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How to Write the Rationale of the Study in Research (Examples)

What is the Rationale of the Study?

The rationale of the study is the justification for taking on a given study. It explains the reason the study was conducted or should be conducted. This means the study rationale should explain to the reader or examiner why the study is/was necessary. It is also sometimes called the “purpose” or “justification” of a study. While this is not difficult to grasp in itself, you might wonder how the rationale of the study is different from your research question or from the statement of the problem of your study, and how it fits into the rest of your thesis or research paper. 

The rationale of the study links the background of the study to your specific research question and justifies the need for the latter on the basis of the former. In brief, you first provide and discuss existing data on the topic, and then you tell the reader, based on the background evidence you just presented, where you identified gaps or issues and why you think it is important to address those. The problem statement, lastly, is the formulation of the specific research question you choose to investigate, following logically from your rationale, and the approach you are planning to use to do that.

Table of Contents:

How to write a rationale for a research paper , how do you justify the need for a research study.

• Study Rationale Example: Where Does It Go In Your Paper?

The basis for writing a research rationale is preliminary data or a clear description of an observation. If you are doing basic/theoretical research, then a literature review will help you identify gaps in current knowledge. In applied/practical research, you base your rationale on an existing issue with a certain process (e.g., vaccine proof registration) or practice (e.g., patient treatment) that is well documented and needs to be addressed. By presenting the reader with earlier evidence or observations, you can (and have to) convince them that you are not just repeating what other people have already done or said and that your ideas are not coming out of thin air. 

Once you have explained where you are coming from, you should justify the need for doing additional research–this is essentially the rationale of your study. Finally, when you have convinced the reader of the purpose of your work, you can end your introduction section with the statement of the problem of your research that contains clear aims and objectives and also briefly describes (and justifies) your methodological approach. 

When is the Rationale for Research Written?

The author can present the study rationale both before and after the research is conducted. 

• Before conducting research : The study rationale is a central component of the research proposal . It represents the plan of your work, constructed before the study is actually executed.
• Once research has been conducted : After the study is completed, the rationale is presented in a research article or  PhD dissertation  to explain why you focused on this specific research question. When writing the study rationale for this purpose, the author should link the rationale of the research to the aims and outcomes of the study.

What to Include in the Study Rationale

Although every study rationale is different and discusses different specific elements of a study’s method or approach, there are some elements that should be included to write a good rationale. Make sure to touch on the following:

• A summary of conclusions from your review of the relevant literature
• What is currently unknown (gaps in knowledge)
• Inconclusive or contested results  from previous studies on the same or similar topic
• The necessity to improve or build on previous research, such as to improve methodology or utilize newer techniques and/or technologies

There are different types of limitations that you can use to justify the need for your study. In applied/practical research, the justification for investigating something is always that an existing process/practice has a problem or is not satisfactory. Let’s say, for example, that people in a certain country/city/community commonly complain about hospital care on weekends (not enough staff, not enough attention, no decisions being made), but you looked into it and realized that nobody ever investigated whether these perceived problems are actually based on objective shortages/non-availabilities of care or whether the lower numbers of patients who are treated during weekends are commensurate with the provided services.

In this case, “lack of data” is your justification for digging deeper into the problem. Or, if it is obvious that there is a shortage of staff and provided services on weekends, you could decide to investigate which of the usual procedures are skipped during weekends as a result and what the negative consequences are. 

In basic/theoretical research, lack of knowledge is of course a common and accepted justification for additional research—but make sure that it is not your only motivation. “Nobody has ever done this” is only a convincing reason for a study if you explain to the reader why you think we should know more about this specific phenomenon. If there is earlier research but you think it has limitations, then those can usually be classified into “methodological”, “contextual”, and “conceptual” limitations. To identify such limitations, you can ask specific questions and let those questions guide you when you explain to the reader why your study was necessary:

Methodological limitations

• Did earlier studies try but failed to measure/identify a specific phenomenon?
• Was earlier research based on incorrect conceptualizations of variables?
• Were earlier studies based on questionable operationalizations of key concepts?
• Did earlier studies use questionable or inappropriate research designs?

Contextual limitations

• Have recent changes in the studied problem made previous studies irrelevant?
• Are you studying a new/particular context that previous findings do not apply to?

Conceptual limitations

• Do previous findings only make sense within a specific framework or ideology?

Study Rationale Examples

Let’s look at an example from one of our earlier articles on the statement of the problem to clarify how your rationale fits into your introduction section. This is a very short introduction for a practical research study on the challenges of online learning. Your introduction might be much longer (especially the context/background section), and this example does not contain any sources (which you will have to provide for all claims you make and all earlier studies you cite)—but please pay attention to how the background presentation , rationale, and problem statement blend into each other in a logical way so that the reader can follow and has no reason to question your motivation or the foundation of your research.

Background presentation

Since the beginning of the Covid pandemic, most educational institutions around the world have transitioned to a fully online study model, at least during peak times of infections and social distancing measures. This transition has not been easy and even two years into the pandemic, problems with online teaching and studying persist (reference needed) . 

While the increasing gap between those with access to technology and equipment and those without access has been determined to be one of the main challenges (reference needed) , others claim that online learning offers more opportunities for many students by breaking down barriers of location and distance (reference needed) .  

Rationale of the study

Since teachers and students cannot wait for circumstances to go back to normal, the measures that schools and universities have implemented during the last two years, their advantages and disadvantages, and the impact of those measures on students’ progress, satisfaction, and well-being need to be understood so that improvements can be made and demographics that have been left behind can receive the support they need as soon as possible.

Statement of the problem

To identify what changes in the learning environment were considered the most challenging and how those changes relate to a variety of student outcome measures, we conducted surveys and interviews among teachers and students at ten institutions of higher education in four different major cities, two in the US (New York and Chicago), one in South Korea (Seoul), and one in the UK (London). Responses were analyzed with a focus on different student demographics and how they might have been affected differently by the current situation.

How long is a study rationale?

In a research article bound for journal publication, your rationale should not be longer than a few sentences (no longer than one brief paragraph). A  dissertation or thesis  usually allows for a longer description; depending on the length and nature of your document, this could be up to a couple of paragraphs in length. A completely novel or unconventional approach might warrant a longer and more detailed justification than an approach that slightly deviates from well-established methods and approaches.

Consider Using Professional Academic Editing Services

Now that you know how to write the rationale of the study for a research proposal or paper, you should make use of our free AI grammar checker , Wordvice AI, or receive professional academic proofreading services from Wordvice, including research paper editing services and manuscript editing services to polish your submitted research documents.

You can also find many more articles, for example on writing the other parts of your research paper , on choosing a title , or on making sure you understand and adhere to the author instructions before you submit to a journal, on the Wordvice academic resources pages.

How to Write the Rationale for a Research Paper

• Research Process
• Peer Review

A research rationale answers the big SO WHAT? that every adviser, peer reviewer, and editor has in mind when they critique your work. A compelling research rationale increases the chances of your paper being published or your grant proposal being funded. In this article, we look at the purpose of a research rationale, its components and key characteristics, and how to create an effective research rationale.

Updated on September 19, 2022

The rationale for your research is the reason why you decided to conduct the study in the first place. The motivation for asking the question. The knowledge gap. This is often the most significant part of your publication. It justifies the study's purpose, novelty, and significance for science or society. It's a critical part of standard research articles as well as funding proposals.

Essentially, the research rationale answers the big SO WHAT? that every (good) adviser, peer reviewer, and editor has in mind when they critique your work.

A compelling research rationale increases the chances of your paper being published or your grant proposal being funded. In this article, we look at:

• the purpose of a research rationale
• its components and key characteristics
• how to create an effective research rationale

What is a research rationale?

Think of a research rationale as a set of reasons that explain why a study is necessary and important based on its background. It's also known as the justification of the study, rationale, or thesis statement.

Essentially, you want to convince your reader that you're not reciting what other people have already said and that your opinion hasn't appeared out of thin air. You've done the background reading and identified a knowledge gap that this rationale now explains.

A research rationale is usually written toward the end of the introduction. You'll see this section clearly in high-impact-factor international journals like Nature and Science. At the end of the introduction there's always a phrase that begins with something like, "here we show..." or "in this paper we show..." This text is part of a logical sequence of information, typically (but not necessarily) provided in this order:

Here's an example from a study by Cataldo et al. (2021) on the impact of social media on teenagers' lives.

Note how the research background, gap, rationale, and objectives logically blend into each other.

The authors chose to put the research aims before the rationale. This is not a problem though. They still achieve a logical sequence. This helps the reader follow their thinking and convinces them about their research's foundation.

Elements of a research rationale

We saw that the research rationale follows logically from the research background and literature review/observation and leads into your study's aims and objectives.

This might sound somewhat abstract. A helpful way to formulate a research rationale is to answer the question, “Why is this study necessary and important?”

Generally, that something has never been done before should not be your only motivation. Use it only If you can give the reader valid evidence why we should learn more about this specific phenomenon.

A well-written introduction covers three key elements:

• What's the background to the research?
• What has been done before (information relevant to this particular study, but NOT a literature review)?
• Research rationale

Now, let's see how you might answer the question.

1. This study complements scientific knowledge and understanding

Discuss the shortcomings of previous studies and explain how'll correct them. Your short review can identify:

• Methodological limitations . The methodology (research design, research approach or sampling) employed in previous works is somewhat flawed.

Example : Here , the authors claim that previous studies have failed to explore the role of apathy “as a predictor of functional decline in healthy older adults” (Burhan et al., 2021). At the same time, we know a lot about other age-related neuropsychiatric disorders, like depression.

Their study is necessary, then, “to increase our understanding of the cognitive, clinical, and neural correlates of apathy and deconstruct its underlying mechanisms.” (Burhan et al., 2021).

• Contextual limitations . External factors have changed and this has minimized or removed the relevance of previous research.

Example : You want to do an empirical study to evaluate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the number of tourists visiting Sicily. Previous studies might have measured tourism determinants in Sicily, but they preceded COVID-19.

• Conceptual limitations . Previous studies are too bound to a specific ideology or a theoretical framework.

Example : The work of English novelist E. M. Forster has been extensively researched for its social, political, and aesthetic dimensions. After the 1990s, younger scholars wanted to read his novels as an example of gay fiction. They justified the need to do so based on previous studies' reliance on homophobic ideology.

This kind of rationale is most common in basic/theoretical research.

2. This study can help solve a specific problem

Here, you base your rationale on a process that has a problem or is not satisfactory.

For example, patients complain about low-quality hospital care on weekends (staff shortages, inadequate attention, etc.). No one has looked into this (there is a lack of data). So, you explore if the reported problems are true and what can be done to address them. This is a knowledge gap.

Or you set out to explore a specific practice. You might want to study the pros and cons of several entry strategies into the Japanese food market.

It's vital to explain the problem in detail and stress the practical benefits of its solution. In the first example, the practical implications are recommendations to improve healthcare provision.

In the second example, the impact of your research is to inform the decision-making of businesses wanting to enter the Japanese food market.

This kind of rationale is more common in applied/practical research.

3. You're the best person to conduct this study

It's a bonus if you can show that you're uniquely positioned to deliver this study, especially if you're writing a funding proposal .

For an anthropologist wanting to explore gender norms in Ethiopia, this could be that they speak Amharic (Ethiopia's official language) and have already lived in the country for a few years (ethnographic experience).

Or if you want to conduct an interdisciplinary research project, consider partnering up with collaborators whose expertise complements your own. Scientists from different fields might bring different skills and a fresh perspective or have access to the latest tech and equipment. Teaming up with reputable collaborators justifies the need for a study by increasing its credibility and likely impact.

When is the research rationale written?

You can write your research rationale before, or after, conducting the study.

In the first case, when you might have a new research idea, and you're applying for funding to implement it.

Or you're preparing a call for papers for a journal special issue or a conference. Here , for instance, the authors seek to collect studies on the impact of apathy on age-related neuropsychiatric disorders.

In the second case, you have completed the study and are writing a research paper for publication. Looking back, you explain why you did the study in question and how it worked out.

Although the research rationale is part of the introduction, it's best to write it at the end. Stand back from your study and look at it in the big picture. At this point, it's easier to convince your reader why your study was both necessary and important.

How long should a research rationale be?

The length of the research rationale is not fixed. Ideally, this will be determined by the guidelines (of your journal, sponsor etc.).

The prestigious journal Nature , for instance, calls for articles to be no more than 6 or 8 pages, depending on the content. The introduction should be around 200 words, and, as mentioned, two to three sentences serve as a brief account of the background and rationale of the study, and come at the end of the introduction.

If you're not provided guidelines, consider these factors:

• Research document : In a thesis or book-length study, the research rationale will be longer than in a journal article. For example, the background and rationale of this book exploring the collective memory of World War I cover more than ten pages.
• Research question : Research into a new sub-field may call for a longer or more detailed justification than a study that plugs a gap in literature.

Which verb tenses to use in the research rationale?

It's best to use the present tense. Though in a research proposal, the research rationale is likely written in the future tense, as you're describing the intended or expected outcomes of the research project (the gaps it will fill, the problems it will solve).

Example of a research rationale

Research question : What are the teachers' perceptions of how a sense of European identity is developed and what underlies such perceptions?

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology , 3(2), 77-101.

Burhan, A.M., Yang, J., & Inagawa, T. (2021). Impact of apathy on aging and age-related neuropsychiatric disorders. Research Topic. Frontiers in Psychiatry

Cataldo, I., Lepri, B., Neoh, M. J. Y., & Esposito, G. (2021). Social media usage and development of psychiatric disorders in childhood and adolescence: A review. Frontiers in Psychiatry , 11.

CiCe Jean Monnet Network (2017). Guidelines for citizenship education in school: Identities and European citizenship children's identity and citizenship in Europe.

Cohen, l, Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2018). Research methods in education . Eighth edition. London: Routledge.

de Prat, R. C. (2013). Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism: The radical parties of the right and left “vis-à-vis” the European Union P.I.E-Peter Lang S.A., Éditions Scientifiques Internationales.

European Commission. (2017). Eurydice Brief: Citizenship education at school in Europe.

Polyakova, A., & Fligstein, N. (2016). Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? Evidence from the 2007–9 financial crisis. Journal of European Public Policy , 23(1), 60-83.

Winter, J. (2014). Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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How do you Write the Rationale for Research?

• By DiscoverPhDs
• October 21, 2020

What is the Rationale of Research?

The term rationale of research means the reason for performing the research study in question. In writing your rational you should able to convey why there was a need for your study to be carried out. It’s an important part of your research paper that should explain how your research was novel and explain why it was significant; this helps the reader understand why your research question needed to be addressed in your research paper, term paper or other research report.

The rationale for research is also sometimes referred to as the justification for the study. When writing your rational, first begin by introducing and explaining what other researchers have published on within your research field.

Having explained the work of previous literature and prior research, include discussion about where the gaps in knowledge are in your field. Use these to define potential research questions that need answering and explain the importance of addressing these unanswered questions.

The rationale conveys to the reader of your publication exactly why your research topic was needed and why it was significant . Having defined your research rationale, you would then go on to define your hypothesis and your research objectives.

Final Comments

Defining the rationale research, is a key part of the research process and academic writing in any research project. You use this in your research paper to firstly explain the research problem within your dissertation topic. This gives you the research justification you need to define your research question and what the expected outcomes may be.

The term rationale of research means the reason for performing the research study in question.

This article will answer common questions about the PhD synopsis, give guidance on how to write one, and provide my thoughts on samples.

An abstract and introduction are the first two sections of your paper or thesis. This guide explains the differences between them and how to write them.

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Annabel is a third-year PhD student at the University of Glasgow, looking at the effects of online self-diagnosis and health information seeking on the patient-healthcare professional relationship.

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Setting Rationale in Research: Cracking the code for excelling at research

Knowledge and curiosity lays the foundation of scientific progress. The quest for knowledge has always been a timeless endeavor. Scholars seek reasons to explain the phenomena they observe, paving way for development of research. Every investigation should offer clarity and a well-defined rationale in research is a cornerstone upon which the entire study can be built.

Research rationale is the heartbeat of every academic pursuit as it guides the researchers to unlock the untouched areas of their field. Additionally, it illuminates the gaps in the existing knowledge, and identifies the potential contributions that the study aims to make.

Table of Contents

What Is Research Rationale and When Is It Written

Research rationale is the “why” behind every academic research. It not only frames the study but also outlines its objectives , questions, and expected outcomes. Additionally, it helps to identify the potential limitations of the study . It serves as a lighthouse for researchers that guides through data collection and analysis, ensuring their efforts remain focused and purposeful. Typically, a rationale is written at the beginning of the research proposal or research paper . It is an essential component of the introduction section and provides the foundation for the entire study. Furthermore, it provides a clear understanding of the purpose and significance of the research to the readers before delving into the specific details of the study. In some cases, the rationale is written before the methodology, data analysis, and other sections. Also, it serves as the justification for the research, and how it contributes to the field. Defining a research rationale can help a researcher in following ways:

1. Justification of a Research Problem

• Research rationale helps to understand the essence of a research problem.
• It designs the right approach to solve a problem. This aspect is particularly important for applied research, where the outcomes can have real-world relevance and impact.
• Also, it explains why the study is worth conducting and why resources should be allocated to pursue it.
• Additionally, it guides a researcher to highlight the benefits and implications of a strategy.

2. Elimination of Literature Gap

• Research rationale helps to ideate new topics which are less addressed.
• Additionally, it offers fresh perspectives on existing research and discusses the shortcomings in previous studies.
• It shows that your study aims to contribute to filling these gaps and advancing the field’s understanding.

3. Originality and Novelty

• The rationale highlights the unique aspects of your research and how it differs from previous studies.
• Furthermore, it explains why your research adds something new to the field and how it expands upon existing knowledge.
• It highlights how your findings might contribute to a better understanding of a particular issue or problem and potentially lead to positive changes.
• Besides these benefits, it provides a personal motivation to the researchers. In some cases, researchers might have personal experiences or interests that drive their desire to investigate a particular topic.

4. An Increase in Chances of Funding

• It is essential to convince funding agencies , supervisors, or reviewers, that a research is worth pursuing.
• Therefore, a good rationale can get your research approved for funding and increases your chances of getting published in journals; as it addresses the potential knowledge gap in existing research.

Overall, research rationale is essential for providing a clear and convincing argument for the value and importance of your research study, setting the stage for the rest of the research proposal or manuscript. Furthermore, it helps establish the context for your work and enables others to understand the purpose and potential impact of your research.

5 Key Elements of a Research Rationale

Research rationale must include certain components which make it more impactful. Here are the key elements of a research rationale:

By incorporating these elements, you provide a strong and convincing case for the legitimacy of your research, which is essential for gaining support and approval from academic institutions, funding agencies, or other stakeholders.

How to Write a Rationale in Research

Writing a rationale requires careful consideration of the reasons for conducting the study. It is usually written in the present tense.

Here are some steps to guide you through the process of writing a research rationale:

After writing the initial draft, it is essential to review and revise the research rationale to ensure that it effectively communicates the purpose of your research. The research rationale should be persuasive and compelling, convincing readers that your study is worthwhile and deserves their attention.

How Long Should a Research Rationale be?

Although there is no pre-defined length for a rationale in research, its length may vary depending on the specific requirements of the research project. It also depends on the academic institution or organization, and the guidelines set by the research advisor or funding agency. In general, a research rationale is usually a concise and focused document.

Typically, it ranges from a few paragraphs to a few pages, but it is usually recommended to keep it as crisp as possible while ensuring all the essential elements are adequately covered. The length of a research rationale can be roughly as follows:

1. For Research Proposal:

A. Around 1 to 3 pages

B. Ensure clear and comprehensive explanation of the research question, its significance, literature review , and methodological approach.

2. Thesis or Dissertation:

A. Around 3 to 5 pages

B. Ensure an extensive coverage of the literature review, theoretical framework, and research objectives to provide a robust justification for the study.

3. Journal Article:

A. Usually concise. Ranges from few paragraphs to one page

B. The research rationale is typically included as part of the introduction section

However, remember that the quality and content of the research rationale are more important than its length. The reasons for conducting the research should be well-structured, clear, and persuasive when presented. Always adhere to the specific institution or publication guidelines.

Example of a Research Rationale

In conclusion, the research rationale serves as the cornerstone of a well-designed and successful research project. It ensures that research efforts are focused, meaningful, and ethically sound. Additionally, it provides a comprehensive and logical justification for embarking on a specific investigation. Therefore, by identifying research gaps, defining clear objectives, emphasizing significance, explaining the chosen methodology, addressing ethical considerations, and recognizing potential limitations, researchers can lay the groundwork for impactful and valuable contributions to the scientific community.

So, are you ready to delve deeper into the world of research and hone your academic writing skills? Explore Enago Academy ‘s comprehensive resources and courses to elevate your research and make a lasting impact in your field. Also, share your thoughts and experiences in the form of an article or a thought piece on Enago Academy’s Open Platform .

Join us on a journey of scholarly excellence today!

Frequently Asked Questions

A rationale of the study can be written by including the following points: 1. Background of the Research/ Study 2. Identifying the Knowledge Gap 3. An Overview of the Goals and Objectives of the Study 4. Methodology and its Significance 5. Relevance of the Research

Start writing a research rationale by defining the research problem and discussing the literature gap associated with it.

A research rationale can be ended by discussing the expected results and summarizing the need of the study.

A rationale for thesis can be made by covering the following points: 1. Extensive coverage of the existing literature 2. Explaining the knowledge gap 3. Provide the framework and objectives of the study 4. Provide a robust justification for the study/ research 5. Highlight the potential of the research and the expected outcomes

A rationale for dissertation can be made by covering the following points: 1. Highlight the existing reference 2. Bridge the gap and establish the context of your research 3. Describe the problem and the objectives 4. Give an overview of the methodology

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• Charlesworth Author Services
• 19 November, 2021

The rationale for one’s research is the justification for undertaking a given study. It states the reason(s) why a researcher chooses to focus on the topic in question, including what the significance is and what gaps the research intends to fill. In short, it is an explanation that rationalises the need for the study. The rationale is typically followed by a hypothesis/ research question (s) and the study objectives.

When is the rationale for research written?

The rationale of a study can be presented both before and after the research is conducted. 

• Before : The rationale is a crucial part of your research proposal , representing the plan of your work as formulated before you execute your study.
• After : Once the study is completed, the rationale is presented in a research paper or dissertation to explain why you focused on the particular question. In this instance, you would link the rationale of your research project to the study aims and outcomes.

Basis for writing the research rationale

The study rationale is predominantly based on preliminary data . A literature review will help you identify gaps in the current knowledge base and also ensure that you avoid duplicating what has already been done. You can then formulate the justification for your study from the existing literature on the subject and the perceived outcomes of the proposed study.

Length of the research rationale

In a research proposal or research article, the rationale would not take up more than a few sentences . A thesis or dissertation would allow for a longer description, which could even run into a couple of paragraphs . The length might even depend on the field of study or nature of the experiment. For instance, a completely novel or unconventional approach might warrant a longer and more detailed justification.

Basic elements of the research rationale

Every research rationale should include some mention or discussion of the following: 

• An overview of your conclusions from your literature review
• Gaps in current knowledge
• Inconclusive or controversial findings from previous studies
• The need to build on previous research (e.g. unanswered questions, the need to update concepts in light of new findings and/or new technical advancements). 

Example of a research rationale

Note: This uses a fictional study.

Abc xyz is a newly identified microalgal species isolated from fish tanks. While Abc xyz algal blooms have been seen as a threat to pisciculture, some studies have hinted at their unusually high carotenoid content and unique carotenoid profile. Carotenoid profiling has been carried out only in a handful of microalgal species from this genus, and the search for microalgae rich in bioactive carotenoids has not yielded promising candidates so far. This in-depth examination of the carotenoid profile of Abc xyz will help identify and quantify novel and potentially useful carotenoids from an untapped aquaculture resource .

In conclusion

It is important to describe the rationale of your research in order to put the significance and novelty of your specific research project into perspective. Once you have successfully articulated the reason(s) for your research, you will have convinced readers of the importance of your work!

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How to Write a Rationale: A Guide for Research and Beyond

Ever found yourself scratching your head, wondering how to justify your choice of a research topic or project? You’re not alone! Writing a rationale, which essentially means explaining the ‘why’ behind your decisions, is crucial to any research process. It’s like the secret sauce that adds flavour to your research recipe. So, the only thing you need to know is how to write a rationale.

What is a Rationale?

A rationale in research is essentially the foundation of your study. It serves as the justification for undertaking a particular research project. At its core, the rationale explains why the research was conducted or needs to be conducted, thus addressing a specific knowledge gap or research question.

Here’s a breakdown of the key elements involved in crafting a rationale:

Linking Background to Research Question: 

The rationale should connect the background of the study to your specific research question. It involves presenting and discussing existing data on your topic, identifying gaps or issues in the current understanding, and explaining why addressing them is important​.

Objectives and Significance: 

Your rationale should clearly outline your research objectives – what you hope to discover or achieve through the study. It should also emphasize the subject’s significance in your field and explain why more or better research is needed​.

Methodological Approach: 

The rationale should briefly describe your proposed research method , whether qualitative (descriptive) or quantitative (experimental), and justify this choice​.

Justifying the Need for Research: 

The rationale isn’t just about what you’re doing and why it’s necessary. It can involve highlighting methodological, contextual, or conceptual limitations in previous studies and explaining how your research aims to overcome these limitations. Essentially, you’re making a case for why your research fills a crucial gap in existing knowledge​​.

Presenting Before and After Research: 

Interestingly, the rationale can be presented before and after the research. Before the research, it forms a central part of the research proposal, setting out the plan for the work. After the research, it’s presented in a research article or dissertation to explain the focus on a specific research question and link it to the study’s aims and outcomes​.

Elements to Include: 

A good rationale should include a summary of conclusions from your literature review, identify what is currently unknown, discuss inconclusive or contested results from previous studies, and emphasize the necessity to improve or build on previous research​.

Creating a rationale is a vital part of the research process, as it not only sets the stage for your study but also convinces readers of the value and necessity of your work.

How to Write a Rationale:

Writing a rationale for your research is crucial in conducting and presenting your study. It involves explaining why your research is necessary and important. Here’s a guide to help you craft a compelling rationale:

Identify the Problem or Knowledge Gap: 

Begin by clearly stating the issue or gap in knowledge that your research aims to address. Explain why this problem is important and merits investigation. It is the foundation of your rationale and sets the stage for the need for your research.​

Review the Literature: 

Conduct a thorough review of existing literature on your topic. It helps you understand what research has already been done and what gaps or open questions exist. Your rationale should build on this background by highlighting these gaps and emphasizing the importance of addressing them​​​​.

Define Your Research Questions/Hypotheses: 

Based on your understanding of the problem and literature review, clearly state the research questions or hypotheses that your study aims to explore. These should logically stem from the identified gaps or issues.

Explain Your Research Approach: 

Describe the methods you will use for your research, including data collection and analysis techniques. Justify why these methods are appropriate for addressing your research questions or hypotheses​​.

Discuss the Potential Impact of Your Research:  Explain the significance of your study. Consider both theoretical contributions and practical implications. For instance, how does your research advance existing knowledge? Does it have real-world applications? Is it relevant to a specific field or community?​

Consider Ethical Considerations: 

If your research involves human or animal subjects, discuss the ethical aspects and how you plan to conduct your study responsibly​.

Contextualise Your Study: 

Justify the relevance of your research by explaining how it fits into the broader context. Connect your study to current trends, societal needs, or academic discussions​​.

Support with Evidence: 

Provide evidence or examples that underscore the need for your research. It could include citing relevant studies, statistics, or scenarios that illustrate the problem or gap your research addresses​.

Methodological, Contextual, and Conceptual Limitations: 

Address any limitations of previous research and how your study aims to overcome them. It can include methodological flaws in previous studies, changes in external factors that make past research less relevant, or the need to study a phenomenon within a new conceptual framework​.

Placement in Your Paper: 

Typically, the rationale is written toward the end of the introduction section of your paper, providing a logical lead-in to your research questions and methodology​​.

By following these steps and considering your audience’s perspective, you can write a strong and compelling rationale that clearly communicates the significance and necessity of your research project.

Frequently Asked Questions:

What makes a good research rationale.

A good rationale clearly identifies a gap in existing knowledge, builds on previous research, and outlines why your study is necessary and significant.

How detailed should my literature review be in the rationale?

Your literature review should be comprehensive enough to highlight the gaps your research aims to fill, but it should not overshadow the rationale itself.

Conclusion: 

A well-crafted rationale is your ticket to making your research stand out. It’s about bridging gaps, challenging norms, and paving the way for new discoveries. So go ahead, make your rationale the cornerstone of your research narrative!

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Think of yourself as a member of a jury, listening to a lawyer who is presenting an opening argument. You'll want to know very soon whether the lawyer believes the accused to be guilty or not guilty, and how the lawyer plans to convince you. Readers of academic essays are like jury members: before they have read too far, they want to know what the essay argues as well as how the writer plans to make the argument. After reading your thesis statement, the reader should think, "This essay is going to try to convince me of something. I'm not convinced yet, but I'm interested to see how I might be."

An effective thesis cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." A thesis is not a topic; nor is it a fact; nor is it an opinion. "Reasons for the fall of communism" is a topic. "Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe" is a fact known by educated people. "The fall of communism is the best thing that ever happened in Europe" is an opinion. (Superlatives like "the best" almost always lead to trouble. It's impossible to weigh every "thing" that ever happened in Europe. And what about the fall of Hitler? Couldn't that be "the best thing"?)

A good thesis has two parts. It should tell what you plan to argue, and it should "telegraph" how you plan to argue—that is, what particular support for your claim is going where in your essay.

Steps in Constructing a Thesis

First, analyze your primary sources.  Look for tension, interest, ambiguity, controversy, and/or complication. Does the author contradict himself or herself? Is a point made and later reversed? What are the deeper implications of the author's argument? Figuring out the why to one or more of these questions, or to related questions, will put you on the path to developing a working thesis. (Without the why, you probably have only come up with an observation—that there are, for instance, many different metaphors in such-and-such a poem—which is not a thesis.)

Once you have a working thesis, write it down.  There is nothing as frustrating as hitting on a great idea for a thesis, then forgetting it when you lose concentration. And by writing down your thesis you will be forced to think of it clearly, logically, and concisely. You probably will not be able to write out a final-draft version of your thesis the first time you try, but you'll get yourself on the right track by writing down what you have.

Keep your thesis prominent in your introduction.  A good, standard place for your thesis statement is at the end of an introductory paragraph, especially in shorter (5-15 page) essays. Readers are used to finding theses there, so they automatically pay more attention when they read the last sentence of your introduction. Although this is not required in all academic essays, it is a good rule of thumb.

Anticipate the counterarguments.  Once you have a working thesis, you should think about what might be said against it. This will help you to refine your thesis, and it will also make you think of the arguments that you'll need to refute later on in your essay. (Every argument has a counterargument. If yours doesn't, then it's not an argument—it may be a fact, or an opinion, but it is not an argument.)

This statement is on its way to being a thesis. However, it is too easy to imagine possible counterarguments. For example, a political observer might believe that Dukakis lost because he suffered from a "soft-on-crime" image. If you complicate your thesis by anticipating the counterargument, you'll strengthen your argument, as shown in the sentence below.

Some Caveats and Some Examples

A thesis is never a question.  Readers of academic essays expect to have questions discussed, explored, or even answered. A question ("Why did communism collapse in Eastern Europe?") is not an argument, and without an argument, a thesis is dead in the water.

A thesis is never a list.  "For political, economic, social and cultural reasons, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe" does a good job of "telegraphing" the reader what to expect in the essay—a section about political reasons, a section about economic reasons, a section about social reasons, and a section about cultural reasons. However, political, economic, social and cultural reasons are pretty much the only possible reasons why communism could collapse. This sentence lacks tension and doesn't advance an argument. Everyone knows that politics, economics, and culture are important.

A thesis should never be vague, combative or confrontational.  An ineffective thesis would be, "Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe because communism is evil." This is hard to argue (evil from whose perspective? what does evil mean?) and it is likely to mark you as moralistic and judgmental rather than rational and thorough. It also may spark a defensive reaction from readers sympathetic to communism. If readers strongly disagree with you right off the bat, they may stop reading.

An effective thesis has a definable, arguable claim.  "While cultural forces contributed to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of economies played the key role in driving its decline" is an effective thesis sentence that "telegraphs," so that the reader expects the essay to have a section about cultural forces and another about the disintegration of economies. This thesis makes a definite, arguable claim: that the disintegration of economies played a more important role than cultural forces in defeating communism in Eastern Europe. The reader would react to this statement by thinking, "Perhaps what the author says is true, but I am not convinced. I want to read further to see how the author argues this claim."

A thesis should be as clear and specific as possible.  Avoid overused, general terms and abstractions. For example, "Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe because of the ruling elite's inability to address the economic concerns of the people" is more powerful than "Communism collapsed due to societal discontent."

Copyright 1999, Maxine Rodburg and The Tutors of the Writing Center at Harvard University

Rationale for the Study

It is important for you to be able to explain the importance of the research you are conducting by providing valid arguments. Rationale for the study, also referred to as justification for the study, is reason why you have conducted your study in the first place. This part in your paper needs to explain uniqueness and importance of your research. Rationale for the study needs to be specific and ideally, it should relate to the following points:

1. The research needs to contribute to the elimination of a gap in the literature. Elimination of gap in the present literature is one of the compulsory requirements for your study. In other words, you don’t need to ‘re-invent the wheel’ and your research aims and objectives need to focus on new topics. For example, you can choose to conduct an empirical study to assess the implications of COVID-19 pandemic on the numbers of tourists visitors in your city. This might be previously undressed topic, taking into account that COVID-19 pandemic is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Alternatively, if you cannot find a new topic to research, you can attempt to offer fresh perspectives on existing management, business or economic issues. For example, while thousands of studies have been previously conducted to study various aspects of leadership, this topic as far from being exhausted as a research area. Specifically, new studies can be conducted in the area of leadership to analyze the impacts of new communication mediums such as TikTok, and other social networking sites on leadership practices.

You can also discuss the shortcomings of previous works devoted to your research area. Shortcomings in previous studies can be divided into three groups:

a) Methodological limitations . Methodology employed in previous study may be flawed in terms of research design, research approach or sampling.

b) Contextual limitations . Relevance of previous works may be non-existent for the present because external factors have changed.

c) Conceptual limitations . Previous studies may be unjustifiably bound up to a particular model or an ideology.

While discussing the shortcomings of previous studies you should explain how you are going to correct them. This principle is true to almost all areas in business studies i.e. gaps or shortcomings in the literature can be found in relation to almost all areas of business and economics.

2. The research can be conducted to solve a specific problem. It helps if you can explain why you are the right person and in the right position to solve the problem. You have to explain the essence of the problem in a detailed manner and highlight practical benefits associated with the solution of the problem. Suppose, your dissertation topic is “a study into advantages and disadvantages of various entry strategies into Chinese market”. In this case, you can say that practical implications of your research relates to assisting businesses aiming to enter Chinese market to do more informed decision making.

Alternatively, if your research is devoted to the analysis of impacts of CSR programs and initiatives on brand image, practical contributions of your study would relate to contributing to the level of effectiveness of CSR programs of businesses.

Additional examples of studies that can assist to address specific practical problems may include the following:

• A study into the reasons of high employee turnover at Hanson Brick
• A critical analysis of employee motivation problems at Esporta, Finchley Road, London
• A research into effective succession planning at Microsoft
• A study into major differences between private and public primary education in the USA and implications of these differences on the quality of education

However, it is important to note that it is not an obligatory for a dissertation   to be associated with the solution of a specific problem. Dissertations can be purely theory-based as well. Examples of such studies include the following:

• Born or bred: revising The Great Man theory of leadership in the 21 st century
• A critical analysis of the relevance of McClelland’s Achievement theory to the US information technology industry
• Neoliberalism as a major reason behind the emergence of the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009
• Analysis of Lewin’s Model of Change and its relevance to pharmaceutical sector of France

3. Your study has to contribute to the level of professional development of the researcher . That is you. You have to explain in a detailed manner in what ways your research contributes to the achievement of your long-term career aspirations.

For example, you have selected a research topic of “ A critical analysis of the relevance of McClelland’s Achievement theory in the US information technology industry ”.  You may state that you associate your career aspirations with becoming an IT executive in the US, and accordingly, in-depth knowledge of employee motivation in this industry is going to contribute your chances of success in your chosen career path.

Therefore, you are in a better position if you have already identified your career objectives, so that during the research process you can get detailed knowledge about various aspects of your chosen industry.

My e-book, The Ultimate Guide to Writing a Dissertation in Business Studies: a step by step assistance offers practical assistance to complete a dissertation with minimum or no stress. The e-book covers all stages of writing a dissertation starting from the selection to the research area to submitting the completed version of the work within the deadline.

John Dudovskiy

Independent Study – Skills Guide

• Formulating the Research Question

Introduction and Rationale of the Study

• Literature Review
• Research Methodology
• Research Design
• Ethical Considerations
• Data Findings
• Data Analysis
• Conclusions

Introduction and rationale of the study

This should briefly outline your area of interest and what has led you to research your chosen area. The rationale section of the dissertation describes why a particular concept, concern or problem is important within the field you are researching. 

A well-constructed rationale demonstrates that you understand your chosen field of research, the competing perspectives that exist, and what you hope to gain by carrying out the research. 

At undergraduate level you will be illuminating your understanding and should be aware that whilst the research you undertake can make a positive contribution to the field (on a small scale) you will not be making a new contribution to knowledge which will improve an entire profession. 

A message from a former student:

"Your Independent Study research is a tremendous opportunity to pursue and discover new knowledge in the field of education. For me, producing a research project was so intellectually liberating, I was encouraged to be critical, critical , critical - and once you become an employee in any educational institution it all changes - you will never get that level of academic freedom again!"

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How to Write a Study Rationale

Last Updated: May 19, 2023 Fact Checked

This article was co-authored by Jake Adams and by wikiHow staff writer, Jennifer Mueller, JD . Jake Adams is an academic tutor and the owner of Simplifi EDU, a Santa Monica, California based online tutoring business offering learning resources and online tutors for academic subjects K-College, SAT & ACT prep, and college admissions applications. With over 14 years of professional tutoring experience, Jake is dedicated to providing his clients the very best online tutoring experience and access to a network of excellent undergraduate and graduate-level tutors from top colleges all over the nation. Jake holds a BS in International Business and Marketing from Pepperdine University. This article has been fact-checked, ensuring the accuracy of any cited facts and confirming the authority of its sources. This article has been viewed 54,310 times.

A study rationale explains the reason for a study and the importance of its findings for a particular field. Commonly, you'll need to write a study rationale as part of a university course of study, although you may also need to write one as a professional researcher to apply for funding or other support. As a student, your study rationale also justifies how it fulfills the requirements for your degree program or course of study. Do research before you write your study rationale so that you can discuss the previous work your study builds on and explain its significance to your field. Thorough research is also important in the professional context because your rationale will likely become part of the contract if funding or support is approved. [1] X Research source

Describing What You Hope to Accomplish

• For example, suppose you want to study how working the night shift affects the academic performance of college students who are taking classes during the day. A narrow question would measure a specific impact based on a specific amount of hours worked.

• Justify the methodology you're using. If there's another methodology that might accomplish the same result, describe it and explain why your methodology is superior — perhaps because it's more efficient, takes less time, or uses fewer resources. For example, you might get more information out of personal interviews, but creating an online questionnaire is more cost-effective.
• Particularly if you're seeking funding or support, this section of your rationale will also include details about the cost of your study and the facilities or resources you'll need. [3] X Research source

Tip: A methodology that is more complex, difficult, or expensive requires more justification than one that is straightforward and simple.

• For example, if you're studying the effect of working the night shift on academic performance, you might hypothesize that working 4 or more nights a week lowers students' grade point averages by more than 1 point.

• Use action words, such as "quantify" or "establish," when writing your goals. For example, you might write that one goal of your study is to "quantify the degree to which working at night inhibits the academic performance of college students."
• If you are a professional researcher, your objectives may need to be more specific and concrete. The organization you submit your rationale to will have details about the requirements to apply for funding and other support. [5] X Research source

Explaining Your Study's Significance

• Going into extensive detail usually isn't necessary. Instead, highlight the findings of the most significant work in the field that addressed a similar question.
• Provide references so that your readers can examine the previous studies for themselves and compare them to your proposed study.

• Methodological limitations: Previous studies failed to measure the variables appropriately or used a research design that had problems or biases
• Contextual limitations: Previous studies aren't relevant because circumstances have changed regarding the variables measured
• Conceptual limitations: Previous studies are too tied up in a specific ideology or framework

• For example, if a previous study had been conducted to support a university's policy that full-time students were not permitted to work, you might argue that it was too tied up in that specific ideology and that this biased the results. You could then point out that your study is not intended to advance any particular policy.

Tip: If you have to defend or present your rationale to an advisor or team, try to anticipate the questions they might ask you and include the answers to as many of those questions as possible.

Including Academic Proposal Information

• As a student, you might emphasize your major and specific classes you've taken that give you particular knowledge about the subject of your study. If you've served as a research assistant on a study with a similar methodology or covering a similar research question, you might mention that as well.
• If you're a professional researcher, focus on the experience you have in a particular field as well as the studies you've done in the past. If you have done studies with a similar methodology that were important in your field, you might mention those as well.

Tip: If you don't have any particular credentials or experience that are relevant to your study, tell the readers of your rationale what drew you to this particular topic and how you became interested in it.

• For example, if you are planning to conduct the study as fulfillment of the research requirement for your degree program, you might discuss any specific guidelines for that research requirement and list how your study meets those criteria.

• In most programs, there will be specific wording for you to include in your rationale if you're submitting it for a certain number of credits. Your instructor or advisor can help make sure you've worded this appropriately.

Study Rationale Outline and Example

Expert Q&A

• This article presents an overview of how to write a study rationale. Check with your instructor or advisor for any specific requirements that apply to your particular project. Thanks Helpful 0 Not Helpful 0

You Might Also Like

• ↑ https://research.com/research/how-to-write-research-methodology
• ↑ https://ris.leeds.ac.uk/applying-for-funding/developing-your-proposal/resources-and-tips/key-questions-for-researchers/
• ↑ https://www.cwauthors.com/article/how-to-write-the-rationale-for-your-research
• ↑ http://www.writingcentre.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/167/Rationale.pdf
• ↑ https://www.niaid.nih.gov/grants-contracts/write-research-plan
• ↑ https://www.esc.edu/degree-planning-academic-review/degree-program/student-degree-planning-guide/rationale-essay-writing/writing-tips/

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• How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

Published on January 11, 2019 by Shona McCombes . Revised on August 15, 2023 by Eoghan Ryan.

A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . It usually comes near the end of your introduction .

Your thesis will look a bit different depending on the type of essay you’re writing. But the thesis statement should always clearly state the main idea you want to get across. Everything else in your essay should relate back to this idea.

You can write your thesis statement by following four simple steps:

• Start with a question
• Write your initial answer
• Develop your answer
• Refine your thesis statement

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Table of contents

What is a thesis statement, placement of the thesis statement, step 1: start with a question, step 2: write your initial answer, step 3: develop your answer, step 4: refine your thesis statement, types of thesis statements, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about thesis statements.

A thesis statement summarizes the central points of your essay. It is a signpost telling the reader what the essay will argue and why.

The best thesis statements are:

• Concise: A good thesis statement is short and sweet—don’t use more words than necessary. State your point clearly and directly in one or two sentences.
• Contentious: Your thesis shouldn’t be a simple statement of fact that everyone already knows. A good thesis statement is a claim that requires further evidence or analysis to back it up.
• Coherent: Everything mentioned in your thesis statement must be supported and explained in the rest of your paper.

Prevent plagiarism. Run a free check.

The thesis statement generally appears at the end of your essay introduction or research paper introduction .

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts and among young people more generally is hotly debated. For many who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education: the internet facilitates easier access to information, exposure to different perspectives, and a flexible learning environment for both students and teachers.

You should come up with an initial thesis, sometimes called a working thesis , early in the writing process . As soon as you’ve decided on your essay topic , you need to work out what you want to say about it—a clear thesis will give your essay direction and structure.

You might already have a question in your assignment, but if not, try to come up with your own. What would you like to find out or decide about your topic?

For example, you might ask:

After some initial research, you can formulate a tentative answer to this question. At this stage it can be simple, and it should guide the research process and writing process .

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Now you need to consider why this is your answer and how you will convince your reader to agree with you. As you read more about your topic and begin writing, your answer should get more detailed.

In your essay about the internet and education, the thesis states your position and sketches out the key arguments you’ll use to support it.

The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education because it facilitates easier access to information.

In your essay about braille, the thesis statement summarizes the key historical development that you’ll explain.

The invention of braille in the 19th century transformed the lives of blind people, allowing them to participate more actively in public life.

A strong thesis statement should tell the reader:

• Why you hold this position
• What they’ll learn from your essay
• The key points of your argument or narrative

The final thesis statement doesn’t just state your position, but summarizes your overall argument or the entire topic you’re going to explain. To strengthen a weak thesis statement, it can help to consider the broader context of your topic.

These examples are more specific and show that you’ll explore your topic in depth.

Your thesis statement should match the goals of your essay, which vary depending on the type of essay you’re writing:

• In an argumentative essay , your thesis statement should take a strong position. Your aim in the essay is to convince your reader of this thesis based on evidence and logical reasoning.
• In an expository essay , you’ll aim to explain the facts of a topic or process. Your thesis statement doesn’t have to include a strong opinion in this case, but it should clearly state the central point you want to make, and mention the key elements you’ll explain.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

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A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . Everything else you write should relate to this key idea.

The thesis statement is essential in any academic essay or research paper for two main reasons:

• It gives your writing direction and focus.
• It gives the reader a concise summary of your main point.

Without a clear thesis statement, an essay can end up rambling and unfocused, leaving your reader unsure of exactly what you want to say.

Follow these four steps to come up with a thesis statement :

• Ask a question about your topic .
• Write your initial answer.
• Develop your answer by including reasons.
• Refine your answer, adding more detail and nuance.

The thesis statement should be placed at the end of your essay introduction .

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What is a thesis | A Complete Guide with Examples

Table of Contents

A thesis is a comprehensive academic paper based on your original research that presents new findings, arguments, and ideas of your study. It’s typically submitted at the end of your master’s degree or as a capstone of your bachelor’s degree.

However, writing a thesis can be laborious, especially for beginners. From the initial challenge of pinpointing a compelling research topic to organizing and presenting findings, the process is filled with potential pitfalls.

Therefore, to help you, this guide talks about what is a thesis. Additionally, it offers revelations and methodologies to transform it from an overwhelming task to a manageable and rewarding academic milestone.

What is a thesis?

A thesis is an in-depth research study that identifies a particular topic of inquiry and presents a clear argument or perspective about that topic using evidence and logic.

Writing a thesis showcases your ability of critical thinking, gathering evidence, and making a compelling argument. Integral to these competencies is thorough research, which not only fortifies your propositions but also confers credibility to your entire study.

Furthermore, there's another phenomenon you might often confuse with the thesis: the ' working thesis .' However, they aren't similar and shouldn't be used interchangeably.

A working thesis, often referred to as a preliminary or tentative thesis, is an initial version of your thesis statement. It serves as a draft or a starting point that guides your research in its early stages.

As you research more and gather more evidence, your initial thesis (aka working thesis) might change. It's like a starting point that can be adjusted as you learn more. It's normal for your main topic to change a few times before you finalize it.

While a thesis identifies and provides an overarching argument, the key to clearly communicating the central point of that argument lies in writing a strong thesis statement.

What is a thesis statement?

A strong thesis statement (aka thesis sentence) is a concise summary of the main argument or claim of the paper. It serves as a critical anchor in any academic work, succinctly encapsulating the primary argument or main idea of the entire paper.

Typically found within the introductory section, a strong thesis statement acts as a roadmap of your thesis, directing readers through your arguments and findings. By delineating the core focus of your investigation, it offers readers an immediate understanding of the context and the gravity of your study.

Furthermore, an effectively crafted thesis statement can set forth the boundaries of your research, helping readers anticipate the specific areas of inquiry you are addressing.

Different types of thesis statements

A good thesis statement is clear, specific, and arguable. Therefore, it is necessary for you to choose the right type of thesis statement for your academic papers.

Thesis statements can be classified based on their purpose and structure. Here are the primary types of thesis statements:

Argumentative (or Persuasive) thesis statement

Purpose : To convince the reader of a particular stance or point of view by presenting evidence and formulating a compelling argument.

Example : Reducing plastic use in daily life is essential for environmental health.

Analytical thesis statement

Purpose : To break down an idea or issue into its components and evaluate it.

Example : By examining the long-term effects, social implications, and economic impact of climate change, it becomes evident that immediate global action is necessary.

Expository (or Descriptive) thesis statement

Purpose : To explain a topic or subject to the reader.

Example : The Great Depression, spanning the 1930s, was a severe worldwide economic downturn triggered by a stock market crash, bank failures, and reduced consumer spending.

Cause and effect thesis statement

Purpose : To demonstrate a cause and its resulting effect.

Example : Overuse of smartphones can lead to impaired sleep patterns, reduced face-to-face social interactions, and increased levels of anxiety.

Compare and contrast thesis statement

Purpose : To highlight similarities and differences between two subjects.

Example : "While both novels '1984' and 'Brave New World' delve into dystopian futures, they differ in their portrayal of individual freedom, societal control, and the role of technology."

When you write a thesis statement , it's important to ensure clarity and precision, so the reader immediately understands the central focus of your work.

What is the difference between a thesis and a thesis statement?

While both terms are frequently used interchangeably, they have distinct meanings.

A thesis refers to the entire research document, encompassing all its chapters and sections. In contrast, a thesis statement is a brief assertion that encapsulates the central argument of the research.

Here’s an in-depth differentiation table of a thesis and a thesis statement.

Now, to craft a compelling thesis, it's crucial to adhere to a specific structure. Let’s break down these essential components that make up a thesis structure

15 components of a thesis structure

Navigating a thesis can be daunting. However, understanding its structure can make the process more manageable.

Here are the key components or different sections of a thesis structure:

Your thesis begins with the title page. It's not just a formality but the gateway to your research.

Here, you'll prominently display the necessary information about you (the author) and your institutional details.

• Title of your thesis
• Your full name
• Your department
• Your institution and degree program
• Your submission date
• Your Supervisor's name (in some cases)
• Your Department or faculty (in some cases)
• Your University's logo (in some cases)
• Your Student ID (in some cases)

In a concise manner, you'll have to summarize the critical aspects of your research in typically no more than 200-300 words.

This includes the problem statement, methodology, key findings, and conclusions. For many, the abstract will determine if they delve deeper into your work, so ensure it's clear and compelling.

Acknowledgments

Research is rarely a solitary endeavor. In the acknowledgments section, you have the chance to express gratitude to those who've supported your journey.

This might include advisors, peers, institutions, or even personal sources of inspiration and support. It's a personal touch, reflecting the humanity behind the academic rigor.

Table of contents

A roadmap for your readers, the table of contents lists the chapters, sections, and subsections of your thesis.

By providing page numbers, you allow readers to navigate your work easily, jumping to sections that pique their interest.

List of figures and tables

Research often involves data, and presenting this data visually can enhance understanding. This section provides an organized listing of all figures and tables in your thesis.

It's a visual index, ensuring that readers can quickly locate and reference your graphical data.

Introduction

Here's where you introduce your research topic, articulate the research question or objective, and outline the significance of your study.

• Present the research topic : Clearly articulate the central theme or subject of your research.
• Background information : Ground your research topic, providing any necessary context or background information your readers might need to understand the significance of your study.
• Define the scope : Clearly delineate the boundaries of your research, indicating what will and won't be covered.
• Literature review : Introduce any relevant existing research on your topic, situating your work within the broader academic conversation and highlighting where your research fits in.
• State the research Question(s) or objective(s) : Clearly articulate the primary questions or objectives your research aims to address.
• Outline the study's structure : Give a brief overview of how the subsequent sections of your work will unfold, guiding your readers through the journey ahead.

The introduction should captivate your readers, making them eager to delve deeper into your research journey.

Literature review section

Your study correlates with existing research. Therefore, in the literature review section, you'll engage in a dialogue with existing knowledge, highlighting relevant studies, theories, and findings.

It's here that you identify gaps in the current knowledge, positioning your research as a bridge to new insights.

To streamline this process, consider leveraging AI tools. For example, the SciSpace literature review tool enables you to efficiently explore and delve into research papers, simplifying your literature review journey.

Methodology

In the research methodology section, you’ll detail the tools, techniques, and processes you employed to gather and analyze data. This section will inform the readers about how you approached your research questions and ensures the reproducibility of your study.

Here's a breakdown of what it should encompass:

• Research Design : Describe the overall structure and approach of your research. Are you conducting a qualitative study with in-depth interviews? Or is it a quantitative study using statistical analysis? Perhaps it's a mixed-methods approach?
• Data Collection : Detail the methods you used to gather data. This could include surveys, experiments, observations, interviews, archival research, etc. Mention where you sourced your data, the duration of data collection, and any tools or instruments used.
• Sampling : If applicable, explain how you selected participants or data sources for your study. Discuss the size of your sample and the rationale behind choosing it.
• Data Analysis : Describe the techniques and tools you used to process and analyze the data. This could range from statistical tests in quantitative research to thematic analysis in qualitative research.
• Validity and Reliability : Address the steps you took to ensure the validity and reliability of your findings to ensure that your results are both accurate and consistent.
• Ethical Considerations : Highlight any ethical issues related to your research and the measures you took to address them, including — informed consent, confidentiality, and data storage and protection measures.

Moreover, different research questions necessitate different types of methodologies. For instance:

• Experimental methodology : Often used in sciences, this involves a controlled experiment to discern causality.
• Qualitative methodology : Employed when exploring patterns or phenomena without numerical data. Methods can include interviews, focus groups, or content analysis.
• Quantitative methodology : Concerned with measurable data and often involves statistical analysis. Surveys and structured observations are common tools here.
• Mixed methods : As the name implies, this combines both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

The Methodology section isn’t just about detailing the methods but also justifying why they were chosen. The appropriateness of the methods in addressing your research question can significantly impact the credibility of your findings.

Results (or Findings)

This section presents the outcomes of your research. It's crucial to note that the nature of your results may vary; they could be quantitative, qualitative, or a mix of both.

Quantitative results often present statistical data, showcasing measurable outcomes, and they benefit from tables, graphs, and figures to depict these data points.

Qualitative results , on the other hand, might delve into patterns, themes, or narratives derived from non-numerical data, such as interviews or observations.

Regardless of the nature of your results, clarity is essential. This section is purely about presenting the data without offering interpretations — that comes later in the discussion.

In the discussion section, the raw data transforms into valuable insights.

Start by revisiting your research question and contrast it with the findings. How do your results expand, constrict, or challenge current academic conversations?

Dive into the intricacies of the data, guiding the reader through its implications. Detail potential limitations transparently, signaling your awareness of the research's boundaries. This is where your academic voice should be resonant and confident.

Practical implications (Recommendation) section

Based on the insights derived from your research, this section provides actionable suggestions or proposed solutions.

Whether aimed at industry professionals or the general public, recommendations translate your academic findings into potential real-world actions. They help readers understand the practical implications of your work and how it can be applied to effect change or improvement in a given field.

When crafting recommendations, it's essential to ensure they're feasible and rooted in the evidence provided by your research. They shouldn't merely be aspirational but should offer a clear path forward, grounded in your findings.

The conclusion provides closure to your research narrative.

It's not merely a recap but a synthesis of your main findings and their broader implications. Reconnect with the research questions or hypotheses posited at the beginning, offering clear answers based on your findings.

Reflect on the broader contributions of your study, considering its impact on the academic community and potential real-world applications.

Lastly, the conclusion should leave your readers with a clear understanding of the value and impact of your study.

References (or Bibliography)

Every theory you've expounded upon, every data point you've cited, and every methodological precedent you've followed finds its acknowledgment here.

In references, it's crucial to ensure meticulous consistency in formatting, mirroring the specific guidelines of the chosen citation style .

Proper referencing helps to avoid plagiarism , gives credit to original ideas, and allows readers to explore topics of interest. Moreover, it situates your work within the continuum of academic knowledge.

To properly cite the sources used in the study, you can rely on online citation generator tools  to generate accurate citations!

Here’s more on how you can cite your sources.

Often, the depth of research produces a wealth of material that, while crucial, can make the core content of the thesis cumbersome. The appendix is where you mention extra information that supports your research but isn't central to the main text.

Whether it's raw datasets, detailed procedural methodologies, extended case studies, or any other ancillary material, the appendices ensure that these elements are archived for reference without breaking the main narrative's flow.

For thorough researchers and readers keen on meticulous details, the appendices provide a treasure trove of insights.

Glossary (optional)

In academics, specialized terminologies, and jargon are inevitable. However, not every reader is versed in every term.

The glossary, while optional, is a critical tool for accessibility. It's a bridge ensuring that even readers from outside the discipline can access, understand, and appreciate your work.

By defining complex terms and providing context, you're inviting a wider audience to engage with your research, enhancing its reach and impact.

Remember, while these components provide a structured framework, the essence of your thesis lies in the originality of your ideas, the rigor of your research, and the clarity of your presentation.

As you craft each section, keep your readers in mind, ensuring that your passion and dedication shine through every page.

Thesis examples

To further elucidate the concept of a thesis, here are illustrative examples from various fields:

Example 1 (History): Abolition, Africans, and Abstraction: the Influence of the ‘Noble Savage’ on British and French Antislavery Thought, 1787-1807 by Suchait Kahlon.

Example 2 (Climate Dynamics): Influence of external forcings on abrupt millennial-scale climate changes: a statistical modelling study by Takahito Mitsui · Michel Crucifix

Checklist for your thesis evaluation

Evaluating your thesis ensures that your research meets the standards of academia. Here's an elaborate checklist to guide you through this critical process.

Content and structure

• Is the thesis statement clear, concise, and debatable?
• Does the introduction provide sufficient background and context?
• Is the literature review comprehensive, relevant, and well-organized?
• Does the methodology section clearly describe and justify the research methods?
• Are the results/findings presented clearly and logically?
• Does the discussion interpret the results in light of the research question and existing literature?
• Is the conclusion summarizing the research and suggesting future directions or implications?

Clarity and coherence

• Is the writing clear and free of jargon?
• Are ideas and sections logically connected and flowing?
• Is there a clear narrative or argument throughout the thesis?

Research quality

• Is the research question significant and relevant?
• Are the research methods appropriate for the question?
• Is the sample size (if applicable) adequate?
• Are the data analysis techniques appropriate and correctly applied?
• Are potential biases or limitations addressed?

Originality and significance

• Does the thesis contribute new knowledge or insights to the field?
• Is the research grounded in existing literature while offering fresh perspectives?

Formatting and presentation

• Is the thesis formatted according to institutional guidelines?
• Are figures, tables, and charts clear, labeled, and referenced in the text?
• Is the bibliography or reference list complete and consistently formatted?
• Are appendices relevant and appropriately referenced in the main text?

Grammar and language

• Is the thesis free of grammatical and spelling errors?
• Is the language professional, consistent, and appropriate for an academic audience?
• Are quotations and paraphrased material correctly cited?

Feedback and revision

• Have you sought feedback from peers, advisors, or experts in the field?
• Have you addressed the feedback and made the necessary revisions?

Overall assessment

• Does the thesis as a whole feel cohesive and comprehensive?
• Would the thesis be understandable and valuable to someone in your field?

Ensure to use this checklist to leave no ground for doubt or missed information in your thesis.

After writing your thesis, the next step is to discuss and defend your findings verbally in front of a knowledgeable panel. You’ve to be well prepared as your professors may grade your presentation abilities.

Preparing your thesis defense

A thesis defense, also known as "defending the thesis," is the culmination of a scholar's research journey. It's the final frontier, where you’ll present their findings and face scrutiny from a panel of experts.

Typically, the defense involves a public presentation where you’ll have to outline your study, followed by a question-and-answer session with a committee of experts. This committee assesses the validity, originality, and significance of the research.

The defense serves as a rite of passage for scholars. It's an opportunity to showcase expertise, address criticisms, and refine arguments. A successful defense not only validates the research but also establishes your authority as a researcher in your field.

Here’s how you can effectively prepare for your thesis defense .

Now, having touched upon the process of defending a thesis, it's worth noting that scholarly work can take various forms, depending on academic and regional practices.

One such form, often paralleled with the thesis, is the 'dissertation.' But what differentiates the two?

Dissertation vs. Thesis

Often used interchangeably in casual discourse, they refer to distinct research projects undertaken at different levels of higher education.

To the uninitiated, understanding their meaning might be elusive. So, let's demystify these terms and delve into their core differences.

Here's a table differentiating between the two.

Wrapping up

From understanding the foundational concept of a thesis to navigating its various components, differentiating it from a dissertation, and recognizing the importance of proper citation — this guide covers it all.

As scholars and readers, understanding these nuances not only aids in academic pursuits but also fosters a deeper appreciation for the relentless quest for knowledge that drives academia.

It’s important to remember that every thesis is a testament to curiosity, dedication, and the indomitable spirit of discovery.

Good luck with your thesis writing!

Frequently Asked Questions

A thesis typically ranges between 40-80 pages, but its length can vary based on the research topic, institution guidelines, and level of study.

A PhD thesis usually spans 200-300 pages, though this can vary based on the discipline, complexity of the research, and institutional requirements.

To identify a thesis topic, consider current trends in your field, gaps in existing literature, personal interests, and discussions with advisors or mentors. Additionally, reviewing related journals and conference proceedings can provide insights into potential areas of exploration.

The conceptual framework is often situated in the literature review or theoretical framework section of a thesis. It helps set the stage by providing the context, defining key concepts, and explaining the relationships between variables.

A thesis statement should be concise, clear, and specific. It should state the main argument or point of your research. Start by pinpointing the central question or issue your research addresses, then condense that into a single statement, ensuring it reflects the essence of your paper.

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Writing a rationale

How to write a rationale.

What is a rationale?

A rationale is when you are asked to give the reasoning or justification for an action or a choice you make.

There is a focus on the ‘ why ’ in a rationale: why you chose to do something, study or focus on something. It is a set of statements of purpose and significance and often addresses a gap or a need.

A rationale in Australian academic writing is rarely a whole task by itself.  It is often a part of a bigger task. For example, a part of a lesson plan might be to provide a rationale for why you chose to teach particular content or use a certain resource or activity, or you may be asked to provide a rationale as to why you chose a particular theory to apply or a concept to support.

You may be called upon to provide a rationale:

prior to an action or decision; why you plan to do something and how, or

• after you have acted or decided something; reflecting, looking back, why you did something and how it worked or not.

You can use language to signal you are clearly providing a rationale in your writing. You can link your rationale to learning outcomes or aims for a lesson, activity or assessment task.

A model: problem-solution-rationale

A rationale can be provided by offering longer essay-based support for why it is important to do something in a certain way – in that sense, a whole paper can be a rationale.

However, a more specific or focused way of thinking about a rationale is how we can overtly show we are justifying our choices with the language we use.

One way of doing this is to consider the problem or issue requiring attention, the solution and then the rationale or justification for the solution (the ‘why’). This sets the rationale (the reason) within a context.

A diagnostic assessment determined that the students required more attention to addition and subtraction of mixed fractions. This activity intends to address this problem by having the children engage with the task with blocks before it is done with figures. The reason I chose to do this is because students have higher comprehension levels when presented with visual or tangible representations of abstract problems (Benson, 2016). I also did this as I wanted to allow the children to ‘play’ with maths, to see that it can be a fun activity and in doing so, to breakdown some of the ‘anti-mathematics prejudices’ that Gaines (2017, p. 4) talks about.

The important thing here is the language used to signal the rationale , in this case:

The reason I chose to do this is because … and I also did this as …

Another problem / solution / rationale example:

Scaffolding is the support provided by the teacher or a significant other, such as a classmate, which helps students in learning (Gibbons, 2015). Some students were having difficulty with the language at entry while others, particularly those who had completed the pre-tasks, had few problems. Therefore, in order to address this disparity in level and understanding, mixed-ability pairs were created where the more competent student helped the other. On reflection, this was an effective way to run the activity for two reasons : it allowed peer-to-peer teaching which solidified both students’ understanding; and it scaffolded the support in a way that allowed me to roam the room lending advice to pairs as needed.

The language used to signal our rationale in this example:

in order to and for two reasons …

Language to signal rationale

in order to

the reason this was done/chosen …

for the following reason(s) …

for two/three reasons …

Language for further justification - showing importance

This was important / significant because …

This meant that I could…

This enabled me to …

… which enabled / allowed me to…

… which pointed to / highlighted that / showed me that …

The key thing to remember about rationale writing is to stand back from the writing, look at it in a big picture sense and ask yourself, ‘ Have I explained why? ’ If that is clearly articulated, you have provided a rationale.

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How to Write the Rationale for a Research Proposal

Table of Contents

Writing a research proposal can be intimidating, especially when you are expected to explain the rationale behind your project. This article will help you learn how to write the rationale for a research proposal to provide justification for why it should be pursued. A good rationale should give readers an understanding of why your project is worth undertaking and how it will contribute to existing knowledge. It should outline any practical implications that could come from your work. By thoroughly preparing this section of your proposal , you will increase the chances of having your research approved.

What Is a Rationale in Research?

A research rationale provides a detailed explanation of why a study is necessary and should be carried out. It convinces the reader or examiner of the importance of the research by outlining its relevance, significance, and potential contribution to existing knowledge. Additionally, it helps transition from the research problem to the methods used in the study, connecting both elements into one comprehensive argument. The research rationale justifies why the researcher chose to conduct this particular study over any other possible alternative studies.

Why Is a Research Rationale Important?

A well-written rationale can help demonstrate your commitment to the project. It can convince reviewers that you have put thought into developing a high-quality research plan. When composing this section, focus on the scientific merit of your proposed study by providing clear and concise reasons for conducting the research. Your goal is to communicate the potential benefits of your project and show that you understand its limitations. Include sufficient detail about the methods you plan to use, any ethical considerations to consider, and how you will evaluate your results. Explaining why your research is important and necessary is essential for getting approval from funding bodies or academic institutions. Your rationale should provide a convincing argument for why the project needs to be conducted. The rationale must make it clear that there are potential benefits that justify its costs. Consider the broader impact of your work and describe how it could contribute to furthering knowledge in the field.

The rationale for research is also known as the justification of the study. Make a mention of the following points while writing the rationale for a research proposal:

Background on All Previous Research on the Subject of Your Study

It is important to include background information on what research has already been done on the study topic. This will help to build a foundation for understanding the current knowledge, open questions, and gaps.

The Open Questions of the Study

Highlighting the open questions related to the study topic helps to identify potential areas for further exploration. It gives readers an understanding of where new research could be helpful. It is essential to state these questions to have clear objectives and goals for the research proposal.

Identify the Gaps in Literature

Identifying literature gaps helps highlight areas that have not yet been studied. This provides the opportunity to add new information and understanding to the field. By including these points in the rationale, the writer can showcase how his work will contribute to existing research.

Highlight the Significance of Addressing These Gaps

Emphasizing why it is important to address those gaps is vital in any research proposal. It allows readers to understand why this particular project needs to be undertaken. By clearly outlining why addressing these gaps is crucial, the writer can successfully argue why his proposed project should be given consideration.

A rationale for a research proposal can help convince the reader of the importance and relevance of your study. This article explains the importance of a rationale and discusses the key elements to learn how to write the rationale for a research proposal . Following these tips will let you create a powerful research rationale that will help convince others of the value of your project.

Abir Ghenaiet

Abir is a data analyst and researcher. Among her interests are artificial intelligence, machine learning, and natural language processing. As a humanitarian and educator, she actively supports women in tech and promotes diversity.

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Structural Rationality

Many paradigm instances of irrationality involve one’s mental states failing to cohere with one another, in a fairly broad sense of ‘cohere’. [ 1 ] For example, it’s commonly thought to be irrational to hold (obviously) inconsistent beliefs – say, to believe that you are a great cook, to believe that great cooks never overcook eggs, and yet to believe that you have overcooked the eggs. These three beliefs are jointly incoherent. Similarly, many central instances of practical irrationality, such as instrumental irrationality, can be thought of as instances of incoherence: it is incoherent to simultaneously intend to shop for groceries today, believe that to shop for groceries today you must get on your bike now, but yet not intend to get on your bike now. In recent years, many philosophers have come to refer to these incoherence-involving instances of irrationality as forms of ‘structural irrationality’, and to call the property of having mental states that  do  cohere with one another properly ‘structural rationality’.

Structural rationality is often contrasted with ‘substantive rationality’, which is typically understood in terms of responsiveness to normative reasons. So, for example, when we say that it isn’t rational to (intend to) gamble one’s life savings on the outcome of a horse race, this seems to reflect the existence of strong normative reasons against gambling (or intending to gamble) one’s life savings on the outcome of the race, rather than pinpointing any incoherence that must be present in the mental states of anyone who gambles her life savings on the outcome of the race. Similarly, when we say it isn’t rational to believe in astrology, this seems to reflect a judgment that there are strong normative reasons – presumably supplied by the available evidence – against believing in astrology, rather than presuming that anyone who believes in astrology must be incoherent.

This entry is composed of three sections. In §1, we survey debates about what structural rationality is, including the emergence of the concept in the contemporary literature, its key characteristics, its relationship to substantive rationality, its paradigm instances, and the questions of whether these instances are unified and, if so, how. In §2, we turn to the debate about structural requirements of rationality – including controversies about whether they are “wide-scope” or “narrow-scope”, synchronic or diachronic, and whether they govern processes or states; as well as examining various forms of skepticism about structural requirements of rationality. In §3, we turn to the debate about the normative significance of structural rationality, surveying central challenges for the view that structural rationality is normatively significant and the theoretical options that arise in light of these challenges.

1.1 The Emergence of the Concept of Structural Rationality

1.2 key characteristics of structural rationality, 1.3 the relationship between structural and substantive rationality, 1.4 instances of structural (ir)rationality: an inventory, 1.5 the unity of structural rationality, 2.1 wide- vs. narrow-scope requirements, 2.2 synchronic vs. diachronic requirements, 2.3 process vs. state requirements, 2.4 skepticism about and alternatives to requirements of structural rationality, 3.1 bootstrapping and detachment, 3.2 the why-be-rational challenge, 3.3 transparency and apparent reasons accounts, 3.4 the theoretical options.

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1. what is structural rationality.

The term ‘structural (ir)rationality’ is relatively recent; to the best of our knowledge, its first use with its current meaning is in Scanlon (2007). [ 2 ] However, philosophers have been theorizing about the underlying concept, using different terminology, for significantly longer. Interesting questions can be asked about whether historical figures such as Hume and Kant had theories of structural rationality. However, the contemporary debate about structural rationality can be more directly traced to a number of important articles and books from the 1970s and 80s (Hill 1973; Greenspan 1975; Dancy 1977; Darwall 1983), which largely focus on practical rationality.

Darwall’s 1983 book Impartial Reason is particularly instructive to focus on. The first half of the book is devoted to arguing against what Darwall calls the “DBR thesis”, on which an agent’s normative reasons are all dependent on her desires or ends – a thesis that was highly popular at the time. One line of support for the DBR thesis to which Darwall responds can be reconstructed roughly as follows:

• It’s irrational not to intend to take the believed means to one’s ends.
• Therefore, not intending to take the believed means to one’s ends involves a failure to respond to one’s reasons.
• Therefore, one’s reasons are strongly dependent on one’s ends.

This line of argument, if successful, generates strongly subjectivist (and anti-moralist) results about reasons. For example, to adapt Darwall’s memorable example, suppose Jo intends to kill Jay in the most violent way possible, and believes that the most violent way to kill Jay is with a cleaver. But suppose Jo does not intend to kill Jay with a cleaver. Jo is, then, practically irrational. According to the line of thought above, the way to explain this is by holding that Jo’s intention to kill Jay in the most violent way possible – perhaps together with her belief that the most violent way to kill Jay is with a cleaver – gives her a strong reason to (intend to) kill Jay with a cleaver. Generalizing, the result is that Jo can give herself strong reasons to perform highly immoral (or, indeed, imprudent) acts merely by adopting ends to which those acts are (believed) necessary means.

Not so fast, says Darwall, however. He focuses on critiquing the transition from (a) to (b) – though one could certainly also question the transition from (b) to (c). According to Darwall, the irrationality of failing to (intend to) take the (believed) means to one’s ends need not equate to a failure to respond to one’s reasons . Rather, it can be understood as a failure to conform to a sui generis rational requirement of coherence, which itself has no consequences for claims about reasons. Darwall calls such requirements principles of “relative rationality”; this notion is roughly equivalent to the more contemporary notion of structural rationality. As well as treating the requirement of instrumental rationality this way, Darwall makes a similar move regarding decision-theoretic principles that require us to do what maximizes subjective utility given our credences and preferences.

The basic maneuver here recurs in the works of a number of other philosophers (McDowell 1995; Scanlon 1998, 2004; Broome 1999, 2001a, 2004; Dancy 2000). In each case, the aim is to avoid highly subjectivist or anti-moralist results about reasons, or instances of what is often called “bootstrapping” (Bratman 1987; Broome 2001a), whereby merely having an attitude that is itself immoral or unreasonable can give one reasons to adopt further immoral or unreasonable attitudes. And in each case, these results are avoided by treating the requirements of structural rationality as autonomous and distinct from requirements that concern responding to reasons. By making space for a distinctively structural or coherence-based notion of rationality, the thought goes, we can accommodate intuitions about the irrationality of incoherence without committing ourselves to potentially problematic subjectivist assumptions about normative reasons.

Analogous points can be made in doxastic cases. To adapt an example from Fogal (2020), suppose that Ali believes that he is Superman, and believes that Superman can fly. If we now add that Ali believes that he cannot fly, Ali seems to be subject to a (further) charge of irrationality that he was not otherwise subject to. Should we conclude from this that, merely by believing that he is Superman and that Superman can fly, Ali gives himself a strong reason to believe that he can fly – one that he flouts by believing, instead, that he cannot fly? Many epistemologists would deny this: on most views, you can’t make an evidentially unsupported belief reasonable just by adopting other, equally unsupported, beliefs that entail it. Indeed, as Broome (1999) points out, if this were so, then any belief could make itself reasonable, since all propositions entail themselves. Rather, the thought goes, we can account for Ali’s irrationality by saying that he violates a requirement of structural rationality forbidding inconsistent beliefs (or, perhaps, particular kinds of inconsistent beliefs).

Once reasons and requirements of structural rationality are distinguished in this way, a number of important questions arise. One pressing question is whether there are any reasons to comply with the requirements of structural rationality. We’ll return to this question in §3. Before that, there is more to be said about the notion of structural rationality and requirements thereof.

As we have already seen, evaluations of structural rationality concern the coherence of one’s mental states. However, we can get a sharper focus on the notion of structural rationality by identifying some further often identified features of evaluations of structural rationality or irrationality, which are supposed to distinguish them from evaluations of substantive rationality or irrationality.

First, structural rationality typically concerns combinations of attitudes (and absences thereof), rather than individual attitudes (and absences thereof). Consider someone who believes \(p\) and believes not-\(p\). Either or both beliefs may fail to be substantively rational if they are ill-supported by the agent’s epistemic reasons. But the structural irrationality lies in the combination, not in either individual belief. The same is true of, for example, intending to \(\Phi\), believing that in order to \(\Phi\) one must \(\Psi\), but not intending to \(\Psi\). Again, one or more of these states may fail to be individually substantively rational, but the structural irrationality lies in the combination. However, it is controversial whether structural rationality always concerns combinations of attitudes, rather than individual attitudes. Broome (2013: 153), for example, suggests that a belief in a conjunctive proposition of the form \((p\) & not-\(p)\) is, on its own, structurally irrational. Nor is it distinctive of structural rationality that it concerns combinations of attitudes. There may be failures of substantive rationality that obtain specifically in virtue of a combination of attitudes: for example, it might not be substantively rational to intend to go to a job interview tomorrow and intend to wear swim shorts tomorrow, even if either of these intentions is rationally permitted on its own.

Second, and relatedly, evaluations of the structural rationality of some combination of attitudes can be made independently of judgments about which (if any) of the individual attitudes within the combination of attitude is substantively rational, or adequately supported by reasons. For example, suppose that Ravi believes that all taxes are illegitimate, while also believing that income taxes are legitimate. A left-liberal might judge that Ravi has good reasons for the second belief but not the first, while an anarcho-capitalist might judge the reverse, and a political agnostic might have no views about which of Ravi’s beliefs, if either, is supported by good reasons. Yet this should be no barrier to all three agreeing that Ravi’s combination of beliefs is structurally irrational. Similarly, even when we disagree about whether some end is worth pursuing, we should be able to agree that intending that end while not intending the believed means to it is structurally irrational.

Third, evaluations of structural rationality can be made without knowing anything about the situation of the agent being evaluated, or about the agent’s information about their situation. In this respect, they again contrast with evaluations of substantive rationality. Whether it is substantively rational for you to intend to go to medical school depends on the information available to you about your likely chances of succeeding in medical school, the costs of going, whether being a doctor would be a career you’d enjoy, and so on. We cannot possibly evaluate the substantive rationality of your intention to go to medical school without knowing what information is available to you about these matters. But if you simultaneously intend to go to medical school, believe that to do so you must take the entrance exam, and yet do not intend to take the entrance exam, then we can tell that you are structurally irrational, without needing to know this sort of information.

Finally, evaluations of structural rationality may be called formal in the sense that we can tell whether combinations of attitudes are structurally irrational even when abstracting at least somewhat from their content. So, for example, it’s always structurally irrational to believe \(p\) and believe not-\(p\), for any proposition \(p\), regardless of its content. Similarly, the means-end requirement says (or entails) that it is irrational to intend to \(\Phi\), to believe that to \(\Phi\) one must \(\Psi\), and not intend to \(\Psi\), for any actions \(\Phi\) and \(\Psi\), regardless of what they are.

The distinction between structural and substantive rationality is not beyond dispute. Some hold that it does not bear scrutiny. Moreover, those who accept the distinction hold competing views on its significance as well as on the relation between substantive and structural rationality.

First, there are those who identify rationality simpliciter with structural rationality (Scanlon 1998; Broome 2013, 2020; Ridge 2014: ch. 8). Such philosophers deny that what others call ‘substantive rationality’ is genuinely a kind of rationality at all: they hold that the requirements of structural rationality exhaust the requirements of rationality simpliciter . It is debatable to what extent this dispute is merely terminological or substantive. These philosophers don’t deny that there is an important normative notion – viz. ‘ought’ or ‘most reason’ – that can be understood in terms of what one’s reasons, on balance, support. But they want to withhold the label ‘rationality’ from it.

One argument for withholding the label ‘rationality’ from (what we’ve called) substantive rationality proceeds from the purported conceptual constraint that rationality supervenes on the mind: there can be no change in whether an agent counts as rational without a change in her mental states (Wedgwood 2002; Broome 2013, 2020). It then holds that reasons do not supervene on the mind: one’s reasons can change without one’s mental states changing. Thus, it is concluded, rationality cannot require us to correctly respond to our reasons. The argument can be supported by intuitions about cases. In a famous case (Broome 2007a), Lois has a piece of fish in front of her, which unbeknownst to her, contains salmonella. The fact that the fish contains salmonella is a decisive reason for Lois not to eat it; yet, since Lois is unaware of this reason, she cannot be irrational for failing to respond to it. Arguably, it is precisely because rationality supervenes on the mind that Lois cannot be irrational for failing to respond to a reason that she is entirely unaware of.

Defenders of the notion of substantive rationality reply that the notion of ‘reasons’ at work in the conception of rationality as reasons-responsiveness is in some important way constrained by the agent’s epistemic position (Kiesewetter 2017; Lord 2018). Perhaps, for example, substantive rationality requires us to respond only to the reasons that our evidence makes available to us – often called “available” or “possessed” reasons. If this is so, then eating the fish may well be substantively rational for Lois. Moreover, while unpossessed reasons do not supervene on the mind, it is less clear that the same is true for possessed reasons. Thus, the rational requirement to correctly respond to these reasons may be compatible with the supervenience of rationality on the mind (Kiesewetter 2020).

It is also worth noting that the proposal that rationality simpliciter is just structural rationality is much less popular in epistemology than it is in ethics and the practical rationality literature (Worsnip 2016b). In epistemology, it is orthodoxy that agents who fail to respond to their evidential reasons for belief thereby fail to be rational, [ 3 ] and thus that there are rational requirements of reasons-responsiveness – i.e. requirements of substantive rationality. By contrast, purely coherentist theories of epistemic rationality – which effectively identify epistemic rationality with a kind of structural rationality – are now widely rejected.

A second view about the relationship between structural and substantive rationality contends that these two notions of rationality ultimately come to the same thing (Wedgwood 2017; Smithies, forthcoming). This position can be motivated in part by taking on board the aforementioned point that substantive rationality requires us only to respond to those reasons that our evidence makes available to us. Putting this together with the claim that our evidence consists in or at least supervenes on our mental states, it can be argued that the rational requirement to respond to our evidentially available reasons is itself a requirement to ensure a kind of coherence between our mental states, in a broad sense of ‘coherence’. Thus, it is argued, the distinction between substantive rationality (viz. reasons-responsiveness) and structural rationality (viz. coherence) breaks down.

Defenders of the structural-substantive distinction respond that the notion of (in)coherence that we should employ in order to understand structural rationality is narrower than the one needed to break the distinction down (Fogal and Worsnip 2021). Consider someone who has a belief that is insufficiently supported by her (available) evidence: say, she believes that the Orioles will win today’s baseball game, when her (available) evidence doesn’t, in fact, give her sufficient grounds for thinking this. Suppose, however, that she holds her belief not in knowing defiance of her evidence, but rather because she simply mistakenly overestimates the probative strength of her evidence. In this case, she has a belief that is insufficiently supported by her (available) evidential reasons, and thus fails to be substantively rational. Yet it is only in a very broad sense of ‘incoherent’ that she is incoherent. In a narrower sense of ‘incoherent’, she need not be incoherent: as long as she does not recognize what her (available) reasons support believing, there seems to be no internal clash between her attitudes here. This narrow sense of ‘incoherent’ – it is held – is the one relevant for structural rationality. This position can be bolstered by appeal to the central characteristics of structural rationality identified in §1.2 above. The judgment that there is a rational shortcoming involved in believing that the Orioles will win today depends on substantive judgments about reasons, and the circumstances and evidence of the agent. Moreover, this rational shortcoming isn’t an instance of a more general pattern of irrationality that can be identified in abstraction from the content of the attitude involved. Additionally, the narrower sense of (in)coherence relevant for structural (ir)rationality is held to obtain only between what Scanlon (1998, 18ff.) has called “judgment-sensitive attitudes”, such as beliefs and intentions, and cannot involve other mental states such as perceptions, which are not responsive to judgment or reasoning. Thus, to have beliefs that are out of whack with one’s perceptual evidence will not be incoherent in this narrower sense, nor structurally irrational.

A third set of views holds that, though substantive and structural rationality can be intelligibly distinguished, one is reducible to the other. Some hold that structural rationality can be reduced to substantive rationality (Kiesewetter 2017; Lord 2018; Henning 2018; Lasonen-Aarnio 2021; see also Singh forthcoming). One way of effecting this reduction is via the claim that what it is to be structurally irrational is to have a combination of attitudinal mental states such that it is guaranteed that, whatever one’s situation (and thus, one’s reasons) is like, at least one of the mental states fails to be substantively rational (Kiesewetter 2017: 235–39; see also Kolodny 2007a and 2008 and Lord 2018 for related ideas). For example, it seems plausible that whatever one’s situation (and thus, one’s reasons) is like, one’s evidence can never sufficiently support both believing \(p\) and believing not-\(p\). If this is so, then to believe \(p\) and believe not-\(p\) is to have a combination of attitudinal mental states such that it is guaranteed that, whatever one’s situation is like, at least one of these mental states fails to be substantively rational. Similarly, it might be thought, one’s reasons could never support intending an end and believing that a means is necessary for that end, while also supporting not intending the means; and this is what makes the combination structurally irrational. Notice that this view is not one on which structural and substantive irrationality turn out to be the same property: having attitudes that guarantee a failure to respond correctly to one’s reasons (structural irrationality) is a stronger property than merely having failed to respond correctly to one’s reasons (a failure of substantive rationality). It thus accommodates the natural idea that structural rationality involves a distinct kind of failure.

Critics of this view push back in a number of ways, but perhaps the most common response is to point to cases where jointly incoherent attitudes are individually permitted by one’s reasons (Broome 2013: 85–6; Way 2013). For example, suppose that your evidence indicates that to go to the supermarket, you must get on your bike (thus permitting, or perhaps even requiring, belief in this proposition). And suppose that your reasons permit, but don’t require, you to go to the supermarket. In that case, it seems like your reasons permit, but don’t require, you to get on your bike. In that case, neither the intention to go to the supermarket, nor the belief that to do so you must get on your bike, nor the absence of an intention to get on your bike, fails to be substantively rational. Yet it seems that the three are still structurally irrational in combination. If this is right, then the structural irrationality of some combination of attitudes is not a guarantee that at least one of the attitudes fails to be substantively rational. Similarly, perhaps there are permissive cases with respect to one’s doxastic attitudes (Ballantyne and Coffman 2011; Schoenfield 2014). For example, perhaps your evidence can permit a credence of 0.6 for \(p\), but also permit a credence of 0.61 for \(p\). Correspondingly, then, it permits a credence of either 0.39 or 0.4 for not-\(p\). In that case, neither a credence of 0.61 for \(p\) nor a credence of 0.4 for not-\(p\) fails to be substantively rational. Yet the combination of the two is structurally irrational (Staffel 2020).

Various strategies have been proposed to deal with this challenge. Kolodny (2011) and Lord (2018: Ch.2) both suggest that the adoption of an intention can alter one’s reasons to take the means, rendering a means-intention that was merely permitted prior to the adoption of the end-intention, substantively required (an analogous story about credences is suggested in Lord 2020). Drawing on work by Bratman (1987), Kiesewetter (2017: Ch. 10) argues that in cases of merely permissible ends, means-end incoherent agents will flout economical reasons because maintaining intentions that one will not carry out makes one susceptible to waste resources. With respect to doxastic incoherence, it is also an option to reject the kind of permissivism that is in conflict with explaining structural irrationality in terms of substantive requirements of rationality (e.g., White 2005, Schultheis 2018). On one alternative view, substantive epistemic rationality permits us to have imprecise credences rather than several precise credences that are probabilistically incoherent.

Other philosophers can be understood as pursuing a reduction in the opposite direction: that is, a reduction of substantive rationality to structural rationality. For example, some hold that what it is to have a reason to \(\Phi\) is to be such that, were one’s mental states to be corrected for structural irrationality, one would be motivated to \(\Phi\) – or desire to \(\Phi\), or intend to \(\Phi\), or similar (Smith 1994; Markovits 2014). Such accounts of reasons are often called “idealized attitudes” accounts. If reasons can be reduced to facts about structural rationality, this plausibly provides the materials to reduce substantive rationality (itself understood in terms of reasons-responsiveness) to facts about structural rationality too. However, idealized attitudes accounts of reasons have been subjected to numerous objections (see e.g. Enoch 2005). One important objection in the present context is that it is quite unclear how to generalize this view to reasons for (and thus, the substantive irrationality of) belief (Cuneo 2007: ch. 7). Another is that, since there is typically more than one way to correct for structural irrationality, such views will leave it radically indeterminate what our reasons are, or perhaps generate reasons for almost anything (Sampson 2021).

Fourth, and finally, some philosophers hold that substantive and structural rationality are both equally genuine kinds of rationality and that neither is reducible to the other (Worsnip 2021). Such views owe us an account of how, if at all, these two kinds of rationality relate to one another: for example, can they come into conflict with one another? If substantive rationality often recommends one thing and structural rationality recommends another, this may seem dissatisfying, especially if there is nothing to be said about which demand takes rational precedence. Indeed, some may think the prospect of structural and substantive rationality conflicting shows that they can’t both be bona fide sources of rational requirements.

However, it’s worth noting that the extent of any conflicts between structural and substantive rationality depends on the positive theory of structural rationality that we adopt. On a “wide-scope” view about structural rationality (see §2.1 below), its requirements are merely negative, prohibiting incoherent combinations of attitudes, and one can come to satisfy the relevant requirement by revising any of the incoherent attitudes. If this is so, it reduces the potential for conflicts between substantive and structural rationality. This is because, on this view, structural rationality simply tells one that one should restore coherence in some way when one is incoherent, and this leaves room for substantive rationality to (sometimes) determine, more specifically, which way to do so. For example, consider again Ali, who believes that he is Superman and that Superman can fly. If Ali’s evidence is normal, substantive rationality prohibits Ali from believing he can fly. Does structural rationality require him to believe he can fly? Not obviously: it might permit him instead to revise one of his original beliefs, requiring only that he either believe he can fly or revise one of these original beliefs. Some have argued, however, that conflicts between substantive and structural rationality can arise in subtler ways in special cases (Worsnip 2018a).

So far, we’ve focused mostly on inconsistent beliefs and means-end incoherence as paradigm instances of structural irrationality. But there are many other putative instances. Any particular instance will be controversial, since it is always up for debate whether some combination of mental states really is structurally irrational. And it is not feasible to be completely comprehensive in identifying all the candidate instances. But we will draw attention to some of the (patterns of) combinations of states that are among the most plausible candidates.

Let’s begin with some combinations of doxastic states that are plausibly structurally irrational. Along with strictly contradictory beliefs – i.e., a belief in \(p\) and a belief in not-\(p\) – it is often thought that other logically inconsistent sets of beliefs are structurally irrational. For example, as mentioned earlier, it seems structurally irrational for Ali to believe he is Superman, believe that Superman can fly, and yet believe that he cannot fly. More strongly, some have thought that it is structurally irrational to fail to believe the logical entailments of one’s beliefs – so that Ali would be irrational were he to believe that he is Superman, believe that Superman can fly, and merely fail to believe that he himself can fly . The requirement that one believes the logical entailments of one’s beliefs is often called ‘deductive closure’.

However, there are thorny issues about whether all instances of inconsistency, or of failing to believe the logical entailments of one’s beliefs, involve irrationality. First, it is not clear if this is so when the relevant inconsistency or entailment is extremely subtle and would take a complex logical proof to detect (Broome 2013: 154–5). Second, it is not clear that we are irrational for failing to clutter our minds with the infinite trivial consequences of our existing beliefs (Harman 1986: 12). In response to the first problem, some say that structural irrationality obtains only when one recognizes the relevant inconsistency or entailment (Sainsbury 2002). In response to the second, some say that, where \(q\) is some consequence of one’s existing beliefs, one needs to care about whether \(q\) (Broome 2013) or attend to \(q\) to be structurally irrational for failing to believe \(q\). However, these restrictions do not deal with all purported cases of rational inconsistency. For example, the preface paradox (Makinson 1965) is a plausible case of rational but inconsistent beliefs (see esp. Christensen 2004). In this case, an author writes a book containing a number of claims, but modestly affirms in the preface that doubtless, the book contains errors – i.e., that at least one of the claims in the book is false. This total set of beliefs – the claims in the book, plus the preface claim – is inconsistent, but arguably, it is not irrational to hold these beliefs – even if one recognizes the inconsistency, and attends to and cares about the relevant beliefs. While some (MacFarlane 2004 – see Other Internet Resources) hold that this is a case where substantive and structural rationality conflict, others (Worsnip 2016a) have argued that the inconsistent beliefs in these cases are not even structurally irrational.

It is also widely held that agents can be structurally irrational in virtue of the ways that their first-order beliefs combine with their higher-order beliefs: that is, with beliefs about the normative status of their first-order beliefs, or about their evidence for them. For example, it’s often thought to be structurally irrational to believe \(p\) while also believing that one’s evidence does not adequately support \(p\) – or to fail to believe \(p\) while also believing that one’s evidence decisively supports \(p\) (see, among many others, Kolodny 2005; Feldman 2005; Titelbaum 2015). Such combinations of states are sometimes described as “epistemically akratic” (Horowitz 2014; Greco 2014). While some deny that such states must be irrational on the grounds that they can be rational in cases of misleading higher-order evidence (Coates 2012; Lasonen-Aarnio 2020), others think that it is at most substantively rational, but not structurally rational, to be epistemically akratic in such cases (Worsnip 2018a).

Many of the kinds of irrationality pinpointed by formal epistemologists, which typically pertain to credences rather than to full belief, can also be plausibly regarded as structural. For example, (most) failures to conform one’s credences to the axioms of probability – such as the aforementioned case of assigning credence 0.6 to \(p\) and credence 0.41 to not -\(p\) – are plausibly structurally irrational. Somewhat more controversially, failing to update one’s credences via conditionalization might be viewed as a kind of structural irrationality between one’s prior and posterior credences. The latter case is more controversial, because this kind of “incoherence” is typically understood as diachronic, whereas some think that structural irrationality is a synchronic phenomenon (see §2.3). Consequently, viewing it as a kind of incoherence either requires us to pinpoint some kind of synchronic failure that occurs when one fails to conditionalize properly, or to allow for diachronic instances of structural irrationality.

Let’s now turn to forms of structural irrationality that (at least partly) involve non-doxastic states. One paradigmatic example of structural irrationality that we’ve already mentioned is means-end incoherence (also known as ‘instrumental irrationality’, though this term is sometimes used with other meanings; see also the entry on instrumental rationality ), whereby one intends to \(\Phi\), believes that in order to \(\Phi\) one must \(\Psi\), but does not intend to \(\Psi\). Besides this, perhaps the most common example of structural irrationality involving non-doxastic states is practical akrasia – believing one ought, all things considered, to \(\Phi\) but not intending to \(\Phi\) (see, among many others, Broome 2001b, 2013; Kolodny 2005; for dissent, see Arpaly 2000). Notably, this form of structural irrationality (as well as means-end incoherence) involves incoherence between a belief and an intention (or lack of), thus bridging doxastic and conative states. Another example of a form of incoherence that bridges doxastic and conative states might be intending to do something that one believes one cannot do.

There are also plausible examples of structural irrationality that obtain solely between conative states. It’s often held that it is structurally irrational to have contradictory intentions – that is, to intend to \(\Phi\) and intend not to \(\Phi\). And as in the doxastic case, there are forms of incoherence studied by formally-inclined philosophers (and economists) that are naturally thought of as instances of structural irrationality – such as having cyclical preferences, whereby one prefers \(A\) to \(B\), prefers \(B\) to \(C\), and yet prefers \(C\) to \(A\) (Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes 1955; Gaus 2008: 36–40).

Finally – though this is understudied – there may be forms of structural irrationality that involve affective and emotional states (see also the entry on emotion , section 10). For example, perhaps it is structurally irrational to hope for something that one believes to be bad, or to fear something that one believes to be good. And perhaps it is also irrational to hope for or fear something that one believes to be impossible.

As the above list makes clear, the instances of structural irrationality are a diverse bunch. One may reasonably wonder what, if anything, all these instances have in common. Some (e.g. Broome 2013) seem to think that it is enough simply to say that they are all combinations of states that are jointly irrational, but others aspire to identify something deeper in virtue of which they share this property.

One way of trying to do this is to embrace the reductivist view mentioned in §1.3 above. On this view, what structurally irrational states have in common is that they are all combinations of attitudes that cannot simultaneously be supported by one’s reasons. However, as we saw, this view faces some important challenges, such as accounting for the structural irrationality of sets of individually permissible attitudes. (It’s worth noting that there is another family of views that also, in a different way, tries to explain structural rationality in terms of reasons. On these views, what unifies structurally irrational states is that they involve the agent’s going against her beliefs about reasons (“transparency” accounts), or her apparent reasons (“apparent reasons accounts”). We discuss these views, and problems with them, in §3.3.)

In a similar but somewhat different vein, some explore the idea that attitudes are structurally irrational just in case they can’t all “succeed”, or fulfil their “aim”, where this might be truth for beliefs and satisfaction or correctness for intentions or preferences (Fink forthcoming; Fullhart and Martinez forthcoming; see also Gibbard 2003; Brunero 2020: Ch. 7; Rosa 2022; Singh forthcoming). However, this proposal struggles to explain the incoherence of other mental states, such as credences. It is also far from obvious that akratic attitude combinations cannot be jointly successful – after all, the beliefs involved in epistemic akrasia are logically consistent, and it is possible for a belief that one ought to \(\Phi\) to be true even if the corresponding intention is not satisfied. Proponents of this view are thus pressed to either accept certain revisionary implications, to introduce more substantive and hence more controversial success conditions for attitudes, or to give up the ambition to provide a fully unifying account of structural irrationality.

Another at least partially unifying proposal is “cognitivism”, which aspires to reduce certain structural requirements governing intention (such as that of means-end coherence) to certain structural requirements governing belief (such as that of deductive closure) (Harman 1976; Velleman 1989; Wallace 2001; Setiya 2007). This view is premised on a corresponding cognitivism about intention, on which, roughly, intending to \(\Phi\) involves believing one will \(\Phi\). Given this, failures of means-end coherence (for example) arguably result in one’s violating closure – specifically, violating a modus ponens requirement by believing one will \(\Phi\), believing that one will \(\Phi\) only if one \(\Psi\)-s, but not believing that one will \(\Psi\). As cognitivists recognize (Setiya 2007), their account must be complicated or supplemented to deliver this result. This is because even if intending to \(\Phi\) involves believing that one will \(\Phi\), it doesn’t follow that not intending to \(\Psi\) involves not believing that one will \(\Psi\) (perhaps one believes that one will unintentionally \(\Psi)\). Moreover, the view that an intention to \(\Phi\) involves believing one will \(\Phi\) has been criticized (e.g., Bratman 2009a). Further, even if cognitivists are right to think that means-end incoherence necessarily involves doxastic incoherence, there are reasons to think that the former involves a distinctively practical mistake that cannot be reduced to a mistake in one’s cognitive attitudes (e.g., Brunero 2020: Ch. 6). And finally, in our context, it is an open question whether cognitivism can be a fully unifying theory of structural rationality, as it is unclear how, for example, practical akrasia can be understood as a violation of a purely doxastic structural requirements, or how cognitivism delivers unity within the class of doxastic structural requirements.

A proposal put forward by some formally-inclined philosophers is that structurally irrational states are those that make one exploitable to loss through devices such as Dutch books or money pumps. [ 4 ] However, again, this proposal seems insufficiently general to capture all instances of structural irrationality: for example, there is no obvious way in which someone with (either epistemically or practically) akratic states is vulnerable to such loss. Moreover, even where structural irrationality and exploitability coincide, it is dubious whether it is the latter that explains the former, rather than vice versa. Numerous philosophers have argued that one’s susceptibility to Dutch books or money pumps merely reflects or brings out one’s irrationality, rather than grounding or explaining it, since it is unclear why vulnerability to purely hypothetical monetary loss (that can only be exacted by someone with full knowledge of one’s mental states, and is almost certain not to actually occur) is the right sort of thing to make one irrational (Lewis 1999: 404–5; Christensen 2004: 109–24; Gaus 2008: 39; Levy 2014: 2).

Finally, it has recently been proposed that structurally irrational states are unified by the fact that it is in some way difficult to sustain them in full, reflective self-knowledge. On one version of this proposal (Worsnip 2018b), this is because it is constitutive of the mental states involved that to genuinely count as having these states, one must have some disposition to revise them when these conditions of “full transparency” are met. For example, if one believes that to go shopping today one must get on one’s bike now, and does not intend to get on one’s bike now, and one is fully and consciously aware of both of these states and has no disposition to revise them, then one arguably does not count as intending to go shopping today (cf. also Finlay 2009; Lee 2022). Again, though, this proposal faces some challenges. In particular, it seems to force us to choose between denying that completely clear-eyed practical akrasia is possible and denying that practical akrasia is structurally irrational. It may also struggle with examples of individuals who hold logically inconsistent or even contradictory beliefs but are not disposed to revise them because they subscribe to non-classical logics.

2. Requirements of Structural Rationality

A common assumption in the literature on structural rationality is that agents have the property of being structurally rational or irrational in virtue of satisfying or violating certain norms or requirements of structural rationality (see esp. Broome 2013: Ch. 7). This section is concerned with various disputes surrounding such structural requirements. §§2.1–2.4 address questions about the general form of structural requirements, while §2.5 is concerned with skepticism about structural requirements and with approaches to structural rationality that dispense with structural requirements. These disputes are important for anyone who aspires to spell out a theory of structural rationality. They are also – as we’ll see in §3 – relevant for debates about the normativity of rationality.

The most widely debated – and arguably most important – question about the form of structural requirements of rationality is whether these requirements take wide scope (e.g. Broome 1999; Wallace 2001; Bratman 2009b) or narrow scope (e.g. Korsgaard 1997; Schroeder 2004; Kolodny 2005). To explain this distinction, recall that structural irrationality involves (at least in the vast majority of cases) a tension between at least two attitude-states (where an attitude-state might consist in either the presence or the absence of an attitude). For example, akrasia involves a tension between a belief to the effect that one ought to \(\Phi\) \([\rBO\Phi]\) and the lack of an intention to \(\Phi\) \([\rI\Phi].\) On the received view, having this combination of attitude-states is irrational in virtue of violating a requirement of structural rationality. And on a prima facie natural interpretation of such requirements, these requirements are conditional on one (or more) of the relevant attitude-states (the “antecedent state(s)”) and take scope over some other attitude-state (the “consequent state”). Thus, for example, a natural way to understand what Broome (2013) has dubbed the “enkratic requirement” – the requirement prohibiting akrasia – is as follows:

Enkratic requirement, narrow-scope: If \(A\) believes that she ought to \(\Phi\), then rationality requires \(A\) to intend to \(\Phi\) \([\rBO\Phi \to \rR(\rI\Phi)].\)

As several authors have emphasized, however, structural requirements can also be understood in a different way (Hill 1973; Greenspan 1975; Dancy 1977; Darwall 1983; and, more recently, Broome 1999, 2007c, 2013; Wallace 2001; Bratman 2009b; Brunero 2010, 2020; Way 2011). According to this alternative reading, structural requirements are not conditional on the antecedent state; instead, both the antecedent and the consequent state are part of the scope of requirement, which is why this is called a ‘wide scope’ reading. In case of the enkratic requirement, this interpretation says:

Enkratic requirement, wide-scope: Rationality requires of \(A\) that [if \(A\) believes that she ought to \(\Phi\), then \(A\) intends to \(\Phi\)] \([\rR(\rBO\Phi\to\rI\Phi)]\).

To illustrate the relevance of this distinction and the ways in which the two requirements have different consequences, consider Ava, an environmentalist activist who has gone astray and formed the belief that she ought to extinguish all human life. The narrow-scope and wide-scope enkratic requirements will have different results for our verdicts about Ava along two dimensions: symmetry and detachment .

Beginning with symmetry: Ava can comply with the wide-scope enkratic requirement in one of two ways: either by coming to intend to extinguish human life or by dropping her belief that she ought to extinguish human life. [ 5 ] Conversely, she can comply with the narrow-scope enkratic requirement only by coming to intend to extinguish human life. In this sense, the wide-scope requirement is symmetric while the narrow-scope requirement is asymmetric . Strikingly, this difference has been employed as part of arguments for both the wide-scope and narrow-scope views. Wide-scopers claim that symmetry is desirable because it would not be irrational in any good sense for Ava to drop her misguided belief instead of coming to intend to extinguish human life (Broome 1999; Worsnip 2021). Narrow-scopers, by contrast, charge that symmetry is undesirable because there is an important difference between forming an intention on the basis of a normative belief and dropping a normative belief merely on the basis of an absence of an intention to follow through on it: the former process seems in some way more rational than the latter (Schroeder 2004, 2009; Kolodny 2005; Bedke 2009; Finlay 2010). Whether this latter charge is a compelling argument against the wide-scope view depends in large part on whether structural requirements such as the enkratic requirement should reflect facts about which states it is rational to base on which: Kolodny (2005) argues that they must, while many wide-scopers (Way 2011; Brunero 2012; Broome 2013) hold that they do not, maintaining that there are independent “basing prohibitions” and “basing permissions” that account for the rationality of basing in particular.

Let’s now consider detachment. Consider the inference:

This inference-pattern is valid via modus ponens . Applied to the case of Ava, this means that we can derive (or “detach”) a requirement for Ava to intend to extinguish human life (3) from the narrow-scope enkratic requirement (1a) and the premise that Ava believes that she ought to extinguish human life (2). The wide-scope account avoids this implication, for the following inference is not validated by the propositional calculus:

Hence, the conclusion that Ava is rationally required to intend to extinguish all human life (3) does not obviously follow from the wide-scope enkratic requirement (1b) and the premise that Ava believes that she ought to extinguish all human life (2). In order for this inference to be valid, the deontic logic of rational requirements would need to contain the following axiom:

Factual detachment: If \(p\), and rationality requires of \(A\) that \(p\to q,\) then rationality requires of \(A\) that \(q\).

But this principle is questionable and widely rejected (see esp. Broome 1999).

Some philosophers (e.g., Broome 1999; Bratman 2009b) take the fact that narrow-scope requirements detach while wide-scope requirements do not as a point in favor of the wide-scope requirement. Suppose that we have derived the conclusion that Ava is rationally required to intend to extinguish all human life from the narrow-scope enkratic requirement via modus ponens. If we add the further premise that rationality is normative (see §3 below) in the sense that we ought (or have reason) to comply with structural requirements, we are forced to conclude that Ava ought (or has reason) to intend to extinguish all human life – simply because she has adopted a crazy belief. But this kind of “bootstrapping” is widely regarded as unacceptable (recall §1.1). Thus, if rationality is normative, this seems to tell against the narrow-scope view.

It is worth noting that the issues of symmetry, detachment, and bootstrapping arise with regard to the scope of all structural requirements on attitude-combinations, including those that concern only doxastic states. For one example, take the aforementioned (putative) requirement forbidding “epistemic akrasia”, which requires alignment between one’s higher-order and first-order doxastic states. Suppose Darren believes that his evidence supports believing that the earth is flat. Again, a narrow-scope version of an anti-epistemic akrasia requirement seems to allow us to detach the conclusion that (structural) rationality requires Darren to believe that the earth is flat. Wide-scopers will complain that this is incorrect, since structural rationality should at least permit Darren to instead drop his higher-order belief that the evidence supports believing that the earth is flat (i.e., the requirement should be symmetrical). Moreover, they will say, it is particularly objectionable when paired with the thesis that rationality is normative, since this would allow us to conclude that Darren can make it the case that he ought or has reason to believe the earth is flat merely by (unjustifiably) believing that this is what his evidence supports (i.e., would license problematic bootstrapping). On the other hand, narrow-scopers will charge that it is more rational to come to believe \(p\) on the basis of a belief that one’s evidence supports \(p\) than to drop a belief that one’s evidence support \(p\) on the basis of a mere absence of belief in \(p\). Or consider the requirement to respect modus ponens , and our aforementioned character Ali, who believes he is Superman and that Superman can fly. Wide-scopers will hold that structural rationality should at least permit Ali to drop his belief that he is Superman rather than come to believe he can fly. In addition, they will stress that any view that yields the conclusion that Ali can make it the case that he ought or has reason to believe he can fly merely by holding the beliefs that he is Superman and that Superman can fly must be rejected. By contrast, narrow-scopers will hold that it is more rational to come to believe \(q\) on the basis of belief in \(p\) and belief that if \(p\) then \(q\) than it is to give up one’s belief in \(p\) or one’s belief that if \(p\) then \(q\) on the basis of a mere absence of belief in \(q\) (as distinct from a positive belief that not-\(q)\). (For reasons of brevity, we will focus on the practical enkratic requirement in the remainder of this section, but as with this subsection, the same points apply to other structural requirements, including those that concern only doxastic states.)

The wide-scope account has sometimes been charged with assuming a mistaken semantic view, namely that ordinary conditionals of the form “If you \(\Phi\), you ought to \(\Psi\)” are to be read as really expressing the wide-scope requirement that you ought to be such that (if you \(\Phi\), then you \(\Psi)\). [ 6 ] Many philosophers of language reject this “wide-scope semantics” (Hansson 1969, van Fraassen 1972, Lewis 1973, Kratzer 1981; for applications to contemporary debates about rationality, see Dreier 2009, Schroeder 2011, Dowell 2012, Silk 2014). In response, wide-scopers can make two points (Kiesewetter 2017: Ch. 3; Worsnip 2021: Chs. 6–7). First, they can maintain that while the fundamental explanation of structural irrationality is provided by wide-scope requirements, the semantics of ordinary conditionals is a different matter. For example, Worsnip (2021: Ch. 7) combines the wide-scope view of structural requirements with a more orthodox, contextualist account of ordinary deontic conditionals along the lines of Kratzer (1981). Second, they can point out that the spirit of the wide-scope view can be maintained without stating structural requirements as involving conditionals at all. The relevant requirements can instead be understood as requiring disjunctive responses or as prohibitions on combinations of responses. For example, the wide-scope enkratic requirement can be formulated in either of the following two ways:

Enkratic requirement, disjunctive: Rationality requires \(A\) to [intend to \(\Phi\) or not believe that she ought to \(\Phi\)].

Enkratic requirement, combination prohibition: Rationality requires \(A\) to not [believe that she ought to \(\Phi\) and not intend to \(\Phi\)].

These requirements are symmetric and do not allow for detachment; they thus share with the original wide-scope formulations the properties that distinguish them from narrow-scope requirements.

As we have discussed them so far, structural requirements do not index attitude-states to time points and are thus open to two interpretations. On the synchronic interpretation, all the attitude-states are indexed to the same point in time, while on a diachronic interpretation, the attitude-states are indexed to different time points or periods. For example, the narrow-scope enkratic requirement (§2.1) may be understood in either of the following ways:

Enkratic requirement, narrow-scope + synchronic: If \(A\) believes at \(t\) that she ought to \(\Phi\), rationality requires \(A\) to intend at \(t\) to \(\Phi\).

Enkratic requirement, narrow-scope + diachronic: If \(A\) believes at \(t_1\) that she ought to \(\Phi\), rationality requires \(A\) to intend at \(t_2\) to \(\Phi\).

The literature contains two kinds of arguments for the diachronic approach. The first is that only diachronic requirements can guide our reasoning going forward (Schroeder 2004; Kolodny 2005). The second is that synchronic requirements cannot accommodate “rational delay” – the assumption that limited beings like us are not rationally criticizable for taking time to adjust their attitudes to new circumstances and establish coherence (Kiesewetter 2017: 62–70; Podgorski 2017).

However, it is difficult to spell out diachronic requirements. An important challenge for any diachronic approach is to specify the relation between \(t_1\) and \(t_2\). A possible view is that \(t_2\) is just any time after \(t_1\), perhaps even including \(t_1\) (Lord 2014). While this might speak to the guidance-related argument for the diachronic account, it does not seem appropriate as a response to the phenomenon of rational delay. And since the length of rational delay appears to depend on particular circumstances and individual abilities, there is reason to be skeptical that there could be a principled specification of diachronic requirements that accounts for rational delay.

Moreover, if one is persuaded that the wide-scope approach is superior to the narrow-scope approach, there are further problems for the diachronic approach, as it is debatable whether the diachronic approach is consistent with the spirit of the wide-scope approach. Consider:

Enkratic requirement, wide-scope + diachronic: Rationality requires \(A\) to (not-believe at \(t_1\) that she ought to \(\Phi\) or intend at \(t_2\) to \(\Phi)\).

If \(A\) believes at \(t_1\) that she ought to \(\Phi\), then at \(t_2\) intending to \(\Phi\) is the only way in which \(A\) can satisfy this requirement. Thus, a requirement to adopt this intention can plausibly be detached (Broome 2013). This violates the spirit of the wide-scope approach. While other ways of spelling out diachronic wide-scope requirements have been proposed, it remains controversial whether they can preserve symmetry and non-detachability without collapsing into their synchronic counterparts (Lord 2014; Reisner 2009; Kiesewetter 2017: 58–69; Worsnip 2021: 183–7).

While there is considerable disagreement about whether all structural requirements are diachronic, it is somewhat less controversial that there are at least some essentially diachronic requirements of rationality ­– for example, requirements of attitude persistence that prohibit abandoning beliefs or intentions arbitrarily (Broome 2013; Bratman 2018; Brunero 2022). However, at least in the doxastic realm, some authors have argued that there are no diachronic requirements at all (Hedden 2015; Moss 2015).

While most authors take requirements of structural rationality to govern attitude-states, such as beliefs or intentions, some have argued that they should rather be understood as requirements on processes, such as reasoning or, more generally, the forming , dropping or retaining of attitudes (Kolodny 2005, 2007b; Podgorski 2017). Since processes are temporally extended, all process requirements are diachronic. What is less often recognized is that the reverse is not true: diachronic requirements need not be process-requirements, since they can govern states at different points in time (Podgorski 2017). Thus, the synchronic/diachronic debate is distinct from the process/state debate.

In support of the process-oriented view, Kolodny (2005) holds that requirements can be response-guiding and potentially normative (§2.2) only if they govern processes rather than states. He also argues that state-requirements are redundant once all plausible process requirements have been specified. Critics of the process-oriented view have responded by drawing an analogy to reasons for belief and other attitudes, which can be response-guiding and normative even though they are for states rather than processes, and have challenged Kolodny’s redundancy claim (Kiesewetter 2017: 73–79).

While it is very controversial whether all instances of structural irrationality can be explained in terms of process requirements, it is less controversial that there are process requirements that cannot be reduced to state requirements. For example, what seems irrational about wishful thinking is not necessarily the belief or the wish, or the combination of these states, or their occurrence in a certain chronological order, but specifically the process through which the belief was formed. More generally, it seems plausible that there are basing prohibitions (Broome 2013) – rational requirements not to base certain attitudes on others – which cannot be reduced to state-requirements.

A number of authors have raised skepticism about structural requirements of rationality. We will distinguish three varieties of such skepticism.

The first variety, which we call “impossibilist skepticism”, is based on the view that once one specifies sufficient conditions for structural irrationality, it turns out to be impossible to violate these conditions. The idea that it is impossible to violate at least some putative structural requirements has a long history: the Socrates of Plato’s Protagoras denies the possibility of akrasia (see also Davidson 1969 and the entry on weakness of will ), while other authors have denied the possibility of epistemic akrasia specifically (Hurley 1989; Adler 2002), irrational self-contradiction (Price 2008), and instrumental irrationality (Finlay 2009; Timmermann 2022). Impossibilist skeptics combine the premise that the putative structural requirements are inviolable with the further premise (argued for by Korsgaard 1997, among others) that any genuine requirement of rationality must leave room for violation, to yield the conclusion that the putative structural requirements are not genuine rational requirements after all (Finlay 2009; Lee 2022).

Impossibilist skepticism entails not only that there are no structural requirements of rationality, but also that there is no such thing as a property of structural rationality (understood as a property that people can fail to have). By contrast, a second kind of skepticism, which we call “particularist skepticism”, does not necessarily take issue with this property; it merely denies that the occurrence of structural irrationality can be explained in terms of general structural requirements. Proponents of this view hold that all general structural requirements prohibiting attitude-combinations are subject to counterexamples, for example in cases of luminosity failure (i.e. failure to be in a position to know one’s own attitudes) and cases in which subjects have higher-order beliefs or evidence that conflict with the putative requirement (Fogal 2020; Lasonen-Aarnio 2021).

In place of the requirements-based approach, particularist skeptics offer alternative models. For example, Fogal (2020) suggests a “pressure-based” model, on which attitudes exert a gradable rational pressure (analogous to the normative pressure of pro tanto reasons) and the structural rationality or irrationality of an attitude depends on the greatest positive or negative rational pressure overall. By contrast, Lasonen-Aarnio (2021) proposes to explain the irrationality of incoherence in terms of the manifestation of certain bad dispositions – dispositions that conflict with being a competent follower of substantive norms (for a similar view, see also Raz 2005). Both views avoid a commitment to generalizable truths to the effect that certain sets of attitudes are by themselves sufficient for irrationality.

A third kind of skepticism, which we call “substantivist skepticism”, holds that even if extensionally adequate formulations of general structural requirements are available, the assumption that there are such requirements is dispensable since structural irrationality can be explained in terms of requirements of substantive rationality alone. [ 7 ] (We mentioned this reductive view already in §1.3.) Proponents of substantivist skepticism often hold that we should dispense with structural requirements if we can because they are problematic. For example, some hold that such requirements cannot be normative (see §3) but would have to be normative in order to exist at all (Price 2008; Kiesewetter 2017: Ch. 2, and Ch. 6 for some additional undesirable implications of structural requirements).

3. The Normative Significance of Structural Rationality

It is widely held that ascriptions of irrationality involve a certain kind of criticism and, thus, that truths about rationality or irrationality are, or at least appear to be, normative or normatively significant (e.g. Parfit 2001; Kolodny 2005; Broome 2007b; Scanlon 2007). A natural (and dominant) way to spell out this intuition is to say that there necessarily are normative reasons to conform to rational requirements. But while it seems evident that there necessarily are reasons to conform to substantive requirements (at least on standard conceptions of substantive rationality), it is much less clear why this should be so in the case of structural requirements. In this section, we give an overview of the most important challenges for the assumption that there necessarily are reasons to conform to structural requirements and discuss the major theoretical options that one can adopt with respect to the normativity of rationality more generally.

Perhaps the most widely discussed challenge for the normativity of structural rationality is the worry that the assumption of reasons for conforming to structural requirements would license implausible forms of “bootstrapping” or detachment (see esp. Bratman 1981, Broome 2001a, Kolodny 2005, and cf. §1.1 above). As we already saw in §2.1, a narrow-scope account of structural requirements plus the assumption that rationality is normative seems to yield unacceptable bootstrapping. For example, it suggests that merely by believing that she ought to extinguish all human life, Ava can make it the case that she ought to, or at least has reason to, intend to extinguish all human life. As we again saw in §2.1, some take this as an objection to the narrow-scope view. Others, however, take it as an argument that structural rationality cannot be normative (Kolodny 2005).

In support of the latter way of going, some have argued that a normative interpretation of structural requirements licenses implausible detachment even on the wide-scope view. Such arguments typically appeal to certain transmission principles – which are (roughly speaking) principles about how reasons are transmitted from ends to means (see also the entry on instrumental rationality , section 2). A prominent instance is Raz’s argument against the wide-scope instrumental requirement (Raz 2005). The argument is based on what is sometimes called a “liberal” principle of reasons transmission, which says (roughly) that for every means that facilitates or probabilizes doing what we have reason to do, there is a derivative reason to take this means (Raz 2005; Bedke 2009; Kolodny 2018). Because wide-scope requirements are symmetric, both dropping the antecedent attitude-state as well as adopting the consequent attitude-state are (highly effective) means to conforming to the requirement. Therefore, if there is a reason to conform to wide-scope requirements, it follows from the liberal transmission principle that we can detach a reason to adopt the consequent attitude-state (as well as a reason to drop the antecedent attitude-state). Again, we end up with the unwanted result that Ava has a reason to intend to extinguish all human life. If this argument is sound, opting for a wide-scope rather than a narrow-scope account of structural requirements does not avoid the problem with detachment. However, some reject the liberal transmission principle on which the argument is based, at least in full generality (Broome 2005; Way 2010; Rippon 2011; Kiesewetter and Gertken 2021).

A different argument to the effect that even wide-scope normative requirements of structural rationality license implausible detachment is based not on the liberal transmission principle, but on the weaker principle that reasons transmit to necessary means (Setiya 2007, who partly draws on Greenspan 1975). The problem is that an agent may be psychologically incapable of altering one of her antecedent attitudes, which renders adopting the consequent attitude a necessary means for conforming to the wide-scope requirement. For example, if Ava is unable to give up her belief that she ought to extinguish all human life, then intending to extinguish all human life is a necessary means to conforming to the wide-scope enkratic requirement. Thus, if Ava has reason to conform to this requirement, the necessary means transmission principle entails that we can detach a reason to intend to extinguish all human life once again. As before, however, some reject the transmission principle on which this argument is based (Broome 2013; but see Kiesewetter 2015 for replies). Others (Bratman 2009b) have replied to the argument by suggesting that the general reason to satisfy structural requirements – which in Bratman’s view, is one of self-governance – is not operative in cases where the agent is psychologically unable to alter their attitudes (but see Brunero 2010; 2020: Ch. 5; Kiesewetter 2017: Ch. 5 for challenges for Bratman’s view).

A second major difficulty for the view that there necessarily are reasons to conform to structural requirements is to come up with a satisfying answer to the question “Why be rational?” (Kolodny 2005) ­– an answer that explicates what such reasons consist in and justifies the assumption that they exist. [ 8 ] It is worth noting that this challenge applies to requirements of structural rationality in particular. At least if requirements of substantive rationality are understood in terms of facts about the balance of reasons, it makes no sense to ask what reasons we have to conform to such requirements: there is no need for a reason to do what there is reason to do. But since structural requirements are not to be understood in terms of facts about the balance of reasons, it is a fair question why one should conform to them.

It is natural to think that an answer to the why-be-rational challenge must show how one can derive a reason to conform to structural requirements from other reasons that exist independently of structural rationality. According to this derivative approach , there is reason to satisfy structural requirements because doing so is conducive to (or necessary for) – for example – being an agent (Korsgaard 2009), governing oneself (Bratman 2009b), doing what is objectively choiceworthy (Wedgwood 2017), or being interpretable by others (Mildenberger 2019). Proposals of this form are subject to at least one of two potential objections. One might question that structural rationality is in fact necessarily conducive to (or necessary for) the other relevant property, and one might question that there necessarily is a reason to instantiate this other property (Kolodny 2005; Broome 2007b; Kiesewetter 2017; Brunero 2020). The current state of the literature tends towards the verdict that none of the existing proposals has been shown to be immune against both kinds of objections.

Partly in response to problems for the derivative approach, some of those who are sympathetic to the normativity of structural rationality have opted for a non-derivative approach , according to which, for any structurally irrational combination of attitudes, there is a sui generis “reason of [structural] rationality” to avoid them, constituted by the very fact that the attitudes in question are prohibited by structural rationality (Southwood 2008; see also Broome 2013; Hussain 2007 – see Other Internet Resources). This move is often supported by way of an analogy with H.A. Prichard’s influential response to the why-be-moral challenge, which essentially involved the rejection of the idea that morality could be derivatively justified (Prichard 1912). Critics of the non-derivative approach respond that it seems fetishistic to treat structural rationality as something we have reason to aim at for its own sake (Kolodny 2005) and that the alleged normativity of structural rationality lacks the kind of self-evident status that Prichard claims for the moral case and bases his view on (Brunero 2020).

Besides the objections that apply to the derivative and the non-derivative approaches specifically, Kolodny (2005) also has raised an important general challenge for the assumption that there necessarily is a reason to do what satisfies structural requirements. On the most general level, the problem is that it is unclear what deliberative relevance such a reason could have. Typically, we form attitudes on the basis of considerations connected to their correctness rather than their coherence with other attitudes. For example, we adopt beliefs because we think they are supported by evidence rather than because they cohere with our other beliefs. Indeed, it seems that because of their correctness-independence, coherence-based reasons for attitudes would belong to the category of so-called “wrong-kind reasons”. [ 9 ] The existence of wrong-kind reasons is often denied (e.g. Kolodny 2005; Way 2016), and even those who accept their existence typically agree that such reasons are irrelevant for the rationality of attitudes (Schroeder 2012). It would thus be very surprising if the normativity of certain rational requirements depended on such reasons. (See Worsnip 2021: Ch. 8 for a recent defense of the view that the normativity of structural rationality can be understood in terms of right -kind of reasons, and Daoust 2022 and Kiesewetter 2023 for criticism.)

If there are not necessarily reasons to conform with requirements of structural rationality, this raises the questions of whether there is some other interesting relation between structural rationality and reasons, and whether there is an explanation of why it has seemed to many that structural rationality is normatively significant. Two prominent views in the literature on rationality – the transparency account and the apparent reasons account – provide answers to these questions.

According to the transparency account, structural rationality is a matter of coherence between one’s attitudes and one’s normative beliefs about such attitudes, and for an attitude to be required by structural rationality is for one to have a belief that this attitude is supported by conclusive reasons (Kolodny 2005, and on one reading, Scanlon 2007). On this view, the apparent normativity of structural rationality is due to the fact that from the first-personal standpoint, rationally required attitudes are always believed to be supported by conclusive reasons.

The transparency account faces problems, however. First, the normative appearance of rationality is not limited to the first-personal perspective. We seem to presuppose that rationality is normatively significant when we recommend options as rational or criticize responses as irrational, and the hypothesis that rationally required responses must be believed to be normatively supported by the agent for whom they are required does not help to understand this (Bridges 2009; Hussain 2007 – see Other Internet Resources). Second, the assumption that structural irrationality always involves a conflict between an attitude and a normative belief about that attitude is questionable: a number of plausible instances of structural irrationality – in particular those involved in certain forms of belief inconsistency and means-end incoherence (see §1.4) – do not seem to involve such a conflict.

While the transparency account explains rationality in terms of believed reasons, the apparent reasons account explains rationality in terms of “apparent reasons”, which are usually understood as the reasons we would have if our beliefs were true (e. g. Parfit 2011; Schroeder 2009; Way 2009; Whiting 2014; Alvarez 2018; see also Sylvan 2015 for a more sophisticated conception of apparent reasons). It has been stated as the view that “for you to be rationally required to \(A\) is for it to be the case that you would have conclusive reasons to \(A\), if your beliefs were true” (Way 2009, 4). Parfit (2001) first proposed a view along these lines, arguably as an account of substantive rationality. However, several authors have tried to explain structural rationality (and, by extension, its apparent or actual normative force) in terms of apparent reasons as well (Schroeder 2009; Way 2012; Sylvan 2021a).

Some proponents of the apparent reasons account suggest that rationality is in fact normative on their view. For example, Schroeder (2009) identifies rational requirements with “subjective oughts”, which he takes to be genuinely normative, and Parfit claims that “normativity involves reasons or apparent reasons” (2011, 59). According to Way (2009), the apparent reasons account vindicates the normativity of rationality, because it explains rational requirements in terms of hypothetical truths of the form ‘If your beliefs were true, you would have conclusive reason to A’ – and such truths are in an interesting sense normative, as a normative error theorist is committed to denying them. However, critics have contended that the sense in which hypotheticals about reasons are normative is a merely technical one that does nothing to vindicate the actual normative significance of rationality (Kiesewetter 2012). (For more on the normative relevance of apparent reasons, see González de Prado Salas 2018; Sylvan 2021a).)

The apparent reasons account also faces similar challenges as the transparency account when it comes to accounting for kinds of structural irrationality that do not involve attitudes with normative contents. While it is straightforward that akratic agents go against what would be conclusive reasons if their beliefs were true, it is much more difficult to see that this is true for agents with “formally incoherent” attitudes, such as incoherent credences.

To summarize, the debate on the normativity of rationality is often centred around two theoretical options. One is to preserve the normativity of rationality by defending the claim that there necessarily are reasons to conform to structural requirements. The other is to deny this claim, and abandon the view that rationality is normative. As we have seen, both options face significant challenges. Proponents of the first view must explain why their views do not entail implausible forms of detachment, why the reasons they allude to exist, and why they are of the right kind. Proponents of the second view must explain why rationality seems normative when it isn’t. More specifically, proponents of the second view need to explain both why describing someone as irrational amounts to a serious form of criticism if there is no reason to avoid irrationality, and how requirements of structural rationality can count as requirements if there’s no sense in which we have reason to comply with them (and if they also aren’t “institutional” or “positive” requirements like the requirements of a social club or 19 th century etiquette). In addition, they face an especially strong challenge to say what unites structural requirements as such, as they cannot to account for the unity of structural rationality by appeal to the reasons that support it.

There is a third option to deal with the issues discussed in this section, which is to dispense with structural requirements of rationality (§2.4) and adopt the view (briefly discussed in §1.3) that structural irrationality is to be explained in terms of substantive requirements of rationality, understood as requirements to respond correctly to reasons, alone. As its proponents have emphasized, this view has the benefits of preserving the idea that rationality is normative, while avoiding the problems that arise with assuming that there are reasons to comply with structural requirements. It is not troubled by detachment worries and can dismiss the why-be-rational challenge as an illegitimate request for a reason to do what we have reason to do. It is well-positioned to explain the criticizability of irrationality and the unity of rationality. But as we have seen already, it faces its own challenges. As noted at the beginning of this entry (§1.1), distinguishing between reasons and requirements of structural rationality gave us a way to explain how one’s holding one attitude can make it the case that one holds another attitude, one is irrational, without allowing the attitudes one has (no matter how misguided) to dictate what substantive reasons one has. Whether a theory that operates only with requirements of substantive rationality can do this is still a controversial question.

Thus, despite the now-voluminous literature on structural rationality, there remain deep challenges for all the views that have been identified. How one adjudicates the comparative seriousness of these challenges will affect whether one opts for a theory of rationality that includes normative structural requirements, non-normative structural requirements, or no structural requirements at all.

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Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Centre for Advanced Studies “Human Abilites”, Humboldt University and Free University Berlin) and the European Union (ERC Grant 101040439, REASONS F1RST). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. In addition, we would like to thank the participants of Thomas Schmidt’s philosophical colloquium at Humboldt University for their feedback. Parts of this article draw on The Normativity of Rationality , by Benjamin Kiesewetter (Oxford University Press 2017), and Fitting Things Together by Alex Worsnip (Oxford University Press 2021).

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RSC Advances

Rational synthesis of 3d coral-like znco 2 o 4 nanoclusters with abundant oxygen vacancies for high-performance supercapacitors †.

* Corresponding authors

a School of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China E-mail: [email protected] , [email protected]

b School of Materials Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China

c Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3255, USA

Transition metal oxides with high theoretical capacitance are regarded as desired electrode materials for supercapacitors, however, the poor conductivity and sluggish charge transfer kinetics constrain their electrochemical performance. The three-dimensional (3D) coral-like ZnCo 2 O 4 nanomaterials with abundant oxygen vacancies were synthesized through a facile hydrothermal method and chemical reduction approach. The introduced oxygen vacancies can provide more active sites and lower the energy barrier, thereby facilitating the kinetics of surface reactions. Furthermore, the abundant oxygen vacancies in metal oxides can function as shallow donors to facilitate charge carrier diffusion, resulting in a faster ion diffusion rate and superior electrochemical conductivity. The electrochemical performance of ZnCo 2 O 4 was optimized by the introduction of oxygen vacancies. The ZnCo 2 O 4 nanoclusters, reduced by 0.5 M NaBH 4 (ZnCo 2 O 4 -0.5), exhibit a specific capacitance of 2685.7 F g −1 at 1 A g −1 , which is nearly twice that of the pristine ZnCo 2 O 4 (1525.7 F g −1 at 1 A g −1 ). The ZnCo 2 O 4 -0.5 exhibits an excellent rate capacity (81.9% capacitance retention at 10 A g −1 ) and a long cycling stability (72.6% specific capacitance retention after 10 000 cycles at 3 A g −1 ). Furthermore, the asymmetric supercapacitor (ASC, ZnCo 2 O 4 -0.5 nanoclusters//active carbon) delivers a maximum energy density of 50.2 W h kg −1 at the power density of 493.7 W kg −1 and an excellent cycling stability (75.3% capacitance retention after 3000 cycles at 2 A g −1 ), surpassing the majority of previously reported ZnCo 2 O 4 -based supercapacitors. This work is important for revealing the pivotal role of implementing the defect engineering regulation strategy in achieving optimization of both electrochemical activity and conductivity.

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Rational synthesis of 3D coral-like ZnCo 2 O 4 nanoclusters with abundant oxygen vacancies for high-performance supercapacitors

Y. Bi, H. Fan, C. Hu, R. Wang, L. Niu, G. Wen and L. Qin, RSC Adv. , 2024,  14 , 11734 DOI: 10.1039/D4RA00927D

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