking, communicating. It's a kind of Socratic method at the civic level of weeding out the the unjust and erroneous notions to build a consensus among the majority that is a more just and refined notion of the public good.

[00:33:10] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. Greg, what is your reaction to Madison's defense of the rise of political parties? Is it persuasively consistent with the broader philosophy that he articulated in the Federalist, or was it a self-interested effort to justify the party that he was increasingly to have?

[00:33:35] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know, I, it's tempting to say, well, it looks like Madison was hypocritical or inconsistent. He opposed factions, and then he was part of a, a, a political party. But I think, I think in fairness if you look at Federalist 10 Madison recognized that there's always going to be different political interests. There are always gonna be fractions. So for example, he said, people who own property are gonna have different interests from people who don't own property, and that's always going to be the case. And really what he was talking about was, or what his goal was, was to create a system that would weaken the power of faction. Sort of behind the veil without knowing what was going to happen, he said, you know, if we have a federal system, if we have a republic where we have representatives who have to represent large numbers of people if we have the different components of government elected at different times all of these things will weaken faction and address their bad effects.

I don't think he had any illusion that there were going to be factions or groups with different interests. But from behind the veil without knowing whether his side was gonna be the majority or some other side was gonna be the majority, he was thinking of a system that would counteract the pernicious effects of faction. Now to say that after that system got going, he got involved in a political party is not really to say that he's hypocritical. And in fact, if he had been nefarious, he would have designed a system that would have favored his interests but I don't think that he did that. I, I think he did the opposite, which was to try to create a system that would further democracy, not direct democracy, but representative democracy, which would have the have counteracting effects on faction.

So I don't, I don't view him as being inconsistent or hypocritical. In fact on the contrary, he created a system behind the veil of not knowing what was gonna happen in the future that he thought would be best for the country by weakening fraction. And even if he later got involved in a faction, he was subject to those rules that the constituency would be divided. It would be represented by large numbers of people and so forth.

[00:35:41] Jeffrey Rosen: Thanks so much for that. Colleen, are you persuaded?

[00:35:44] Colleen Sheehan: Well, I don't think I answered the question you asked me very well. So let me give another shot at that. Madison deliberately establishes the Republican Party in the United States in 1792, and Jefferson as his cohort in this. And he writes a couple of articles about this and explains himself. One is called Parties, and one is called A Candid State of Parties. And he sees the opposition, the Federalist Party as the anti-Republican party.

By this point in 1792, he's so frustrated with the Hamiltonian federalists thrust of, of government that he feels it's necessary to organize this Republican Party not, it's not in the contemporary sense of just organization to be a part to win elections. Madison sees it as putting the country on the right track on the Republican smaller Republican tract, where we're not ignoring the people out in the countryside and just letting the stop jobbers in New York control things or these enlightened statesmen, or people who think they're enlightened statesmen at the seat of government. That for this kind of Republican government to work the way he's envisioned it, requires a genuine attention by the people and participation and governing by the people, not just when you vote, not just at election time, but to be real citizens, not like the ancient Greeks, where that's all you do with your life is go to the assembly every day but to have a real meaningful part in this thing called self-government.

And so for Madison, the Republican Party he's founding is not a faction. It's the opposite. It's meant to promote republicanism against what he sees as a tendency towards anti-republicanism in the early days of the Republic to set America on a course in which we could actually... You know, they were so afraid when Washington was in office that this would fail and that we can't do it without Washington. We were not ready to walk alone, as Jefferson put it. Washington had to stay a second term because the country wasn't ready to walk alone. And it's during this period that Madison and Jefferson are founding the Republican Party to bring the Republican cause into the workings of government. And so for them, it's, it's the culmination of the founding it republicanism so that it's not factions that will rule, but a just majority that will rule.

[00:38:36] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you very much for that. Greg I wanna put on the table the main ideas of the Federalist Papers, and there are different ways to organize them. Do you have any particular papers? We've talked about of course 10 and, and 1. And, and are there any particular ones or groups of papers that you want with the people listeners to read and learn about?

[00:39:01] Gregory Maggs: Well you, you know, I, I think it's hard to single out any. I mean, it'd be like if you gave me the Bible and said w- which books are important and which ones are not, it would be hard to, to pick one or another, but you know, what I've always found to be very interesting are the initial essays where they describe the weaknesses of the articles of the government under the Articles of Confederation and the need for a stronger union. These these are not as philosophically deep as some of the other ones. And yet, when you do read them you recognize what they were trying to accomplish was to make the system better.

And I think without fully understanding some of the weaknesses of the the Articles of Confederation and also the article, the the the ones that were comparing the government to state governments that already existed. I think it's hard to understand, you know, what, what were they specifically trying to do.

One of the things that's very interesting is that nearly every provision in the Articles of Confederation has a corelative provision in the constitution often exchanged but you can sort of map the Articles of Confederation to the constitution. There are provisions in the constitution that are nowhere found in the Articles of Confederation. But you can look very carefully at these different provisions, because they weren't starting from scratch. They were, they had a system and they were trying to persuade people to change the system. The system had flaws, but they had to identify those flaws. And I think that in many ways although they're somewhat overlooked these are some of the most important ones.

And let me just give you some of the numbers. 15 to 22 are really the ones that mostly talk about the difficulties with the Articles of Confederation. And I think it, it's kind of the background that you need to to understand why they were undertaking this project. Now, this doesn't necessarily tell you what they were trying to accomplish but it does give you the background. So I, I think 15 to 22 are a very good place to start to get an idea of why they were trying to create a new constitution. It wasn't that we didn't have a government, it was that we wanted a better one.

[00:41:08] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you very much for that. Colleen, in your introduction with Jack Rikove to the Cambridge Companion to the Federalist, you know, two ways of organizing the Federalists, one flags the division that, that Greg just did focusing on half A, the essays concerned with making the case for the national government and, and half B, the essays focused on the exposition of the constitution itself. And then you say another approach focuses on the broader political thought and vision of each of the authors including Madison's emphasis on republican government and Hamils- Hamilton's interests in state building like commerce and foreign affairs and so forth.

So maybe tell us more about that taxonomy. But also when I asked you which papers you wanted to talk about today, you said beside 10 and 51, I think 1, 14 39, 49, 57 and 63 are especially interesting. That's so tantalizing, and you c- you can't talk about all of them, but maybe give us a sense of why you picked some of those numbers that you did.

[00:42:11] Colleen Sheehan: Well, in terms of studying the Federalist Papers I think either and both, either and both is the answer to your question there that it's, it's, it's good to, to study it the way it was originally thought to be laid out by Hamilton. Of course, it doesn't quite work out as planned because this is a work in progress, right, as they're, they're writing these papers, staying up burning the midnight oil to get it in by the deadline, to publish it in the, in the newspapers. And so sometimes the plan didn't go quite as, as, as planned to begin with. So they don't really follow Hamilton's original plan perfectly.

And it is interesting to see the different personalities coming through despite the fact that they all sign the each paper Publius as if there's one persona writing these papers. Publius speaks with one voice, but you can discover in the pages of the Federalists when you see how Hamilton and Madison will disagree and be on different sides of the party line later on, you can see the seeds of some of that in, in their essays. For example, Madison, one of the essays talks about trade, h- how it has to take its natural, agriculture and trade, it has to take its natural course.

Well, that's exactly his argument in the 1790s against Hamilton's report on manufacturers. Hamilton wants to jumpstart manufacturers. Madison says, no, trade should take its natural course. Madison was with the physiocrats then, where he would be much of a free market kind of guy. Don't get government involved in subsidizing this. And Hamilton is saying, we have to, we have to in order to compete with England. Don't you understand economics? Madison and Jefferson, you guys don't get it. So you can see some of the seeds of that in the Federalist Papers.

I think Federalist number one, when Hamilton says, you know, seems to have been reserved to the people of this country to decide the important question, whether or not societies of men are really capable of establishing good government on the basis of reflection and choice, or whether they're forever destined for their political constitutions to depend on accident and force. That one sentence, a long sentence, but if you parse it out, think about that, our choices, I mean, it's either gonna be accident and force in some form, material near another, or the possibility of establishing good government on the basis of reflection and choice. That is exactly the dichotomy put before us in book one of Plato's Republic.

[00:44:56] Jeffrey Rosen: Hmm.

[00:44:57] Colleen Sheehan: This, that's, that's exactly what's going on in the pro-am of Plato's Republic, power, is it gonna be on the basis of power or is it gonna be on the basis of persuasion? Is it gonna be ballots ultimately or bullets? And are we facing that in the United States today? We're asking ourselves that question. Can we go on? Can we talk to each other so we can persuade each other and be one people rather than resort to force? Once we resort to force, the rule of law is in danger, as Lincoln tells us in the Lyceum address, and it's a very easy slide downhill, and just some kind of chaos, anarchy and disrespect for government and disrespect for each other.

So that opening salvo of Federalist number one is more than mere words. It's more than rhetoric. It's puts before us the question of politics, which is the question for each of us as citizens. What are we going to choose? And how we act is that choice. How we act with one another is making that choice. I have to say one word about Federalist 49, it's my favorite, though I like, though I have others that, that come in close seconds but Federalists 49 is Madison's disagreement with Jefferson, and he takes him to task, and he really kind of points out, he shows us that the seeds of his theory of public opinion are in Federalist 49. But there's another thing I like about it. And Jack Rikove, if he's listening will laugh at this.

So at Montpelier, that beautiful farm that you can, Madison's home that you can walk around, there are these, these gorgeous horses there. And Jack and I were ruminating one time about these horses, if, if any of them were race horses, wouldn't you wanna name one of them ticklish experiment?

[00:46:51] Jeffrey Rosen: [inaudible 00:49:26].

[00:46:54] Colleen Sheehan: Madison says, Madison says, you know, calling a second convention, you shouldn't do that. It's a ticklish experiment. So we, we thought that if there was a race horse from Montpelier, it ought to be named ticklish experiment. Let me con- let me just conclude with my favorite passage in the Federalist Papers. It's actually from Federalist 39, which I think sums up the vision of the Federalist. The first question that offers itself is whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America, with the fundamental principles of the revolution, or with the honorable determination, which animates every votary of, of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. That's the project of the Federalist, that's the challenge of the Federalist, that's our challenge still today.

[00:47:58] Jeffrey Rosen: So inspiring. Thank you so much for that. Thank you for reminding us that it all comes back to Plato and Aristotle, power and persuasion, reason and passion reflected in Federalist one. And thanks for sharing your favorites, including 49. Greg, I, I know it's very hard to pick one, but s- so, so much fun to hear which ones especially speak to you. Can you single out one or two Federalist Papers that you like especially?

[00:48:26] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know, the one that that captures the imagination as a, as a judge and as a legal scholar of constitutional laws Federalist 78. Now, as I mentioned earlier, Federalist 78, it's one of the most cited in the courts. Whether anybody actually read it at the time as I mentioned, eight states had already ratified before it was published. It was one of the last ones published. It was, wasn't first published in the newspaper. It was published in the, in the second volume of the Federalist and it was only later published in the newspapers. But it talks about the judiciary, and it says two things which both seem eminently reasonable until you think about them, and then you wonder whether they're contradictory.

One is it says that the, the courts, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch, because all they do is apply the law. They just decide the questions, and they don't have their own force or their own political will. And then in a very interesting passage, they expressly discuss judicial review, that if there are provisions that are contrary to the constitution, the courts have no choice but to enforce the constitution over the provisions. Now, this is somewhat remarkable because while there is the supremacy clause, which says that the constitution is supreme over state law, there's, there's nothing that really says what the relationship of the constitution to laws passed by Congress are. But the unmistakable implication of Federalist 78 is that they're talking about judicial review.

And those two propositions seem evident to us and, and reasonable that they're not like the president, they're not like the Congress. They, they take cases that come to them and they decide them according to law, and they're there for the least dangerous branch. And then at the same time, it says, and of course, they get to decide when there's a conflict between legislation and the constitution. And I don't think at the time they understood that that could be seen as making it perhaps one of the most dangerous branches. If not one of the most dangerous, one of the most powerful. And you know, it, it was difficult for them in their mindset to see things that would transpire later on. It doesn't make them wrong but it's very interesting.

And certainly any lawyer who's interested in judicial review and, and charges of judicial activism or arguments that there is in judicial activism should read the Federalist 78.

[00:50:43] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. So great to read Federalist 78 and also to hear [inaudible 00:53:36] recommendation of Federalist 49. Well, it is time for closing arguments in this wonderful discussion of the Federalist Papers on Constitution Day. Your homework with the people listeners is, is obvious read the Federalist Papers. And if you find you have a favorite, write to me and tell me what it is and why, [email protected] . And in order to inspire you to do that homework, I'm gonna ask for closing statements from Professor Sheehan and Judge Maggs. Colleen, the first one is to you, why should We the People listeners read the Federalist Papers on Constitution Day, and why are the Federalist Papers important?

[00:51:29] Colleen Sheehan: We the people would find it in our interest, if not for the purpose of simply of edification and amazement to read the Federalist, I think, because we don't depend on others to govern us. We have the responsibility to govern ourselves. And as Madison once put it, liberty and learning lean on each other. You can't have liberty without learning for free people. Otherwise, he says it's a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Well, I don't want either of those things to be the end of the American story. So one of the places that we can educate ourselves in both our rights and our responsibilities as citizens is by reading the Federalist. I think Jefferson's right, it's the best commentary on the principles of government that ever was written.

Let me just say one word about Constitution Day in 1787. I went back and looked at the weather map that day. It was a gloomy day in Philadelphia, September 17th, 1787. It was overcast. And you can just imagine the men in what we today call leggings, all these men walking around Independence Hall in leggings walking up to Washington's desk and putting their signature on that parchment. And then afterwards, they adjourned, e- except, I don't know if Elbridge Gary, Edmund Rudolf, and George Mason went with them, maybe to, probably to the city tavern over on, on, on second street, and they celebrated. But as, as Ben Franklin said, yes, it's a republic if we can keep it. I think there's never been a time more than today that that question is real for us. It was certainly the case in 1860, but it's again, the case in 2021. Do we wanna keep it? Are we willing to do the work to keep it? I think it's something that we as Americans have to give them a serious thought to. And Constitution is a good day to spend a little time thinking about that.

[00:53:48] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you very much for that. Greg, the last words are to you. Why should We the People listeners read the Federalist Papers on Constitution Day, and why are they important?

[00:53:59] Gregory Maggs: You know, in in the 1820s Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Cohens v. Virginia said this about the Federalist Papers, it is a complete commentary on our constitution, and it is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank, and the part of two of its members, and he was speaking about Hamilton and Madison, performed in the framing of the constitution put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed. The Federalist Papers are not the final word. They are not a perfect source of the original meaning of the constitution. And yet, I think it's almost impossible to get ahold of the original meaning without at least considering what the Federalist Papers have to offer.

And I think if you're interested in the constitution, if you're interested in what they, the framers intended to accomplish, the ratifiers wanted I think you have to include the Federalist Papers in your study.

[00:54:58] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much, Colleen Sheehan and Judge Gregory Maggs for a wonderful discussion of the Federalist Papers, the philosophy that inspired them, and the reasons for reading them today. Thank you We the People listeners for reading the Federalist Papers, and if you find a favorite, let me know. Colleen, Greg, thank you so much for joining, and happy Constitution Day.

[00:55:24] Gregory Maggs: Happy Constitution Day.

[00:55:26] Colleen Sheehan: Thank you very much. Happy Constitution Day, September 17th.

[00:55:31] Jeffrey Rosen: Today's show was produced by Jackie McDermott and engineered by Kevin Kilbourne. Research was provided by Sam Desai, John Guerra and Lana Ulrich. Please rate, review, and subscribe to We the People on Apple, and recommend the show to friends, colleagues, or anyone anywhere who is eager for a weekly dose of constitutional illumination and debate. And always remember that the National Constitution Center is a private nonprofit. Thanks so much to those of you who have been sending in donations of any amounts, $5, $10 to show your support for the mission. In honor of Constitution Day, it would be so great if you would go online and make a donation as a sign of your support. You can do that by becoming a member at constitutioncenter.org/membership, or give a donation of any amount at constitutioncenter.org/donate. On behalf of the National Constitution Center. I'm Jeffrey Rosen, and happy Constitution Day.

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Introductory note: the federalist, [27 october 1787–28 may 1788], introductory note: the federalist.

[New York, October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788]

The Federalist essays have been printed more frequently than any other work of Hamilton. They have, nevertheless, been reprinted in these volumes because no edition of his writings which omitted his most important contribution to political thought could be considered definitive. The essays written by John Jay and James Madison, however, have not been included. They are available in many editions, and they do not, after all, properly belong in the writings of Alexander Hamilton.

The Federalist , addressed to the “People of the State of New-York,” was occasioned by the objections of many New Yorkers to the Constitution which had been proposed on September 17, 1787, by the Philadelphia Convention. During the last week in September and the first weeks of October, 1787, the pages of New York newspapers were filled with articles denouncing the Constitution. 1 The proposed government also had its defenders, but their articles were characterized by somewhat indignant attacks on those who dared oppose the Constitution rather than by reasoned explanations of the advantages of its provisions. 2

The decision to publish a series of essays defending the Constitution and explaining in detail its provisions was made by Alexander Hamilton. Both the reasons for his decision and the date on which he conceived the project are conjecturable. Having gone to Albany early in October to attend the fall session of the Supreme Court, he was not in New York City during the early weeks of the controversy over the Constitution. 3 He must, nevertheless, have concluded that if it were to be adopted, convincing proof of its merits would have to be placed before the citizens of New York. His decision to write the essays may have been made before he left Albany, for according to tradition he wrote the first number of The Federalist in the cabin of his sloop on the return trip to New York. 4

At some time before the appearance of the first essay, written under the pseudonym “Publius,” Hamilton sought and found collaborators, for the first essay, published in The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser on October 27, 1787, was followed in four days by an essay by John Jay. Neither Hamilton nor Jay left a record of any plans they might have made, but the third collaborator, James Madison, later wrote that “the undertaking was proposed by Alexander Hamilton to James Madison with a request to join him and Mr. Jay in carrying it into effect. William Duer was also included in the original plan; and wrote two or more papers, which though intelligent and sprightly, were not continued, nor did they make a part of the printed collection.” 5 Hamilton also sought the assistance of Gouverneur Morris, who in 1815 remembered that he had been “warmly pressed by Hamilton to assist in writing the Federalist.” 6

In reprinting the text of The Federalist the original manuscripts have been approximated as nearly as possible. As the first printing of each essay, despite typographical errors, was presumably closest to the original, the text published in this edition is that which was first printed. The texts of those essays among the first seventy-seven which were written by Hamilton or are of doubtful authorship are taken from the newspapers in which they first appeared; the texts of essays 78–85 are taken from the first edition of The Federalist , edited by John and Archibald McLean. 7

With the exception of the last eight numbers, all the issues of The Federalist were first printed in the newspapers of New York City. The first essay was published on October 27, 1787, in The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , edited by John McLean and Company. Subsequent essays appeared in The Independent Journal and in three other New York newspapers: New-York Packet , edited by Samuel and John Loudon; The Daily Advertiser , edited by Francis Childs; and The New-York Journal, and Daily Patriotic Register , edited by Thomas Greenleaf. 8

The first seven essays, published between October 27 and November 17, 1787, appeared on Saturdays and Wednesdays in The Independent Journal , a semiweekly paper, and a day or two later in both New-York Packet and The Daily Advertiser . At the conclusion of essay 7 the following announcement appeared in The Independent Journal: “In order that the whole subject of these Papers may be as soon as possible laid before the Public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week, on Tuesday in the New-York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.” The intention thus was to publish on Tuesday in New-York Packet , on Wednesday in The Independent Journal , on Thursday in The Daily Advertiser , and on Saturday in The Independent Journal .

The announced plan was not consistently followed. On Thursday, November 22, The Daily Advertiser , according to the proposed schedule, published essay 10, but after its publication no other essay appeared first in that newspaper. To continue the proposed plan of publication—a plan which occasionally was altered by publishing three instead of four essays a week—the third “Publius” essay of the next week appeared on Friday in New-York Packet . After November 30 the essays appeared in the following manner: Tuesday, New-York Packet , Wednesday, The Independent Journal , Friday, New-York Packet , and Saturday, The Independent Journal . The third essay of the week appeared either on Friday in the Packet or on Saturday in The Independent Journal . This pattern of publication was followed through the publication of essay 76 (or essay 77, in the numbering used in this edition of Hamilton’s works) on April 2, 1788. The remaining essays were first printed in the second volume of McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends ’s edition of May 28, 1788, and beginning on June 14 were reprinted, at intervals of several days, first in The Independent Journal and then in New-York Packet .

The first edition, printed by J. and A. McLean 9 and corrected by Hamilton, is the source from which most editions of The Federalist have been taken. On January 1, 1788, McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends , having observed “the avidity” with which the “Publius” essays had been “sought after by politicians and persons of every description,” announced plans for the publication of “The FEDERALIST, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution, By a Citizen of New-York , Corrected by the Author, with Additions and Alterations.” 10 The promised volume, including the first thirty-six essays, was published on March 22, 1788. Hamilton was not altogether pleased with the volume, for he stated in the preface 11 that it contained “violations of method and repetitions of ideas which cannot but displease a critical reader.” Despite such imperfections, he hoped that the essays would “promote the cause of truth, and lead to a right judgment of the true interests of the community.” Interested readers were promised a second volume of essays as soon as the editor could prepare them for publication.

“This Day is published,” The Independent Journal advertised on May 28, 1788, “The FEDERALIST, VOLUME SECOND.” This volume contained the remaining essays, including the final eight which had not yet appeared in the newspapers. As in the first volume, there were editorial revisions which probably were made by Hamilton. The final eight essays, which first appeared in this volume were reprinted in The Independent Journal and in New-York Packet between June 14, 1788, and August 16, 1788.

In addition to the McLean edition, during Hamilton’s lifetime there were two French editions 12 and two American editions of The Federalist . The second American edition, printed by John Tiebout in 1799, was not a new printing but a reissue of the remaining copies of the McLean edition with new title pages. The third American edition, published in 1802, not only was a new printing; it also contained revisions presumably approved by Hamilton. It is this, the Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends edition, which must be taken as Hamilton’s final version of The Federalist . 13

George F. Hopkins announced his plan for a new edition of The Federalist in the January 13, 1802, issue of New-York Evening Post . “Proposals, By G. F. Hopkins, 118 Pearl Street,” read the advertisement in the Post , “For Publishing by Subscription, in Two handsome Octavo Volumes, THE FEDERALIST, ON THE CONSTITUTION, BY PUBLIUS Written in 1788. TO WHICH IS ADDED, PACIFICUS, ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY. Written in 1793. The whole Revised and Corrected. With new passages and notes .” Hopkins proposed not only to issue a revised text but to give the author of each essay; by naming Hamilton, Madison, and Jay as the authors of The Federalist , he publicly broke the poorly kept secrecy surrounding its authorship. Almost a year passed before Hopkins, on December 8, 1802, offered to the public “in a dress which it is believed will meet with general approbation” the new edition.

Although it is certain that Hamilton did not himself revise the text published in the Hopkins edition, available evidence indicates that he approved the alterations which were made. In 1847 J. C. Hamilton wrote to Hopkins requesting information on the extent to which Hamilton had made or approved the revisions. Hopkins replied that the changes had been made by a “respectable professional gentleman” who, after completing his work, had “put the volumes into the hands of your father, who examined the numerous corrections, most of which he sanctioned, and the work was put to press.” The editor, who was not named by Hopkins, was identified by J. C. Hamilton as John Wells, an eminent New York lawyer. The Hopkins edition, Hamilton’s son emphatically stated, was “ revised and corrected by John Wells … and supervised by Hamilton.” 14 Henry B. Dawson in his 1864 edition of The Federalist contested J. C. Hamilton’s conclusion and argued that the changes were made by William Coleman, editor of New-York Evening Post , and that they were made without Hamilton’s authorization or approval. According to Dawson, Hopkins declared on two different occasions in later years—once to James A. Hamilton and once to John W. Francis—that Hamilton refused to have any changes made in the essays. 15 Although it is impossible to resolve the contradictory statements on Hamilton’s participation in the revisions included in the 1802 edition of The Federalist , J. C. Hamilton presents the more convincing evidence. He, after all, quoted a statement by Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends , while Dawson related only a conversation.

The McLean and Hopkins editions thus constitute Hamilton’s revision of the text of The Federalist . Hamilton made some minor changes in essays written by Jay and Madison—changes which in the McLean edition they presumably authorized. Jay never revised the essays he wrote, and it was not until 1818 that Madison authorized the publication of an edition which included his own corrections of his essays. This edition was published by Jacob Gideon, 16 a printer in Washington, D.C.

It is, then, from the newspapers of the day, the McLean edition of 1788, and the Hopkins edition of 1802 that a definitive text of Hamilton’s contribution to The Federalist must be reconstructed. In the present edition, as stated above, the texts of essays 1–77 have been taken from the newspapers in which they first appeared; the texts of essays 78–85 are from volume two of the McLean edition. All changes which Hamilton later made or approved in the texts of the essays he wrote have been indicated in notes. Thus in essays 1–77 all changes made in the McLean and Hopkins editions in Hamilton’s essays are given. In essays 78–85 all the changes which appeared in the Hopkins edition are noted. The edition in which a revision was made is indicated by a short title, either by the name “McLean” or “Hopkins.” To this rule there are, however, three exceptions: 1. When an obvious typographical error appears in the text taken from the newspaper, it has been corrected without annotation. 2. When in McLean there is a correction of a printer’s error which, if left unchanged, would make the text meaningless or inaccurate, that correction has been incorporated in the text; the word or words in the newspaper for which changes have been substituted are then indicated in the notes. 3. Obvious printer’s errors in punctuation have been corrected; a period at the end of a question, for example, has been changed to a question mark. When a dash is used at the end of a sentence, a period has been substituted.

Because of changes made in the McLean edition, the numbering of certain essays presents an editorial problem. When McLean, with Hamilton’s assistance, published the first edition of The Federalist , it was decided that the essay published in the newspaper as 35 should follow essay 28, presumably because the subject matter of 35 was a continuation of the subject treated in 28. It also was concluded, probably because of its unusual length, that the essay which appeared in the newspapers as essay 31 should be divided and published as two essays. When these changes were made, the original numbering of essays 29–36 was changed in the following way:

Essays 36–78 in the McLean edition thus were one number higher than the number given the corresponding essay in the newspaper.

Because McLean changed the numbers of some of the essays, later editors have questioned whether there were 84 or 85 essays. This is understandable, for there were only 84 essays printed in the newspapers, the essays 32 and 33 by McLean having appeared in the press as a single essay. The last essay printed in The Independent Journal accordingly was numbered 84. The last eight essays published in New-York Packet , on the other hand, were given the numbers used in the second volume of McLean’s edition. The last number of The Federalist printed by New-York Packet in April had been numbered “76”; the following essay, published in June, was numbered “78.” By omitting the number “77,” the editor of New-York Packet , like McLean, numbered the last of the essays “85.”

Later editions of The Federalist , except for that published by Henry B. Dawson, have followed the numbering of the McLean edition. Since no possible purpose would be served and some confusion might result by restoring the newspaper numbering, the essays in the present edition have been given the numbers used by McLean in 1788, and the newspaper number has been placed in brackets.

Almost a century and a half of controversy has centered on the authorship of certain numbers of The Federalist . Similar to most other eighteenth-century newspaper contributors, the authors of The Federalist chose to write anonymously. When The Federalist essays appeared in the press, many New Yorkers probably suspected that Hamilton, if not the sole author of the “Publius” essays, was the major contributor. Friends of Hamilton and Madison, and perhaps those of Jay, certainly knew that this was a joint enterprise and who the authors were. 17 The number of essays written by each author, if only because the question probably never arose, aroused no curiosity. The Federalist , after all, was written for the immediate purpose of persuading the citizens of New York that it was to their interest to adopt the Constitution; certainly not the authors, and probably few readers, realized that the essays which in the winter of 1788 appeared so frequently in the New York press under the signature of “Publius” would become a classic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. In 1802, George F. Hopkins proposed to publish a new edition of The Federalist in which the authors would be identified; but because of Hamilton’s “decided disapprobation” 18 no identification of the authors was made in that edition. It was not until three years after Hamilton’s death that The Port Folio , a Philadelphia weekly, published a list of the authors of the essays, thus opening a controversy which still remains unsettled. 19

The evidence on the authorship of several of the essays is contradictory because both Hamilton and Madison made, or allegedly made, several lists in which they claimed authorship of the same essays. It is neither necessary nor instructive to discuss the minor discrepancies found in the claims by the two men in their respective lists. 20 The whole problem is simplified by keeping in mind that of the eighty-five essays the authorship of only fifteen is disputed. Despite contrary claims in several of the least credible lists published during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, it has long been accepted that Hamilton wrote essays 1, 6–9, 11–13, 15–17, 21–36, 59–61, and 65–85; that Madison was the author of essays 10, 14, 37–48; and that Jay contributed essays 2–5 and 64. 21 The authorship of only essays 18–20, 49–58, and 62–63 is therefore debatable.

The number of disputed essays can be reduced by examining the reliability of the several Madison and Hamilton lists. There are four reputed Madison lists: 1. An article, signed “Corrector,” which appeared in the National Intelligencer on March 20, 1817, and which, according to the anonymous author, was copied from “a penciled memorandum in the hand of Madison.” 22 2. A statement of authorship, supposedly endorsed by Madison, made by Richard Rush, a member of Madison’s cabinet, in his copy of The Federalist . 23 3. An article in the City of Washington Gazette , December 15, 1817, claiming to set forth a list “furnished by Madison himself.” 24 4. The edition of The Federalist published by Jacob Gideon in 1818, which based its attribution of authorship on Madison’s own “copy of the work which that gentleman had preserved for himself.” 25 There is no evidence that Madison approved the first three lists; the fourth, the Gideon edition, was not only based on Madison’s copy, but it was endorsed by him as correct.

Hamilton’s claims to authorship are more complicated. Despite statements by his partisans, there are only three Hamilton lists that merit the serious attention of the historian who applies any known tests for evaluating historical evidence. They are the so-called “Benson list,” the list allegedly preserved by Hamilton in his own copy of The Federalist , and the “Kent list.”

The Benson list, according to a story first related by William Coleman in March, 1817, was left by Hamilton, shortly before his death, between the pages of a book in the library of his long-time friend, Judge Egbert Benson. Arriving at Benson’s office, Hamilton was told by Robert Benson, Jr., Egbert’s nephew and clerk, that the Judge and Rufus King had gone to Massachusetts for a few days. As Hamilton conversed with the law clerk, he idly handled one of the volumes on the shelves in the office. After Hamilton’s death which occurred two days later, Benson remembered the incident and, looking in the book Hamilton had picked up, he found a scrap of paper, unsigned but in Hamilton’s hand, listing the essays he had written. 26 Judge Benson, according to the traditional account, pasted it on the inside cover of his copy of The Federalist but somewhat later, fearing that he might lose such a valuable document, deposited it in the New York Society Library. The memorandum was presumably stolen in 1818. 27

The existence of the Benson list was corroborated by two witnesses, Robert Benson and William Coleman. Coleman, editor of New-York Evening Post , is the less credible authority; he may have seen the Benson list, but it is significant that he never definitely stated that he did. The most emphatic statement that he made, elicited by the demands for proof made by an antagonist in a newspaper controversy over the authorship of The Federalist , was as follows:

“I, therefore, for the entire satisfaction of the public, now state, that the memorandum referred to is in General Hamilton’s own hand writing, was left by him with his friend judge BENSON, the week before his death, and was, by the latter, deposited in the city library, where it now is, and may be seen, pasted in one of the volumes of The Federalist .” 28

The statement of Robert Benson, the law clerk to whom Hamilton spoke on the day before his encounter with Burr, is more convincing, but it was made many years after the event, and it is far from being conclusive. “I was then a student in the office,” Benson recalled “and well known to the General” who called and enquired for Judge Benson.

“I replied that he had left the city with Mr. King. The General in his usual manner then went to the book case and took down a book which he opened and soon replaced, and left the office. Some time after the General’s death, a memorandum in his handwriting was found in a volume of Pliny’s letters, I think , which, I believe , was the book he took down, and which memorandum was afterwards wafered by the Judge in the inside cover of the first volume of the Federalist, and where it remained for several years. He subsequently removed it, and, as I understand , gave it to some public library.… The marks of the wafers still remain in the volume, and above them in Judge Benson’s handwriting is, what is presumed, and I believe to be , a copy of the General’s memorandum above referred to.” 29

The Benson list is suspect, then, because the claim for its authenticity is based on the evidence of two men neither of whom stated that he actually saw it. If there had not already been too much fruitless speculation on Hamilton’s thoughts and intentions, it would be interesting to explain why Hamilton chose such a roundabout method to make certain that future generations would recognize his contribution to such a celebrated book. Perhaps he knew that Robert Benson would search all the volumes in his uncle’s office on the suspicion that Hamilton, however uncharacteristically, had concealed a note on some important subject; or perhaps he thought that Benson frequently read Pliny’s Letters and thus could be sure the note would be found. One can speculate endlessly on the motives for Hamilton’s extraordinary behavior, but the significant fact is that the Benson list is inadequate as historical evidence.

Evidence of the existence of Hamilton’s own copy of The Federalist in which he supposedly listed the essays he wrote comes from a notice which appeared on November 14, 1807, in The Port Folio . “The Executors of the last will of General Hamilton,” the Philadelphia weekly announced, “have deposited in the Publick Library of New-York a copy of ‘ The Federalist ,’ which belonged to the General in his lifetime, in which he has designated in his own handwriting, the parts of that celebrated work written by himself, as well as those contributed by Mr. JAY and Mr. MADISON.” No one has seen Hamilton’s copy in the last 150 years; whether it existed or what happened to it, if it did exist, cannot now be known. 30

While the numbers claimed by Hamilton in the Benson list and in his own copy of The Federalist are the same, the list by Chancellor James Kent disagrees in several particulars from the other two. The Kent list, in the Chancellor’s own writing, was found on the inside cover of his copy of The Federalist , now in the Columbia University Libraries. Because of differences in the ink and pen he used, Kent’s statement may be divided into three parts, each of which was written at a different time. In the following copy of Kent’s notes the three parts are indicated by Roman numerals:

The numbers which were written over the numbers Kent first wrote are not in Kent’s writing. However familiar one is with the handwriting of another, it is difficult to determine if a single numeral is in his writing. But despite the impossibility of positive identification, a close comparison of numerals made by Hamilton with the numerals which were added to the Kent list strongly indicates that the changes are in the writing of Hamilton. The Kent list thus becomes the only evidence in Hamilton’s writing which now exists. See also James Kent to William Coleman, May 12, 1817 ( ALS , Columbia University Libraries).

Certain reasonable deductions can be made from the evidence presented by Kent’s notes. The ink clearly reveals that the three notes were made at different times. The information in part I of the notes was obtained from someone other than Hamilton, for otherwise Kent would not have written in part II “that Mr. Hamilton told me.” The information in part II must have been given to Kent in a conversation, for it is evident that Kent was not sure that he remembered what Hamilton had said or that Hamilton could remember, without reference to a copy of The Federalist , which essays he had written.

Part III—because it refers to Hamilton as “general” (a rank which he attained in 1798), and because the conversation alluded to took place in Albany—must have been made between 1800, the year in which Hamilton resumed his law practice after completing his duties as inspector general of the Army, and his death in 1804. The third section of Kent’s memorandum also indicates that Hamilton corrected and approved the Kent list. It constitutes, therefore, the most reliable evidence available on Hamilton’s claims of authorship. It should be noted, however, that Kent later doubted the accuracy of Hamilton’s memory, for on the page opposite his memorandum he pasted a copy of the article from the City of Washington Gazette , which stated that Madison had written essays 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37–58, 62–63, and that Jay was the author of essays 2, 3, 4, 5, 64. Underneath this clipping Kent wrote:

“I have no doubt Mr. Jay wrote No 64 on the Treaty Power—He made a Speech on that Subject in the NY Convention, & I am told he says he wrote it. I suspect therefore from internal Ev. the above to be the correct List, & not the one on the opposite page.” 31

A comparison of the Kent list (for those essays claimed by Hamilton) with the Gideon edition (for those essays claimed by Madison) makes it clear that there is room for doubt only over the authorship of essays 18, 19, 20, 50, 51, 52, 54–58, and 62–63. About three of these—18, 19, and 20—there should be no dispute, for there is a statement by Madison which Hamilton’s claim does not really controvert. On the margin of his copy of The Federalist opposite number 18 Madison wrote:

“The subject matter of this and the two following numbers happened to be taken up by both Mr. H and Mr. M. What had been prepared by Mr. H who had entered more briefly into the subject, was left with Mr. M on its appearing that the latter was engaged in it, with larger materials, and with a view to a more precise delineation; and from the pen of the latter, the several papers went to the Press.”

The problem of determining the authorship of these three essays is merely one of deciding on the comparative contributions of the two men. Although there are several sentences which are very similar to remarks Hamilton recorded in the outline for his speech of June 18, 1787, on the Constitution, most of the material was undoubtedly supplied by Madison who without doubt wrote these essays. Essay 20, for example, is virtually a copy of notes which Madison had taken in preparation for the Constitutional Convention. 32 On the other hand, Hamilton, however slight his contribution, did contribute to these essays. The authorship of 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, and 63 is more difficult to determine, 33 but Madison’s claim as represented by the Gideon edition appears more convincing than Hamilton’s claim as represented by the Kent list.

Internal evidence has proved to be of little assistance in determining the authorship of The Federalist . The ablest studies in this field are those by Edward G. Bourne 34 and J. C. Hamilton. 35 Bourne attributes all disputed essays to Madison; J. C. Hamilton asserts that they were written by his father. Bourne and J. C. Hamilton attempt to prove their respective cases by printing excerpts from the disputed essays parallel to similar, and sometimes identical, passages from other writings by each man. Bourne presents very convincing evidence for Madison’s authorship of numbers 49, 51, 53, 62, 63, and a fair case for Madison having written numbers 50 and 52; his case for 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 is particularly weak as he offers no evidence from Madison’s other writings and relies on the argument that, as essays 48–58 are a group, the author who wrote the earlier essays must also have written the later ones in the group. J. C. Hamilton, on the other hand, produces some evidence that Hamilton wrote essays 55–58, and he offers contrived and unconvincing arguments in support of Hamilton’s authorship of the remaining disputed essays. The significant point, however, is that each man was able to find evidence that his candidate wrote all the disputed essays. The contradictory conclusions of these two men—one of whom studied intensively the previous writings of Madison and the other whose life-long study of his father gave him a knowledge of Hamilton’s writings which never has been excelled—point up the difficulties of deciding this dispute on the basis of internal evidence.

The problems posed by internal evidence are made even more difficult by the fact that both Hamilton and Madison defended the Constitution with similar arguments and by the fact that they both had a remarkably similar prose style. To attempt to find in any of the disputed essays words which either man used and which the other never employed is futile, if only because the enormous amount which each wrote allows the assiduous searcher to discover almost any word in the earlier or subsequent writings of both. 36 The search for parallel statements in the disputed essays and in earlier writings is also an unrewarding enterprise. Madison doubtless did not approve of the ideas expressed in Hamilton’s famous speech on June 18, 1787, to the Convention; but before 1787 both men agreed on the weaknesses of the Confederation and the necessity of a stronger central government. 37 The similarity of their thinking is particularly apparent to one who examines their collaboration when they were both members of the Continental Congress in 1783. Their later political differences prove little about what they wrote in 1787–88.

If one were to rely on internal evidence, it would be impossible to assign all the disputed essays to either Hamilton or Madison. While such evidence indicates that Madison surely wrote numbers 49–54 and probably 62–63, it also suggests that Hamilton wrote 55–58. In this edition of Hamilton’s writings, however, greater weight is given to the claims made by the disputants than to internal evidence. Madison’s claims were maturely considered and emphatically stated; Hamilton, on the other hand, showed little interest in the question, and he died before it had become a matter of acrimonious controversy. But the fact remains that Hamilton’s claims have never been unequivocally refuted, and the possibility remains that he could have written essays 50–52, 54–58, 62–63. As a consequence, these essays have been printed in this edition of Hamilton’s writings. Madison’s adherents may, however, derive some consolation from the fact that in the notes to each of these essays it is stated that Madison’s claims to authorship are superior to those of Hamilton.

1 .  The most important of these was by “Cato,” presumably George Clinton. The first “Cato” letter was published in The New-York Journal, and Weekly Register on September 27, 1787.

2 .  See, for example, the two articles by “Caesar” ( September 28 and October 15, 1787 ), which erroneously have been attributed to H.

3 .  An anonymous newspaper article, signed “Aristides” and published in The [New York] Daily Advertiser on October 6, stated that H’s absence from the city prevented him from defending himself against newspaper attacks. An entry in H’s Cash Book dated November 4 (see “Cash Book,” March 1, 1782–1791 ) indicates that he attended the October session of the Supreme Court in Albany.

4 .  The story was first related in Hamilton, History description begins John C. Hamilton, Life of Alexander Hamilton, a History of the Republic of the United States of America (Boston, 1879). description ends III, 369, and has been repeated in most works on The Federalist .

5 .  A memorandum by Madison entitled “The Federalist,” quoted in J. C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: a Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865), I, lxxxv.

The essays by William Duer, signed “Philo-Publius,” are published at the end of the second volume of J. C. Hamilton’s edition of The Federalist .

6 .  Morris to W. H. Wells, February 24, 1815, in Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris description begins Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris (Boston, 1832). description ends , III, 339.

7 .  Drafts of only two essays, 5 and 64, both of which were written by John Jay, have been found. The draft of essay 5 is in the John Jay Papers, Columbia University Libraries. The draft of essay 64 is in the New-York Historical Society, New York City. The draft of essay 3 is now owned by Mr. Ruddy Ruggles of Chicago.

8 .  Most writers have stated that all the essays first appeared in The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser or New-York Packet . Others (J. C. Hamilton and Henry B. Dawson, for example) were aware that they appeared first in different newspapers, but they did not determine accurately the newspaper in which each essay first appeared.

The Independent Journal and New-York Packet carried the entire series of essays, while The Daily Advertiser ceased to print them after essay 51. The New-York Journal carried only essays 23 through 39. At no time, however, did an essay appear in The New-York Journal without appearing in at least one of the three other papers at the same time. On January 1, 1788, Thomas Greenleaf, editor of the Journal and supporter of George Clinton, printed a letter signed “45 Subscribers” which complained about Greenleaf’s publication of “Publius,” which was already appearing in three newspapers. Shortly after this, on January 30, 1788, Greenleaf discontinued publication of the essays with number 39 (numbered by him 37).

9 .  The full title is The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, No. 41, Hanover-Square. MDCCLXXXVIII). This is referred to hereafter as the “McLean edition.”

10 .  The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser January 1, 1788.

11 .  There is no question that H was the author of the preface and that he corrected the essays. Not only was this stated by McLean’s advertisement, but Madison, writing years later, said that the essays “were edited as soon as possible in two small vols. the preface to the 1st. vol. drawn up by Mr. H., bearing date N. York Mar. 1788” ( Hunt, Writings of Madison description begins Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 1902). description ends , VIII, 411).

12 .  The first French edition, published in two volumes in 1792, listed the authors as “MM. Hamilton, Madisson et Gay, Citoyens de l’Etat de New-York.” The second edition, published in 1795 and also in two volumes, named “MM. Hamilton, Madisson et Jay” as the authors. For a description of these editions, see The Fœderalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favor of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Fœderal Convention, September 17, 1787. Reprinted from the Original Text . With an Historical Introduction and Notes by Henry B. Dawson. In Two Volumes (Morrisania, New York, 1864), I, lxiv–lxvi.

13 .  The FEDERALIST, On the New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, PACIFICUS, On the Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, At Washington’s Head, 1802). Cited hereafter as the “Hopkins edition.”

14 .  J. C. Hamilton, The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xci, xcii.

15 .  Henry B. Dawson, The Fœderalist , I, lxx–lxxi.

16 .  The Federalist, on The New Constitution, written in the year 1788, By Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay with An Appendix, containing The Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius, on the Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793; Also the Original Articles of Confederation, and The Constitution of the United States, with the Amendments Made Thereto. A New Edition. The Numbers Written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself (City of Washington: Printed and Published by Jacob Gideon, Jun., 1818). Cited hereafter as the “Gideon edition.”

17 .  Three days after the publication of the first essay, Hamilton sent George Washington a copy of it. Hamilton wrote that the essay was “the first of a series of papers to be written in its [the Constitution’s] defense.” Washington, of course, knew that H was the author, for H customarily sent to Washington anonymous newspaper articles which he wrote. On December 2, 1787, Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph:

“The enclosed paper contains two numbers of the Federalist. This paper was begun about three weeks ago, and proposes to go through the subject. I have not been able to collect all the numbers, since my return to Philad, or I would have sent them to you. I have been the less anxious, as I understand the printer means to make a pamphlet of them, when I can give them to you in a more convenient form. You will probably discover marks of different pens. I am not at liberty to give you any other key, than, that I am in myself for a few numbers; and that one, besides myself was a member of the Convention.” ( Hunt, Writings of Madison description begins Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 1902). description ends , V, 60–61.)

18 .  The first edition of The Federalist which attributed specific essays to individual authors appeared as the second and third volumes of a three-volume edition of H’s writings published in 1810 ( The Federalist, on the new constitution; written in 1788, by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison … A new edition, with the names and portraits of the several writers . In Two Volumes [New York, published by Williams & Whiting, 1810]).

19 .  The letter in The Port Folio of November 14, 1807, reads as follows:

“Mr. OLDSCHOOL,

“The Executors of the last will of General HAMILTON have deposited in the Publick Library of New-York a copy of ‘ The Federalist ,’ which belonged to the General in his lifetime, in which he has designated, in his own hand-writing, the parts of that celebrated work written by himself, as well as those contributed by Mr. JAY and Mr. MADISON. As it may not be uninteresting to many of your readers, I shall subjoin a copy of the General’s memorandum for publication in ‘The Port Folio.’   M.

“Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 54 Mr. JAY. Nos. 10, 14, 37, to 48 inclusive, Mr. MADISON. Nos. 18, 19, 20, Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. MADDISON jointly—all the rest by Mr. HAMILTON.”

20 .  There are several lists other than those subsequently discussed in the text. On the flyleaf of volume 1 of his copy of The Federalist , Thomas Jefferson wrote the following: “No. 2. 3. 4. 5. 64 by Mr. Jay. No. 10. 14. 17. 18. 19. 21. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 62. 63. by Mr. Madison. The rest of the work by Alexander Hamilton.” Jefferson’s copy of The Federalist , now in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress, came to him indirectly from H’s wife, Elizabeth. It bears the inscription: “For Mrs. Church from her Sister . Elizabeth Hamilton.” The words, “For Mrs. Church from her Sister ,” are in the handwriting of Elizabeth Hamilton. Angelica Schuyler Church, despite her admiration for her brother-in-law, had long been a friend of Jefferson and must have sent her copy of The Federalist to him. It is not known from whom Jefferson got his information on the authorship of the essays, but presumably it was from Madison. It will be noted that there is only one minor difference between Jefferson’s attribution of the essays and that made by Madison: Jefferson attributed essay 17 to Madison. A facsimile is printed in E. Millicent Sowerby, Catalog of the Library of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C., 1953), III, 228.

On the title page of George Washington’s copy of The Federalist there is an assignment of authorship which reads as follows: “Jay author—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 54. Madison—10, 14, 37–48 exclusive of last. 18, 19, 20, productive of Jay, AH and Madison. All rest by Gen’l Hamilton.” This memorandum is in an unidentified handwriting. Except for two differences it conforms to the Benson list. Without more information on the source of the list, its reliability is highly suspect (Washington’s copy of The Federalist is in the National Archives).

Henry Cabot Lodge in his edition of The Federalist ( HCLW description begins Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1904). description ends , XI, xxvii), placed in evidence lists of authors which he found in copies of The Federalist owned by Fisher Ames and George Cabot. Both correspond to the Benson list.

21 .  Jay’s authorship of these essays is incontestable. H supposedly stated in the Benson list that he wrote 64 and that Jay was the author of 54. The draft of 64, in the writing of Jay, is in the New-York Historical Society, New York City. Both H and Madison agreed that Jay wrote 2, 3, 4, and 5.

That Jay contributed only five essays was due to an attack of rheumatism which lasted through the winter of 1787. It was not due, as his earlier biographers stated, to an injury which he received in the “Doctors’ Riot” in New York. The riot did not occur until April, 1788, by which time most of the “Publius” essays had been written (Frank Monaghan, John Jay [New York, 1935], 290).

22 .  “I take upon me to state from indubitable authority,” Corrector wrote “that Mr. Madison wrote Nos. 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, and 64. Mr. Jay wrote Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5; and Mr. Hamilton the residue” ([Washington] National Intelligencer , March 20, 1817).

23 .  Benjamin Rush, the oldest son of Richard, sent Henry B. Dawson the following description of the notes in the edition of The Federalist owned by his father: “On a fly-leaf of the second volume there is the following memorandum in my father’s handwriting. I copy it exactly as it appears: ‘The initials, J.M. J.J. and A.H. throughout the work, are in Mr. Madison’s hand, and designate the author of each number. By these it will be seen, that although the printed designations are generally correct, they are not always so’” (Benjamin Rush to Dawson, August 29, 1863, New-York Historical Society, New York City).

Madison’s attribution of authorship, according to Benjamin Rush, was exactly the same as that which the Virginian authorized in the Gideon edition.

24 .  The anonymous author of the article in the City of Washington Gazette stated that Madison wrote essays 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37–58, 62–63, that Jay was the author of essays 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64, and that H wrote the rest.

25 .  Gideon, p. 3. In this edition, essays 10, 14, 18–20, 37–58, 62–63 are assigned to Madison; 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64 to Jay; and the remainder to H. Madison’s copy of The Federalist , with corrections in his handwriting, is in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress.

26 .  The memorandum by H, as printed by William Coleman, reads as follows: “Nos. 2. 3. 4. 5. 54, Mr. Jay; Nos. 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive, Mr. Madison; Nos. 18, 19, 20, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison jointly; all the rest by Mr. Hamilton” ( New-York Evening Post , March 25, 1817).

27 .  According to Coleman the memorandum was deposited by Egbert Benson in “the city library,” as the New York Society Library was then sometimes known. The remainder of the story related in this paragraph is taken from J. C. Hamilton’s account of a “ Copy of a statement in my possession made for me by Egbert Benson, Esq., a nephew of Judge Benson.” It is quoted in Hamilton, The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xcvi–xcvii.

28 .  New-York Evening Post , January 23, 1818.

The volume from which the memorandum was stolen may have been at one time in the New York Society Library; however, it is no longer there. That library has no McLean edition of The Federalist that bears any marks which indicate that a piece of paper once had been pasted on the inside cover.

29 .  Hamilton, The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xcvi–xcvii. The italics have been inserted.

J. C. Hamilton did not get this statement from Robert Benson. It was, as has been stated, from the “ Copy of a statement in my possession made for me by Egbert Benson, Esq., a nephew of Judge Benson” ( ibid. , xcvii).

30 .  For the attribution of authorship which H made in his copy of The Federalist , see note 20.

H’s copy is now in neither the New York Society Library, the New-York Historical Society, nor the New York Public Library, and those libraries have no record of ever having owned it. G. W. Cole, ed., A Catalogue of Books Relating to the Discovery and Early History of North and South America, The E. D. Church Library (New York, 1907), V, Number 1230, lists an item purporting to be H’s copy of The Federalist with notes in his writing. According to the librarian of the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, which acquired the Church library, the notes were not in the writing of H. The book, which is no longer in the Huntington Library, was sold to an unknown purchaser.

J. C. Hamilton, probably unintentionally, contradicts the statement that the names of the authors in his father’s copy of The Federalist were in H’s handwriting. He stated that his father dictated to him the authors of the essays which he then copied into H’s copy ( The Federalist description begins John C. Hamilton, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Also, The Continentalist and Other Papers by Hamilton (Philadelphia, 1865). description ends , I, xcvi–xcvii).

31 .  Not too much reliance should be placed on Kent’s endorsement of the Madison list in the City of Washington Gazette . According to that list, Madison wrote not only all the disputed essays but also essay 17. As Madison’s most ardent defenders assign this essay to H, it seems that Kent’s statement indicated nothing more than his suspicion that H may have made errors in his assignment of authors of the essays.

While Kent’s statement shows that he doubted the accuracy of the attribution of essays made by H, it raises several questions that cannot satisfactorily be answered. The clipping from the City of Washington Gazette was dated December 15, 1817, and the notes on the opposite page of the flyleaf, as stated in the text, could not have been written later than 1804. How, then, could Kent have written that he doubted that Jay wrote essay 64 when the essay was attributed to Jay on a page which was in front of Kent as he wrote? The only possible answer is that Kent, when writing in 1817 or later, failed to look carefully at the changes which had been made in his earlier memorandum and had his uncorrected list in mind. Whatever the explanation for his later statement, it is at least certain that he did not change the earlier list after he saw the article in the City of Washington Gazette .

32 .  “Notes of Ancient and Modern Confederacies, preparatory to the federal Convention of 1787” ( Madison, Letters description begins James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867). description ends , I, 293–315).

33 .  A favorite argument of those who support Madison’s claim to essays 49–58 of The Federalist is that since those essays constitute a unit, one man must have written all of them. The essays deal with: 1. the necessity of the departments of government having checks on each other, and 2. the House of Representatives. Madison’s defenders, in their desire to prove his authorship, forget that essays 59, 60, and 61, essays which they attribute to H, also deal with the House of Representatives. There are, furthermore, several obvious breaks in continuity among the essays from 48 to 58, at which a change of authors could have taken place. Essay 51, for example, ends the discussion of the necessity that “these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others,” and essay 52 begins the discussion of the House of Representatives. A change could also have occurred after essay 54 or essay 57. This is not to say that changes in authorship did occur; it is to indicate that the “unit” argument will not stand up under scrutiny.

34 .  “The Authorship of the Federalist,” The American Historical Review , II (April, 1897), 443–60.

35 .  The fact that only Bourne and J. C. Hamilton are cited does not mean that other studies of the authorship of The Federalist have been ignored or overlooked. It means rather that other authors, while sometimes introducing new arguments, have relied heavily on the research of Bourne and J. C. Hamilton. To cite all those who have agreed with Bourne or Hamilton would be redundant; to summarize all the arguments of the numerous students of The Federalist —based for the most part on Bourne and Hamilton’s original research—is a task best left to the historiographer of that work.

There have been, of course, other able studies of the authorship of the disputed essays. Among the defenders of H’s claim, Henry Cabot Lodge (“The Authorship of the Federalist,” HCLW description begins Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1904). description ends , XI, xv–xlv) and Paul L. Ford (“The Authorship of The Federalist,” The American Historical Review , II [July, 1897], 675–82) have been the most able advocates. The most convincing exponent of Madison’s claim since Bourne is Douglass Adair (“The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers,” The William and Mary Quarterly , 3rd. ser., Vol. I, Numbers 2 and 3 [April and July, 1944], 97–122, 235–64). In two essays which brilliantly summarize the century-old controversy over the authorship of the disputed essays, Adair amplifies the research of Bourne and attempts to assign the disputed essays on the basis of the political philosophy which they reveal.

36 .  See, for example, S. A. Bailey, “Notes on Authorship of Disputed Numbers of the Federalist,” Case and Comment , XXII (1915), 674–75. Bailey credits Madison with sole authorship of the disputed essays on the basis of the use of the word “while” by H and “whilst” by Madison. Although the evidence for Bailey’s conclusion is convincing—and there is far more evidence than he produces—his argument is destroyed by H’s occasional use of “whilst.” In essay 51, for example, H, who himself edited the essays for publication by McLean, substituted “whilst” for “and.” In essay 81, certainly written by H, the word “whilst” is used. Edward G. Bourne (see note 35), to give another example, offers as evidence for Madison’s authorship of essay 56 his use of the word “monitory,” which, according to Bourne, was “almost a favorite word with Madison.” Yet in essay 26, H, in revising the essays for publication in the McLean edition, changed “cautionary” to “monitory.” Similarly, to assign authorship on the basis of differences in the spelling of certain words in different essays—for example, “color” or “colour,” “federal” or “fœderal”—would be hazardous. The editors of the various newspapers in which the essays appeared obviously changed the spelling of certain words to conform to their individual preferences.

37 .  Similarity between a statement in one of the disputed essays and an earlier remark in the writings of either Madison or H is perhaps valid evidence. It does not seem relevant, however, to attempt to prove authorship by reference to the later writings of either of the men. As both presumably read all the essays, they might later have borrowed a statement from a number of The Federalist written by the other without being aware of its source.

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The Federalist Papers: 1787-1788

Shortly after the end of the Constitutional Convention, a national debate began about whether or not to ratify the Constitution. Newspapers nationwide published essays both for and against ratification Those who supported ratification of the Constitution were known as Federalists.

The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, that appeared in New York newspapers, primarily, the Independent Journal and the New York Packet, between October of 1787 and August of 1788. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison did not sign their names to the essays; they chose to publish using assumed names such as Publius, which was a reference to a Roman consul, Publius Valerius Publicola. The essays urged New York delegates to ratify the Constitution. In 1788, the essays were published in a bound volume entitled the Federalist and eventually became known as the Federalist Papers.

Some people felt that the Constitution would give the central government too much power and would limit individual freedom. To address these fears, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison analyzed the Constitution in detail and outlined the built in checks and balances meant to divide power between the three branches of government and preserve the rights of the people and states.

Even though they did not play a significant role in New York's decision to ratify the Constitution, the Federalist Papers remain an important collection today because they offer insight into the intentions of key individuals who debated the elements of the Constitution.

To learn more, see the  Federalist Papers  site at the Library of Congress.

2.4 The Ratification of the Constitution

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the steps required to ratify the Constitution
• Describe arguments the framers raised in support of a strong national government and counterpoints raised by the Anti-Federalists

On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia voted to approve the document they had drafted over the course of many months. Some did not support it, but the majority did. Before it could become the law of the land, however, the Constitution faced another hurdle. It had to be ratified by the states.

THE RATIFICATION PROCESS

Article VII, the final article of the Constitution, required that before the Constitution could become law and a new government could form, the document had to be ratified by nine of the thirteen states. Eleven days after the delegates at the Philadelphia convention approved it, copies of the Constitution were sent to each of the states, which were to hold ratifying conventions to either accept or reject it.

This approach to ratification was an unusual one. Since the authority inherent in the Articles of Confederation and the Confederation Congress had rested on the consent of the states, changes to the nation’s government should also have been ratified by the state legislatures. Instead, by calling upon state legislatures to hold ratification conventions to approve the Constitution, the framers avoided asking the legislators to approve a document that would require them to give up a degree of their own power. The men attending the ratification conventions would be delegates elected by their neighbors to represent their interests. They were not being asked to relinquish their power; in fact, they were being asked to place limits upon the power of their state legislators, whom they may not have elected in the first place. Finally, because the new nation was to be a republic in which power was held by the people through their elected representatives, it was considered appropriate to leave the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the Constitution to the nation’s citizens. If convention delegates, who were chosen by popular vote, approved it, then the new government could rightly claim that it ruled with the consent of the people.

The greatest sticking point when it came to ratification, as it had been at the Constitutional Convention itself, was the relative power of the state and federal governments. The framers of the Constitution believed that without the ability to maintain and command an army and navy, impose taxes, and force the states to comply with laws passed by Congress, the young nation would not survive for very long. But many people resisted increasing the powers of the national government at the expense of the states. Virginia’s Patrick Henry , for example, feared that the newly created office of president would place excessive power in the hands of one man. He also disapproved of the federal government’s new ability to tax its citizens. This right, Henry believed, should remain with the states.

Other delegates, such as Edmund Randolph of Virginia, disapproved of the Constitution because it created a new federal judicial system. Their fear was that the federal courts would be too far away from where those who were tried lived. State courts were located closer to the homes of both plaintiffs and defendants, and it was believed that judges and juries in state courts could better understand the actions of those who appeared before them. In response to these fears, the federal government created federal courts in each of the states as well as in Maine, which was then part of Massachusetts, and Kentucky, which was part of Virginia. 11

Perhaps the greatest source of dissatisfaction with the Constitution was that it did not guarantee protection of individual liberties. State governments had given jury trials to residents charged with violating the law and allowed their residents to possess weapons for their protection. Some had practiced religious tolerance as well. The Constitution, however, did not contain reassurances that the federal government would do so. Although it provided for habeas corpus and prohibited both a religious test for holding office and granting noble titles, some citizens feared the loss of their traditional rights and the violation of their liberties. This led many of the Constitution’s opponents to call for a bill of rights and the refusal to ratify the document without one. The lack of a bill of rights was especially problematic in Virginia, as the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the most extensive rights-granting document among the states. The promise that a bill of rights would be drafted for the Constitution persuaded delegates in many states to support ratification. 12

Insider Perspective

Thomas jefferson on the bill of rights.

John Adams and Thomas Jefferson carried on a lively correspondence regarding the ratification of the Constitution. In the following excerpt (reproduced as written) from a letter dated March 15, 1789, after the Constitution had been ratified by nine states but before it had been approved by all thirteen, Jefferson reiterates his previously expressed concerns that a bill of rights to protect citizens’ freedoms was necessary and should be added to the Constitution:

“In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, . . . I am happy to find that on the whole you are a friend to this amendment. The Declaration of rights is like all other human blessings alloyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully it’s object. But the good in this instance vastly overweighs the evil. . . . This instrument [the Constitution] forms us into one state as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative & executive body for these objects. It should therefore guard us against their abuses of power. . . . Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. True. But tho it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. . . . There is a remarkeable difference between the . . . Inconveniences which attend a Declaration of rights, & those which attend the want of it. . . . The inconveniences of the want of a Declaration are permanent, afflicting & irreparable: they are in constant progression from bad to worse.” 13

What were some of the inconveniences of not having a bill of rights that Jefferson mentioned? Why did he decide in favor of having one?

It was clear how some states would vote. Smaller states, like Delaware, favored the Constitution. Equal representation in the Senate would give them a degree of equality with the larger states, and a strong national government with an army at its command would be better able to defend them than their state militias could. Larger states, however, had significant power to lose. They did not believe they needed the federal government to defend them and disliked the prospect of having to provide tax money to support the new government. Thus, from the very beginning, the supporters of the Constitution feared that New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would refuse to ratify it. That would mean all nine of the remaining states would have to, and Rhode Island, the smallest state, was unlikely to do so. It had not even sent delegates to the convention in Philadelphia. And even if it joined the other states in ratifying the document and the requisite nine votes were cast, the new nation would not be secure without its largest, wealthiest, and most populous states as members of the union.

THE RATIFICATION CAMPAIGN

On the question of ratification, citizens quickly separated into two groups: Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The Federalists supported it. They tended to be among the elite members of society—wealthy and well-educated landowners, businessmen, and former military commanders who believed a strong government would be better for both national defense and economic growth. A national currency, which the federal government had the power to create, would ease business transactions. The ability of the federal government to regulate trade and place tariffs on imports would protect merchants from foreign competition. Furthermore, the power to collect taxes would allow the national government to fund internal improvements like roads, which would also help businessmen. Support for the Federalists was especially strong in New England.

Opponents of ratification were called Anti-Federalists . Anti-Federalists feared the power of the national government and believed state legislatures, with which they had more contact, could better protect their freedoms. Although some Anti-Federalists, like Patrick Henry , were wealthy, most distrusted the elite and believed a strong federal government would favor the rich over those of “the middling sort.” This was certainly the fear of Melancton Smith , a New York merchant and landowner, who believed that power should rest in the hands of small, landowning farmers of average wealth who “are more temperate, of better morals and less ambitious than the great.” 14 Even members of the social elite, like Henry, feared that the centralization of power would lead to the creation of a political aristocracy, to the detriment of state sovereignty and individual liberty.

Related to these concerns were fears that the strong central government Federalists advocated for would levy taxes on farmers and planters, who lacked the hard currency needed to pay them. Many also believed Congress would impose tariffs on foreign imports that would make American agricultural products less welcome in Europe and in European colonies in the western hemisphere. For these reasons, Anti-Federalist sentiment was especially strong in the South.

Some Anti-Federalists also believed that the large federal republic that the Constitution would create could not work as intended. Americans had long believed that virtue was necessary in a nation where people governed themselves (i.e., the ability to put self-interest and petty concerns aside for the good of the larger community). In small republics, similarities among members of the community would naturally lead them to the same positions and make it easier for those in power to understand the needs of their neighbors. In a larger republic, one that encompassed nearly the entire Eastern Seaboard and ran west to the Appalachian Mountains, people would lack such a strong commonality of interests. 15

Likewise, Anti-Federalists argued, the diversity of religion tolerated by the Constitution would prevent the formation of a political community with shared values and interests. The Constitution contained no provisions for government support of churches or of religious education, and Article VI explicitly forbade the use of religious tests to determine eligibility for public office. This caused many, like Henry Abbot of North Carolina, to fear that government would be placed in the hands of “pagans . . . and Mahometans [Muslims].” 16

It is difficult to determine how many people were Federalists and how many were Anti-Federalists in 1787. The Federalists won the day, but they may not have been in the majority. First, the Federalist position tended to win support among businessmen, large farmers, and, in the South, plantation owners. These people tended to live along the Eastern Seaboard. In 1787, most of the states were divided into voting districts in a manner that gave more votes to the eastern part of the state than to the western part. 17 Thus, in some states, like Virginia and South Carolina, small farmers who may have favored the Anti-Federalist position were unable to elect as many delegates to state ratification conventions as those who lived in the east. Small settlements may also have lacked the funds to send delegates to the convention. 18

In all the states, educated men authored pamphlets and published essays and cartoons arguing either for or against ratification ( Figure 2.11 ). Although many writers supported each position, it is the Federalist essays that are now best known. The arguments these authors put forth, along with explicit guarantees that amendments would be added to protect individual liberties, helped to sway delegates to ratification conventions in many states.

For obvious reasons, smaller, less populous states favored the Constitution and the protection of a strong federal government. As shown in Figure 2.12 , Delaware and New Jersey ratified the document within a few months after it was sent to them for approval in 1787. Connecticut ratified it early in 1788. Some of the larger states, such as Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, also voted in favor of the new government. New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in the summer of 1788.

Although the Constitution went into effect following ratification by New Hampshire, four states still remained outside the newly formed union. Two were the wealthy, populous states of Virginia and New York. In Virginia, James Madison’s active support and the intercession of George Washington, who wrote letters to the convention, changed the minds of many. Some who had initially opposed the Constitution, such as Edmund Randolph, were persuaded that the creation of a strong union was necessary for the country’s survival and changed their position. Other Virginia delegates were swayed by the promise that a bill of rights similar to the Virginia Declaration of Rights would be added after the Constitution was ratified. On June 25, 1788, Virginia became the tenth state to grant its approval.

The approval of New York was the last major hurdle. Facing considerable opposition to the Constitution in that state, Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay wrote a series of essays, beginning in 1787, arguing for a strong federal government and support of the Constitution ( Figure 2.13 ). Later compiled as The Federalist and now known as The Federalist Papers , these eighty-five essays were originally published in newspapers in New York and other states under the name of Publius, a supporter of the Roman Republic.

The essays addressed a variety of issues that troubled citizens. For example, in Federalist No. 51, attributed to James Madison ( Figure 2.14 ), the author assured readers they did not need to fear that the national government would grow too powerful. The federal system, in which power was divided between the national and state governments, and the division of authority within the federal government into separate branches would prevent any one part of the government from becoming too strong. Furthermore, tyranny could not arise in a government in which “the legislature necessarily predominates.” Finally, the desire of office holders in each branch of government to exercise the powers given to them, described as “personal motives,” would encourage them to limit any attempt by the other branches to overstep their authority. According to Madison , “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”

Other essays countered different criticisms made of the Constitution and echoed the argument in favor of a strong national government. In Federalist No. 35 , for example, Hamilton ( Figure 2.14 ) argued that people’s interests could in fact be represented by men who were not their neighbors. Indeed, Hamilton asked rhetorically, would American citizens best be served by a representative “whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and his acquaintances” or by someone with more extensive knowledge of the world? To those who argued that a merchant and land-owning elite would come to dominate Congress, Hamilton countered that the majority of men currently sitting in New York’s state senate and assembly were landowners of moderate wealth and that artisans usually chose merchants, “their natural patron[s] and friend[s],” to represent them. An aristocracy would not arise, and if it did, its members would have been chosen by lesser men. Similarly, Jay reminded New Yorkers in Federalist No. 2 that union had been the goal of Americans since the time of the Revolution. A desire for union was natural among people of such “similar sentiments” who “were united to each other by the strongest ties,” and the government proposed by the Constitution was the best means of achieving that union.

Objections that an elite group of wealthy and educated bankers, businessmen, and large landowners would come to dominate the nation’s politics were also addressed by Madison in Federalist No. 10 . Americans need not fear the power of factions or special interests, he argued, for the republic was too big and the interests of its people too diverse to allow the development of large, powerful political parties. Likewise, elected representatives, who were expected to “possess the most attractive merit,” would protect the government from being controlled by “an unjust and interested [biased in favor of their own interests] majority.”

For those who worried that the president might indeed grow too ambitious or king-like, Hamilton, in Federalist No. 68 , provided assurance that placing the leadership of the country in the hands of one person was not dangerous. Electors from each state would select the president. Because these men would be members of a “transient” body called together only for the purpose of choosing the president and would meet in separate deliberations in each state, they would be free of corruption and beyond the influence of the “heats and ferments” of the voters. Indeed, Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 70 , instead of being afraid that the president would become a tyrant, Americans should realize that it was easier to control one person than it was to control many. Furthermore, one person could also act with an “energy” that Congress did not possess. Making decisions alone, the president could decide what actions should be taken faster than could Congress, whose deliberations, because of its size, were necessarily slow. At times, the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” of the chief executive might be necessary.

Link to Learning

The Library of Congress has The Federalist Papers on their website. The Anti-Federalists also produced a body of writings, less extensive than The Federalists Papers , which argued against the ratification of the Constitution. However, these were not written by one small group of men as The Federalist Papers had been. A collection of the writings that are unofficially called The Anti-Federalist Papers is also available online.

The arguments of the Federalists were persuasive, but whether they actually succeeded in changing the minds of New Yorkers is unclear. Once Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788, New York realized that it had little choice but to do so as well. If it did not ratify the Constitution, it would be the last large state that had not joined the union. Thus, on July 26, 1788, the majority of delegates to New York’s ratification convention voted to accept the Constitution. A year later, North Carolina became the twelfth state to approve. Alone and realizing it could not hope to survive on its own, Rhode Island became the last state to ratify, nearly two years after New York had done so.

Finding a Middle Ground

Term limits.

One of the objections raised to the Constitution’s new government was that it did not set term limits for members of Congress or the president. Those who opposed a strong central government argued that this failure could allow a handful of powerful men to gain control of the nation and rule it for as long as they wished. Although the framers did not anticipate the idea of career politicians, those who supported the Constitution argued that reelecting the president and reappointing senators by state legislatures would create a body of experienced men who could better guide the country through crises. A president who did not prove to be a good leader would be voted out of office instead of being reelected. In fact, presidents long followed George Washington’s example and limited themselves to two terms. Only in 1951, after Franklin Roosevelt had been elected four times, was the Twenty-Second Amendment passed to restrict the presidency to two terms.

Are term limits a good idea? Should they have originally been included in the Constitution? Why or why not? Are there times when term limits might not be good?

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Chapter 2: The Constitution and Its Origins

The Ratification of the Constitution

Learning outcomes.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the steps required to ratify the Constitution
• Describe arguments the framers raised in support of a strong national government and counterpoints raised by the Anti-Federalists

On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia voted to approve the document they had drafted over the course of many months. Some did not support it, but the majority did. Before it could become the law of the land, however, the Constitution faced another hurdle. It had to be ratified by the states.

THE RATIFICATION PROCESS

Article VII, the final article of the Constitution, required that before the Constitution could become law and a new government could form, the document had to be ratified by nine of the thirteen states. Eleven days after the delegates at the Philadelphia convention approved it, copies of the Constitution were sent to each of the states, which were to hold ratifying conventions to either accept or reject it.

This approach to ratification was an unusual one. Since the authority inherent in the Articles of Confederation and the Confederation Congress had rested on the consent of the states, changes to the nation’s government should also have been ratified by the state legislatures. Instead, by calling upon state legislatures to hold ratification conventions to approve the Constitution, the framers avoided asking the legislators to approve a document that would require them to give up a degree of their own power. The men attending the ratification conventions would be delegates elected by their neighbors to represent their interests. They were not being asked to relinquish their power; in fact, they were being asked to place limits upon the power of their state legislators, whom they may not have elected in the first place. Finally, because the new nation was to be a republic in which power was held by the people through their elected representatives, it was considered appropriate to leave the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the Constitution to the nation’s citizens. If convention delegates, who were chosen by popular vote, approved it, then the new government could rightly claim that it ruled with the consent of the people.

The greatest sticking point when it came to ratification, as it had been at the Constitutional Convention itself, was the relative power of the state and federal governments. The framers of the Constitution believed that without the ability to maintain and command an army and navy, impose taxes, and force the states to comply with laws passed by Congress, the young nation would not survive for very long. But many people resisted increasing the powers of the national government at the expense of the states. Virginia’s Patrick Henry, for example, feared that the newly created office of president would place excessive power in the hands of one man. He also disapproved of the federal government’s new ability to tax its citizens. This right, Henry believed, should remain with the states.

Other delegates, such as Edmund Randolph of Virginia, disapproved of the Constitution because it created a new federal judicial system. Their fear was that the federal courts would be too far away from where those who were tried lived. State courts were located closer to the homes of both plaintiffs and defendants, and it was believed that judges and juries in state courts could better understand the actions of those who appeared before them. In response to these fears, the federal government created federal courts in each of the states as well as in Maine, which was then part of Massachusetts, and Kentucky, which was part of Virginia. [1]

Perhaps the greatest source of dissatisfaction with the Constitution was that it did not guarantee protection of individual liberties. State governments had given jury trials to residents charged with violating the law and allowed their residents to possess weapons for their protection. Some had practiced religious tolerance as well. The Constitution, however, did not contain reassurances that the federal government would do so. Although it provided for habeas corpus and prohibited both a religious test for holding office and granting noble titles, some citizens feared the loss of their traditional rights and the violation of their liberties. This led many of the Constitution’s opponents to call for a bill of rights and the refusal to ratify the document without one. The lack of a bill of rights was especially problematic in Virginia, as the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the most extensive rights-granting document among the states. The promise that a bill of rights would be drafted for the Constitution persuaded delegates in many states to support ratification. [2]

INSIDER PERSPECTIVE

Thomas Jefferson on the Bill of Rights

John Adams and Thomas Jefferson carried on a lively correspondence regarding the ratification of the Constitution. In the following excerpt (reproduced as written) from a letter dated March 15, 1789, after the Constitution had been ratified by nine states but before it had been approved by all thirteen, Jefferson reiterates his previously expressed concerns that a bill of rights to protect citizens’ freedoms was necessary and should be added to the Constitution:

“In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, . . . I am happy to find that on the whole you are a friend to this amendment. The Declaration of rights is like all other human blessings alloyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully it’s object. But the good in this instance vastly overweighs the evil. . . . This instrument [the Constitution] forms us into one state as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative & executive body for these objects. It should therefore guard us against their abuses of power. . . . Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. True. But tho it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. . . . There is a remarkeable difference between the . . . Inconveniences which attend a Declaration of rights, & those which attend the want of it. . . . The inconveniences of the want of a Declaration are permanent, afflicting & irreparable: they are in constant progression from bad to worse.” [3]

What were some of the inconveniences of not having a bill of rights that Jefferson mentioned? Why did he decide in favor of having one?

It was clear how some states would vote. Smaller states, like Delaware, favored the Constitution. Equal representation in the Senate would give them a degree of equality with the larger states, and a strong national government with an army at its command would be better able to defend them than their state militias could. Larger states, however, had significant power to lose. They did not believe they needed the federal government to defend them and disliked the prospect of having to provide tax money to support the new government. Thus, from the very beginning, the supporters of the Constitution feared that New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would refuse to ratify it. That would mean all nine of the remaining states would have to, and Rhode Island, the smallest state, was unlikely to do so. It had not even sent delegates to the convention in Philadelphia. And even if it joined the other states in ratifying the document and the requisite nine votes were cast, the new nation would not be secure without its largest, wealthiest, and most populous states as members of the union.

THE RATIFICATION CAMPAIGN

On the question of ratification, citizens quickly separated into two groups: Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The Federalists supported it. They tended to be among the elite members of society—wealthy and well-educated landowners, businessmen, and former military commanders who believed a strong government would be better for both national defense and economic growth. A national currency, which the federal government had the power to create, would ease business transactions. The ability of the federal government to regulate trade and place tariffs on imports would protect merchants from foreign competition. Furthermore, the power to collect taxes would allow the national government to fund internal improvements like roads, which would also help businessmen. Support for the Federalists was especially strong in New England.

Opponents of ratification were called Anti-Federalists . Anti-Federalists feared the power of the national government and believed state legislatures, with which they had more contact, could better protect their freedoms. Although some Anti-Federalists, like Patrick Henry, were wealthy, most distrusted the elite and believed a strong federal government would favor the rich over those of “the middling sort.” This was certainly the fear of Melancton Smith, a New York merchant and landowner, who believed that power should rest in the hands of small, landowning farmers of average wealth who “are more temperate, of better morals and less ambitious than the great.” [4] Even members of the social elite, like Henry, feared that the centralization of power would lead to the creation of a political aristocracy, to the detriment of state sovereignty and individual liberty.

Related to these concerns were fears that the strong central government Federalists advocated for would levy taxes on farmers and planters, who lacked the hard currency needed to pay them. Many also believed Congress would impose tariffs on foreign imports that would make American agricultural products less welcome in Europe and in European colonies in the western hemisphere. For these reasons, Anti-Federalist sentiment was especially strong in the South.

Some Anti-Federalists also believed that the large federal republic that the Constitution would create could not work as intended. Americans had long believed that virtue was necessary in a nation where people governed themselves (i.e., the ability to put self-interest and petty concerns aside for the good of the larger community). In small republics, similarities among members of the community would naturally lead them to the same positions and make it easier for those in power to understand the needs of their neighbors. In a larger republic, one that encompassed nearly the entire Eastern Seaboard and ran west to the Appalachian Mountains, people would lack such a strong commonality of interests. [5]

Likewise, Anti-Federalists argued, the diversity of religion tolerated by the Constitution would prevent the formation of a political community with shared values and interests. The Constitution contained no provisions for government support of churches or of religious education, and Article VI explicitly forbade the use of religious tests to determine eligibility for public office. This caused many, like Henry Abbot of North Carolina, to fear that government would be placed in the hands of “pagans . . . and Mahometans [Muslims].” [6]

It is difficult to determine how many people were Federalists and how many were Anti-Federalists in 1787. The Federalists won the day, but they may not have been in the majority. First, the Federalist position tended to win support among businessmen, large farmers, and, in the South, plantation owners. These people tended to live along the Eastern Seaboard. In 1787, most of the states were divided into voting districts in a manner that gave more votes to the eastern part of the state than to the western part. [7] Thus, in some states, like Virginia and South Carolina, small farmers who may have favored the Anti-Federalist position were unable to elect as many delegates to state ratification conventions as those who lived in the east. Small settlements may also have lacked the funds to send delegates to the convention. [8]

In all the states, educated men authored pamphlets and published essays and cartoons arguing either for or against ratification. Although many writers supported each position, it is the Federalist essays that are now best known. The arguments these authors put forth, along with explicit guarantees that amendments would be added to protect individual liberties, helped to sway delegates to ratification conventions in many states.

For obvious reasons, smaller, less populous states favored the Constitution and the protection of a strong federal government. Delaware and New Jersey ratified the document within a few months after it was sent to them for approval in 1787. Connecticut ratified it early in 1788. Some of the larger states, such as Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, also voted in favor of the new government. New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in the summer of 1788.

Although the Constitution went into effect following ratification by New Hampshire, four states still remained outside the newly formed union. Two were the wealthy, populous states of Virginia and New York. In Virginia, James Madison’s active support and the intercession of George Washington, who wrote letters to the convention, changed the minds of many. Some who had initially opposed the Constitution, such as Edmund Randolph, were persuaded that the creation of a strong union was necessary for the country’s survival and changed their position. Other Virginia delegates were swayed by the promise that a bill of rights similar to the Virginia Declaration of Rights would be added after the Constitution was ratified. On June 25, 1788, Virginia became the tenth state to grant its approval.

The approval of New York was the last major hurdle. Facing considerable opposition to the Constitution in that state, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote a series of essays, beginning in 1787, arguing for a strong federal government and support of the Constitution. Later compiled as The Federalist and now known as The Federalist Papers , these eighty-five essays were originally published in newspapers in New York and other states under the name of Publius, a supporter of the Roman Republic.

The essays addressed a variety of issues that troubled citizens. For example, in Federalist No. 51, attributed to James Madison, the author assured readers they did not need to fear that the national government would grow too powerful. The federal system, in which power was divided between the national and state governments, and the division of authority within the federal government into separate branches would prevent any one part of the government from becoming too strong. Furthermore, tyranny could not arise in a government in which “the legislature necessarily predominates.” Finally, the desire of office holders in each branch of government to exercise the powers given to them, described as “personal motives,” would encourage them to limit any attempt by the other branches to overstep their authority. According to Madison, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”

Other essays countered different criticisms made of the Constitution and echoed the argument in favor of a strong national government. In Federalist No. 35, for example, Hamilton argued that people’s interests could in fact be represented by men who were not their neighbors. Indeed, Hamilton asked rhetorically, would American citizens best be served by a representative “whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and his acquaintances” or by someone with more extensive knowledge of the world? To those who argued that a merchant and land-owning elite would come to dominate Congress, Hamilton countered that the majority of men currently sitting in New York’s state senate and assembly were landowners of moderate wealth and that artisans usually chose merchants, “their natural patron[s] and friend[s],” to represent them. An aristocracy would not arise, and if it did, its members would have been chosen by lesser men. Similarly, Jay reminded New Yorkers in Federalist No. 2 that union had been the goal of Americans since the time of the Revolution. A desire for union was natural among people of such “similar sentiments” who “were united to each other by the strongest ties,” and the government proposed by the Constitution was the best means of achieving that union.

Objections that an elite group of wealthy and educated bankers, businessmen, and large landowners would come to dominate the nation’s politics were also addressed by Madison in Federalist No. 10. Americans need not fear the power of factions or special interests, he argued, for the republic was too big and the interests of its people too diverse to allow the development of large, powerful political parties. Likewise, elected representatives, who were expected to “possess the most attractive merit,” would protect the government from being controlled by “an unjust and interested [biased in favor of their own interests] majority.”

For those who worried that the president might indeed grow too ambitious or king-like, Hamilton, in Federalist No. 68, provided assurance that placing the leadership of the country in the hands of one person was not dangerous. Electors from each state would select the president. Because these men would be members of a “transient” body called together only for the purpose of choosing the president and would meet in separate deliberations in each state, they would be free of corruption and beyond the influence of the “heats and ferments” of the voters. Indeed, Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 70, instead of being afraid that the president would become a tyrant, Americans should realize that it was easier to control one person than it was to control many. Furthermore, one person could also act with an “energy” that Congress did not possess. Making decisions alone, the president could decide what actions should be taken faster than could Congress, whose deliberations, because of its size, were necessarily slow. At times, the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” of the chief executive might be necessary.

LINK TO LEARNING

The Library of Congress has The Federalist Papers on their website. The Anti-Federalists also produced a body of writings, less extensive than The Federalists Papers , which argued against the ratification of the Constitution. However, these were not written by one small group of men as The Federalist Papers had been. A collection of the writings that are unofficially called The Anti-Federalist Papers is also available online.

The arguments of the Federalists were persuasive, but whether they actually succeeded in changing the minds of New Yorkers is unclear. Once Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788, New York realized that it had little choice but to do so as well. If it did not ratify the Constitution, it would be the last large state that had not joined the union. Thus, on July 26, 1788, the majority of delegates to New York’s ratification convention voted to accept the Constitution. A year later, North Carolina became the twelfth state to approve. Alone and realizing it could not hope to survive on its own, Rhode Island became the last state to ratify, nearly two years after New York had done so.

FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND

Term Limits

One of the objections raised to the Constitution’s new government was that it did not set term limits for members of Congress or the president. Those who opposed a strong central government argued that this failure could allow a handful of powerful men to gain control of the nation and rule it for as long as they wished. Although the framers did not anticipate the idea of career politicians, those who supported the Constitution argued that reelecting the president and reappointing senators by state legislatures would create a body of experienced men who could better guide the country through crises. A president who did not prove to be a good leader would be voted out of office instead of being reelected. In fact, presidents long followed George Washington’s example and limited themselves to two terms. Only in 1951, after Franklin Roosevelt had been elected four times, was the Twenty-Second Amendment passed to restrict the presidency to two terms.

Are term limits a good idea? Should they have originally been included in the Constitution? Why or why not? Are there times when term limits might not be good?

CHAPTER REVIEW

See the Chapter 2.4 Review for a summary of this section, the key vocabulary , and some review questions to check your knowledge.

• Pauline Maier. 2010. Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788. New York: Simon & Schuster, 464. ↵
• Maier, Ratification, 431. ↵
• Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 15, 1789, https://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p7/p7_1text.html . ↵
• Isaac Krannick. 1999. “The Great National Discussion: The Discourse of Politics in 1787.” In What Did the Constitution Mean to Early Americans? ed. Edward Countryman. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 52. ↵
• Krannick, Great National Discussion, 42-43. ↵
• Krannick, Great National Discussion, 42. ↵
• Evelyn C. Fink and William H. Riker. 1989. "The Strategy of Ratification." In The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, eds. Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman. New York: Agathon, 229. ↵
• Fink and Riker, Strategy of Ratification, 221. ↵

those who supported ratification of the Constitution

those who did not support ratification of the Constitution

a collection of eighty-five essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in support of ratification of the Constitution

American Government (2e - Second Edition) Copyright © 2019 by OpenStax and Lumen Learning is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Constitution Annotated: A Research Guide

Guide to constitution annotated essays.

• Introduction
• How to Use the Constitution Annotated Website
• Resources for Constitution Annotated Research
• Primary and Secondary Sources
• Related Research Guides

As a starting point to your constitutional research, you can begin to explore the Constitution Annotated by subject matter using the menu below or by inputting keywords in the search bar .

The links in the section below take you to the browse section for each constitutional provision's annotated essays. Individual essays can be accessed by clicking the serial numbers left of each essay title.

Introductory Essays

• U.S. Constitution (Articles 1-7)
• Bill of Rights (1-10)
• Early Amendments (11-12)
• Reconstruction Amendments (13-15)
• Early 20th Century Amendments (16-22)
• Post-War Amendments (23-27)

Unratified Amendments

These essays introduce the reader to various components underpinning the Constitution Annotated and how the Constitution is interpreted today.

• Constitution Annotated Methodology This section of essays explains the methodology for the current edition of the Constitution Annotated—that is, the rules and principles that dictate the organization and construction of the document.
• Organization of the Constitution Annotated The section of essays covers how the Constitution Annotated is organized.
• Historical Background of the Constitution This section of essays covers the historical background of the creation of the Constitution in 1787, looking at the Articles of Confederation and the Constitutional Convention.
• Basic Principles Underlying the Constitution This section of essays explores the basic principles underlying and permeating the Constitution, such as federalism, separation of powers, and rights.
• Ways to Interpret the Constitution This section of essays explores the various current frameworks by which the Constitution is interpreted by the Supreme Court, such as textualism, pragmatism, and moral reasoning.

The U.S. Constitution

The foundational legal document of the United States of America.

Legislative Power (Article I)

This section encompasses essays on Article I of the Constitution dealing specifically with the Legislative branch, its powers, and functions. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Historical Origin Limits on Federal Power .

Executive Power (Article II)

This section encompasses essays on Article II of the Constitution dealing specifically with the Executive branch, the Presidency, its powers, and functions. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Overview of Article II, Executive Branch .

Judicial Power (Article III)

This section encompasses essays on Article III of the Constitution dealing specifically with the Judicial branch, its powers, and functions. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review .

Interstate Relations (Article IV)

This section encompasses essays on Article IV of the Constitution dealing specifically with the relationships between states. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Purpose of Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Amending the Constitution (Article V)

This section encompasses essays on Article V of the Constitution dealing specifically with the creation of constitutional amendments. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on Congressional Proposals of Amendments .

Supreme Law (Article VI)

This section encompasses essays on Article VI of the Constitution dealing specifically with the establishment of the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Overview of the Supremacy Clause.

Ratification (Article VII)

This section encompasses essays on Article VII of the Constitution dealing specifically with the ratification of the Constitution.

Bill of Rights

The first ten amendments to the Constitution.

First Amendment: Fundamental Freedoms

This section encompasses essays on the First Amendment dealing specifically with fundamental freedoms. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on State Action Doctrine and Free Speech .

Second Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Second Amendment dealing specifically with the right to bear arms. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on Early Second Amendment Jurisprudence.

Third Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Third Amendment dealing specifically with the quartering of soldiers. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on Government Intrusion .

Fourth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Fourth Amendment dealing specifically with searches and seizures. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Amendment’s Historical Background .

Fifth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Fifth Amendment dealing specifically with the rights of persons. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay overviewing Due Process .

Sixth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Sixth Amendment dealing specifically with rights in criminal prosecutions. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on Prejudice and the Right to a Speedy Trial.

Seventh Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Seventh Amendment dealing specifically with civil trial rights. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay overviewing the Seventh Amendment.

Eighth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Eighth Amendment dealing specifically with cruel and unusual punishment. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the standard of cruel and unusual punishment.

Ninth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Ninth Amendment dealing specifically with unenumerated rights. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Amendment’s modern doctrine.

Tenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Tenth Amendment dealing specifically with rights reserved to states and the people. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on State Sovereignty .

Early Amendments

The two earliest amendments ratified after the Bill of Rights.

Eleventh Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Eleventh Amendment dealing specifically with suits against states. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the Amendment’s historical background.

Twelfth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twelfth Amendment dealing specifically with the election of the President.

Reconstruction Amendments

Also referred to as the Civil War Amendments, the 13th-15th Amendments were passed in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War to enshrine constitutional protections for newly-freed Black Americans.

Thirteenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Thirteenth Amendment dealing specifically with the abolition of slavery. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on Defining Badges and Incidents of Slavery

Fourteenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Fourteenth Amendment dealing specifically with equal protection and other rights. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay overviewing Substantive Due Process .

Fifteenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Fifteenth Amendment dealing specifically with the right to vote. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the right to vote generally .

Early Twentieth Century Amendments

The constitutional amendments ratified in the early twentieth century prior to the Second World War.

Sixteenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Sixteenth Amendment dealing specifically with income tax. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the historical background of the Amendment.

Seventeenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Seventeenth Amendment dealing specifically with the popular election of senators. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on the historical background of the Amendment.

Eighteenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Eighteenth Amendment dealing specifically with the prohibition of alcohol.

Nineteenth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Nineteenth Amendment dealing specifically with women’s suffrage. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay overviewing the amendment .

Twentieth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twentieth Amendment dealing specifically with the presidential terms and succession.

Twenty-First Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-First Amendment dealing specifically with the repeal of prohibition. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay on interstate commerce .

Twenty-Second Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-Second Amendment dealing specifically with Presidential term limits.

Post-War Amendments

Constitutional amendments passed in the twentieth century after the conclusion of the Second World War.

Twenty-Third Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-Third Amendment dealing specifically with District of Columbia electors.

Twenty-Fourth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-Fourth Amendment dealing specifically with the abolition of poll tax.

Twenty-Fifth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment dealing specifically with Presidential vacancy.

Twenty-Sixth Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment dealing specifically with the reduction of voting age.

Twenty-Seventh Amendment

This section encompasses essays on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment dealing specifically with the congressional compensation. A recommended first stop is the annotated essay overviewing the amendment .

Six amendments have been proposed by Congress, but have not been ratified by the States.

• Proposed Amendments Not Ratified by the States This essay covers amendments proposed by Congress, but as of yet unratified by the States.
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Module 2: The Constitution and Its Origins

The ratification of the constitution, learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the steps required to ratify the Constitution
• Describe arguments the framers raised in support of a strong national government and counterpoints raised by the Anti-Federalists

On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia voted to approve the document they had drafted over the course of many months. Some did not support it, but the majority did. Before it could become the law of the land, however, the Constitution faced another hurdle. It had to be ratified by the states.

The Ratification Process

Article VII, the final article of the Constitution, required that before the Constitution could become law and a new government could form, the document had to be ratified by nine of the thirteen states. Eleven days after the delegates at the Philadelphia convention approved it, copies of the Constitution were sent to each of the states, which were to hold ratifying conventions to either accept or reject it.

This approach to ratification was an unusual one. Since the authority inherent in the Articles of Confederation and the Confederation Congress had rested on the consent of the states, changes to the nation’s government should also have been ratified by the state legislatures. Instead, by calling upon state legislatures to hold ratification conventions to approve the Constitution, the framers avoided asking the legislators to approve a document that would require them to give up a degree of their own power. The men attending the ratification conventions would be delegates elected by their neighbors to represent their interests. They were not being asked to relinquish their power; in fact, they were being asked to place limits upon the power of their state legislators, whom they may not have elected in the first place. Finally, because the new nation was to be a republic in which power was held by the people through their elected representatives, it was considered appropriate to leave the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the Constitution to the nation’s citizens. If convention delegates, who were chosen by popular vote, approved it, then the new government could rightly claim that it ruled with the consent of the people.

The greatest sticking point when it came to ratification, as it had been at the Constitutional Convention itself, was the relative power of the state and federal governments. The framers of the Constitution believed that without the ability to maintain and command an army and navy, impose taxes, and force the states to comply with laws passed by Congress, the young nation would not survive for very long. But many people resisted increasing the powers of the national government at the expense of the states. Virginia’s Patrick Henry , for example, feared that the newly created office of president would place excessive power in the hands of one man. He also disapproved of the federal government’s new ability to tax its citizens. This right, Henry believed, should remain with the states.

Other delegates, such as Edmund Randolph of Virginia, disapproved of the Constitution because it created a new federal judicial system. Their fear was that the federal courts would be too far away from where those who were tried lived. State courts were located closer to the homes of both plaintiffs and defendants, and it was believed that judges and juries in state courts could better understand the actions of those who appeared before them. In response to these fears, the federal government created federal courts in each of the states as well as in Maine, which was then part of Massachusetts, and Kentucky, which was part of Virginia. [1]

Perhaps the greatest source of dissatisfaction with the Constitution was that it did not guarantee protection of individual liberties. State governments had given jury trials to residents charged with violating the law and allowed their residents to possess weapons for their protection. Some had practiced religious tolerance as well. The Constitution, however, did not contain reassurances that the federal government would do so. Although it provided for habeas corpus and prohibited both a religious test for holding office and granting noble titles, some citizens feared the loss of their traditional rights and the violation of their liberties. This led many of the Constitution’s opponents to call for a bill of rights and the refusal to ratify the document without one. The lack of a bill of rights was especially problematic in Virginia, as the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the most extensive rights-granting document among the states. The promise that a bill of rights would be drafted for the Constitution persuaded delegates in many states to support ratification. [2]

Thomas Jefferson on the Bill of Rights

John Adams and Thomas Jefferson carried on a lively correspondence regarding the ratification of the Constitution. In the following excerpt (reproduced as written) from a letter dated March 15, 1789, after the Constitution had been ratified by nine states but before it had been approved by all thirteen, Jefferson reiterates his previously expressed concerns that a bill of rights to protect citizens’ freedoms was necessary and should be added to the Constitution:

“In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, . . . I am happy to find that on the whole you are a friend to this amendment. The Declaration of rights is like all other human blessings alloyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully it’s object. But the good in this instance vastly overweighs the evil. . . . This instrument [the Constitution] forms us into one state as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative & executive body for these objects. It should therefore guard us against their abuses of power. . . . Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. True. But tho it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. . . . There is a remarkeable difference between the . . . Inconveniences which attend a Declaration of rights, & those which attend the want of it. . . . The inconveniences of the want of a Declaration are permanent, afflicting & irreparable: they are in constant progression from bad to worse.” [3]

What were some of the inconveniences of not having a bill of rights that Jefferson mentioned? Why did he decide in favor of having one?

It was clear how some states would vote. Smaller states, like Delaware, favored the Constitution. Equal representation in the Senate would give them a degree of equality with the larger states, and a strong national government with an army at its command would be better able to defend them than their state militias could. Larger states, however, had significant power to lose. They did not believe they needed the federal government to defend them and disliked the prospect of having to provide tax money to support the new government. Thus, from the very beginning, the supporters of the Constitution feared that New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would refuse to ratify it. That would mean all nine of the remaining states would have to, and Rhode Island, the smallest state, was unlikely to do so. It had not even sent delegates to the convention in Philadelphia. And even if it joined the other states in ratifying the document and the requisite nine votes were cast, the new nation would not be secure without its largest, wealthiest, and most populous states as members of the union.

The Ratification Campaign

On the question of ratification, citizens quickly separated into two groups: Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The Federalists supported it. They tended to be among the elite members of society—wealthy and well-educated landowners, businessmen, and former military commanders who believed a strong government would be better for both national defense and economic growth. A national currency, which the federal government had the power to create, would ease business transactions. The ability of the federal government to regulate trade and place tariffs on imports would protect merchants from foreign competition. Furthermore, the power to collect taxes would allow the national government to fund internal improvements like roads, which would also help businessmen. Support for the Federalists was especially strong in New England.

Opponents of ratification were called Anti-Federalists . Anti-Federalists feared the power of the national government and believed state legislatures, with which they had more contact, could better protect their freedoms. Although some Anti-Federalists, like Patrick Henry , were wealthy, most distrusted the elite and believed a strong federal government would favor the rich over those of “the middling sort.” This was certainly the fear of Melancton Smith , a New York merchant and landowner, who believed that power should rest in the hands of small, landowning farmers of average wealth who “are more temperate, of better morals and less ambitious than the great.” [4]

Even members of the social elite, like Henry, feared that the centralization of power would lead to the creation of a political aristocracy, to the detriment of state sovereignty and individual liberty.

Related to these concerns were fears that the strong central government Federalists advocated for would levy taxes on farmers and planters, who lacked the hard currency needed to pay them. Many also believed Congress would impose tariffs on foreign imports that would make American agricultural products less welcome in Europe and in European colonies in the western hemisphere. For these reasons, Anti-Federalist sentiment was especially strong in the South.

Some Anti-Federalists also believed that the large federal republic that the Constitution would create could not work as intended. Americans had long believed that virtue was necessary in a nation where people governed themselves (i.e., the ability to put self-interest and petty concerns aside for the good of the larger community). In small republics, similarities among members of the community would naturally lead them to the same positions and make it easier for those in power to understand the needs of their neighbors. In a larger republic, one that encompassed nearly the entire Eastern Seaboard and ran west to the Appalachian Mountains, people would lack such a strong commonality of interests. [5]

Likewise, Anti-Federalists argued, the diversity of religion tolerated by the Constitution would prevent the formation of a political community with shared values and interests. The Constitution contained no provisions for government support of churches or of religious education, and Article VI explicitly forbade the use of religious tests to determine eligibility for public office. This caused many, like Henry Abbot of North Carolina, to fear that government would be placed in the hands of “pagans . . . and Mahometans [Muslims].” [6]

It is difficult to determine how many people were Federalists and how many were Anti-Federalists in 1787. The Federalists won the day, but they may not have been in the majority. First, the Federalist position tended to win support among businessmen, large farmers, and, in the South, plantation owners. These people tended to live along the Eastern Seaboard. In 1787, most of the states were divided into voting districts in a manner that gave more votes to the eastern part of the state than to the western part. [7]

Thus, in some states, like Virginia and South Carolina, small farmers who may have favored the Anti-Federalist position were unable to elect as many delegates to state ratification conventions as those who lived in the east. Small settlements may also have lacked the funds to send delegates to the convention. [8]

In all the states, educated men authored pamphlets and published essays and cartoons arguing either for or against ratification. Although many writers supported each position, it is the Federalist essays that are now best known. The arguments these authors put forth, along with explicit guarantees that amendments would be added to protect individual liberties, helped to sway delegates to ratification conventions in many states.

For obvious reasons, smaller, less populous states favored the Constitution and the protection of a strong federal government. Delaware and New Jersey ratified the document within a few months after it was sent to them for approval in 1787. Connecticut ratified it early in 1788. Some of the larger states, such as Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, also voted in favor of the new government. New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in the summer of 1788.

This Massachusetts Sentinel cartoon (a) encourages the state’s voters to join Georgia and neighboring Connecticut in ratifying the Constitution. Less than a month later, on February 6, 1788, Massachusetts became the sixth member of the newly formed federal union (b).

This timeline shows the order in which states ratified the new Constitution. Small states that would benefit from the protection of a larger union ratified the Constitution fairly quickly, such as Delaware and Connecticut. Larger, more populous states like Virginia and New York took longer. The last state to ratify was Rhode Island, a state that had always proven reluctant to act alongside the others.

Although the Constitution went into effect following ratification by New Hampshire, four states still remained outside the newly formed union. Two were the wealthy, populous states of Virginia and New York. In Virginia, James Madison’s active support and the intercession of George Washington, who wrote letters to the convention, changed the minds of many. Some who had initially opposed the Constitution, such as Edmund Randolph, were persuaded that the creation of a strong union was necessary for the country’s survival and changed their position. Other Virginia delegates were swayed by the promise that a bill of rights similar to the Virginia Declaration of Rights would be added after the Constitution was ratified. On June 25, 1788, Virginia became the tenth state to grant its approval.

The approval of New York was the last major hurdle. Facing considerable opposition to the Constitution in that state, Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay wrote a series of essays, beginning in 1787, arguing for a strong federal government and support of the Constitution. Later compiled as The Federalist and now known as The Federalist Papers , these eighty-five essays were originally published in newspapers in New York and other states under the name of Publius, a supporter of the Roman Republic.

From 1787 to 1788, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay authored a series of essays intended to convince Americans, especially New Yorkers, to support the new Constitution. These essays, which originally appeared in newspapers, were collected and published together under the title The Federalist in 1788. They are now known as The Federalist Papers .

The essays addressed a variety of issues that troubled citizens. For example, in Federalist No. 51, attributed to James Madison, the author assured readers they did not need to fear that the national government would grow too powerful. The federal system, in which power was divided between the national and state governments, and the division of authority within the federal government into separate branches would prevent any one part of the government from becoming too strong. Furthermore, tyranny could not arise in a government in which “the legislature necessarily predominates.” Finally, the desire of office holders in each branch of government to exercise the powers given to them, described as “personal motives,” would encourage them to limit any attempt by the other branches to overstep their authority. According to Madison , “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”

Other essays countered different criticisms made of the Constitution and echoed the argument in favor of a strong national government. In Federalist No. 35 , for example, Hamilton argued that people’s interests could in fact be represented by men who were not their neighbors. Indeed, Hamilton asked rhetorically, would American citizens best be served by a representative “whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and his acquaintances” or by someone with more extensive knowledge of the world? To those who argued that a merchant and land-owning elite would come to dominate Congress, Hamilton countered that the majority of men currently sitting in New York’s state senate and assembly were landowners of moderate wealth and that artisans usually chose merchants, “their natural patron[s] and friend[s],” to represent them. An aristocracy would not arise, and if it did, its members would have been chosen by lesser men. Similarly, Jay reminded New Yorkers in Federalist No. 2 that union had been the goal of Americans since the time of the Revolution. A desire for union was natural among people of such “similar sentiments” who “were united to each other by the strongest ties,” and the government proposed by the Constitution was the best means of achieving that union.

James Madison (a) played a vital role in the formation of the Constitution. He was an important participant in the Constitutional Convention and authored many of The Federalist Papers . Despite the fact that he did not believe that a Bill of Rights was necessary, he wrote one in order to allay the fears of those who believed the federal government was too powerful. He also served as Thomas Jefferson’s vice president and was elected president himself in 1808. Alexander Hamilton (b) was one of the greatest political minds of the early United States. He authored the majority of The Federalist Papers and served as Secretary of the Treasury in George Washington’s administration.

Objections that an elite group of wealthy and educated bankers, businessmen, and large landowners would come to dominate the nation’s politics were also addressed by Madison in Federalist No. 10 . Americans need not fear the power of factions or special interests, he argued, for the republic was too big and the interests of its people too diverse to allow the development of large, powerful political parties. Likewise, elected representatives, who were expected to “possess the most attractive merit,” would protect the government from being controlled by “an unjust and interested [biased in favor of their own interests] majority.”

For those who worried that the president might indeed grow too ambitious or king-like, Hamilton, in Federalist No. 68 , provided assurance that placing the leadership of the country in the hands of one person was not dangerous. Electors from each state would select the president. Because these men would be members of a “transient” body called together only for the purpose of choosing the president and would meet in separate deliberations in each state, they would be free of corruption and beyond the influence of the “heats and ferments” of the voters. Indeed, Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 70 , instead of being afraid that the president would become a tyrant, Americans should realize that it was easier to control one person than it was to control many. Furthermore, one person could also act with an “energy” that Congress did not possess. Making decisions alone, the president could decide what actions should be taken faster than could Congress, whose deliberations, because of its size, were necessarily slow. At times, the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” of the chief executive might be necessary.

The arguments of the Federalists were persuasive, but whether they actually succeeded in changing the minds of New Yorkers is unclear. Once Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788, New York realized that it had little choice but to do so as well. If it did not ratify the Constitution, it would be the last large state that had not joined the union. Thus, on July 26, 1788, the majority of delegates to New York’s ratification convention voted to accept the Constitution. A year later, North Carolina became the twelfth state to approve. Alone and realizing it could not hope to survive on its own, Rhode Island became the last state to ratify, nearly two years after New York had done so.

Term Limits

One of the objections raised to the Constitution’s new government was that it did not set term limits for members of Congress or the president. Those who opposed a strong central government argued that this failure could allow a handful of powerful men to gain control of the nation and rule it for as long as they wished. Although the framers did not anticipate the idea of career politicians, those who supported the Constitution argued that reelecting the president and reappointing senators by state legislatures would create a body of experienced men who could better guide the country through crises. A president who did not prove to be a good leader would be voted out of office instead of being reelected. In fact, presidents long followed George Washington’s example and limited themselves to two terms. Only in 1951, after Franklin Roosevelt had been elected four times, was the Twenty-Second Amendment passed to restrict the presidency to two terms.

Are term limits a good idea? Should they have originally been included in the Constitution? Why or why not? Are there times when term limits might not be good?

Anti-Federalists objected to the power the Constitution gave the federal government and the absence of a bill of rights to protect individual liberties. The Federalists countered that a strong government was necessary to lead the new nation and promised to add a bill of rights to the Constitution. The Federalist Papers , in particular, argued in favor of ratification and sought to convince people that the new government would not become tyrannical. Finally, in June 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state to approve the Constitution, making it the law of the land. The large and prosperous states of Virginia and New York followed shortly thereafter, and the remaining states joined as well.

Review Questions

1. Why did so many people oppose ratification of the Constitution, and how was their opposition partly overcome?

Anti-Federalists those who did not support ratification of the Constitution

Federalists those who supported ratification of the Constitution

The Federalist Papers a collection of eighty-five essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in support of ratification of the Constitution

• Pauline Maier. 2010. Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution , 1787-1788. New York: Simon & Schuster, 464. ↵
• Maier, Ratification , 431. ↵
• Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 15, 1789, https://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p7/p7_1text.html . ↵
• Isaac Krannick. 1999. "The Great National Discussion: The Discourse of Politics in 1787." In What Did the Constitution Mean to Early Americans? ed. Edward Countryman. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 52. ↵
• Krannick, Great National Discussion , 42-43. ↵
• Krannick, Great National Discussion , 42. ↵
• Evelyn C. Fink and William H. Riker. 1989. "The Strategy of Ratification." In The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism , eds. Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman. New York: Agathon, 229. ↵
• Fink and Riker, Strategy of Ratification , 221. ↵
• American Government. Authored by : OpenStax. Provided by : OpenStax; Rice University. Located at : https://cnx.org/contents/[email protected]:Y1CfqFju@5/Preface . License : CC BY: Attribution . License Terms : Download for free at http://cnx.org/contents/9e28f580-0d1b-4d72-8795-c48329947ac2@1.
• Share icon. Authored by : Quan Do. Provided by : The Noun Project. Located at : https://thenounproject.com/term/share/7671/ . License : CC BY: Attribution

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The state of play on the eve of France’s pivotal election

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Peggy Hollinger

This article is an onsite version of our Europe Express newsletter. Sign up here to get the newsletter sent straight to your inbox every weekday and Saturday morning. Explore all of our newsletters here

Welcome back to our special French election edition of Europe Express. 

A day before France goes to the polls in the first-round vote to elect a new National Assembly — followed by a run-off second round on July 7 — voters seem keener than ever on extreme politics. 

We are dedicating this and the next two editions of Europe Express to French politics, after President Emmanuel Macron’s decision on June 9 to call a snap election which threatens to crush the political mainstream. This is the English edition but you can also read it en français here . I can be reached at [email protected] .

Where are we now?

Polls this week showed roughly 36.5 per cent of the vote in the first round supporting the far-right Rassemblement National, a party that wants to bar dual nationals from certain public posts and has declared a culture war on Islam, as revealed in our interview with its chief Jordan Bardella. That score is up from the unprecedented 31 per cent the party won at the European elections earlier this month. 

In second place with 29 per cent is still the New Popular Front, a fragile alliance of the mainstream Parti Socialiste with the far-left and virulently anti-capitalist La France Insoumise. 

So a run-off between the extremes is looking likely in most seats after tomorrow’s first round vote, with the moderate centre likely to be relegated to a bit-part player in the theatre of French parliamentary politics. 

Faire barrage à l’extrême droite

And yet . . . voter turnout is forecast to hit 64 per cent or more, a level not seen in legislative elections for 20 years. And this week so many French citizens abroad rushed to lodge proxy votes that the government website had to be suspended temporarily to cope with demand. On Thursday, the interior ministry announced that 2.1mn proxies had been registered so far, twice as many as in the previous legislative vote. 

Some see this as a sign that the French are heeding calls to “faire barrage” — or unite across party lines — to vote against the far right in the first round. They hope voters will yet again reject government by extreme, as they have done three times before (2002, 2017 and 2022) when the RN, and its predecessor the Front National, lost to the centre right in the second round of presidential elections. Bruno Le Maire, finance minister, said in this interview on France’s BFM business channel that he was “delighted with this start. I see it as an awareness that the future of France is really at stake.”

But not everyone is as optimistic. A veteran centrist deputy fighting to hold his seat told me this week that the depth of voter animosity towards Macron and his autocratic style of governing has devastated the centre he sought to lead, shocking even government ministers out on the campaign trail. “One rang me last week to tell me that we will be swept away,” he said. The candidate has deleted any mention of Macron or his Ensemble alliance from his campaign brochures, but that hasn’t stopped voters from berating him on the street or on social media.

The Macron era — which began with the promise of a dynamic reinvigorated France and went on to deliver record employment along with a wave of new business start-ups — seems to be coming to an end in a fog of anger and frustration. Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist of the IMF, dissects the four acts of the Macron tragedy here . 

But not all the blame can be laid on the current president, says political scientist Olivier Roy in this thoughtful essay . The story has been decades in the making, with French society no longer finding its reflection in the institutions and practices of the Fifth Republic. 

When the left rallied to support the centre-right Jacques Chirac against FN founder Jean-Marie Le Pen in the presidential race of 2002, people across political divides were prepared to defend the state and its institutions, Roy says.

But this was when different parties saw themselves as rooted in a common history and had deep ties to local politics, where compromises and personal relationships with opponents are essential. That is no longer the case.

Then Macron, following a trend initiated by Nicolas Sarkozy, president from 2007 to 2012, tried to bypass France’s institutions, Roy says. 

This contempt for the “deep state” was accompanied by a contempt for traditional politics,” he writes. “The arrival of the RN in government might entail, not a complete rupture, but rather an intensification of trends already evident.

Economics homework

Back to the campaign, and polls this week suggested that voters trust the untested RN more than centrists or the left to manage the economy. It is a sign that Le Pen’s strategy of de-demonising (her words) the RN, depicting it as a champion of small business and ordinary working folk, is succeeding, even if the party’s economic policies are rudimentary, confused and likely to spark a series of legal challenges in Brussels. 

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On Monday, Bardella — the 28-year-old party chief who will be prime minister if the RN wins a majority — unveiled his economic programme . He has backtracked on some of the more costly policies, postponing the reversal of pension reforms, for example. But many of the proposals are still unfunded. Les Echos columnist Étienne Lefebvre described it as little more than a “budgetary deceit”, despite Bardella’s claims that he wanted to be fiscally responsible. 

Meanwhile, business leaders are wrestling with how they should respond if the RN wins a majority, or even the biggest share of seats in the National Assembly. Despite years of careful message management, the RN has not entirely shed its reputation for toxic nationalism. The election of dozens of untried deputies is likely to reveal some more unpleasant currents in the populist movement. “We are trying to decide how to approach them, who to meet and whether or not we should ask them to defend some of our policies,” said one executive this week. 

Nevertheless some business leaders have already begun to court the party , judging the RN’s nascent economic programme is still more susceptible to influence than that of a leftwing coalition including the anti-capitalist La France Insoumise.

 “It is a choice between two evils,” the chair of a French blue-chip company confided. “The mad policies of the NFP [alliance] have actually resulted in making the RN seem reasonable by contrast. But some of the RN’s proposals will put us into a head-to-head conflict with Europe. Business dreads that, and the consequences for French borrowing rates. It will cost us more.”

Some business leaders may be going even further. Two French media outlets, Le Monde and Mediapart, have detailed the exposure given to RN views and candidates on stations owned by media magnate Vincent Bolloré. On Thursday, France’s media watchdog put Bolloré’s Europe 1 on notice for a “lack of measure and honesty” in the election commentary of pro-RN presenter Cyril Hanouna.

So what now?

Marine Le Pen, architect of the RN’s “normalisation”, has been adept at controlling the party’s image in the 13 years since she took over from her father, Jean-Marie. However, in the final days of the campaign, her grip — even over herself — may be slipping. Speaking to regional news outlet Le Télégramme, Le Pen described the president’s role as head of the armed forces as “an honorary title because the prime minister holds the purse strings”. In that short sentence Le Pen not only challenged the institution of France’s powerful executive, but the constitution itself. Her comments, which she then partially retracted, gave RN’s opponents in Thursday’s televised debate the chance to attack the party’s willingness to work with the executive in any shared government.

Her slip reminded me of an interview I did with Le Pen in 2011, just a month after she assumed leadership of the RN, then called the Front National. She had been well prepared for the questions about the party’s reputation for antisemitism and racism. Not so much, however, for the sudden question about whether she would approve of her daughter marrying a Muslim. Instinctively, she responded — “I would warn her that ….” — then stopped, quickly, getting back on message and changing the subject. It was a brief moment, but enough. 

I also asked her about her mission as the new leader of the far right. “I am here to build the National Front’s accession to power,” she told me with absolute conviction. 

Over the next week, she may well realise that ambition. 

More on this topic

The BBC’s Hugh Schofield dives into the family life and influences of Marine Le Pen in an effort to understand the “normalisation” of France’s biggest far-right party. It may have been written in 2017, when Le Pen was challenging Macron in the presidential election, but it is still one of the best dissections of the RN’s “normalisation” I have read.

Peggy’s picks of the week  

Thank you Simon Kuper for explaining why France may not be not as lost as the French think!

If you need a break from elections in France, the US and UK, then this essay on teen slang by Canadian essayist Stephen Marche is an entertaining read. You may even begin to understand your own offspring.

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