thesis synthesis antithesis examples

Persuasive Writing In Three Steps: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

April 14, 2021 by Ryan Law in

Great writing persuades. It persuades the reader that your product is right for them, that your process achieves the outcome they desire, that your opinion supersedes all other opinions. But spend an hour clicking around the internet and you’ll quickly realise that most content is passive, presenting facts and ideas without context or structure. The reader must connect the dots and create a convincing argument from the raw material presented to them. They rarely do, and for good reason: It’s hard work. The onus of persuasion falls on the writer, not the reader. Persuasive communication is a timeless challenge with an ancient solution. Zeno of Elea cracked it in the 5th century B.C. Georg Hegel gave it a lick of paint in the 1800s. You can apply it to your writing in three simple steps: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Use Dialectic to Find Logical Bedrock

“ Dialectic ” is a complicated-sounding idea with a simple meaning: It’s a structured process for taking two seemingly contradictory viewpoints and, through reasoned discussion, reaching a satisfactory conclusion. Over centuries of use the term has been burdened with the baggage of philosophy and academia. But at its heart, dialectics reflects a process similar to every spirited conversation or debate humans have ever had:

• Person A presents an idea: “We should travel to the Eastern waterhole because it’s closest to camp.”
• Person B disagrees and shares a counterargument: “I saw wolf prints on the Eastern trail, so we should go to the Western waterhole instead.”
• Person A responds to the counterargument , either disproving it or modifying their own stance to accommodate the criticism: “I saw those same wolf prints, but our party is large enough that the wolves won’t risk an attack.”
• Person B responds in a similar vein: “Ordinarily that would be true, but half of our party had dysentery last week so we’re not at full strength.”
• Person A responds: “They got dysentery from drinking at the Western waterhole.”

This process continues until conversational bedrock is reached: an idea that both parties understand and agree to, helped by the fact they’ve both been a part of the process that shaped it.

Dialectic is intended to help draw closer to the “truth” of an argument, tempering any viewpoint by working through and resolving its flaws. This same process can also be used to persuade.

Create Inevitability with Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

The philosopher Georg Hegel is most famous for popularizing a type of dialectics that is particularly well-suited to writing: thesis, antithesis, synthesis (also known, unsurprisingly, as Hegelian Dialectic ).

• Thesis: Present the status quo, the viewpoint that is currently accepted and widely held.
• Antithesis: Articulate the problems with the thesis. (Hegel also called this phase “the negative.”)
• Synthesis: Share a new viewpoint (a modified thesis) that resolves the problems.

Hegel’s method focused less on the search for absolute truth and more on replacing old ideas with newer, more sophisticated versions . That, in a nutshell, is the same objective as much of content marketing (and particularly thought leadership content ): We’re persuading the reader that our product, processes, and ideas are better and more useful than the “old” way of doing things. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis (or TAS) is a persuasive writing structure because it:

• Reduces complex arguments into a simple three-act structure. Complicated, nuanced arguments are simplified into a clear, concise format that anyone can follow. This simplification reflects well on the author: It takes mastery of a topic to explain it in it the simplest terms.
• Presents a balanced argument by “steelmanning” the best objection. Strong, one-sided arguments can trigger reactance in the reader: They don’t want to feel duped. TAS gives voice to their doubts, addressing their best objection and “giv[ing] readers the chance to entertain the other side, making them feel as though they have come to an objective conclusion.”
• Creates a sense of inevitability. Like a story building to a satisfying conclusion, articles written with TAS take the reader on a structured, logical journey that culminates in precisely the viewpoint we wish to advocate for. Doubts are voiced, ideas challenged, and the conclusion reached feels more valid and concrete as a result.

There are two main ways to apply TAS to your writing: Use it beef up your introductions, or apply it to your article’s entire structure.

Writing Article Introductions with TAS

Take a moment to scroll back to the top of this article. If I’ve done my job correctly, you’ll notice a now familiar formula staring back at you: The first three paragraphs are built around Hegel’s thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure. Here’s what the introduction looked like during the outlining process . The first paragraph shares the thesis, the accepted idea that great writing should be persuasive:

Next up, the antithesis introduces a complicating idea, explaining why most content marketing isn’t all that persuasive:

Finally, the synthesis shares a new idea that serves to reconcile the two previous paragraphs: Content can be made persuasive by using the thesis, antithesis, synthesis framework. The meat of the article is then focused on the nitty-gritty of the synthesis.

Introductions are hard, but thesis, antithesis, synthesis offers a simple way to write consistently persuasive opening copy. In the space of three short paragraphs, the article’s key ideas are shared , the entire argument is summarised, and—hopefully—the reader is hooked.

Best of all, most articles—whether how-to’s, thought leadership content, or even list content—can benefit from Hegelian Dialectic , for the simple reason that every article introduction should be persuasive enough to encourage the reader to stick around.

Structuring Entire Articles with TAS

Harder, but most persuasive, is to use thesis, antithesis, synthesis to structure your entire article. This works best for thought leadership content. Here, your primary objective is to advocate for a new idea and disprove the old, tired way of thinking—exactly the use case Hegel intended for his dialectic. It’s less useful for content that explores and illustrates a process, because the primary objective is to show the reader how to do something (like this article—otherwise, I would have written the whole darn thing using the framework). Arjun Sethi’s article The Hive is the New Network is a great example.

The article’s primary purpose is to explain why the “old” model of social networks is outmoded and offer a newer, better framework. (It would be equally valid—but less punchy—to publish this with the title “ Why the Hive is the New Network.”) The thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure shapes the entire article:

• Thesis: Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram grew by creating networks “that brought existing real-world relationships online.”
• Antithesis: As these networks grow, the less useful they become, skewing towards bots, “celebrity, meme and business accounts.”
• Synthesis: To survive continued growth, these networks need to embrace a new structure and become hives.

With the argument established, the vast majority of the article is focused on synthesis. After all, it requires little elaboration to share the status quo in a particular situation, and it’s relatively easy to point out the problems with a given idea. The synthesis—the solution that needs to reconcile both thesis and antithesis—is the hardest part to tackle and requires the greatest word count. Throughout the article, Arjun is systematically addressing the “best objections” to his theory and demonstrating why the “Hive” is the best solution:

• Antithesis: Why now? Why didn’t Hives emerge in the first place?
• Thesis: We were limited by technology, but today, we have the necessary infrastructure: “We’re no longer limited to a broadcast radio model, where one signal is received by many nodes. ...We sync with each other instantaneously, and all the time.”
• Antithesis: If the Hive is so smart, why aren’t our brightest and best companies already embracing it?
• Thesis: They are, and autonomous cars are a perfect example: “Why are all these vastly different companies converging on the autonomous car? That’s because for these companies, it’s about platform and hive, not just about roads without drivers.”

It takes bravery to tackle objections head-on and an innate understanding of the subject matter to even identify objections in the first place, but the effort is worthwhile. The end result is a structured journey through the arguments for and against the “Hive,” with the reader eventually reaching the same conclusion as the author: that “Hives” are superior to traditional networks.

Destination: Persuasion

Persuasion isn’t about cajoling or coercing the reader. Statistics and anecdotes alone aren’t all that persuasive. Simply sharing a new idea and hoping that it will trigger an about-turn in the reader’s beliefs is wishful thinking. Instead, you should take the reader on a journey—the same journey you travelled to arrive at your newfound beliefs, whether it’s about the superiority of your product or the zeitgeist-changing trend that’s about to break. Hegelian Dialectic—thesis, antithesis, synthesis— is a structured process for doing precisely that. It contextualises your ideas and explains why they matter. It challenges the idea and strengthens it in the process. Using centuries-old processes, it nudges the 21st-century reader onto a well-worn path that takes them exactly where they need to go.

Ryan is the Content Director at Ahrefs and former CMO of Animalz.

Why ‘Vertical Volatility’ Is the Missing Link in Your Keyword Strategy

Get insight and analysis on the world's top SaaS brands, each and every Monday morning.

Success! Now check your email to confirm your subscription.

There was an error submitting your subscription. Please try again.

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Hegel’s Dialectics

“Dialectics” is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of “dialectics”, the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato (see entry on Plato ), for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other. In the course of the dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes. The back-and-forth debate between opposing sides produces a kind of linear progression or evolution in philosophical views or positions: as the dialogues go along, Socrates’ interlocutors change or refine their views in response to Socrates’ challenges and come to adopt more sophisticated views. The back-and-forth dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors thus becomes Plato’s way of arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated views or positions and for the more sophisticated ones later.

“Hegel’s dialectics” refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel (see entry on Hegel ), which, like other “dialectical” methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Whereas Plato’s “opposing sides” were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the “opposing sides” are in Hegel’s work depends on the subject matter he discusses. In his work on logic, for instance, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of logical concepts that are opposed to one another. In the Phenomenology of Spirit , which presents Hegel’s epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato’s dialogues, a contradictory process between “opposing sides” in Hegel’s dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel’s method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel regarded this dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” (PR §10) as the hallmark of his philosophy and used the same method in the Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG], as well as in all of the mature works he published later—the entire Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (including, as its first part, the “Lesser Logic” or the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]), the Science of Logic [SL], and the Philosophy of Right [PR].

Note that, although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato’s version of dialectics. He argued that Plato’s dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31). According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then,

the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. (PhG-M §79)

Hegel argues that, because Plato’s dialectics cannot get beyond arbitrariness and skepticism, it generates only approximate truths, and falls short of being a genuine science (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31; cf. EL Remark to §81). The following sections examine Hegel’s dialectics as well as these issues in more detail.

1. Hegel’s description of his dialectical method

2. applying hegel’s dialectical method to his arguments, 3. why does hegel use dialectics, 4. is hegel’s dialectical method logical, 5. syntactic patterns and special terminology in hegel’s dialectics, english translations of key texts by hegel, english translations of other primary sources, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences , which is often called the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments (EL §79). These sides are not parts of logic, but, rather, moments of “every concept”, as well as “of everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79; we will see why Hegel thought dialectics is in everything in section 3 ). The first moment—the moment of the understanding—is the moment of fixity, in which concepts or forms have a seemingly stable definition or determination (EL §80).

The second moment—the “ dialectical ” (EL §§79, 81) or “ negatively rational ” (EL §79) moment—is the moment of instability. In this moment, a one-sidedness or restrictedness (EL Remark to §81) in the determination from the moment of understanding comes to the fore, and the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into its opposite (EL §81). Hegel describes this process as a process of “self-sublation” (EL §81). The English verb “to sublate” translates Hegel’s technical use of the German verb aufheben , which is a crucial concept in his dialectical method. Hegel says that aufheben has a doubled meaning: it means both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time (PhG §113; SL-M 107; SL-dG 81–2; cf. EL the Addition to §95). The moment of understanding sublates itself because its own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self -sublation, or a process in which the determination from the moment of understanding sublates itself , or both cancels and preserves itself , as it pushes on to or passes into its opposite.

The third moment—the “ speculative ” or “ positively rational ” (EL §§79, 82) moment—grasps the unity of the opposition between the first two determinations, or is the positive result of the dissolution or transition of those determinations (EL §82 and Remark to §82). Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, reductio ad absurdum argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing. As Hegel suggests in the Phenomenology , such an argument

is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results . (PhG-M §79)

Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a specific process. There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment has a definition, determination or content because it grows out of and unifies the particular character of those earlier determinations, or is “a unity of distinct determinations ” (EL Remark to §82). The speculative moment is thus “truly not empty, abstract nothing , but the negation of certain determinations ” (EL-GSH §82). When the result “is taken as the result of that from which it emerges”, Hegel says, then it is “in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content” (PhG-M §79). As he also puts it, “the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]; a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). Or, as he says, “[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation ], it has a content ” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54). Hegel’s claim in both the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic that his philosophy relies on a process of “ determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]” has sometimes led scholars to describe his dialectics as a method or doctrine of “determinate negation” (see entry on Hegel, section on Science of Logic ; cf. Rosen 1982: 30; Stewart 1996, 2000: 41–3; Winfield 1990: 56).

There are several features of this account that Hegel thinks raise his dialectical method above the arbitrariness of Plato’s dialectics to the level of a genuine science. First, because the determinations in the moment of understanding sublate themselves , Hegel’s dialectics does not require some new idea to show up arbitrarily. Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations and so “comes about on its own accord” (PhG-P §79). Indeed, for Hegel, the movement is driven by necessity (see, e.g., EL Remarks to §§12, 42, 81, 87, 88; PhG §79). The natures of the determinations themselves drive or force them to pass into their opposites. This sense of necessity —the idea that the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later ones—leads Hegel to regard his dialectics as a kind of logic . As he says in the Phenomenology , the method’s “proper exposition belongs to logic” (PhG-M §48). Necessity—the sense of being driven or forced to conclusions—is the hallmark of “logic” in Western philosophy.

Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside. Instead, the transition to the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the process itself. Unlike in Plato’s arbitrary dialectics, then—which must wait around until some other idea comes in from the outside—in Hegel’s dialectics “nothing extraneous is introduced”, as he says (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33). His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or “inwardness” of its own content (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33; cf. PR §31). As he puts it, dialectics is “the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).

Third, because later determinations “sublate” earlier determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely cancelled or negated. On the contrary, the earlier determinations are preserved in the sense that they remain in effect within the later determinations. When Being-for-itself, for instance, is introduced in the logic as the first concept of ideality or universality and is defined by embracing a set of “something-others”, Being-for-itself replaces the something-others as the new concept, but those something-others remain active within the definition of the concept of Being-for-itself. The something-others must continue to do the work of picking out individual somethings before the concept of Being-for-itself can have its own definition as the concept that gathers them up. Being-for-itself replaces the something-others, but it also preserves them, because its definition still requires them to do their work of picking out individual somethings (EL §§95–6).

The concept of “apple”, for example, as a Being-for-itself, would be defined by gathering up individual “somethings” that are the same as one another (as apples). Each individual apple can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to an “other” that is the same “something” that it is (i.e., an apple). That is the one-sidedness or restrictedness that leads each “something” to pass into its “other” or opposite. The “somethings” are thus both “something-others”. Moreover, their defining processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into one another: one “something” can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to another “something” that is the same as it is, which, in turn, can be what it is (an apple) only in relation to the other “something” that is the same as it is, and so on, back and forth, endlessly (cf. EL §95). The concept of “apple”, as a Being-for-itself, stops that endless, passing-over process by embracing or including the individual something-others (the apples) in its content. It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples . But the “something-others” must do their work of picking out and separating those individual items (the apples) before the concept of “apple”—as the Being-for-itself—can gather them up for its own definition. We can picture the concept of Being-for-itself like this:

Later concepts thus replace, but also preserve, earlier concepts.

Fourth, later concepts both determine and also surpass the limits or finitude of earlier concepts. Earlier determinations sublate themselves —they pass into their others because of some weakness, one-sidedness or restrictedness in their own definitions. There are thus limitations in each of the determinations that lead them to pass into their opposites. As Hegel says, “that is what everything finite is: its own sublation” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). Later determinations define the finiteness of the earlier determinations. From the point of view of the concept of Being-for-itself, for instance, the concept of a “something-other” is limited or finite: although the something-others are supposed to be the same as one another, the character of their sameness (e.g., as apples) is captured only from above, by the higher-level, more universal concept of Being-for-itself. Being-for-itself reveals the limitations of the concept of a “something-other”. It also rises above those limitations, since it can do something that the concept of a something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the finite to the universal. As Hegel puts it, “all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle [of dialectics]” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).

Fifth, because the determination in the speculative moment grasps the unity of the first two moments, Hegel’s dialectical method leads to concepts or forms that are increasingly comprehensive and universal. As Hegel puts it, the result of the dialectical process

is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite. (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54)

Like Being-for-itself, later concepts are more universal because they unify or are built out of earlier determinations, and include those earlier determinations as part of their definitions. Indeed, many other concepts or determinations can also be depicted as literally surrounding earlier ones (cf. Maybee 2009: 73, 100, 112, 156, 193, 214, 221, 235, 458).

Finally, because the dialectical process leads to increasing comprehensiveness and universality, it ultimately produces a complete series, or drives “to completion” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54; PhG §79). Dialectics drives to the “Absolute”, to use Hegel’s term, which is the last, final, and completely all-encompassing or unconditioned concept or form in the relevant subject matter under discussion (logic, phenomenology, ethics/politics and so on). The “Absolute” concept or form is unconditioned because its definition or determination contains all the other concepts or forms that were developed earlier in the dialectical process for that subject matter. Moreover, because the process develops necessarily and comprehensively through each concept, form or determination, there are no determinations that are left out of the process. There are therefore no left-over concepts or forms—concepts or forms outside of the “Absolute”—that might “condition” or define it. The “Absolute” is thus unconditioned because it contains all of the conditions in its content, and is not conditioned by anything else outside of it. This Absolute is the highest concept or form of universality for that subject matter. It is the thought or concept of the whole conceptual system for the relevant subject matter. We can picture the Absolute Idea (EL §236), for instance—which is the “Absolute” for logic—as an oval that is filled up with and surrounds numerous, embedded rings of smaller ovals and circles, which represent all of the earlier and less universal determinations from the logical development (cf. Maybee 2009: 30, 600):

Since the “Absolute” concepts for each subject matter lead into one another, when they are taken together, they constitute Hegel’s entire philosophical system, which, as Hegel says, “presents itself therefore as a circle of circles” (EL-GSH §15). We can picture the entire system like this (cf. Maybee 2009: 29):

Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical method genuinely scientific. As he says, “the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). He acknowledges that a description of the method can be more or less complete and detailed, but because the method or progression is driven only by the subject matter itself, this dialectical method is the “only true method” (SL-M 54; SL-dG 33).

So far, we have seen how Hegel describes his dialectical method, but we have yet to see how we might read this method into the arguments he offers in his works. Scholars often use the first three stages of the logic as the “textbook example” (Forster 1993: 133) to illustrate how Hegel’s dialectical method should be applied to his arguments. The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the understanding. We can think of Being here as a concept of pure presence. It is not mediated by any other concept—or is not defined in relation to any other concept—and so is undetermined or has no further determination (EL §86; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). It asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further determination. Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative (EL §87). It is therefore equally a Nothing (SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). Being’s lack of determination thus leads it to sublate itself and pass into the concept of Nothing (EL §87; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59), which illustrates the dialectical moment.

But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content. The only difference between them is “something merely meant ” (EL-GSH Remark to §87), namely, that Being is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be absence. The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence (Being) and then taken as absence (Nothing), or taken as absence (Nothing) and then taken as presence (Being). To Become is to go from Being to Nothing or from Nothing to Being, or is, as Hegel puts it, “the immediate vanishing of the one in the other” (SL-M 83; cf. SL-dG 60). The contradiction between Being and Nothing thus is not a reductio ad absurdum , or does not lead to the rejection of both concepts and hence to nothingness—as Hegel had said Plato’s dialectics does (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5)—but leads to a positive result, namely, to the introduction of a new concept—the synthesis—which unifies the two, earlier, opposed concepts.

We can also use the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example to illustrate Hegel’s concept of aufheben (to sublate), which, as we saw, means to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time. Hegel says that the concept of Becoming sublates the concepts of Being and Nothing (SL-M 105; SL-dG 80). Becoming cancels or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition. Indeed, it is the first concrete concept in the logic. Unlike Being and Nothing, which had no definition or determination as concepts themselves and so were merely abstract (SL-M 82–3; SL-dG 59–60; cf. EL Addition to §88), Becoming is a “ determinate unity in which there is both Being and Nothing” (SL-M 105; cf. SL-dG 80). Becoming succeeds in having a definition or determination because it is defined by, or piggy-backs on, the concepts of Being and Nothing.

This “textbook” Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely connected to the traditional idea that Hegel’s dialectics follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a “thesis” or positive concept, which then develops into a second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its “antithesis”, which in turn leads to a third concept, the “synthesis”, that unifies the first two (see, e.g., McTaggert 1964 [1910]: 3–4; Mure 1950: 302; Stace, 1955 [1924]: 90–3, 125–6; Kosek 1972: 243; E. Harris 1983: 93–7; Singer 1983: 77–79). Versions of this interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics continue to have currency (e.g., Forster 1993: 131; Stewart 2000: 39, 55; Fritzman 2014: 3–5). On this reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment of aufheben or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.

We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too dogmatically to the rest of Hegel’s logic or to his dialectical method more generally (for a classic criticism of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel’s dialectics, see Mueller 1958). There are other places where this general pattern might describe some of the transitions from stage to stage, but there are many more places where the development does not seem to fit this pattern very well. One place where the pattern seems to hold, for instance, is where the Measure (EL §107)—as the combination of Quality and Quantity—transitions into the Measureless (EL §107), which is opposed to it, which then in turn transitions into Essence, which is the unity or combination of the two earlier sides (EL §111). This series of transitions could be said to follow the general pattern captured by the “textbook example”: Measure would be the moment of the understanding or thesis, the Measureless would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Essence would be the speculative moment or synthesis that unifies the two earlier moments. However, before the transition to Essence takes place, the Measureless itself is redefined as a Measure (EL §109)—undercutting a precise parallel with the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example, since the transition from Measure to Essence would not follow a Measure-Measureless-Essence pattern, but rather a Measure-(Measureless?)-Measure-Essence pattern.

Other sections of Hegel’s philosophy do not fit the triadic, textbook example of Being-Nothing-Becoming at all, as even interpreters who have supported the traditional reading of Hegel’s dialectics have noted. After using the Being-Nothing-Becoming example to argue that Hegel’s dialectical method consists of “triads” whose members “are called the thesis, antithesis, synthesis” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 93), W.T. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system. It is hard to see, Stace says, how the middle term of some of Hegel’s triads are the opposites or antitheses of the first term, “and there are even ‘triads’ which contain four terms!” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 97). As a matter of fact, one section of Hegel’s logic—the section on Cognition—violates the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern because it has only two sub-divisions, rather than three. “The triad is incomplete”, Stace complains. “There is no third. Hegel here abandons the triadic method. Nor is any explanation of his having done so forthcoming” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 286; cf. McTaggart 1964 [1910]: 292).

Interpreters have offered various solutions to the complaint that Hegel’s dialectics sometimes seems to violate the triadic form. Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several stages (e.g. Burbidge 1981: 43–5; Taylor 1975: 229–30). Others have applied Hegel’s triadic method to whole sections of his philosophy, rather than to individual stages. For G.R.G. Mure, for instance, the section on Cognition fits neatly into a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis account of dialectics because the whole section is itself the antithesis of the previous section of Hegel’s logic, the section on Life (Mure 1950: 270). Mure argues that Hegel’s triadic form is easier to discern the more broadly we apply it. “The triadic form appears on many scales”, he says, “and the larger the scale we consider the more obvious it is” (Mure 1950: 302).

Scholars who interpret Hegel’s description of dialectics on a smaller scale—as an account of how to get from stage to stage—have also tried to explain why some sections seem to violate the triadic form. J.N. Findlay, for instance—who, like Stace, associates dialectics “with the triad , or with triplicity ”—argues that stages can fit into that form in “more than one sense” (Findlay 1962: 66). The first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming example. In a second sense, however, Findlay says, the dialectical moment or “contradictory breakdown” is not itself a separate stage, or “does not count as one of the stages”, but is a transition between opposed, “but complementary”, abstract stages that “are developed more or less concurrently” (Findlay 1962: 66). This second sort of triplicity could involve any number of stages: it “could readily have been expanded into a quadruplicity, a quintuplicity and so forth” (Findlay 1962: 66). Still, like Stace, he goes on to complain that many of the transitions in Hegel’s philosophy do not seem to fit the triadic pattern very well. In some triads, the second term is “the direct and obvious contrary of the first”—as in the case of Being and Nothing. In other cases, however, the opposition is, as Findlay puts it, “of a much less extreme character” (Findlay 1962: 69). In some triads, the third term obviously mediates between the first two terms. In other cases, however, he says, the third term is just one possible mediator or unity among other possible ones; and, in yet other cases, “the reconciling functions of the third member are not at all obvious” (Findlay 1962: 70).

Let us look more closely at one place where the “textbook example” of Being-Nothing-Becoming does not seem to describe the dialectical development of Hegel’s logic very well. In a later stage of the logic, the concept of Purpose goes through several iterations, from Abstract Purpose (EL §204), to Finite or Immediate Purpose (EL §205), and then through several stages of a syllogism (EL §206) to Realized Purpose (EL §210). Abstract Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, where the purpose has not been further determined or defined. It includes not just the kinds of purposes that occur in consciousness, such as needs or drives, but also the “internal purposiveness” or teleological view proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (see entry on Aristotle ; EL Remark to §204), according to which things in the world have essences and aim to achieve (or have the purpose of living up to) their essences. Finite Purpose is the moment in which an Abstract Purpose begins to have a determination by fixing on some particular material or content through which it will be realized (EL §205). The Finite Purpose then goes through a process in which it, as the Universality, comes to realize itself as the Purpose over the particular material or content (and hence becomes Realized Purpose) by pushing out into Particularity, then into Singularity (the syllogism U-P-S), and ultimately into ‘out-thereness,’ or into individual objects out there in the world (EL §210; cf. Maybee 2009: 466–493).

Hegel’s description of the development of Purpose does not seem to fit the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example or the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. According to the example and model, Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis, Finite Purpose would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis. Although Finite Purpose has a different determination from Abstract Purpose (it refines the definition of Abstract Purpose), it is hard to see how it would qualify as strictly “opposed” to or as the “antithesis” of Abstract Purpose in the way that Nothing is opposed to or is the antithesis of Being.

There is an answer, however, to the criticism that many of the determinations are not “opposites” in a strict sense. The German term that is translated as “opposite” in Hegel’s description of the moments of dialectics (EL §§81, 82)— entgegensetzen —has three root words: setzen (“to posit or set”), gegen , (“against”), and the prefix ent -, which indicates that something has entered into a new state. The verb entgegensetzen can therefore literally be translated as “to set over against”. The “ engegengesetzte ” into which determinations pass, then, do not need to be the strict “opposites” of the first, but can be determinations that are merely “set against” or are different from the first ones. And the prefix ent -, which suggests that the first determinations are put into a new state, can be explained by Hegel’s claim that the finite determinations from the moment of understanding sublate (cancel but also preserve) themselves (EL §81): later determinations put earlier determinations into a new state by preserving them.

At the same time, there is a technical sense in which a later determination would still be the “opposite” of the earlier determination. Since the second determination is different from the first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, or is not -the-first-determination. If the first determination is “e”, for instance, because the new determination is different from that one, the new one is “not-e” (Kosek 1972: 240). Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or determination that is different from the definition that Abstract Purpose has, it is not -Abstract-Purpose, or is the negation or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense. There is therefore a technical, logical sense in which the second concept or form is the “opposite” or negation of—or is “not”—the first one—though, again, it need not be the “opposite” of the first one in a strict sense.

Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the product of several stages of development (at least four, by my count, if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determination), which would seem to violate a triadic model. Moreover, the concept of Realized Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose. Realized Purpose is the result of (and so unifies) the syllogistic process of Finite Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on and is realized in a particular material or content. Realized Purpose thus seems to be a development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing.

These sorts of considerations have led some scholars to interpret Hegel’s dialectics in a way that is implied by a more literal reading of his claim, in the Encyclopaedia Logic , that the three “sides” of the form of logic—namely, the moment of understanding, the dialectical moment, and the speculative moment—“are moments of each [or every; jedes ] logically-real , that is each [or every; jedes ] concept” (EL Remark to §79; this is an alternative translation). The quotation suggests that each concept goes through all three moments of the dialectical process—a suggestion reinforced by Hegel’s claim, in the Phenomenology , that the result of the process of determinate negation is that “a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). According to this interpretation, the three “sides” are not three different concepts or forms that are related to one another in a triad—as the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example suggests—but rather different momentary sides or “determinations” in the life, so to speak, of each concept or form as it transitions to the next one. The three moments thus involve only two concepts or forms: the one that comes first, and the one that comes next (examples of philosophers who interpret Hegel’s dialectics in this second way include Maybee 2009; Priest 1989: 402; Rosen 2014: 122, 132; and Winfield 1990: 56).

For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure presence. This determination is one-sided or restricted however, because, as we saw, it ignores another aspect of Being’s definition, namely, that Being has no content or determination, which is how Being is defined in its dialectical moment. Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines that determination and leads to the definition it has in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being (as pure presence) implies nothing. It is also the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [ Entgegensetzung ]” (EL §82; alternative translation): since it captures a process from one to the other, it includes Being’s moment of understanding (as pure presence) and dialectical moment (as nothing or undetermined), but also compares those two determinations, or sets (- setzen ) them up against (- gegen ) each other. It even puts Being into a new state (as the prefix ent - suggests) because the next concept, Nothing, will sublate (cancel and preserve) Being.

The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted to be the speculative result of the concept of Being, it has its moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure absence, as the absence of determination. But Nothing’s moment of understanding is also one-sided or restricted: like Being, Nothing is also an undefined content, which is its determination in its dialectical moment. Nothing thus sublates itself : since it is an undefined content , it is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being did. It is present as an undefined content . Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces (cancels) Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition (as an undefined content) and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this (the circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are each undefined; cf. Maybee 2009: 51):

In its speculative moment, then, Nothing implies presence or Being, which is the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [ Entgegensetzung ]” (EL §82; alternative translation), since it both includes but—as a process from one to the other—also compares the two earlier determinations of Nothing, first, as pure absence and, second, as just as much presence.

The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or form—Becoming—not by a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothing—which leads Nothing to sublate itself—and by the implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and Nothing at the same time. Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence (i.e., Being) implies Nothing (or absence), and that an undefined content taken to be absence (i.e., Nothing) implies presence (i.e., Being). The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implications—namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing becomes Being. We can picture Becoming this way (cf. Maybee 2009: 53):

In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. In its moment of understanding, Finite Purpose particularizes into (or presents) its content as “ something-presupposed ” or as a pre-given object (EL §205). I go to a restaurant for the purpose of having dinner, for instance, and order a salad. My purpose of having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object—the salad. But this object or particularity—e.g. the salad—is “inwardly reflected” (EL §205): it has its own content—developed in earlier stages—which the definition of Finite Purpose ignores. We can picture Finite Purpose this way:

In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the previously ignored content, or by that other content. The one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose in relation to the ignored content. The first syllogism links the Finite Purpose to the first layer of content in the object: the Purpose or universality (e.g., dinner) goes through the particularity (e.g., the salad) to its content, the singularity (e.g., lettuce as a type of thing)—the syllogism U-P-S (EL §206). But the particularity (e.g., the salad) is itself a universality or purpose, “which at the same time is a syllogism within itself [ in sich ]” (EL Remark to §208; alternative translation), in relation to its own content. The salad is a universality/purpose that particularizes as lettuce (as a type of thing) and has its singularity in this lettuce here—a second syllogism, U-P-S. Thus, the first singularity (e.g., “lettuce” as a type of thing)—which, in this second syllogism, is the particularity or P —“ judges ” (EL §207) or asserts that “ U is S ”: it says that “lettuce” as a universality ( U ) or type of thing is a singularity ( S ), or is “this lettuce here”, for instance. This new singularity (e.g. “this lettuce here”) is itself a combination of subjectivity and objectivity (EL §207): it is an Inner or identifying concept (“lettuce”) that is in a mutually-defining relationship (the circular arrow) with an Outer or out-thereness (“this here”) as its content. In the speculative moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the whole process of development from the moment of understanding—when it is defined by particularizing into a pre-given object with a content that it ignores—to its dialectical moment—when it is also defined by the previously ignored content. We can picture the speculative moment of Finite Purpose this way:

Finite Purpose’s speculative moment leads to Realized Purpose. As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a return process (a series of return arrows) that establishes each layer and redefines Finite Purpose as Realized Purpose. The presence of “this lettuce here” establishes the actuality of “lettuce” as a type of thing (an Actuality is a concept that captures a mutually-defining relationship between an Inner and an Outer [EL §142]), which establishes the “salad”, which establishes “dinner” as the Realized Purpose over the whole process. We can picture Realized Purpose this way:

If Hegel’s account of dialectics is a general description of the life of each concept or form, then any section can include as many or as few stages as the development requires. Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)—a technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG §50; cf. section 3 )—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.

We can begin to see why Hegel was motivated to use a dialectical method by examining the project he set for himself, particularly in relation to the work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant (see entries on Hume and Kant ). Hume had argued against what we can think of as the naïve view of how we come to have scientific knowledge. According to the naïve view, we gain knowledge of the world by using our senses to pull the world into our heads, so to speak. Although we may have to use careful observations and do experiments, our knowledge of the world is basically a mirror or copy of what the world is like. Hume argued, however, that naïve science’s claim that our knowledge corresponds to or copies what the world is like does not work. Take the scientific concept of cause, for instance. According to that concept of cause, to say that one event causes another is to say that there is a necessary connection between the first event (the cause) and the second event (the effect), such that, when the first event happens, the second event must also happen. According to naïve science, when we claim (or know) that some event causes some other event, our claim mirrors or copies what the world is like. It follows that the necessary, causal connection between the two events must itself be out there in the world. However, Hume argued, we never observe any such necessary causal connection in our experience of the world, nor can we infer that one exists based on our reasoning (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature , Book I, Part III, Section II; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Section VII, Part I). There is nothing in the world itself that our idea of cause mirrors or copies.

Kant thought Hume’s argument led to an unacceptable, skeptical conclusion, and he rejected Hume’s own solution to the skepticism (see Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , B5, B19–20). Hume suggested that our idea of causal necessity is grounded merely in custom or habit, since it is generated by our own imaginations after repeated observations of one sort of event following another sort of event (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature , Book I, Section VI; Hegel also rejected Hume’s solution, see EL §39). For Kant, science and knowledge should be grounded in reason, and he proposed a solution that aimed to reestablish the connection between reason and knowledge that was broken by Hume’s skeptical argument. Kant’s solution involved proposing a Copernican revolution in philosophy ( Critique of Pure Reason , Bxvi). Nicholas Copernicus was the Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than the other way around. Kant proposed a similar solution to Hume’s skepticism. Naïve science assumes that our knowledge revolves around what the world is like, but, Hume’s criticism argued, this view entails that we cannot then have knowledge of scientific causes through reason. We can reestablish a connection between reason and knowledge, however, Kant suggested, if we say—not that knowledge revolves around what the world is like—but that knowledge revolves around what we are like . For the purposes of our knowledge, Kant said, we do not revolve around the world—the world revolves around us. Because we are rational creatures, we share a cognitive structure with one another that regularizes our experiences of the world. This intersubjectively shared structure of rationality—and not the world itself—grounds our knowledge.

However, Kant’s solution to Hume’s skepticism led to a skeptical conclusion of its own that Hegel rejected. While the intersubjectively shared structure of our reason might allow us to have knowledge of the world from our perspective, so to speak, we cannot get outside of our mental, rational structures to see what the world might be like in itself. As Kant had to admit, according to his theory, there is still a world in itself or “Thing-in-itself” ( Ding an sich ) about which we can know nothing (see, e.g., Critique of Pure Reason , Bxxv–xxvi). Hegel rejected Kant’s skeptical conclusion that we can know nothing about the world- or Thing-in-itself, and he intended his own philosophy to be a response to this view (see, e.g., EL §44 and the Remark to §44).

How did Hegel respond to Kant’s skepticism—especially since Hegel accepted Kant’s Copernican revolution, or Kant’s claim that we have knowledge of the world because of what we are like, because of our reason? How, for Hegel, can we get out of our heads to see the world as it is in itself? Hegel’s answer is very close to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle’s response to Plato. Plato argued that we have knowledge of the world only through the Forms. The Forms are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because the world is imperfect, however, Plato exiled the Forms to their own realm. Although things in the world get their definitions by participating in the Forms, those things are, at best, imperfect copies of the universal Forms (see, e.g., Parmenides 131–135a). The Forms are therefore not in this world, but in a separate realm of their own. Aristotle argued, however, that the world is knowable not because things in the world are imperfect copies of the Forms, but because the Forms are in things themselves as the defining essences of those things (see, e.g., De Anima [ On the Soul ], Book I, Chapter 1 [403a26–403b18]; Metaphysics , Book VII, Chapter 6 [1031b6–1032a5] and Chapter 8 [1033b20–1034a8]).

In a similar way, Hegel’s answer to Kant is that we can get out of our heads to see what the world is like in itself—and hence can have knowledge of the world in itself—because the very same rationality or reason that is in our heads is in the world itself . As Hegel apparently put it in a lecture, the opposition or antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears by saying, as the Ancients did,

that nous governs the world, or by our own saying that there is reason in the world, by which we mean that reason is the soul of the world, inhabits it, and is immanent in it, as it own, innermost nature, its universal. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to §24)

Hegel used an example familiar from Aristotle’s work to illustrate this view:

“to be an animal”, the kind considered as the universal, pertains to the determinate animal and constitutes its determinate essentiality. If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what it is. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to §24; cf. SL-dG 16–17, SL-M 36-37)

Kant’s mistake, then, was that he regarded reason or rationality as only in our heads, Hegel suggests (EL §§43–44), rather than in both us and the world itself (see also below in this section and section 4 ). We can use our reason to have knowledge of the world because the very same reason that is in us, is in the world itself as it own defining principle. The rationality or reason in the world makes reality understandable, and that is why we can have knowledge of, or can understand, reality with our rationality. Dialectics—which is Hegel’s account of reason—characterizes not only logic, but also “everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79).

But why does Hegel come to define reason in terms of dialectics, and hence adopt a dialectical method? We can begin to see what drove Hegel to adopt a dialectical method by returning once again to Plato’s philosophy. Plato argued that we can have knowledge of the world only by grasping the Forms, which are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because things in the world are so imperfect, however, Plato concluded that the Forms are not in this world, but in a realm of their own. After all, if a human being were perfectly beautiful, for instance, then he or she would never become not-beautiful. But human beings change, get old, and die, and so can be, at best, imperfect copies of the Form of beauty—though they get whatever beauty they have by participating in that Form. Moreover, for Plato, things in the world are such imperfect copies that we cannot gain knowledge of the Forms by studying things in the world, but only through reason, that is, only by using our rationality to access the separate realm of the Forms (as Plato argued in the well-known parable of the cave; Republic , Book 7, 514–516b).

Notice, however, that Plato’s conclusion that the Forms cannot be in this world and so must be exiled to a separate realm rests on two claims. First, it rests on the claim that the world is an imperfect and messy place—a claim that is hard to deny. But it also rests on the assumption that the Forms—the universal, rational concepts or ideas of reason itself—are static and fixed, and so cannot grasp the messiness within the imperfect world. Hegel is able to link reason back to our messy world by changing the definition of reason. Instead of saying that reason consists of static universals, concepts or ideas, Hegel says that the universal concepts or forms are themselves messy . Against Plato, Hegel’s dialectical method allows him to argue that universal concepts can “overgrasp” (from the German verb übergreifen ) the messy, dialectical nature of the world because they, themselves, are dialectical . Moreover, because later concepts build on or sublate (cancel, but also preserve) earlier concepts, the later, more universal concepts grasp the dialectical processes of earlier concepts. As a result, higher-level concepts can grasp not only the dialectical nature of earlier concepts or forms, but also the dialectical processes that make the world itself a messy place. The highest definition of the concept of beauty, for instance, would not take beauty to be fixed and static, but would include within it the dialectical nature or finiteness of beauty, the idea that beauty becomes, on its own account, not-beauty. This dialectical understanding of the concept of beauty can then overgrasp the dialectical and finite nature of beauty in the world, and hence the truth that, in the world, beautiful things themselves become not-beautiful, or might be beautiful in one respect and not another. Similarly, the highest determination of the concept of “tree” will include within its definition the dialectical process of development and change from seed to sapling to tree. As Hegel says, dialectics is “the principle of all natural and spiritual life” (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35), or “the moving soul of scientific progression” (EL §81). Dialectics is what drives the development of both reason as well as of things in the world. A dialectical reason can overgrasp a dialectical world.

Two further journeys into the history of philosophy will help to show why Hegel chose dialectics as his method of argument. As we saw, Hegel argues against Kant’s skepticism by suggesting that reason is not only in our heads, but in the world itself. To show that reason is in the world itself, however, Hegel has to show that reason can be what it is without us human beings to help it. He has to show that reason can develop on its own, and does not need us to do the developing for it (at least for those things in the world that are not human-created). As we saw (cf. section 1 ), central to Hegel’s dialectics is the idea that concepts or forms develop on their own because they “self-sublate”, or sublate (cancel and preserve) themselves , and so pass into subsequent concepts or forms on their own accounts, because of their own, dialectical natures. Thus reason, as it were, drives itself, and hence does not need our heads to develop it. Hegel needs an account of self-driving reason to get beyond Kant’s skepticism.

Ironically, Hegel derives the basic outlines of his account of self-driving reason from Kant. Kant divided human rationality into two faculties: the faculty of the understanding and the faculty of reason. The understanding uses concepts to organize and regularize our experiences of the world. Reason’s job is to coordinate the concepts and categories of the understanding by developing a completely unified, conceptual system, and it does this work, Kant thought, on its own, independently of how those concepts might apply to the world. Reason coordinates the concepts of the understanding by following out necessary chains of syllogisms to produce concepts that achieve higher and higher levels of conceptual unity. Indeed, this process will lead reason to produce its own transcendental ideas, or concepts that go beyond the world of experience. Kant calls this necessary, concept-creating reason “speculative” reason (cf. Critique of Pure Reason , Bxx–xxi, A327/B384). Reason creates its own concepts or ideas—it “speculates”—by generating new and increasingly comprehensive concepts of its own, independently of the understanding. In the end, Kant thought, reason will follow out such chains of syllogisms until it develops completely comprehensive or unconditioned universals—universals that contain all of the conditions or all of the less-comprehensive concepts that help to define them. As we saw (cf. section 1 ), Hegel’s dialectics adopts Kant’s notion of a self-driving and concept-creating “speculative” reason, as well as Kant’s idea that reason aims toward unconditioned universality or absolute concepts.

Ultimately, Kant thought, reasons’ necessary, self-driving activity will lead it to produce contradictions—what he called the “antinomies”, which consist of a thesis and antithesis. Once reason has generated the unconditioned concept of the whole world, for instance, Kant argued, it can look at the world in two, contradictory ways. In the first antinomy, reason can see the world (1) as the whole totality or as the unconditioned, or (2) as the series of syllogisms that led up to that totality. If reason sees the world as the unconditioned or as a complete whole that is not conditioned by anything else, then it will see the world as having a beginning and end in terms of space and time, and so will conclude (the thesis) that the world has a beginning and end or limit. But if reason sees the world as the series, in which each member of the series is conditioned by the previous member, then the world will appear to be without a beginning and infinite, and reason will conclude (the antithesis) that the world does not have a limit in terms of space and time (cf. Critique of Pure Reason , A417–18/B445–6). Reason thus leads to a contradiction: it holds both that the world has a limit and that it does not have a limit at the same time. Because reason’s own process of self-development will lead it to develop contradictions or to be dialectical in this way, Kant thought that reason must be kept in check by the understanding. Any conclusions that reason draws that do not fall within the purview of the understanding cannot be applied to the world of experience, Kant said, and so cannot be considered genuine knowledge ( Critique of Pure Reason , A506/B534).

Hegel adopts Kant’s dialectical conception of reason, but he liberates reason for knowledge from the tyranny of the understanding. Kant was right that reason speculatively generates concepts on its own, and that this speculative process is driven by necessity and leads to concepts of increasing universality or comprehensiveness. Kant was even right to suggest—as he had shown in the discussion of the antinomies—that reason is dialectical, or necessarily produces contradictions on its own. Again, Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “ things in themselves ” (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35; see also section 4 ). Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it , shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself. Kant, however, failed to draw this conclusion, and continued to regard reason’s conclusions as illusions. Still, Kant’s philosophy vindicated the general idea that the contradictions he took to be illusions are both objective—or out there in the world—and necessary. As Hegel puts it, Kant vindicates the general idea of “the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations” (SL-M 56; cf. SL-dG 35), or to the nature of concepts themselves.

The work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (see entry on Fichte ) showed Hegel how dialectics can get beyond Kant—beyond the contradictions that, as Kant had shown, reason (necessarily) develops on its own, beyond the reductio ad absurdum argument (which, as we saw above, holds that a contradiction leads to nothingness), and beyond Kant’s skepticism, or Kant’s claim that reason’s contradictions must be reined in by the understanding and cannot count as knowledge. Fichte argued that the task of discovering the foundation of all human knowledge leads to a contradiction or opposition between the self and the not-self (it is not important, for our purposes, why Fichte held this view). The kind of reasoning that leads to this contradiction, Fichte said, is the analytical or antithetical method of reasoning, which involves drawing out an opposition between elements (in this case, the self and not-self) that are being compared to, or equated with, one another. While the traditional reductio ad absurdum argument would lead us to reject both sides of the contradiction and start from scratch, Fichte argued that the contradiction or opposition between the self and not-self can be resolved. In particular, the contradiction is resolved by positing a third concept—the concept of divisibility—which unites the two sides ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 110–11; Fichte 1982: 108–110). The concept of divisibility is produced by a synthetic procedure of reasoning, which involves “discovering in opposites the respect in which they are alike ” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 112–13; Fichte 1982: 111). Indeed, Fichte argued, not only is the move to resolve contradictions with synthetic concepts or judgments possible, it is necessary . As he says of the move from the contradiction between self and not-self to the synthetic concept of divisibility,

there can be no further question as to the possibility of this [synthesis], nor can any ground for it be given; it is absolutely possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any kind. ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 114; Fichte 1982: 112)

Since the analytical method leads to oppositions or contradictions, he argued, if we use only analytic judgments, “we not only do not get very far, as Kant says; we do not get anywhere at all” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 113; Fichte 1982: 112). Without the synthetic concepts or judgments, we are left, as the classic reductio ad absurdum argument suggests, with nothing at all. The synthetic concepts or judgments are thus necessary to get beyond contradiction without leaving us with nothing.

Fichte’s account of the synthetic method provides Hegel with the key to moving beyond Kant. Fichte suggested that a synthetic concept that unifies the results of a dialectically-generated contradiction does not completely cancel the contradictory sides, but only limits them. As he said, in general, “[t]o limit something is to abolish its reality, not wholly , but in part only” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 108; Fichte 1982: 108). Instead of concluding, as a reductio ad absurdum requires, that the two sides of a contradiction must be dismissed altogether, the synthetic concept or judgment retroactively justifies the opposing sides by demonstrating their limit, by showing which part of reality they attach to and which they do not ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 108–10; Fichte 1982: 108–9), or by determining in what respect and to what degree they are each true. For Hegel, as we saw (cf. section 1 ), later concepts and forms sublate—both cancel and preserve —earlier concepts and forms in the sense that they include earlier concepts and forms in their own definitions. From the point of view of the later concepts or forms, the earlier ones still have some validity, that is, they have a limited validity or truth defined by the higher-level concept or form.

Dialectically generated contradictions are therefore not a defect to be reigned in by the understanding, as Kant had said, but invitations for reason to “speculate”, that is, for reason to generate precisely the sort of increasingly comprehensive and universal concepts and forms that Kant had said reason aims to develop. Ultimately, Hegel thought, as we saw (cf. section 1 ), the dialectical process leads to a completely unconditioned concept or form for each subject matter—the Absolute Idea (logic), Absolute Spirit (phenomenology), Absolute Idea of right and law ( Philosophy of Right ), and so on—which, taken together, form the “circle of circles” (EL §15) that constitutes the whole philosophical system or “Idea” (EL §15) that both overgrasps the world and makes it understandable (for us).

Note that, while Hegel was clearly influenced by Fichte’s work, he never adopted Fichte’s triadic “thesis—antithesis—synthesis” language in his descriptions of his own philosophy (Mueller 1958: 411–2; Solomon 1983: 23), though he did apparently use it in his lectures to describe Kant’s philosophy (LHP III: 477). Indeed, Hegel criticized formalistic uses of the method of “ triplicity [Triplizität]” (PhG-P §50) inspired by Kant—a criticism that could well have been aimed at Fichte. Hegel argued that Kantian-inspired uses of triadic form had been reduced to “a lifeless schema” and “an actual semblance [ eigentlichen Scheinen ]” (PhG §50; alternative translation) that, like a formula in mathematics, was simply imposed on top of subject matters. Instead, a properly scientific use of Kant’s “triplicity” should flow—as he said his own dialectical method did (see section 1 )—out of “the inner life and self-movement” (PhG §51) of the content.

Scholars have often questioned whether Hegel’s dialectical method is logical. Some of their skepticism grows out of the role that contradiction plays in his thought and argument. While many of the oppositions embedded in the dialectical development and the definitions of concepts or forms are not contradictions in the strict sense, as we saw ( section 2 , above), scholars such as Graham Priest have suggested that some of them arguably are (Priest 1989: 391). Hegel even holds, against Kant (cf. section 3 above), that there are contradictions, not only in thought, but also in the world. Motion, for instance, Hegel says, is an “ existent contradiction”. As he describes it:

Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now, but because in one and the same now it is here and not here, because in this here, it is and is not at the same time. (SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M 440)

Kant’s sorts of antinomies (cf. section 3 above) or contradictions more generally are therefore, as Hegel puts it in one place, “in all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts and ideas” (EL-GSH Remark to §48). Hegel thus seems to reject, as he himself explicitly claims (SL-M 439–40; SL-dG 381–82), the law of non-contradiction, which is a fundamental principle of formal logic—the classical, Aristotelian logic (see entries on Aristotle’s Logic and Contradiction ) that dominated during Hegel’s lifetime as well as the dominant systems of symbolic logic today (cf. Priest 1989: 391; Düsing 2010: 97–103). According to the law of non-contradiction, something cannot be both true and false at the same time or, put another way, “x” and “not-x” cannot both be true at the same time.

Hegel’s apparent rejection of the law of non-contradiction has led some interpreters to regard his dialectics as illogical, even “absurd” (Popper 1940: 420; 1962: 330; 2002: 443). Karl R. Popper, for instance, argued that accepting Hegel’s and other dialecticians’ rejection of the law of non-contradiction as part of both a logical theory and a general theory of the world “would mean a complete breakdown of science” (Popper 1940: 408; 1962: 317; 2002: 426). Since, according to today’s systems of symbolic logic, he suggested, the truth of a contradiction leads logically to any claim (any claim can logically be inferred from two contradictory claims), if we allow contradictory claims to be valid or true together, then we would have no reason to rule out any claim whatsoever (Popper 1940: 408–410; 1962: 317–319; 2002: 426–429).

Popper was notoriously hostile toward Hegel’s work (cf. Popper 2013: 242–289; for a scathing criticism of Popper’s analysis see Kaufmann 1976 [1972]), but, as Priest has noted (Priest 1989: 389–91), even some sympathetic interpreters have been inspired by today’s dominant systems of symbolic logic to hold that the kind of contradiction that is embedded in Hegel’s dialectics cannot be genuine contradiction in the strict sense. While Dieter Wandschneider, for instance, grants that his sympathetic theory of dialectic “is not presented as a faithful interpretation of the Hegelian text” (Wandschneider 2010: 32), he uses the same logical argument that Popper offered in defense of the claim that “dialectical contradiction is not a ‘normal’ contradiction, but one that is actually only an apparent contradiction” (Wandschneider 2010: 37). The suggestion (by the traditional, triadic account of Hegel’s dialectics, cf. section 2 , above) that Being and Nothing (or non-being) is a contradiction, for instance, he says, rests on an ambiguity. Being is an undefined content, taken to mean being or presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken to mean nothing or absence ( section 2 , above; cf. Wandschneider 2010: 34–35). Being is Nothing (or non-being) with respect to the property they have as concepts, namely, that they both have an undefined content. But Being is not Nothing (or non-being) with respect to their meaning (Wandschneider 2010: 34–38). The supposed contradiction between them, then, Wandschneider suggests, takes place “in different respects ”. It is therefore only an apparent contradiction. “Rightly understood”, he concludes, “there can be no talk of contradiction ” (Wandschneider 2010: 38).

Inoue Kazumi also argues that dialectical contradiction in the Hegelian sense does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 121–123), and he rejects Popper’s claim that Hegel’s dialectical method is incompatible with good science. A dialectical contradiction, Inoue says, is a contradiction that arises when the same topic is considered from different vantage points, but each vantage point by itself does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 120). The understanding leads to contradictions, as Hegel said (cf. section 3 above), because it examines a topic from a fixed point of view; reason embraces contradictions because it examines a topic from multiple points of view (Inoue 2014: 121). The geocentric theory that the sun revolves around the Earth and the heliocentric theory that the Earth revolves around the sun, for instance, Inoue suggests, are both correct from certain points of view. We live our everyday lives from a vantage point in which the sun makes a periodic rotation around the Earth roughly every 24 hours. Astronomers make their observations from a geocentric point of view and then translate those observations into a heliocentric one. From these points of view, the geocentric account is not incorrect. But physics, particularly in its concepts of mass and force, requires the heliocentric account. For science—which takes all these points of view into consideration—both theories are valid: they are dialectically contradictory, though neither theory, by itself, violates the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 126–127). To insist that the Earth really revolves around the sun is merely an irrational, reductive prejudice, theoretically and practically (Inoue 2014: 126). Dialectical contradictions, Inoue says, are, as Hegel said, constructive: they lead to concepts or points of view that grasp the world from ever wider and more encompassing perspectives, culminating ultimately in the “Absolute” (Inoue 2014: 121; cf. section 1 , above). Hegel’s claim that motion violates the law of non-contradiction, Inoue suggests, is an expression of the idea that contradictory claims can be true when motion is described from more than one point of view (Inoue 2014: 123). (For a similar reading of Hegel’s conception of dialectical contradiction, which influenced Inoue’s account [Inoue 2014: 121], see Düsing 2010: 102–103.)

Other interpreters, however, have been inspired by Hegel’s dialectics to develop alternative systems of logic that do not subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Priest, for instance, has defended Hegel’s rejection of the law of non-contradiction (cf. Priest 1989; 1997 [2006: 4]). The acceptance of some contradictions, he has suggested, does not require the acceptance of all contradictions (Priest 1989: 392). Popper’s logical argument is also unconvincing. Contradictions lead logically to any claim whatsoever, as Popper said, only if we presuppose that nothing can be both true and false at the same time (i.e. only if we presuppose that the law of non-contradiction is correct), which is just what Hegel denies. Popper’s logical argument thus assumes what it is supposed to prove or begs the question (Priest 1989: 392; 1997 [2006: 5–6]), and so is not convincing. Moreover, consistency (not allowing contradictions), Priest suggests, is actually “a very weak constraint” (Priest 1997 [2006: 104]) on what counts as a rational inference. Other principles or criteria—such as being strongly disproved (or supported) by the data—are more important for determining whether a claim or inference is rational (Priest 1997 [2006: 105]). And, as Hegel pointed out, Priest says, the data—namely, “the world as it appears ” (as Hegel puts it in EL) or “ordinary experience itself” (as Hegel puts it in SL)—suggest that there are indeed contradictions (EL Remark to §48; SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M 440; Priest 1989: 389, 399–400). Hegel is right, for instance, Priest argues, that change, and motion in particular, are examples of real or existing contradictions (Priest 1985; 1989: 396–97; 1997 [2006: 172–181, 213–15]). What distinguishes motion, as a process, from a situation in which something is simply here at one time and then some other place at some other time is the embodiment of contradiction: that, in a process of motion, there is one (span of) time in which something is both here and not here at the same time (in that span of time) (Priest 1985: 340–341; 1997 [2006: 172–175, 213–214]). A system of logic, Priest suggests, is always just a theory about what good reasoning should be like (Priest 1989: 392). A dialectical logic that admits that there are “dialetheia” or true contradictions (Priest 1989: 388), he says, is a broader theory or version of logic than traditional, formal logics that subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Those traditional logics apply only to topics or domains that are consistent, primarily domains that are “static and changeless” (Priest 1989: 391; cf. 395); dialectical/dialetheic logic handles consistent domains, but also applies to domains in which there are dialetheia. Thus Priest, extending Hegel’s own concept of aufheben (“to sublate”; cf. section 1 , above), suggests that traditional “formal logic is perfectly valid in its domain, but dialectical (dialetheic) logic is more general” (Priest 1989: 395). (For an earlier example of a logical system that allows contradiction and was inspired in part by Hegel [and Marx], see Jaśkowski 1999: 36 [1969: 143] [cf. Inoue 2014: 128–129]. For more on dialetheic logic generally, see the entry on Dialetheism .)

Worries that Hegel’s arguments fail to fit his account of dialectics (see section 2 , above) have led some interpreters to conclude that his method is arbitrary or that his works have no single dialectical method at all (Findlay 1962: 93; Solomon 1983: 21). These interpreters reject the idea that there is any logical necessity to the moves from stage to stage. “[T]he important point to make here, and again and again”, Robert C. Solomon writes, for instance,

is that the transition from the first form to the second, or the transition from the first form of the Phenomenology all the way to the last, is not in any way a deductive necessity. The connections are anything but entailments, and the Phenomenology could always take another route and other starting points. (Solomon 1983: 230)

In a footnote to this passage, Solomon adds “that a formalization of Hegel’s logic, however ingenious, is impossible” (Solomon 1983: 230).

Some scholars have argued that Hegel’s necessity is not intended to be logical necessity. Walter Kaufmann suggested, for instance, that the necessity at work in Hegel’s dialectic is a kind of organic necessity. The moves in the Phenomenology , he said, follow one another “in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image from the preface, bud, blossom and fruit succeed each other” (Kaufmann 1965: 148; 1966: 132). Findlay argued that later stages provide what he called a “ higher-order comment ” on earlier stages, even if later stages do not follow from earlier ones in a trivial way (Findlay 1966: 367). Solomon suggested that the necessity that Hegel wants is not “‘necessity’ in the modern sense of ‘logical necessity,’” (Solomon 1983: 209), but a kind of progression (Solomon 1983: 207), or a “necessity within a context for some purpose ” (Solomon 1983: 209). John Burbidge defines Hegel’s necessity in terms of three senses of the relationship between actuality and possibility, only the last of which is logical necessity (Burbidge 1981: 195–6).

Other scholars have defined the necessity of Hegel’s dialectics in terms of a transcendental argument. A transcendental argument begins with uncontroversial facts of experience and tries to show that other conditions must be present—or are necessary—for those facts to be possible. Jon Stewart argues, for instance, that “Hegel’s dialectic in the Phenomenology is a transcendental account” in this sense, and thus has the necessity of that form of argument (Stewart 2000: 23; cf. Taylor 1975: 97, 226–7; for a critique of this view, see Pinkard 1988: 7, 15).

Some scholars have avoided these debates by interpreting Hegel’s dialectics in a literary way. In his examination of the epistemological theory of the Phenomenology , for instance, Kenneth R. Westphal offers “a literary model” of Hegel’s dialectics based on the story of Sophocles’ play Antigone (Westphal 2003: 14, 16). Ermanno Bencivenga offers an interpretation that combines a narrative approach with a concept of necessity. For him, the necessity of Hegel’s dialectical logic can be captured by the notion of telling a good story—where “good” implies that the story is both creative and correct at the same time (Bencivenga 2000: 43–65).

Debate over whether Hegel’s dialectical logic is logical may also be fueled in part by discomfort with his particular brand of logic. Unlike today’s symbolic logics, Hegel’s logic is not only syntactic, but also semantic (cf. Berto 2007; Maybee 2009: xx–xxv; Margolis 2010: 193–94). Hegel’s interest in semantics appears, for instance, in the very first stages of his logic, where the difference between Being and Nothing is “something merely meant ” (EL-GSH Remark to §87; cf. section 2 above). While some of the moves from stage to stage are driven by syntactic necessity, other moves are driven by the meanings of the concepts in play. Indeed, Hegel rejected what he regarded as the overly formalistic logics that dominated the field during his day (EL Remark to §162; SL-M 43–44; SL-dG 24). A logic that deals only with the forms of logical arguments and not the meanings of the concepts used in those argument forms will do no better in terms of preserving truth than the old joke about computer programs suggests: garbage in, garbage out. In those logics, if we (using today’s versions of formal, symbolic logic) plug in something for the P or Q (in the proposition “if P then Q ” or “ P → Q ”, for instance) or for the “ F ”, “ G ”, or “ x ” (in the proposition “if F is x , then G is x ” or “ F x → G x ”, for instance) that means something true, then the syntax of formal logics will preserve that truth. But if we plug in something for those terms that is untrue or meaningless (garbage in), then the syntax of formal logic will lead to an untrue or meaningless conclusion (garbage out). Today’s versions of prepositional logic also assume that we know what the meaning of “is” is. Against these sorts of logics, Hegel wanted to develop a logic that not only preserved truth, but also determined how to construct truthful claims in the first place. A logic that defines concepts (semantics) as well as their relationships with one another (syntax) will show, Hegel thought, how concepts can be combined into meaningful forms. Because interpreters are familiar with modern logics focused on syntax, however, they may regard Hegel’s syntactic and semantic logic as not really logical (cf. Maybee 2009: xvii–xxv).

In Hegel’s other works, the moves from stage to stage are often driven, not only by syntax and semantics—that is, by logic (given his account of logic)—but also by considerations that grow out of the relevant subject matter. In the Phenomenology , for instance, the moves are driven by syntax, semantics, and by phenomenological factors. Sometimes a move from one stage to the next is driven by a syntactic need—the need to stop an endless, back-and-forth process, for instance, or to take a new path after all the current options have been exhausted (cf. section 5 ). Sometimes, a move is driven by the meaning of a concept, such as the concept of a “This” or “Thing”. And sometimes a move is driven by a phenomenological need or necessity—by requirements of consciousness , or by the fact that the Phenomenology is about a consciousness that claims to be aware of (or to know) something. The logic of the Phenomenology is thus a phenomeno -logic, or a logic driven by logic—syntax and semantics—and by phenomenological considerations. Still, interpreters such as Quentin Lauer have suggested that, for Hegel,

phenomeno-logy is a logic of appearing, a logic of implication, like any other logic, even though not of the formal entailment with which logicians and mathematicians are familiar. (Lauer 1976: 3)

Lauer warns us against dismissing the idea that there is any implication or necessity in Hegel’s method at all (Lauer 1976: 3). (Other scholars who also believe there is a logical necessity to the dialectics of the Phenomenology include Hyppolite 1974: 78–9 and H.S. Harris 1997: xii.)

We should also be careful not to exaggerate the “necessity” of formal, symbolic logics. Even in these logics, there can often be more than one path from some premises to the same conclusion, logical operators can be dealt with in different orders, and different sets of operations can be used to reach the same conclusions. There is therefore often no strict, necessary “entailment” from one step to the next, even though the conclusion might be entailed by the whole series of steps, taken together. As in today’s logics, then, whether Hegel’s dialectics counts as logical depends on the degree to which he shows that we are forced—necessarily—from earlier stages or series of stages to later stages (see also section 5 ).

Although Hegel’s dialectics is driven by syntax, semantics and considerations specific to the different subject matters ( section 4 above), several important syntactic patterns appear repeatedly throughout his works. In many places, the dialectical process is driven by a syntactic necessity that is really a kind of exhaustion: when the current strategy has been exhausted, the process is forced, necessarily, to employ a new strategy. As we saw ( section 2 ), once the strategy of treating Being and Nothing as separate concepts is exhausted, the dialectical process must, necessarily, adopt a different strategy, namely, one that takes the two concepts together. The concept of Becoming captures the first way in which Being and Nothing are taken together. In the stages of Quantum through Number, the concepts of One and Many take turns defining the whole quantity as well as the quantitative bits inside that make it up: first, the One is the whole, while the Many are the bits; then the whole and the bits are all Ones; then the Many is the whole, while the bits are each a One; and finally the whole and the bits are all a Many. We can picture the development like this (cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix):

Since One and Many have been exhausted, the next stage, Ratio, must, necessarily, employ a different strategy to grasp the elements in play. Just as Being-for-itself is a concept of universality for Quality and captures the character of a set of something-others in its content (see section 1 ), so Ratio (the whole rectangle with rounded corners) is a concept of universality for Quantity and captures the character of a set of quantities in its content (EL §105–6; cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix, 95–7). In another version of syntactic necessity driven by exhaustion, the dialectical development will take account of every aspect or layer, so to speak, of a concept or form—as we saw in the stages of Purpose outlined above, for instance ( section 2 ). Once all the aspects or layers of a concept or form have been taken account of and so exhausted, the dialectical development must also, necessarily, employ a different strategy in the next stage to grasp the elements in play.

In a second, common syntactic pattern, the dialectical development leads to an endless, back-and-forth process—a “bad” (EL-BD §94) or “spurious” (EL-GSH §94) infinity—between two concepts or forms. Hegel’s dialectics cannot rest with spurious infinities. So long as the dialectical process is passing endlessly back and forth between two elements, it is never finished, and the concept or form in play cannot be determined. Spurious infinities must therefore be resolved or stopped, and they are always resolved by a higher-level, more universal concept. In some cases, a new, higher-level concept is introduced that stops the spurious infinity by grasping the whole, back-and-forth process. Being-for-itself (cf. section 1 ), for instance, is introduced as a new, more universal concept that embraces—and hence stops—the whole, back-and-forth process between “something-others”. However, if the back-and-forth process takes place between a concept and its own content—in which case the concept already embraces the content—then that embracing concept is redefined in a new way that grasps the whole, back-and-forth process. The new definition raises the embracing concept to a higher level of universality—as a totality (an “all”) or as a complete and completed concept. Examples from logic include the redefinition of Appearance as the whole World of Appearance (EL §132; cf. SL-M 505–7, SL-dG 443–4), the move in which the endless, back-and-forth process of Real Possibility redefines the Condition as a totality (EL §147; cf. SL-M 547, SL-dG 483), and the move in which a back-and-forth process created by finite Cognition and finite Willing redefines the Subjective Idea as Absolute Idea (EL §§234–5; cf. SL-M 822–3, SL-dG 733–4).

Some of the most famous terms in Hegel’s works—“in itself [ an sich ]”, “for itself [ für sich ]” and “in and for itself [ an und für sich ]”—capture other, common, syntactic patterns. A concept or form is “in itself” when it has a determination that it gets by being defined against its “other” (cf. Being-in-itself, EL §91). A concept or form is “for itself” when it is defined only in relation to its own content, so that, while it is technically defined in relation to an “other”, the “other” is not really an “other” for it. As a result, it is really defined only in relation to itself. Unlike an “in itself” concept or form, then, a “for itself” concept or form seems to have its definition on its own, or does not need a genuine “other” to be defined (like other concepts or forms, however, “for itself” concepts or forms turn out to be dialectical too, and hence push on to new concepts or forms). In the logic, Being-for-itself (cf. section 1 ), which is defined by embracing the “something others” in its content, is the first, “for itself” concept or form.

A concept or form is “in and for itself” when it is doubly “for itself”, or “for itself” not only in terms of content —insofar as it embraces its content—but also in terms of form or presentation, insofar as it also has the activity of presenting its content. It is “for itself” (embraces its content) for itself (through its own activity), or not only embraces its content (the “for itself” of content) but also presents its content through its own activity (the “for itself” of form). The second “for itself” of form provides the concept with a logical activity (i.e., presenting its content) and hence a definition that goes beyond—and so is separate from—the definition that its content has. Since it has a definition of its own that is separate from the definition of its content, it comes to be defined—in the “in itself” sense— against its content, which has become its “other”. Because this “other” is still its own content, however, the concept or form is both “in itself” but also still “for itself” at the same time, or is “in and for itself” (EL §§148–9; cf. Maybee 2009: 244–6). The “in and for itself” relationship is the hallmark of a genuine Concept (EL §160), and captures the idea that a genuine concept is defined not only from the bottom up by its content, but also from the top down through its own activity of presenting its content. The genuine concept of animal, for instance, is not only defined by embracing its content (namely, all animals) from the bottom up, but also has a definition of its own, separate from that content, that leads it to determine (and so present), from the top down, what counts as an animal.

Other technical, syntactic terms include aufheben (“to sublate”), which we already saw ( section 1 ), and “abstract”. To say that a concept or form is “abstract” is to say that it is only a partial definition. Hegel describes the moment of understanding, for instance, as abstract (EL §§79, 80) because it is a one-sided or restricted definition or determination ( section 1 ). Conversely, a concept or form is “concrete” in the most basic sense when it has a content or definition that it gets from being built out of other concepts or forms. As we saw ( section 2 ), Hegel regarded Becoming as the first concrete concept in the logic.

Although Hegel’s writing and his use of technical terms can make his philosophy notoriously difficult, his work can also be very rewarding. In spite of—or perhaps because of—the difficulty, there are a surprising number of fresh ideas in his work that have not yet been fully explored in philosophy.

• [EL], The Encyclopedia Logic [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] . Because the translations of EL listed below use the same section numbers as well as sub-paragraphs (“Remarks”) and sub-sub-paragraphs (“Additions”), citations simply to “EL” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific translation, the translators’ initials are added.
• [EL-BD], Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] , translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• [EL-GSH], The Encyclopedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] , translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
• [LHP], Lectures on the History of Philosophy [Geschichte der Philosophie] , in three volumes, translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974.
• [PhG], Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] . Because the translations of PhG listed below use the same section numbers, citations simply to “PhG” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific translation, the translator’s initial is added.
• [PhG-M], Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• [PhG-P], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] , translated and edited by Terry Pinkard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
• [PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right [Philosophie des Rechts] , edited by Allen W. Wood and translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
• [SL-dG], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik] , translated by George di Giovanni, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• [SL-M], Hegel’s Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik] , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Aristotle, 1954, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (in two volumes), edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to Aristotle’s text use the Bekker numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Aristotle’s works.)
• Fichte, J.G., 1982 [1794/95], The Science of Knowledge , translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Fichte’s work include references to the volume and page number in the German edition of Fichte’s collected works edited by I.H Fichte, which are used in the margins of many translations of Fichte’s works.)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1999 [1781], Critique of Pure Reason , translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Kant’s text use the “Ak.” numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Kant’s works.)
• Plato, 1961, The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters , edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to Plato’s text use the Stephanus numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Plato’s works.)
• Bencivenga, Ermanno, 2000, Hegel’s Dialectical Logic , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Berto, Francesco, 2007, “Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory: An Analytic Reading”, European Journal of Philosophy , 15(1): 19–39.
• Burbidge, John, 1981, On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary , Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
• Düsing, Klaus, 2010, “Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel’s Thought”, translated by Andrés Colapinto, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 97–122.
• Findlay, J.N., 1962, Hegel: A Re-Examination , New York: Collier Books.
• –––, 1966, Review of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary , by Walter Kaufmann. The Philosophical Quarterly , 16(65): 366–68.
• Forster, Michael, 1993, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel , Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130–170.
• Fritzman, J.M., 2014, Hegel , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Harris, Errol E., 1983, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel , Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
• Harris, H.S. (Henry Silton), 1997, Hegel’s Ladder (in two volumes: vol. I, The Pilgrimage of Reason , and vol. II, The Odyssey of Spirit ), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett).
• Hyppolite, Jean, 1974, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit ”, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Inoue, Kazumi, 2014, “Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 28(2), 113–132.
• Jaśkowski, Stanislaw, 1999 [1969], “A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems”, translated by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz and A. Pietruszczak, Logic and Logical Philosophy (7)7: 35–56. (This article is a republication, with some changes, of a 1969 translation by Wojtasiewicz entitled “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems (Communicated at the Meeting of March 19, 1948)”, published in Studia Logica , 24, 143–160.)
• Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, 1965, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary , Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company Inc.
• –––, 1966, A Reinterpretation , Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (This is a republication of the first part of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary .)
• –––, 1976 [1972], “The Hegel Myth and its Method”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 21–60. (This is a republication of the 1972 Anchor Books/Doubleday edition.)
• Kosok, Michael, 1972, “The Formalization of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , Alisdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 237–87.
• Lauer, Quentin, 1976, A Reading of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” , New York: Fordham University Press.
• Margolis, Joseph, 2010, “The Greening of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic”, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 193–215.
• Maybee, Julie E., 2009, Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel’s “Encyclopaedia Logic” , Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
• McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 1964 [1910], A Commentary of Hegel’s Logic , New York: Russell and Russell Inc. (This edition is a reissue of McTaggart’s book, which was first published in 1910.)
• Mueller, Gustav, 1958, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Synthesis-Antithesis-Thesis’”, Journal of the History of Ideas , 19(3): 411–14.
• Mure, G.R.G., 1950, A Study of Hegel’s Logic , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pinkard, Terry, 1988, Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of a Possibility , Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
• Priest, Graham, 1985, “Inconsistencies in Motion”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 22(4): 339–346.
• –––, 1989, “Dialectic and Dialetheic”, Science and Society , 53(4): 388–415.
• –––, 1997 [2006], In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent , expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press; first edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997.
• Popper, Karl R., 1940, “What is Dialectic?”, Mind , 49(196): 403–426. (This article was reprinted, with some changes, in two different editions of Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , listed below.)
• –––, 1962, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , New York: Basic Books.
• –––, 2002, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , second edition, London: Routledge Classics.
• –––, 2013, The Open Society and its Enemies , Princeton: Princeton University Press. (This is a one-volume republication of the original, two-volume edition first published by Princeton University Press in 1945.)
• Rosen, Michael, 1982, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Rosen, Stanley, 2014, The Idea of Hegel’s “Science of Logic” , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Singer, Peter, 1983, Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Solomon, Robert C., 1983, In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Stace, W.T., 1955 [1924], The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition , New York: Dover Publications. (This edition is a reprint of the first edition, published in 1924.)
• Stewart, Jon, 1996, “Hegel’s Doctrine of Determinate Negation: An Example from ‘Sense-certainty’ and ‘Perception’”, Idealistic Studies , 26(1): 57–78.
• –––, 2000, The Unity of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”: A Systematic Interpretation , Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Taylor, Charles, 1975, Hegel , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Wandschneider, Dieter, 2010, “Dialectic as the ‘Self-Fulfillment’ of Logic”, translated by Anthony Jensen, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 31–54.
• Westphal, Kenneth R., 2003, Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the “Phenomenology of Spirit” , Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
• Winfield, Richard Dien, 1990, “The Method of Hegel’s Science of Logic ”, in Essays on Hegel’s Logic , George di Giovanni (ed.), Albany, NY: State University of New York, pp. 45–57.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Hegel on Dialectic , Philosophy Bites podcast interview with Robert Stern
• Hegel , Philosophy Talks preview video, interview notes and recorded radio interview with Allen Wood, which includes a discussion of Hegel’s dialectics

Aristotle | Aristotle, General Topics: logic | Fichte, Johann Gottlieb | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Hume, David | Kant, Immanuel | Plato

Copyright © 2020 by Julie E. Maybee < julie . maybee @ lehman . cuny . edu >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

• Scholarly Community Encyclopedia
• Log in/Sign up

Video Upload Options

• MDPI and ACS Style
• Chicago Style

In philosophy, the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese; originally: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis) is a progression of three ideas or propositions. The first idea, the thesis, is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis, that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis, resolves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. It is often used to explain the dialectical method of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but Hegel never used the terms himself; instead his triad was concrete, abstract, absolute. The thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad actually originated with Johann Fichte.

1. History of the Idea

Thomas McFarland (2002), in his Prolegomena to Coleridge's Opus Maximum , [ 1 ] identifies Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as the genesis of the thesis/antithesis dyad. Kant concretises his ideas into:

• Thesis: "The world has a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space."
• Antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space."

Inasmuch as conjectures like these can be said to be resolvable, Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations of the Science of Knowledge , 1794) resolved Kant's dyad by synthesis, posing the question thus: [ 1 ]

• No synthesis is possible without a preceding antithesis. As little as antithesis without synthesis, or synthesis without antithesis, is possible; just as little possible are both without thesis.

Fichte employed the triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" as a formula for the explanation of change. [ 2 ] Fichte was the first to use the trilogy of words together, [ 3 ] in his Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (1795, Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty ): "Die jetzt aufgezeigte Handlung ist thetisch, antithetisch und synthetisch zugleich." ["The action here described is simultaneously thetic, antithetic, and synthetic." [ 4 ] ]

Still according to McFarland, Schelling then, in his Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), arranged the terms schematically in pyramidal form.

According to Walter Kaufmann (1966), although the triad is often thought to form part of an analysis of historical and philosophical progress called the Hegelian dialectic, the assumption is erroneous: [ 5 ]

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Gustav E. Mueller (1958) concurs that Hegel was not a proponent of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and clarifies what the concept of dialectic might have meant in Hegel's thought. [ 6 ]

"Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".

According to Mueller, the attribution of this tripartite dialectic to Hegel is the result of "inept reading" and simplistic translations which do not take into account the genesis of Hegel's terms:

Hegel's greatness is as indisputable as his obscurity. The matter is due to his peculiar terminology and style; they are undoubtedly involved and complicated, and seem excessively abstract. These linguistic troubles, in turn, have given rise to legends which are like perverse and magic spectacles – once you wear them, the text simply vanishes. Theodor Haering's monumental and standard work has for the first time cleared up the linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved – though it was complete when he began to publish. Hegel's contemporaries were immediately baffled, because what was clear to him was not clear to his readers, who were not initiated into the genesis of his terms. An example of how a legend can grow on inept reading is this: Translate "Begriff" by "concept," "Vernunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science" – and they are all good dictionary translations – and you have transformed the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd pan-logistic rationalism and scientism. The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." [ 7 ]

Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) adopted and extended the triad, especially in Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). Here, in Chapter 2, Marx is obsessed by the word "thesis"; [ 8 ] it forms an important part of the basis for the Marxist theory of history. [ 9 ]

2. Writing Pedagogy

In modern times, the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been implemented across the world as a strategy for organizing expositional writing. For example, this technique is taught as a basic organizing principle in French schools: [ 10 ]

The French learn to value and practice eloquence from a young age. Almost from day one, students are taught to produce plans for their compositions, and are graded on them. The structures change with fashions. Youngsters were once taught to express a progression of ideas. Now they follow a dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. If you listen carefully to the French arguing about any topic they all follow this model closely: they present an idea, explain possible objections to it, and then sum up their conclusions. ... This analytical mode of reasoning is integrated into the entire school corpus.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis has also been used as a basic scheme to organize writing in the English language. For example, the website WikiPreMed.com advocates the use of this scheme in writing timed essays for the MCAT standardized test: [ 11 ]

For the purposes of writing MCAT essays, the dialectic describes the progression of ideas in a critical thought process that is the force driving your argument. A good dialectical progression propels your arguments in a way that is satisfying to the reader. The thesis is an intellectual proposition. The antithesis is a critical perspective on the thesis. The synthesis solves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis by reconciling their common truths, and forming a new proposition.

• Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Opus Maximum. Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 89.
• Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History. Greenwood Publishing Group (1986), p.114
• Williams, Robert R. (1992). Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. SUNY Press. p. 46, note 37. 
• Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Breazeale, Daniel (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. p. 249. 
• Walter Kaufmann (1966). "§ 37". Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-268-01068-3. OCLC 3168016. https://archive.org/details/hegelreinterpret00kauf. 
• Mueller, Gustav (1958). "The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (4): 411–414. doi:10.2307/2708045.  https://dx.doi.org/10.2307%2F2708045
• Mueller 1958, p. 411.
• marxists.org: Chapter 2 of "The Poverty of Philosophy", by Karl Marx https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm
• Shrimp, Kaleb (2009). "The Validity of Karl Marx's Theory of Historical Materialism". Major Themes in Economics 11 (1): 35–56. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol11/iss1/5/. Retrieved 13 September 2018. 
• Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French. Sourcebooks, Inc.. p. 62. https://archive.org/details/sixtymillionfren00nade_041. 
• "The MCAT writing assignment.". Wisebridge Learning Systems, LLC. http://www.wikipremed.com/mcat_essay.php. Retrieved 1 November 2015. 

• Terms and Conditions
• Privacy Policy
• Advisory Board

Literature Review Survival Library Guide: Thesis, antithesis and synthesis

• What is a literature review?
• Thesis, antithesis and synthesis
• 1. Choose your topic
• 2. Collect relevant material
• 3. Read/Skim articles
• 4. Group articles by themes
• 5. Use citation databases
• 6. Find agreement & disagreement
• Review Articles - A new option on Google Scholar
• How To Follow References
• Newspaper archives
• Aditi's Humanities Referencing Style Guide
• Referencing and RefWorks
• New-version RefWorks Demo
• Tracking Your Academic Footprint This link opens in a new window
• Finding Seminal Authors and Mapping the Shape of the Literature
• Types of Literature Review, including "Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: A Practical Guide"
• Research Data Management
• Tamzyn Suleiman's guide to Systematic Reviews
• Danielle Abrahamse's Search String Design and Search Template

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

The classic pattern of academic arguments is:

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

An Idea (Thesis) is proposed, an opposing Idea (Antithesis) is proposed, and a revised Idea incorporating (Synthesis) the opposing Idea is arrived at. This revised idea sometimes sparks another opposing idea, another synthesis, and so on…

If you can show this pattern at work in your literature review, and, above all, if you can suggest a new synthesis of two opposing views, or demolish one of the opposing views, then you are almost certainly on the right track.

Next topic: Step 1: Choose your topic

• << Previous: What is a literature review?
• Next: 1. Choose your topic >>
• Last Updated: Mar 14, 2024 9:06 AM
• URL: https://libguides.lib.uct.ac.za/litreviewsurvival

Antithesis Definition

What is antithesis? Here’s a quick and simple definition:

Antithesis is a figure of speech that juxtaposes two contrasting or opposing ideas, usually within parallel grammatical structures. For instance, Neil Armstrong used antithesis when he stepped onto the surface of the moon in 1969 and said, "That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind." This is an example of antithesis because the two halves of the sentence mirror each other in grammatical structure, while together the two halves emphasize the incredible contrast between the individual experience of taking an ordinary step, and the extraordinary progress that Armstrong's step symbolized for the human race.

Some additional key details about antithesis:

• Antithesis works best when it is used in conjunction with parallelism (successive phrases that use the same grammatical structure), since the repetition of structure makes the contrast of the content of the phrases as clear as possible.
• The word "antithesis" has another meaning, which is to describe something as being the opposite of another thing. For example, "love is the antithesis of selfishness." This guide focuses only on antithesis as a literary device.
• The word antithesis has its origins in the Greek word antithenai , meaning "to oppose." The plural of antithesis is antitheses.

How to Pronounce Antithesis

Here's how to pronounce antithesis: an- tith -uh-sis

Antithesis and Parallelism

Often, but not always, antithesis works in tandem with parallelism . In parallelism, two components of a sentence (or pair of sentences) mirror one another by repeating grammatical elements. The following is a good example of both antithesis and parallelism:

To err is human , to forgive divine .

The two clauses of the sentence are parallel because each starts off with an infinitive verb and ends with an adjective ("human" and "divine"). The mirroring of these elements then works to emphasize the contrast in their content, particularly in the very strong opposite contrast between "human" and "divine."

Antithesis Without Parallelism

In most cases, antitheses involve parallel elements of the sentence—whether a pair of nouns, verbs, adjectives, or other grammar elements. However, it is also possible to have antithesis without such clear cut parallelism. In the Temptations Song "My Girl," the singer uses antithesis when he says:

"When it's cold outside , I've got the month of May ."

Here the sentence is clearly cut into two clauses on either side of the comma, and the contrasting elements are clear enough. However, strictly speaking there isn't true parallelism here because "cold outside" and "month of May" are different types of grammatical structures (an adjective phrase and a noun phrase, respectively).

Antithesis vs. Related Terms

Three literary terms that are often mistakenly used in the place of antithesis are juxtaposition , oxymoron , and foil . Each of these three terms does have to do with establishing a relationship of difference between two ideas or characters in a text, but beyond that there are significant differences between them.

Antithesis vs. Juxtaposition

In juxtaposition , two things or ideas are placed next to one another to draw attention to their differences or similarities. In juxtaposition, the pairing of two ideas is therefore not necessarily done to create a relationship of opposition or contradiction between them, as is the case with antithesis. So, while antithesis could be a type of juxtaposition, juxtaposition is not always antithesis.

Antithesis vs. Oxymoron

In an oxymoron , two seemingly contradictory words are placed together because their unlikely combination reveals a deeper truth. Some examples of oxymorons include:

• Sweet sorrow
• Cruel kindness
• Living dead

The focus of antithesis is opposites rather than contradictions . While the words involved in oxymorons seem like they don't belong together (until you give them deeper thought), the words or ideas of antithesis do feel like they belong together even as they contrast as opposites. Further, antitheses seldom function by placing the two words or ideas right next to one another, so antitheses are usually made up of more than two words (as in, "I'd rather be among the living than among the dead").

Antithesis vs. Foil

Some Internet sources use "antithesis" to describe an author's decision to create two characters in a story that are direct opposites of one another—for instance, the protagonist and antagonist . But the correct term for this kind of opposition is a foil : a person or thing in a work of literature that contrasts with another thing in order to call attention to its qualities. While the sentence "the hare was fast, and the tortoise was slow" is an example of antithesis, if we step back and look at the story as a whole, the better term to describe the relationship between the characters of the tortoise and the hare is "foil," as in, "The character of the hare is a foil of the tortoise."

Antithesis Examples

Antithesis in literature.

Below are examples of antithesis from some of English literature's most acclaimed writers — and a comic book!

Antithesis in Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities

In the famous opening lines of A Tale of Two Cities , Dickens sets out a flowing list of antitheses punctuated by the repetition of the word "it was" at the beginning of each clause (which is itself an example of the figure of speech anaphora ). By building up this list of contrasts, Dickens sets the scene of the French Revolution that will serve as the setting of his tale by emphasizing the division and confusion of the era. The overwhelming accumulation of antitheses is also purposefully overdone; Dickens is using hyperbole to make fun of the "noisiest authorities" of the day and their exaggerated claims. The passage contains many examples of antithesis, each consisting of one pair of contrasting ideas that we've highlighted to make the structure clearer.

It was the best of times , it was the worst of times , it was the age of wisdom , it was the age of foolishness , it was the epoch of belief , it was the epoch of incredulity , it was the season of Light , it was the season of Darkness , it was the spring of hope , it was the winter of despair , we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven , we were all going direct the other way —in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

Antithesis in John Milton's Paradise Lost

In this verse from Paradise Lost , Milton's anti-hero , Satan, claims he's happier as the king of Hell than he could ever have been as a servant in Heaven. He justifies his rebellion against God with this pithy phrase, and the antithesis drives home the double contrast between Hell and Heaven, and between ruling and serving.

Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.

Antithesis in William Shakespeare's Othello

As the plot of Othello nears its climax , the antagonist of the play, Iago, pauses for a moment to acknowledge the significance of what is about to happen. Iago uses antithesis to contrast the two opposite potential outcomes of his villainous plot: either events will transpire in Iago's favor and he will come out on top, or his treachery will be discovered, ruining him.

This is the night That either makes me or fordoes me quite .

In this passage, the simple word "either" functions as a cue for the reader to expect some form of parallelism, because the "either" signals that a contrast between two things is coming.

Antithesis in William Shakespeare's Hamlet

Shakespeare's plays are full of antithesis, and so is Hamlet's most well-known "To be or not to be" soliloquy . This excerpt of the soliloquy is a good example of an antithesis that is not limited to a single word or short phrase. The first instance of antithesis here, where Hamlet announces the guiding question (" to be or not to be ") is followed by an elaboration of each idea ("to be" and "not to be") into metaphors that then form their own antithesis. Both instances of antithesis hinge on an " or " that divides the two contrasting options.

To be or not to be , that is the question: Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, And by opposing end them ...

Antithesis in T.S. Eliot's "Four Quartets"

In this excerpt from his poem "Four Quartets," T.S. Eliot uses antithesis to describe the cycle of life, which is continuously passing from beginning to end, from rise to fall, and from old to new.

In my beginning is my end . In succession Houses rise and fall , crumble, are extended, Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place Is an open field, or a factory, or a by-pass. Old stone to new building , old timber to new fires ...

Antithesis in Green Lantern's Oath

Comic book writers know the power of antithesis too! In this catchy oath, Green Lantern uses antithesis to emphasize that his mission to defeat evil will endure no matter the conditions.

In brightest day , in blackest night , No evil shall escape my sight. Let those who worship evil's might Beware my power—Green lantern's light!

While most instances of antithesis are built around an "or" that signals the contrast between the two parts of the sentence, the Green Lantern oath works a bit differently. It's built around an implied "and" (to be technical, that first line of the oath is an asyndeton that replaces the "and" with a comma), because members of the Green Lantern corps are expressing their willingness to fight evil in all places, even very opposite environments.

Antithesis in Speeches

Many well-known speeches contain examples of antithesis. Speakers use antithesis to drive home the stakes of what they are saying, sometimes by contrasting two distinct visions of the future.

Antithesis in Patrick Henry's Speech to the Second Virginia Convention, 1775

This speech by famous American patriot Patrick Henry includes one of the most memorable and oft-quoted phrases from the era of the American Revolution. Here, Henry uses antithesis to emphasize just how highly he prizes liberty, and how deadly serious he is about his fight to achieve it.

Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take: but as for me, give me liberty or give me death .

Antithesis in Martin Luther King Jr.'s Oberlin Commencement Address

In this speech by one of America's most well-known orators, antithesis allows Martin Luther King Jr. to highlight the contrast between two visions of the future; in the first vision, humans rise above their differences to cooperate with one another, while in the other humanity is doomed by infighting and division.

We must all learn to live together as brothers —or we will all perish together as fools .

Antithesis in Songs

In songs, contrasting two opposite ideas using antithesis can heighten the dramatic tension of a difficult decision, or express the singer's intense emotion—but whatever the context, antithesis is a useful tool for songwriters mainly because opposites are always easy to remember, so lyrics that use antithesis tend to stick in the head.

Antithesis in "Should I Stay or Should I Go" by The Clash (1981)

In this song by The Clash, the speaker is caught at a crossroads between two choices, and antithesis serves as the perfect tool to express just how confused and conflicted he is. The rhetorical question —whether to stay or to go—presents two opposing options, and the contrast between his lover's mood from one day (when everything is "fine") to the next (when it's all "black") explains the difficulty of his choice.

One day it's fine and next it's black So if you want me off your back Well, come on and let me know Should I stay or should I go ? Should I stay or should I go now? Should I stay or should I go now? If I go, there will be trouble If I stay it will be double ...

Antithesis in "My Girl" by the Temptations (1965)

In this song, the singer uses a pair of metaphors to describe the feeling of joy that his lover brings him. This joy is expressed through antithesis, since the singer uses the miserable weather of a cloudy, cold day as the setting for the sunshine-filled month of May that "his girl" makes him feel inside, emphasizing the power of his emotions by contrasting them with the bleak weather.

I've got sunshine on a cloudy day When it's cold outside I've got the month of May Well I guess you'd say, What can make me feel this way? My girl, my girl, my girl Talkin' bout my girl.

Why Do Writers Use Antithesis?

Fundamentally, writers of all types use antithesis for its ability to create a clear contrast. This contrast can serve a number of purposes, as shown in the examples above. It can:

• Present a stark choice between two alternatives.
• Convey magnitude or range (i.e. "in brightest day, in darkest night" or "from the highest mountain, to the deepest valley").
• Express strong emotions.
• Create a relationship of opposition between two separate ideas.
• Accentuate the qualities and characteristics of one thing by placing it in opposition to another.

Whatever the case, antithesis almost always has the added benefit of making language more memorable to listeners and readers. The use of parallelism and other simple grammatical constructions like "either/or" help to establish opposition between concepts—and opposites have a way of sticking in the memory.

Other Helpful Antithesis Resources

• The Wikipedia page on Antithesis : A useful summary with associated examples, along with an extensive account of antithesis in the Gospel of Matthew.
• Sound bites from history : A list of examples of antithesis in famous political speeches from United States history — with audio clips!
• A blog post on antithesis : This quick rundown of antithesis focuses on a quote you may know from Muhammad Ali's philosophy of boxing: "Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee."

• PDFs for all 136 Lit Terms we cover
• Downloads of 1890 LitCharts Lit Guides
• Teacher Editions for every Lit Guide
• Explanations and citation info for 39,819 quotes across 1890 books
• Downloadable (PDF) line-by-line translations of every Shakespeare play
• Climax (Figure of Speech)
• Figure of Speech
• Juxtaposition
• Parallelism
• Protagonist
• Rhetorical Question
• Stream of Consciousness
• Colloquialism
• Epanalepsis
• Figurative Language
• Alliteration
• Pathetic Fallacy
• Common Meter
• Dynamic Character
• Dramatic Irony
• Bildungsroman

• school Campus Bookshelves
• menu_book Bookshelves
• perm_media Learning Objects
• login Login
• how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
• hub Instructor Commons
• Download Page (PDF)
• Download Full Book (PDF)
• Periodic Table
• Physics Constants
• Scientific Calculator
• Reference & Cite
• Tools expand_more
• Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

9: The Antithesis Exercise

• Last updated
• Save as PDF
• Page ID 6523

• Steven D. Krause
• Eastern Michigan University

If you are coming to this chapter after working through some of the earlier exercises in this part of the book, you might find yourself quite attached to your topic and your working thesis. Perhaps you are so attached and focused on your topic that you have a hard time imagining why anyone would disagree with you. This attachment is certainly understandable. After you have done so much hunting in the library and on the Internet and thinking about your working thesis, you might have a hard time imaging how anyone could possibly disagree with your position, or why they would want to. But it is important to remember that not all of your potential readers are going to automatically agree with you. If your topic or take on an issue is particularly controversial, you might have to work hard at convincing almost all of your readers about the validity of your argument.

The process of considering opposing viewpoints is the goal of this exercise, the Antithesis essay. Think about this exercise as a way of exploring the variety of different and opposing views to the main argument you are trying to make with your research project.

• 9.1: Revisiting the Working (and Inevitably Changing) Thesis
• 9.2: Why Write an Antithesis Essay?
• 9.3: Generating Antithetical Points in Five Easy Steps
• 9.4: Finding Antithetical Points on the Internet
• 9.5: Strategies for Answering Antithetical Arguments
• 9.6: Assignment- Writing the Antithesis Essay
• 9.7: A Student Example- “Are Casinos Good For Las Vegas? Defending Legalized Gambling,” by Kerry Oaks

Synthesis Statement

Crafting a synthesis statement requires the skillful merging of multiple sources or ideas to form a unified perspective. It’s not just about summarizing; it’s about creating a new understanding from various points of view. As you delve into the art of synthesis writing, you’ll discover how to sift through diverse sources, draw connections, and construct a cohesive argument. This guide will provide you with clear synthesis statement examples, actionable writing tips, and insights on creating compelling synthesis statements. Dive in and explore the intricate art of synthesis writing.

What is a Synthesis Statement?

A synthesis statement is a sentence or series of sentences that combine information from multiple sources to present a unique perspective or argument. Unlike summary or paraphrase, a synthesis seeks to blend ideas and data from different texts or sources to create a cohesive understanding or to spotlight new relationships among ideas. It is commonly used in research papers and essays where diverse viewpoints or facts need to be converged into a unified analysis.  You should also take a look at our  null thesis statement .

What is the Best Example of Synthesis Statement?

“Though research has shown that solar energy has its flaws, such as inconsistent availability and expensive infrastructure, when combined with wind energy, which tends to be available when solar is not, a more reliable and cost-effective green energy solution emerges.” This good thesis statement synthesizes information about the limitations of solar energy with the potential benefits of combining it with wind energy.

100 Synthesis Statement Examples

Size: 424 KB

Synthesis statements serve to intertwine different ideas, allowing the writer to create a novel perspective derived from varied sources. This unification of diverse thoughts often results in a more nuanced understanding or a fresh viewpoint. Below are examples that demonstrate how to merge different concepts, research findings, or arguments to present a new insight.

• “While digital learning provides flexible schedules and personalized content, the in-person classroom environment fosters collaboration; integrating both can lead to an enriched learning experience.”
• “Research into Mediterranean diets highlights their heart health benefits, but when coupled with regular exercise, a more holistic approach to cardiovascular wellness emerges.”
• “Vegan diets are known for their ethical and environmental benefits, but when combined with local food sourcing, the environmental impact is even more profound.”
• “Historical accounts depict Roman strategy in warfare as advanced, but when juxtaposed with their architectural marvels, a civilization with a balanced emphasis on art and warfare is revealed.”
• “While urban areas are hubs for technology and culture, they often lack green spaces; however, the rise of urban gardens illustrates a synthesis of city living and nature.”
• “Meditation is praised for its mental relaxation effects, but when combined with aerobic exercise, the benefits for both mental and physical health are synergized.”
• “Though AI brings efficiency to industries, it poses job loss threats; a middle ground emerges when AI is integrated into roles to assist rather than replace humans.”
• “Solar energy is sustainable but relies heavily on weather; when synthesized with geothermal energy sources, a more reliable green energy system is apparent.”
• “Economic growth has its merits, but it often leads to increased inequality; however, when nations prioritize both growth and social programs, a more balanced development is achievable.”
• “The digital age has revolutionized communication, but it’s also led to information overload; the re-emergence of offline reading habits presents a harmonized information intake approach.”
• “Space exploration offers technological advancements, while ocean exploration provides insights into our planet; blending resources for both can lead to broader discoveries.”
• “Nature provides serenity, while urban environments offer convenience. The rise of urban parks and green rooftops represents a synthesis of these two worlds.”
• “Artificial sweeteners reduce calorie intake but have health concerns; natural sweeteners like stevia bring a balanced alternative to the table.”
• “Remote work offers freedom and flexibility, while office work fosters collaboration. A hybrid work model is the culmination of these benefits.”
• “E-books provide convenience, but they lack the tactile experience of physical books. The development of advanced e-readers that mimic book-feel showcases a synthesis of the digital and tangible.”
• “Modern medicine offers effective treatments, while traditional remedies provide centuries of knowledge; integrated healthcare utilizes both for a comprehensive approach.”
• “Rapid urbanization brings economic growth, but also environmental degradation. Sustainable urban planning is the nexus of progress and preservation.”
• “Children learn through structured lessons, but they also thrive in play. Educational systems that merge formal learning with playtime see heightened student engagement.”
• “Fast fashion meets consumer demand but at environmental costs. The rise of sustainable fashion brands is a synthesis of demand and ecological responsibility.”
• “Local travel reduces carbon footprints, while international travel expands horizons. Traveling with a mix of local and overseas adventures offers the best of both worlds.”
• “Traditional classrooms emphasize rote learning, while modern pedagogy focuses on critical thinking. Integrating both methodologies prepares students for real-world challenges.”
• “Organic farming champions environmental health, but may not meet global food demands. Merging it with technology-enhanced farming can achieve sustainability and efficiency.”
• “Solo travels offer introspection, while group tours provide camaraderie. Opting for trips that mix solitude with group activities gives a rounded experience.”
• “Western medicine excels in diagnostics and technology, while Eastern medicine focuses on holistic wellness. A synthesis between the two offers comprehensive patient care.”
• “Physical stores provide tactile experiences, while online shops offer convenience. The rise of retail shops with integrated online catalogues represents the best of both worlds.”
• “Traditional marketing thrives on human intuition, while digital marketing is data-driven. Merging them can create campaigns that touch hearts and optimize reach.”
• “Movies provide visual storytelling, while books dive deep into a character’s psyche. Adapting books into films with insights from literature offers a richer narrative.”
• “Freelancing offers flexibility, but lacks job security. Combining it with part-time stable employment can create a balanced professional life.”
• “Yoga emphasizes mental peace, while gym workouts focus on physical strength. A routine mixing both can provide mental and physical equilibrium.”
• “Solar panels harness energy during the day, but wind turbines work best at night. Combining both creates a round-the-clock green energy source.”
• “Public transport is eco-friendly, while personal vehicles offer convenience. Carpooling and shared mobility services synthesize the benefits of both.”
• “E-commerce platforms offer vast choices, while local shops provide authenticity. Platforms that source locally combine wide reach with genuine products.”
• “Cultural traditions provide societal roots, while global influences bring variety. Festivals that celebrate both aspects ensure preservation with evolution.”
• “Indoor plants offer aesthetics, while outdoor gardens provide space. Terrace gardens are a synthesis, maximizing utility in urban dwellings.”
• “Dairy farming meets protein needs but has sustainability concerns. Combining it with plant-based alternatives can fulfill nutritional needs responsibly.”
• “Digital notes are easily searchable, but handwriting aids memory. Using tablets with stylus inputs merges digital convenience with the act of writing.”
• “History teaches past lessons, while futuristic sci-fi imagines the unknown. Novels blending historical settings with futuristic ideas offer a unique perspective.”
• “Artificial lighting offers brightness control, while natural light boosts mood. Architectural designs maximizing daylight with adjustable artificial lights balance both needs.”
• “Work offers financial independence, while vacations provide relaxation. The concept of ‘workations’ synthesizes productivity with leisure.”
• “Classical music embodies tradition, while modern genres resonate with the youth. Fusion music that integrates both appeals across generations.”
• “Mental well-being is as vital as physical health. Wellness programs that merge mental health discussions with physical activities provide comprehensive care.”
• “Standalone shops offer specialty products, while malls provide variety. Pop-up stores in malls combine niche offerings with wide exposure.”
• “Vegetarian diets are ethically sound, while meat offers certain nutrients. Flexitarian diets, synthesizing both, cater to ethics and nutrition.”
• “Traditional news offers depth, while social media provides real-time updates. Modern news apps merging both ensure timely yet in-depth coverage.”
• “Manual labor ensures craftsmanship, but machines boost production. Manufacturing that integrates handcrafted elements with machine precision ensures quality at scale.”
• “Wildlife documentaries showcase natural behaviors, while zoos allow close encounters. Virtual reality experiences synthesizing both provide education without captivity.”
• “Economic models focus on monetary metrics, while social models value human welfare. Inclusive models combine both for holistic national progress.”
• “Plastic offers convenience, but biodegradable materials are eco-friendly. Bio-plastics synthesize the utility of plastic with environmental responsibility.”
• “Virtual meetings save travel time, while face-to-face interactions build trust. Hybrid models, blending virtual with occasional physical meets, optimize communication.”
• “Print media offers tangible reading pleasure, while digital media is easily updated. E-papers that emulate print layout combine traditional with modern.”
• “Dieting focuses on caloric intake, while mindfulness emphasizes eating awareness. Mindful dieting synthesizes both for holistic weight management.”
• “Physical books are timeless, but audiobooks are portable. Mobile apps offering synchronized reading and listening blend immersion with convenience.”
• “Home cooking ensures health, while dining out offers diverse flavors. Home chefs using global ingredients merge health with gourmet experiences.”
• “Non-renewable energy provides consistent output, while renewables are sustainable. A grid relying on both ensures energy stability with sustainability.”
• “Rural living offers tranquility, while cities pulsate with life. Townships blending urban amenities with rural serenity offer a balanced lifestyle.”
• “Online learning provides global insights, while local classrooms offer context. Blended learning models synthesize global knowledge with local relevance.”
• “Ancient architecture showcases heritage, while modern designs prioritize function. Designs that integrate both preserve history while ensuring functionality.”
• “Silent retreats offer introspection, while group therapies provide external perspectives. Programs blending both cater to internal and external well-being.”
• “Organic foods prioritize health, but genetically modified organisms (GMOs) boost yield. A balance between the two can address health and hunger.”
• “Crowdsourced content is diverse, while expert-created content ensures accuracy. Platforms that curate both offer breadth with reliability.”
• “Classroom learning offers structured knowledge, while self-study fosters independence. Modern curricula which integrate guided learning with self-initiated projects cultivate holistic student growth.”
• “Freshwater resources are limited, but desalination technologies can harness the sea. Integrating conservation with desalination strategies can ensure sustained water supply.”
• “Traditional arts capture cultural essence, while contemporary arts reflect modern dilemmas. Exhibitions showcasing a blend of both capture the evolution of societal expression.”
• “Cryptocurrencies offer decentralized finance, while traditional banking provides established trust. Financial systems which amalgamate both can redefine economic sovereignty and security.”
• “Monoculture farming maximizes yield but decreases biodiversity. Integrating polyculture methods can ensure productive, resilient, and diverse ecosystems.”
• “Podcasts offer auditory immersion, while articles provide detailed insights. Platforms which transcribe podcasts merge the ease of listening with the depth of reading.”
• “Freemium models offer accessibility, while premium versions ensure quality. Products blending a robust freemium offering with valuable premium features cater to a wider audience range.”
• “Space exploration unravels cosmic mysteries, while ocean expeditions uncover terrestrial wonders. A holistic approach to exploration recognizes the significance of both realms.”
• “Virtual reality offers immersive experiences, while reality keeps us grounded. Experiences that oscillate between the two can provide balance and perspective.”
• “Farm-to-table ensures fresh produce, while global supply chains offer variety. Hybrid models which source locally but import specialty items cater to taste and sustainability.”
• “Meditation emphasizes inner calm, while aerobic exercises boost physical vitality. Wellness routines incorporating both ensure mental peace and bodily health.”
• “Battery power offers clean energy, while fossil fuels provide consistent output. Transition plans that slowly integrate more renewable sources can guide a smooth energy shift.”
• “Digital art offers endless possibilities, while traditional art has tactile charm. Artists using digital tools for traditional styles merge the best of both domains.”
• “Coworking spaces foster collaboration, while personal offices ensure privacy. Spaces designed with open areas and secluded nooks cater to varied working styles.”
• “Personalized learning aids individual growth, while standard curricula maintain uniform benchmarks. Educational models adopting both strategies cater to individual needs while ensuring standard competencies.”
• “Live performances captivate with spontaneity, while recorded versions offer perfection. Artists hosting live events with recorded backups guarantee engagement and quality.”
• “Natural immunity fights diseases organically, while vaccines prepare the body beforehand. A health strategy emphasizing natural wellness and timely vaccination ensures robust defense.”
• “Open-source offers community-driven innovation, while proprietary software ensures tailored solutions. Tech firms adopting a hybrid model can harness community wisdom and bespoke excellence.”
• “Telemedicine offers remote healthcare accessibility, while in-person check-ups ensure thorough examination. Healthcare systems integrating both cater to immediate needs and comprehensive care.”
• “Charity provides immediate relief, while empowerment ensures long-term well-being. Initiatives that offer aid and skill-building ensure immediate sustenance and future self-reliance.
• “E-books offer convenience and portability, while physical books provide tactile satisfaction. Libraries that provide both options cater to modern needs and traditional tastes.”
• “Solar energy harnesses sunlight, while wind energy taps into atmospheric currents. An energy strategy that integrates both ensures a consistent renewable power supply.”
• “Remote work offers flexibility, while office interactions foster team bonding. Companies adopting a hybrid work model can benefit from productivity and camaraderie.”
• “Organic farming supports the environment, while conventional farming meets mass demand. A balanced approach using sustainable methods in large-scale farming can cater to both objectives.”
• “Traditional marketing creates brand trust, while digital marketing ensures wider reach. A marketing strategy blending both approaches maximizes visibility and credibility.”
• “Manual driving offers control, while autonomous driving ensures safety through AI. The future of transport may lie in vehicles that offer both modes.”
• “Historical narratives provide context, while futuristic visions inspire innovation. Curriculums that teach both history and future studies prepare students for a holistic understanding of time.”
• “Face-to-face therapy offers personal touch, while digital counseling provides accessibility. Mental health services that offer both modalities can cater to immediate and deep-seated needs.”
• “Local tourism supports communities, while international travel broadens horizons. Promoting a mix of both can boost the tourism industry and cultural exchange.”
• “Homemade food offers authenticity, while restaurant dining provides a gourmet experience. Culinary services that blend home-style with gourmet elements cater to varied palates.”
• “Independent research fosters critical thinking, while guided study ensures foundational understanding. Educational approaches that balance both produce well-rounded, informed learners.”
• “Play-based learning boosts creativity, while structured lessons provide clear knowledge. Early childhood education which integrates both approaches nurtures imaginative yet informed young minds.”
• “AI offers data-driven insights, while human judgment brings intuition. Decision-making processes that value both AI analytics and human intuition achieve balanced outcomes.”
• “Public transport reduces carbon emissions, while personal vehicles offer convenience. Urban planning that promotes efficient public transit with car-sharing options can reduce traffic and pollution.”
• “Natural cosmetics offer skin-friendly ingredients, while synthetics ensure longer shelf-life. Beauty products blending natural extracts with safe synthetics offer efficacy and longevity.”
• “Online shopping provides variety, while physical stores offer try-before-you-buy. Retailers that integrate online catalogs with physical outlets cater to convenience and certainty.”
• “Classical music provides time-tested melodies, while modern genres capture contemporary sentiments. Musicians who blend classical techniques with modern beats create timeless yet relatable pieces.”
• “Recycling manages waste, while upcycling transforms it into something valuable. Sustainable initiatives that promote both can revolutionize waste management.”
• “Yoga enhances flexibility and calm, while strength training builds muscle. Fitness regimes that incorporate both yoga and weight training ensure a balanced physique and mind.”
• “Crowdfunding sources funds democratically, while venture capital provides bulk investment. Startups that consider both funding avenues can harness public support and substantial capital.”

Short Synthesis Statement Examples

Synthesis statements can be concise yet impactful, combining elements from different sources to present a cohesive idea in a nutshell. Here are some succinct examples that convey in-depth meaning:

• “Diet and exercise collectively combat obesity.”
• “Love transcends culture and tradition.”
• “Digital innovation enhances human capability.”
• “History informs future endeavors.”
• “Nature inspires technological advancements.”
• “Art reflects societal evolution.”
• “Travel expands minds and boundaries.”
• “Education combines experience with knowledge.”
• “Music bridges generational gaps.”
• “Sustainability merges economy with ecology.”

Synthesis Statement Examples for College

In the collegiate environment, synthesis statements often merge complex ideas from academic sources to create well-rounded conclusions. These examples embody the depth and rigor expected at this level.  Our  concise thesis statement is also worth a look at.

• “Globalization, while driving economic growth, also underscores the importance of local cultures in shaping global narratives.”
• “Quantum physics and classical mechanics together illuminate the vast spectrum of natural phenomena.”
• “Modernist literature, influenced by industrialization, intertwines with postmodern narratives to depict evolving human conditions.”
• “Biochemistry and molecular biology converge to unravel cellular mysteries.”
• “Political theories from Eastern and Western philosophies together shape global diplomatic strategies.”
• “Neural networks in AI draw inspiration from human cognitive processes.”
• “Environmental sciences and urban planning collaboratively address global warming.”
• “Postcolonial studies and global literature intersect to explore themes of identity and belonging.”
• “Microeconomics and macroeconomics jointly provide insights into financial markets.”
• “Cultural anthropology and sociology together decode societal norms and behaviors.”

Argumentative Essay Synthesis Statement Examples

Argumentative essays demand a synthesis of evidence to back a stance. These argumentative essay thesis statements present a clear position by synthesizing various facets of an argument.

• “While digital learning offers flexibility, traditional classrooms foster interpersonal skills, making a blended approach most beneficial.”
• “Genetically modified organisms, despite their potential benefits, require rigorous testing due to possible ecological impacts.”
• “Universal healthcare, combined with preventive education, ensures societal health and economic stability.”
• “Renewable energy sources, when merged with traditional energy backups, ensure consistent power supply and environmental preservation.”
• “Censorship, while protecting societal norms, can inhibit freedom of expression and thus, a balance is paramount.”
• “Vegan diets, supported by scientific evidence, offer health benefits but require supplementation to fill nutritional gaps.”
• “Automation promises efficiency but can lead to job losses, necessitating retraining programs.”
• “Childhood vaccinations, backed by studies, safeguard public health, outweighing minimal side-effects.”
• “Online privacy is pivotal, but so is security; a synthesis of both determines effective internet regulations.”
• “Space exploration, although expensive, synthesizes technological advancement with potential interstellar colonization benefits.”

Synthesis Statement Examples in Research Paper

Thesis Statement for Research papers require synthesis statements that reflect an amalgamation of various studies, findings, or theories to present a unified understanding of the topic.

• “Studies on neural plasticity and cognitive therapy together offer breakthroughs in dementia care.”
• “Ocean acidification research, combined with marine biology studies, underlines the broader ecosystemic impacts of climate change.”
• “Archaeological findings, synthesized with ancient literary sources, present a holistic view of historical civilizations.”
• “Genomic research and traditional medical practices jointly unveil personalized therapeutic approaches.”
• “Pedagogical theories, merged with technological advancements, drive modern educational innovations.”
• “Environmental data and sociological surveys together highlight the human role in habitat degradation.”
• “Quantitative financial models, integrated with behavioral economics, predict market trends more accurately.”
• “Microbiome research and nutritional studies collaboratively inform gut health recommendations.”
• “Astrophysical data, synthesized with mathematical models, decode cosmic phenomena.”
• “Sociolinguistic studies, combined with historical migration patterns, elucidate the evolution of dialects.

Synthesis Statement Examples for College Board

The college board examinations and assessments often demand robust, integrative thinking. Here, synthesis statements reflect an ability to merge curriculum-based knowledge with analytical skills, suitable for these examinations.

• “Analyzing both Shakespearean sonnets and contemporary poetry showcases the evolution of thematic expressions across eras.”
• “The intersection of the American Revolution and Enlightenment thought reveals how political upheavals are often rooted in intellectual movements.”
• “The study of Mendelian genetics in conjunction with modern genomics presents a comprehensive view of heredity.”
• “Exploring classical economic theories alongside modern fiscal policies provides insight into current economic challenges.”
• “The Harlem Renaissance, synthesized with the Civil Rights Movement, paints a fuller picture of African American artistic and political progression.”
• “Assessing Renaissance art alongside modern abstract movements reflects changing perceptions of beauty and representation.”
• “The juxtaposition of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon offers insights into the balance of ideals and power.”
• “By merging studies of World Wars with Cold War dynamics, one discerns the cyclical nature of global conflicts.”
• “The integration of Newtonian physics and Einstein’s relativity captures the vast scope of physical laws.”
• “Comparing classical music theory with contemporary compositions reveals the evolving nature of auditory aesthetics.”

Synthesis Statement Examples for Essay

Essays require statements that can combine various viewpoints or information sources to create a comprehensive perspective on the topic.

• “Combining the philosophies of Eastern mindfulness with Western productivity techniques leads to holistic personal development.”
• “The fusion of traditional farming methods and modern agritech promises sustainable agriculture.”
• “Merging historical gender roles with modern feminist theories provides a multi-dimensional view of gender dynamics.”
• “The blend of ancient architecture and modern design principles embodies evolving human aesthetics.”
• “By synthesizing classic literary tropes with contemporary narratives, the universality of human experiences is evident.”
• “The amalgamation of folk medicine and modern pharmacology offers comprehensive healthcare solutions.”
• “Combining urban development principles with green initiatives paves the way for eco-friendly cities.”
• “The synthesis of traditional media and digital platforms depicts the changing landscape of global communication.”
• “Merging classical art styles with digital mediums showcases the blend of tradition and innovation.”
• “By integrating cultural traditions with globalized practices, the essence of a global village emerges.”

Strong Synthesis Statement Examples

A robust strong synthesis statement leaves an indelible mark, firmly stating its claim by merging distinct elements into a well-rounded assertion.

• “The unification of quantum mechanics and general relativity promises a groundbreaking theory of everything.”
• “Sustainable development, when combined with socioeconomic growth, ensures a balanced global progression.”
• “Fusing anthropological insights with evolutionary biology provides a thorough understanding of human evolution.”
• “Merging neuroscientific findings with psychological theories revolutionizes mental health care.”
• “Integrating sustainable energy solutions with industrial demands ensures a green industrial revolution.”
• “The combination of global trade dynamics and local market nuances dictates economic policies.”
• “By synthesizing traditional teaching methodologies with e-learning, a comprehensive education system emerges.”
• “Merging biotechnological advancements with ethical considerations promises a balanced scientific progression.”
• “The integration of ancient martial arts with modern sports science enhances physical training regimens.”
• “By blending cinematic artistry with technological innovations, the future of cinema is both authentic and groundbreaking.”

Synthesis Statement Examples for Narrative Essay

In narrative essays, syn thesis statements for narrative essay meld storytelling elements with underlying themes or lessons, offering a comprehensive view of the narrative’s significance.

• “In the juxtaposition of childhood innocence and adult wisdom, life’s transient nature unravels.”
• “By weaving familial traditions with personal aspirations, the narrative underscores the balance between past and future.”
• “The narrative blends personal adversities with triumphant moments, illustrating resilience.”
• “Merging historical backdrops with personal tales, the narrative offers a microcosm of societal evolution.”
• “The story integrates romance with individual growth, spotlighting the journey of self-discovery.”
• “By intertwining elements of fantasy with stark realities, the narrative delves into escapism.”
• “The narrative fuses humor with profound lessons, presenting life’s ironies.”
• “Blending cultural nuances with universal emotions, the story traverses borders.”
• “In combining elements of suspense with psychological insights, the narrative unveils human intricacies.”
• “By merging tales of wanderlust with inner journeys, the narrative celebrates exploration in all forms.”

Synthesis Statement Examples for High School

High school synthesis statements are a blend of foundational knowledge and emerging analytical skills. These examples reflect the depth suitable for this academic level.  In addition, you should review our  thesis statement high school .

• “By examining the causes of both World Wars, patterns of political alliances and animosities emerge.”
• “Merging studies of photosynthesis and cellular respiration offers a holistic view of plant biology.”
• “Combining Romantic literary elements with Gothic undertones elucidates 19th-century literary dynamics.”
• “The synthesis of algebraic and geometric principles enhances mathematical problem-solving skills.”
• “Analyzing the American Civil War in conjunction with Reconstruction reveals the challenges of nation-building.”
• “The study of classical elements combined with modern periodic table insights enriches chemical understanding.”
• “Merging tales of Greek gods with Roman counterparts provides a pantheon of shared myths.”
• “The blend of biology with ethics in discussions on cloning opens a multidimensional debate.”
• “Combining studies on Renaissance art and the scientific revolution reflects the age’s intellectual awakening.”
• “By synthesizing theories of democracy with global practices, the variance in democratic norms becomes evident.”

Synthesis Statement Examples for Middle School

Middle school synthesis statements merge basic knowledge with an introductory level of critical thinking. These are tailored for younger minds beginning to explore comprehensive insights.

• “By looking at both predators and prey, the circle of life in ecosystems is evident.”
• “Merging tales of King Arthur with historical records paints a picture of medieval legends and truths.”
• “Studying both plant and animal cells provides a rounded view of living organisms.”
• “Combining lessons on ancient civilizations with modern societies shows the evolution of cultures.”
• “The fusion of multiplication and division principles solidifies arithmetic foundations.”
• “Analyzing both poetry and prose enhances appreciation for literary expressions.”
• “Blending studies on Earth’s layers with tectonic movements reveals the dynamics of natural disasters.”
• “By synthesizing knowledge of stars and planets, the vastness of the universe unfolds.”
• “Merging lessons on gravity with those on flight introduces the marvels of physics.”
• “Integrating discussions on rights and responsibilities fosters a balanced civic understanding.

How do you write a synthesis statement? – A Step by Step Guide

Constructing a synthesis statement means weaving together multiple concepts, viewpoints, or resources to create a singular, unified narrative. Let’s navigate through the art of molding a robust synthesis statement:

Steps to Sculpt a Synthesis Statement

• Engage with Your Materials : Prior to formulating your synthesis, delve deep into all the materials or notions you intend to amalgamate. Highlight crucial elements and arguments.
• Establish Your Stand : Post your material review, settle on a perspective or opinion. This will become the core of your synthesis statement, integrating insights from the diverse materials.
• Sketch a Tentative Statement : Use this as a beacon for your synthesis journey. It should encapsulate the crux of the discourse you aspire to curate.
• Categorize Supportive Elements : Identify endorsements or pieces of evidence from your materials that bolster your preliminary statement.
• Merge and Streamline : Intertwine these supportive elements to shape a seamless statement that embodies facets from each material. Hone this statement for brevity and lucidity.
• Strive for Equilibrium : True synthesis embraces varied opinions, even if they’re contrasting. Ensure your statement is well-rounded, reflecting a multi-dimensional view.
• Review and Refine : Reflect upon your synthesis statement’s precision, consistency, and coherence. Undertake necessary modifications to enhance its elegance and intelligibility.

How to Start a Synthesis

• Spot a Fitting Subject : It should offer multiple materials or perspectives ripe for synthesis.
• Accumulate Your References : Gather diverse references pertinent to your subject, like articles, researches, or treatises.
• Dissect and Document : Examine each reference, marking significant elements or arguments.
• Frame an Initial Statement : Curate a guiding statement based on your materials’ interpretation.
• Draft an Outline : Systematize your findings and inferences in a methodical layout.
• Introduce with Impact : Begin with an engaging preamble, familiarize your audience with your references, and unveil your guiding statement.
• Ensure Fluidity : Guarantee a coherent flow of ideas to uphold consistency.

Tips for Drafting a Thesis Statement:

• Clarity is King : A thesis should be succinct yet echo your principal contention.
• Place Strategically : Ideally, slot your thesis at your introductory paragraph’s finale to offer readers an early guiding light.
• Court Contention : A potent thesis piques debate. Steer clear from mere factual statements.
• Stay on Track : Confine your thesis to the immediate subject. Evade generalizations.
• Invite Critique : Encourage peers or experts to assess your thesis for clarity and potency.
• Flexibility is Vital : If your composition evolves, recalibrate your thesis to mirror the content.
• Shun Vagueness : Your thesis should resound with conviction, leaving minimal room for speculations.
• Consistency is Crucial : Though your composition will entertain diverse opinions, the thesis should be unwavering in its stance.
• Eschew Esoteric Terms : Ensure your thesis remains accessible, even to those outside the subject’s sphere.
• Iterate and Refine : Chisel multiple thesis drafts to zero in on the most impactful version

AI Generator

Text prompt

• Instructive
• Professional

10 Examples of Public speaking

20 Examples of Gas lighting

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

This simple model for the progression of ideas is sometimes called a dialectic. It has many philosophical roots, but regardless it’s a nice way to think of how ideas, and perhaps society can progress. Something is created or put forward. It has some benefits but gives rise to negative effects and somehow we figure out a resolution as progress. That new solution then becomes the basis for the next step.

In engineering I learned that we progress by the resolution of contradictions. As a very simple example, it’s nice to have a walking stick. But a full-length walking stick is difficult to transport. You want it to be long when you’re walking, and short when you’re traveling with it. So we invent retractable ones. But retractable ones break more easily, so we invent…to be determined.

You also see a similar idea in stories, for example, the story spine .

It’s sometimes erroneously called Hegel’s dialectic, perhaps partly because Hegel’s work was sometimes so difficult to grasp and this is nicely simple.

You’re welcome to use and share this image and text for non-commercial purposes with attribution. Go wild! See licence

Thesis Antithesis Synthesis

        Often attributed to the philosophers Hegel or Marx, these terms have been used to describe the development of reasoning about evidence.  They sometimes even occur in historically documented events, but they probably are best thought of as a convenient mental model for styles of thought.  That is, they help us decide how to position ourselves in the flow of scholarly discourse about our topic.  It's always hard to find a "starting place" for real knowledge because it always builds upon old knowledge, either making it better or demolishing it or some compromise in betweeen.  But the pattern of the discourse flow, a repeating conversation, will become familiar to you.  It usually goes like this.

1)  Are we beginning something new?  (Nobody has ever thought of interpreting Casablanca as a film noir .)

                In that case, we position our ideas as a thesis .  ( The similarities in this evidence from films noir and from Casablanca suggests that Casablanca is a film noir . )

2)  Are we responding to something a previous thesis asserts?  (X has argued that Casablanca is a film noir .)

                In that case, we position our ideas as an antithesis to a previous thesis.  ( X suggests Casablanca is a film noir, but this is unlikely because films noir typically end with the hero's destruction and the triumph of evil's power. )

3)  Are we responding to the existence of a debate between a thesis and its antithesis, or to a series of theses?  (X says Casablanca is a film noir and Y says it is not.)

                In that case, we take the best points made by each, if they do not contradict, and create a synthesis of the thesis-antithesis dyad or the series of theses. 

( X has recently argued that, based upon comparison of evidence from other films noir and from Casablanca , that   Casablanca ought to be viewed as a film noir .  Y challenged X's argument by drawing our attention to evidence in Casablanca and in films noir that suggests Casablanca should not be viewed as a film noir .  Z recently has proposed a subgenre of film noir  which he calls "ironic film noir ," based on evidence from more recent films that X and Y do not consider, like Repo Man (1984) and Diva (1981).    In these films, the triumph of evil and destruction of the hero are thwarted at the last moment by supernatural or extremely unlikely interventions in a world that remains deeply corrupt.  If we look at X's and Y's evidence in the light of Z's reasoning, we probably should conclude that Casablanca is best understood as an ironic film noir, but with a comic rather than satiric attitude toward its characters and their dilemma. )

        Don't make the mistake of assuming that all theses have to be positive and all antitheses have to be negative.  Note that the thesis might easily have begun arguing that Casablanca was not film noir if X had begun by analyzing the roles played by Bogart, Greenstreet, and Lorre in previous films noir and argued that the differences between their characters and the plots of those movies and those of Casablanca meant that Casablanca was meant to be viewed as a rebellion against film noir to promote positive views of society in a time of war.  In that case, Y's antithesis might well have looked for similarities between those same characters and plots to argue that Casablanca was a failed film noir, a genre hijacked by the Hollywood studios from the auteur directors in a truly "corrupt city" that was the whole world, now that war had become a global norm. 

        Syntheses also do not always arise from the happy discovery of the solution in someone else's published reasoning.  Sometimes we have to come up with the synthesizing position ourselves.  Had Z's article not existed, the synthesis might have agreed with X that Casablanca was similar to films noir but also might have agreed with Y that it was not similar enough to films noir for twentieth-century audiences to view it that way.  Then the synthesis might have offered its own way to view the movie as playing with film noir conventions while it subconsciously flirts with some other, culturally taboo notions (e.g., the tragedy of a misunderstood, sympathetic African-American musician who was treated like a servant and betrayed to the criminal underworld and the Nazis [Sam's the mediator of Rick and Ilsa's entire romance, but who does he wind up with?  Ferrari, the creep!  And won't the Nazis eventually figure out his boss had something to do with Strasser's murder?], or homoerotic "bromance"?  ["Rickie" and "Louis" do walk off into the future together, eh?]).

4)  OR ARE WE DISCOVERING THAT THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE WE WERE OPERATING UNDER WAS WRONG ?!?!?

Not logged in

• Create account

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

Page actions.

• View source

In philosophy , the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis ( German : These, Antithese, Synthese ; originally: [1] Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis ) is a progression of three ideas or propositions . The first idea, the thesis , is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis , that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis , resolves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. [2] It is often used to explain the dialectical method of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , [3] but Hegel never used the terms himself; instead his triad was concrete, abstract , absolute . The thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad actually originated with Johann Fichte. [1]

• 1 History of the idea
• 2 Writing pedagogy
• 4 References
• 5 External links

History of the idea

Thomas McFarland (2002), in his Prolegomena to Coleridge 's Opus Maximum , [4] identifies Immanuel Kant 's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as the genesis of the thesis/antithesis dyad. Kant concretises his ideas into:

• Thesis: "The world has a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space."
• Antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space."

Inasmuch as conjectures like these can be said to be resolvable, Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations of the Science of Knowledge , 1794) resolved Kant's dyad by synthesis, posing the question thus: [4]

• No synthesis is possible without a preceding antithesis. As little as antithesis without synthesis, or synthesis without antithesis, is possible; just as little possible are both without thesis.

Fichte employed the triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" as a formula for the explanation of change. [5] Fichte was the first to use the trilogy of words together, [6] in his Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (1795, Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty ): "Die jetzt aufgezeigte Handlung ist thetisch, antithetisch und synthetisch zugleich." ["The action here described is simultaneously thetic, antithetic, and synthetic." [7] ]

Still according to McFarland, Schelling then, in his Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), arranged the terms schematically in pyramidal form.

According to Walter Kaufmann (1966), although the triad is often thought to form part of an analysis of historical and philosophical progress called the Hegelian dialectic , the assumption is erroneous: [8]

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Gustav E. Mueller (1958) concurs that Hegel was not a proponent of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and clarifies what the concept of dialectic might have meant in Hegel's thought. [9]

"Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".

According to Mueller, the attribution of this tripartite dialectic to Hegel is the result of "inept reading" and simplistic translations which do not take into account the genesis of Hegel's terms:

Hegel's greatness is as indisputable as his obscurity. The matter is due to his peculiar terminology and style; they are undoubtedly involved and complicated, and seem excessively abstract. These linguistic troubles, in turn, have given rise to legends which are like perverse and magic spectacles – once you wear them, the text simply vanishes. Theodor Haering's monumental and standard work has for the first time cleared up the linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved – though it was complete when he began to publish. Hegel's contemporaries were immediately baffled, because what was clear to him was not clear to his readers, who were not initiated into the genesis of his terms. An example of how a legend can grow on inept reading is this: Translate "Begriff" by "concept," "Vernunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science" – and they are all good dictionary translations – and you have transformed the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd pan-logistic rationalism and scientism. The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." [10]

Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) adopted and extended the triad, especially in Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). Here, in Chapter 2, Marx is obsessed by the word "thesis"; [11] it forms an important part of the basis for the Marxist theory of history . [12]

Writing pedagogy

In modern times, the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been implemented across the world as a strategy for organizing expositional writing. For example, this technique is taught as a basic organizing principle in French schools: [13]

The French learn to value and practice eloquence from a young age. Almost from day one, students are taught to produce plans for their compositions, and are graded on them. The structures change with fashions. Youngsters were once taught to express a progression of ideas. Now they follow a dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. If you listen carefully to the French arguing about any topic they all follow this model closely: they present an idea, explain possible objections to it, and then sum up their conclusions. ... This analytical mode of reasoning is integrated into the entire school corpus.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis has also been used as a basic scheme to organize writing in the English language. For example, the website WikiPreMed.com advocates the use of this scheme in writing timed essays for the MCAT standardized test: [14]

For the purposes of writing MCAT essays, the dialectic describes the progression of ideas in a critical thought process that is the force driving your argument. A good dialectical progression propels your arguments in a way that is satisfying to the reader. The thesis is an intellectual proposition. The antithesis is a critical perspective on the thesis. The synthesis solves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis by reconciling their common truths, and forming a new proposition.

• Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
• Science of Logic
• The Phenomenology of Spirit
• Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus
• David Icke § Problem–reaction–solution
• Fusion of horizons
• ↑ 1.0 1.1 "Review of Aenesidemus " ( "Rezension des Aenesidemus" , Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung , February 11–12, 1794). Trans. Daniel Breazeale. In Breazeale, Daniel; Fichte, Johann (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings . Cornell University Press. p. 63.  
• ↑ Schnitker, Sarah A.; Emmons, Robert A. (2013). "Hegel's Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Model". Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions . Berlin: Springer. pp. 978. doi : 10.1007/978-1-4020-8265-8_200183 . ISBN   978-1-4020-8264-1 .  
• ↑ Robert C. Solomon (1986), In the Spirit of Hegel , Oxford UP, p. 23.
• ↑ 4.0 4.1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Opus Maximum . Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 89.
• ↑ Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History . Greenwood Publishing Group (1986), p.114
• ↑ Williams, Robert R. (1992). Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other . SUNY Press. p. 46, note 37.  
• ↑ Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Breazeale, Daniel (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings . Cornell University Press. p. 249.  
• ↑ Walter Kaufmann (1966). "§ 37" . Hegel: A Reinterpretation . Anchor Books. ISBN   978-0-268-01068-3 . OCLC   3168016 . https://archive.org/details/hegelreinterpret00kauf .  
• ↑ Mueller, Gustav (1958). "The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (4): 411–414. doi : 10.2307/2708045 .  
• ↑ Mueller 1958, p. 411.
• ↑ marxists.org: Chapter 2 of "The Poverty of Philosophy", by Karl Marx
• ↑ Shrimp, Kaleb (2009). "The Validity of Karl Marx's Theory of Historical Materialism" . Major Themes in Economics 11 (1): 35–56 . https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol11/iss1/5/ . Retrieved 13 September 2018 .  
• ↑ Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French . Sourcebooks, Inc.. p.  62 . https://archive.org/details/sixtymillionfren00nade_041 .  
• ↑ "The MCAT writing assignment." . Wisebridge Learning Systems, LLC . http://www.wikipremed.com/mcat_essay.php . Retrieved 1 November 2015 .  

External links

• Dialectical Inquiry
• A passage from Karl Marx' works using the terms

es:Tríada dialéctica

• Philosophical phrases
• Theories of history
• Articles containing German-language text

• Add a new article
• Search in all topics
• Search in namespaces
• Search in categories
• Search using prefix
• About HandWiki
• How to edit
• Citation manager
• Formatting articles
• List of categories
• Recent pages
• Recent changes
• Random page
• Support & Donate
• Special pages
• Cite this page

User page tools

• What links here
• Related changes
• Printable version
• Permanent link
• Page information

Other projects

In other languages, hidden category.

• This page was last edited on 27 June 2023, at 06:09.
• Privacy policy
• Disclaimers

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

The triad thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese ) is often used to describe the thought of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel . Although Hegel never used the terms Johann Fichte used them to describe Hegel's thought.

Quotes [ edit ]

• Johann Fichte , Early Philosophical Writings , p. 63
• The Science of Rights 1796 by, Johann Gottlieb Fichte , 1762-1814; Kroeger, Adolph Ernest, 1837-1882, tr Publication date 1889 P. 147
• Thesis. The freedom of the person, according to the Conception of Rights, is limited only by the possibility that other persons are also to also with him as free persons, and hence as also having rights. Whatsoever does not violate the rights of another, each person has the right to do, and this, indeed, constitutes each person's right. Each one, moreover, has the right to judge for himself what is, and to defend, by his own powers, what he so judges to be, the limit of his free actions.
• Antithesis. According to a correct conclusion drawn from the same Conception of Rights, each person must utterly and unconditionally transfer all his power and judgment to a third party, if a legal relation between free persons is to be possible. By this transfer each person loses altogether the right to judge the limits of his own right and to defend those limits. He makes himself completely dependent upon the knowledge and good- will of the third party, to whom he has made the transfer, and ceases to be a free being.
• The Science of Rights 1796 by, Johann Gottlieb Fichte , 1762-1814; Kroeger, Adolph Ernest, 1837-1882, tr Publication date 1889 P. 149
• Thesis. — The state guarantees to each citizen, who contributes toward the protection of the state and to the support of the poor, the absolute and unlimited property of the remainder of his possession. Each must have the right to waste, destroy, or throw away what belongs to him, provided he thereby inflicts no injury upon other citizens.
• Antithesis. — The state continually takes possession of all the remainder — of the products of the producers, and of the wares and labor of the artist — in order thereby to make possible the necessary exchange, without which each can not be sure that he can sustain himself from the results of his labor.
• The Science of Rights 1796 by, Johann Gottlieb Fichte , 1762-1814; Kroeger, Adolph Ernest, 1837-1882, tr Publication date 1889 P. 317-319
• Thesis. — Whosoever violates the municipal compact in any manner, whether from neglect or intentionally, loses, strictly speaking, all his rights as a citizen and as a man, and becomes an outlaw. ….
• The Science of Rights 1796 by, Johann Gottlieb Fichte , 1762-1814; Kroeger, Adolph Ernest, 1837-1882, tr Publication date 1889 P. 343-344
• Franz Kafka , Parable translated by Hanna Arendt, in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (1954), p. 7

See also [ edit ]

• Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

External links [ edit ]

• Theme stubs

Navigation menu

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Trop Parasitol
• v.9(1); Jan-Jun 2019

Systems approach in medical education: The thesis, antithesis, and synthesis

B. v. adkoli.

Centre for Health Professions Education, Sri Balaji Vidyapeeth (Deemed University), Puducherry, India

S. C. Parija

1 Vice Chancellor, Sri Balaji Vidyapeeth (Deemed University), Puducherry, India

Systems approach is a time tested, method of trying to understand the reality holistically, and resolving the issues by problem-solving method. It has resulted in enormous applications in almost every field of knowledge, science, technology, industries, agriculture, and health or education. The main essence of systems thinking lies in minimizing the inputs, optimizing the process to maximize the outputs through continuous feedback, and monitoring. Medical education has been greatly benefitted as the systems approach has influenced all aspects, from delineating the competencies of doctors, designing curriculum that includes comprehensive assessment. However, of late, there has been a debate as to whether the systems approach can really contribute to resolve complex issues such as bringing curricular reforms, or promote policy changes in patient care, education, or research. This involves a paradigm shift from problem-solving approach to “pattern recognition” and adaptive action to correct the system. This review based on critical appreciation, begins with a thesis that systems approach is a great tool. It then exposes its inadequacy to address complex systems. This is antithesis. In the end, a synthesis of both the contradictory views has been proposed as a take home.

Perhaps, no other concept has made as deep impact on the life of human beings as systems approach. Systems approach is a holistic concept. In simplistic terms, a system is a functional entity. It consists of parts or components which are interconnected and interdependent. They work in harmony with each other to achieve the common goal. Systems like solar system existed long before the origin of the earth. The human body is an example of a complex, dynamic system in which different systems function in perfect coordination. Systems concept has been applied successfully to various fields such as science and technology, manufacturing industries, business, commerce, management, humanities, health, education, and more. Systems engineering is a branch of engineering that uses systems approach in designing complex systems such as ballistic missile systems.[ 1 ]

All systems have three major components as follows: Inputs, process, and output. Inputs are converted into outputs through the process, which is often less understood, hence referred to as black box. Human body, for example, receives food, water, and oxygen, which are processed through various biochemical processes such as respiration, digestion, blood circulation, and excretion ultimately leading to outputs such as energy, carbon dioxide, excreta, feces, and urine.

Another key concept in systems thinking is the distinction made between “open system” and “closed system.” An open system responds dynamically to the external environment through a feedback loop, which helps in monitoring and self-regulation whereas, a closed system is closed to the external milieu. Diwali rocket is an example of closed system. Open systems are preferred in all situations where in systems are expected to be responsive to the changes happening outside.

The early literature about systems thinking comes from the work of Dunlop, who applied it to explain industrial relationships.[ 2 ]

Manufacturing industries have been very successfully applying systems approach to their best advantage. This has helped them in achieving their dual objectives. The first objective is to be effective, in other words, to produce something “fit for the purpose.” This refers to quality. The second objective is to be efficient, in producing the given product in a most efficient manner, in other words to produce the required quantity in less time and cost.

Application of systems approach in education is found in the literature. Both clinical application of systems approach and its application in teaching have been described.[ 3 , 4 ] The medical education is a functional entity which is expected to be responsive to the external environment. This environment consists of patients, public, and members of the civil society who are the “stakeholders” of medical education.

The main inputs in medical education are students, who are expected to come out as medical graduates (output) with requisite competencies to go for higher education or practice. The quality of students admitted to medical colleges to a large extent influences the quality of graduate output.

The quality of faculty members recruited is yet another input that really matters. However, one cannot guarantee that a high quality of faculty necessarily leads to the high quality of products. There are other inputs such as the infrastructure, resources, and facilities which are instrumental in enhancing the quantity and quality of output. Last but not the least the curriculum adopted by the medical college plays a key role in deciding the fitness of the graduate output.

Medical education system undergoes several processes, as the inputs (students) roll out as outputs (doctors). Most importantly, the teaching processes take place in a variety of settings such as class room teaching, laboratory work, library, Out Patient Department, bedside, clinics, field postings, and workplaces. Teaching is accompanied by monitoring and evaluation including several forms of formative and summative assessment. Another key process is the provision of feedback and mentoring provided by the faculty on and off the campus.

The major output produced in the medical education system is a medical graduate, endowed with knowledge, skills, and attitude to serve the patients. There are other outputs such as service rendered to the patients, research output, and service rendered to the society.

While translating this into a working model, the steps involved are:

• Identify stakeholders' needs. Your products (graduates) should ultimately fit in with the needs of the society
• Define the competencies expected at the end of a program and prepare a plan of evaluation including student assessment
• Identify and engage inputs such as right students, faculty, infrastructure, and resources as required to achieve the program outcomes
• Optimize the process of teaching-learning, monitoring progress by appropriate feedback mechanism including coaching, mentoring, and supporting.

The systems approach is, therefore, a great tool to systematize the entire process of education right from defining the product to design curriculum and develop assessment strategies for the students.[ 5 ] The beauty of systems approach lies in the fact that you can identify and specify the kind of product you need, and try your best by optimizing your inputs and the process. If you are keen to produce a doctor of international standard, you can do so by following systems approach. You need to engage the high quality of inputs, namely admit students of high merit, appoint faculty of high caliber, and invest in high-quality infrastructure and resources. You also need to optimize your process components, such as teaching, assessment, feedback, and mentoring systems. In the end, you are sure to achieve your goal.

Let's say that you are not be able to exercise control over the quality of student input due to centralized admission procedure National Eligibility and Entrance Test (NEET) or reservation policy of the Government.[ 6 ] What you can do to achieve your goal is to accelerate your input by appointing exceptionally trained faculty, or to set in place a system of mentoring which can boost the performance of “weak” students to bring on par with “normal” students.

The main plank of systems approach is to attack the problem systematically. Problem-solving is the panacea. What is the problem? Where lies the problem? How can we fix the problem? Which solution works better? These are the questions used in systems approach to guide the decision makers.

Systems approach is also a time tested approach used in scientific and biomedical research. The steps which are customized here are-identifying the problem, the variables (outcome, dependent, and intervening), defining the hypothesis or research questions, describing a phenomenon (descriptive study), explaining, comparing or at times, predicting the pathway of the intervention (experimental studies), all of which leading to solve a problem.[ 7 ] The inputs here the researcher, the known literature in the field, resources, facilities, and time at the disposal of researcher. The process is the scientific method followed in the research. The main output of this system is “well-informed research scholar” who has generated a new knowledge or reconfirmed the existing information. Besides, there are other byproducts such as the evolution of a new procedure, product, or innovation benefitting the research community, in particular, and humankind in general.

Patient care, the third dimension of medicine is also a major beneficiary of systems thinking. A clinician is all the time involved in solving patient's problem by following the time tested method of diagnosis. A person with a disease or deformity is the “input” who is successfully converted in to- “cured, healthy person,” the main output of the system. This is done by a “process” consisting of history, physical examination, diagnostics, treatment, and follow-up. Of course, there are other outputs accruing to society as a by-product of this system. The modern medicine, owing to the pace of specialization has resulted in too much compartmentalization, thus diluting the holistic feature of the system. Whereas, the Indian system of medicine is a typical example of a systems approach with a holistic approach to the diagnostics and treatment of the patient.[ 8 ]

Systems approach is, therefore, a well-known, well-tested strategy. It will address the problem as a whole, break the “silos” among various departments and direct them to work in harmony. The practical implications are that the leaders should be sensitized to this approach, work out a coordinated plan to find fault, and correct the same.

While systems approach has contributed immensely to the advancement of patient care, education and research, there has been recent debate as to whether this approach still holds good in the current scenario of medical education. The current scenario is marked by the presence of “Complex Systems” which are too difficult to deal with, using systems approach. What we really encounter in complex systems are not the problems but the patterns. Stewart Mennin a thought leader in dealing with complex systems calls these issues as “sticky issues in medical education.”[ 9 ] Sticky issues are those which are not easily amenable for control. They are described by various individuals or groups, in various forms depending on what they “perceive” as truth and nothing beyond. The issue of enhancing quality in education, introducing curricular reforms, overcoming resistance to change are some examples of sticky issues which involve several stakeholders who do not agree about the nature of the problem or the solution.

For instance, everyone thinks that the medical profession today is undergoing erosion in professionalism. However if you ask the various stakeholders, the students, teachers, professionals, and patients as to what they mean by professionalism, they will come out with different issues, with certain patterns.[ 10 ] For a medical student who has invested huge money on education, successful professional may mean a specialist who has a well-established practice in a high tech environment. For a patient, it may mean a doctor who is caring, compassionate, and cost-effective in treating. For a faculty member, it may mean providing the highest quality of care in compliance with high ethical standard. Thus, in the absence of a consensus on what is “real problem,” how can one solve it? Hence, the dictum is “Do not try to solve the problem but create a supportive milieu in which people are empowered to tackle the “problem” and move forward”.

PARADIGM SHIFT IN THINKING

The approach to deal with the complex systems, therefore, demands a paradigm shift in our thinking. We should not waste our efforts in finding who is right and who is wrong. The first step is to ask WHAT. What is happening here? What is the perception of various stakeholders? For achieving this, we need to break the silos, consult and listen to every section without any prejudice. The traditional approach of relying on expert views will not work in case of complex systems. This will also dissolve the boundaries between the authorities and implementers, which is a big barrier for change management.

The next step after “asking what” is asking '”SO, WHAT.” This is a state of reflection to seek what the issue means to YOU so that YOU can change. This leads to contemplation and adaptive action from your end to address the issue differently. This may involve several strategies which can be thought of as short and long term measures. For example, your approach to address professionalism could be to serve as a role model or rely on hidden curriculum which you could sphere-head on your own without bothering about system change.

The third and the final step is asking “NOW WHAT,” to freeze a particular adaptive action as a top priority for the time being. At the end, you would realize that the things would fall in their place not because of the “control” you choose to exercise in the systems approach, but because of your power to sit back, meditate, and do what best you can under the current of wavering pressures and pulls from various quarters. No doubt this approach requires a lot of dispassionate attitudes, and surrender of ego which are difficult to achieve. However, spiritual development can be helpful. Many leaders who made a difference to the society designed their own methods of dealing with the complex systems by the power of motivation, setting role models, and letting the followers to grow.

Systems approach has no doubt contributed to the growth of mankind in all fields. However, as we stand on the pedestal of a society in which various ideologies, views, and practices are in conflict with each other, we need to move out of the box to address complex systems. Problem-solving strategy which is time tested method may be supplemented with pattern resolution strategy. This will mean that academic leaders should be willing to adopt a different leadership style with more of collaboration and less of competition, more of delegation and less of centralization, more of learning and less of teaching, and more of inclusiveness and less of exclusiveness in a spirit of giving for the collective good.

Financial support and sponsorship

Conflicts of interest.

There are no conflicts of interest.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank Dr. Stewart Mennin, Mennin Consulting Associate, Human Systems Dynamics Institute, Adjunct Professor, Department of Medicine, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland [email protected].

• Anatomy & Physiology
• Astrophysics
• Earth Science
• Environmental Science
• Organic Chemistry
• Precalculus
• Trigonometry
• English Grammar
• U.S. History
• World History

... and beyond

• Socratic Meta
• Featured Answers

What are thesis, antithesis, synthesis? In what ways are they related to Marx?

Antithesis of a One-in-a-Million Bug: Taming Demonic Nondeterminism

• Stan Rosenberg ,
• and  Alex Sarkesian

on March 21, 2024

Subscribe to our newsletter

We will email you updates about CockroachDB. You can unsubscribe at any time. Learn more about our privacy practices here .

DoorDash's Journey from Aurora PostgreSQL to CockroachDB

Editor’s note: The one-in-a-million bug detailed below has never been reported by customers of Cockroach Labs. It was autofiled by Sentry’s crash reporting module, which led us on a long journey to uncover its root cause(s). The story below details our investigation into and ultimate resolution of said bug.

Background: Nondeterminism

Nondeterminism –the property of being in any of the possible next states, is a double-edged sword. In Computer Science (CS), the notion of nondeterminism is instrumental to managing complexity of reasoning about the state space. The earliest uses of nondeterminism appear in [Chomsky, 1959] and [Rabin and Scott, 1959]. The former gave us succinct context-free grammars (CFG), e.g., arithmetic expressions,

S ::= x | y | z | S + S | S * S | (S)

The latter gave us non-deterministic finite automata (NFAs), aka regular expressions. Both CFGs and NFAs are fundamental concepts, known virtually to any CS grad.

And of course, who can forget the elusive problem of P = NP [Cook, 1971 and Levin, 1973], and the eternal search for taming NP-completeness? As an example, testing serializability of a given history of committed transactions is NP-complete (see Testing Distributed Systems for Linearizability ). However, if we’re given a total (per-object) order, the verification problem is now in P. Indeed, the Elle checker runs in linear time.

In software verification, nondeterminism allows techniques like symbolic model checking (SMC) in cases where exhaustive state enumeration is infeasible, such as pretty much any modern distributed system like CockroachDB. For a recent, large-scale application of SMC, see Model checking boot code from AWS data centers . Nondeterminism also makes TLA+ more expressive. The one-in-a-million bug we discuss below is a byproduct of the implementation of the ParallelCommits.tla model.

Demonic Nondeterminism

While CS theoreticians mostly see the good side of nondeterminism, practitioners of distributed systems often fall prey to its bad side–(distributed) failure reproduction. Indeed as others have pointed out, “ Nondeterminism makes the development of distributed systems difficult. ”. Inability to reproduce bugs is one of the main reasons that distributed systems are notoriously hard to debug. Nondeterminism of this type is known as demonic . (Intuitively, “worst” possible action is chosen.) E.g., Go’s select statement behaves like Dijkstra’s guarded commands. Ignoring its demonic nondeterminism leads to bugs like this . (The bug is triggered when multiple goroutines execute inside the default clause.)

Despite decades of R&D improvements, there is an obvious gap in available tools to help debug and reproduce a “one-in-a-million” type of bug. Colloquially, we refer to such bugs whose probability of failure is extremely low; they typically require several, correlated internal state transitions, e.g., race conditions and/or intermittent (hardware) failure(s). Until recently, one such bug lurked in CockroachDB. Achieving world class resiliency is one of our highest product principles, and by enlisting the help of Antithesis , a startup from the founders of FoundationDB, we were able to track down and reproduce this most elusive bug, nearly deterministically! With additional instrumentation in the form of (distributed) traces, many reruns, and much log spelunking, a fix was merged, thanks to Alex Sarkesian, co-author of this post and former KV engineer at Cockroach Labs.

Without deterministic reproduction, conventional debugging and (stress) testing don’t yield an effective strategy; for “one-in-a-million” type of bug, it’s really no different than pure chance. Sadly, the state-of-the-art of deterministic debugging leaves much to be desired.

Below we review existing tools. Then, we describe our experience with Antithesis , a system for autonomous testing. We conclude with an intuitive description of the discovered bug and its fix. (See Appendix for technical details.)

The idea behind “deterministic debugging” is not new. In Debug Determinism (~2011), the authors argue for, “a new determinism model premised on the idea that effective debugging entails reproducing the same failure and the same root cause as the original execution”. Conceptually, it’s exactly what we’re after; in practice, it’s hard to achieve. Let’s quickly review why and what’s currently available.

Sources of Nondeterminism

For a stateful, distributed system like CockroachDB, running on a wide variety of deployment environments, sources of nondeterminism can seem endless. Unexpected network delays, thread timings, and disk faults can conspire to manifest rare bugs hidden in the system, particularly in ways that can be nearly impossible to reliably reproduce, diagnose, and fix.

Flaky tests, particularly integration tests , can offer many examples of the bugs found due to this unexpected nondeterminism. Usual suspects like TCP port collision and out of file descriptors result due to resource limits; race conditions and timeouts are examples of scheduler non-determinism. (See A Survey of Flaky Tests and Reproducible Containers .)

Hardware (interrupts), clocks (e.g., clock_gettime ), /dev/(u)random , and CPU instructions (e.g., RDRAND ) are other examples. Beyond single address space, network is a major source of nondeterminism.

ptrace to the Rescue

ptrace is a system call that’s been around since Version 6 Unix (~1975). Originally added to support debugging with breakpoints, today it supports a whole gamut of applications such as syscall tracing (strace) and syscall record and replay (rr). In essence, ptrace allows to emulate any syscall by intercepting the original call and modifying its result(s). (See Liz Rice’s Demo strace in Go ). Thus, nondeterministic syscalls, e.g., clock_gettime, can be emulated by their deterministic counterparts, e.g., using a logical clock.

In fact, ptrace , a logical clock, a single-threaded scheduler, and a RAM disk is roughly all you need for deterministic debugging on a single machine; beyond a single machine, network is a great non-determinizer. Note that a logical clock can be effectively derived from the precise CPU hardware performance counter– retired conditional branches (RCB) .

History of Deterministic Debuggers

To our knowledge, deterministic debugging is fairly sparse and experimental. The above timeline depicts some of the noteworthy tools developed in the last two decades. While valgrind isn’t strictly deterministic, it implements a single-threaded (fair) scheduler. It served as an inspiration for rr . The more recent development is hermit which was inspired by dettrace .

rr is perhaps the most widely known deterministic debugger. However, it’s only able to replay deterministically what was previously recorded; hermit, on the other hand, can deterministically execute any binary. (That is, under rr , a pair of runs of the same binary and input would yield two different recordings; see Explanation .)

At this time, the latter is highly experimental whereas the former is production-ready, assuming you can find a Cloud VM which exposes CPU perf. counters :)

Recall, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle . Physicists discovered another bad side of nondeterminism way before computer scientists. Deterministic debuggers exhibit side-effects similar to quantum mechanics–deterministic recording alters original execution. 

All of the above rely on ptrace , which incurs a significant overhead, 2-3x additional syscalls, plus context-switching. Using seccomp with eBPF can remove the overhead for non-emulated syscalls. The remaining overhead is still quite substantial although rr employs several optimization tricks, e.g., syscall buffering. Nevertheless, ptrace is a poorman’s deterministic debugger at best. Instead, what if determinism could be built directly into a hypervisor ?

The Antithesis platform was inspired by FoundationDB , which is deeply embedded with a deterministic simulation framework. FoundationDB’s framework can simulate network and disk I/O, as well as inject faults. The simulation framework code is interleaved with the database code. E.g., here a corrupted key can be injected when FDB’s consistency checker is running inside the simulator. During simulation, an entire database cluster is running single-threaded in the same address space. Since all hardware I/O and non-deterministic syscalls are simulated, it’s effectively a whitebox, deterministic debugger. However, it’s not without limitations. E.g., third-party code like the RocksDB storage engine renders simulation non-deterministic .

While FoundationDB is unique in its inherent design to enable deterministic simulation testing, it is frequently far too complex to retrofit the large-scale code base of an existing database with such a system. The Antithesis platform solves this problem by using a deterministic hypervisor, thereby enabling virtually any binary to benefit from deterministic simulation testing!

Similar to FoundationDB, failure injection is built into the Antithesis platform. In running its  autonomous tests, Antithesis will catch errors by monitoring for process failures, such as those caused by assertions like Go’s panic , as well as, by monitoring logs for errors and failures to maintain system invariants. These can be caught by providing regexes to fail on matching patterns of log messages. Intuitively, it runs many short experiments (scenarios), optimizing for a maximum amount of code (i.e. unique edges) explored over the course of a full test run, encountering a number of distinct failures. Roughly, each scenario denotes a simulator run under deterministically random failures. The example below shows thousands of scenarios executed over 25 hours.

The Antithesis platform is more than just a deterministic simulator. It uses a fuzzer to find “interesting” scenarios. When available, code coverage instrumentation can provide further (optimization) guidance to the fuzzer, such that faults are injected to explore branches of the code not previously covered in the tests. In the above example, we can see a sharp increase in branches covered during the first ~5 hours. Then, coverage stabilizes as is often the case with distributed systems. (Absent any new failure, the same event loops are executed.)

Given what we now know about the Antithesis platform, we can succinctly describe it as Greybox Deterministic Simulator with Coverage-Guided Failure Injection . In layman’s terms it’s a marriage of a fuzzer and a deterministic debugger.

The one-in-a-million bug first showed up on our radar in 2021. None of our customers reported the issue but; it was autofiled by Sentry’s crash reporting module. The stacktrace revealed it to be a violated invariant –an undefined state. For this invariant, like many others, CockroachDB’s code asserts to ensure the invariant holds, using Go’s panic to crash the node and recover diagnostics for further troubleshooting. Unfortunately, besides the stacktrace and the anonymized cluster metadata, we didn’t have any actionable information. Furthermore, this failure mode never appeared in any of our extensive test runs.

In the investigation of these rare crash reports, engineers on our KV Team started to develop plausible theories ; it appeared to implicate ambiguous errors which occur during retries of distributed SQL request batches. In 2023, we started evaluating the Antithesis platform. Fortuitously, one of the scenarios terminates in exactly the same, elusive state as seen in the log below.

The error message “transaction unexpectedly committed” denotes a serious bug–it should not be possible to perform additional operations (such as writes) on an already committed transaction. Any data written by an atomically committed transaction can immediately be read by other transactions. Thus, any subsequent operations that could change that data would violate the transaction isolation model . Examining the above log output, we developed a few leads. (Recall, the crash reports gave us only a stacktrace without a full log.)

The failure message indicates the batch of inflight requests (ba), as well as, transaction record ( txn ), and the affected (key) ranges . Suspiciously, we see a batch with EndTxn(commit) and Put requests which, upon evaluation, is rejected due to being against an already committed transaction – particularly one previously noted as being in an indeterminate commit state. Immediately before the failure message is an indication of a “transaction recovery” . Lastly, we see an RPC error; though it is unclear if this is related, or simply a correlated symptom due to the simulation’s introduction of network interference.  The RPC error is immediately preceded by a network failure injection message.

Armed with these new insights, the root cause should now be imminent, right? Not exactly. The transaction recovery message seemed to implicate the Parallel Commit protocol. However, the actual root cause analysis took a fairly long time, during which distributed traces and deterministic replays began to tease out the state machine behind the sufficient conditions for “transaction unexpectedly committed”. Many rinse-and-repeat cycles later, the root cause, its fix, and a reproducing unit test have emerged.

For an in-depth analysis of the root cause, see Appendix . The culprit, as it turns out, was an attempt to retry the ambiguous (or, “indeterminately committed”) write at a higher timestamp, which results in non-idempotency . More generally, we need to protect the transaction coordinator against non-idempotent replays of request batches that result in ambiguous failures (e.g., RPC error). That’s exactly what our fix implements. By explicitly tracking potentially non-idempotent replays, the transaction coordinator now responds with result is ambiguous error to the SQL client, if any replay fails the idempotency check, e.g., change of write timestamp.

This may not seem like the most graceful recovery; effectively, we’re shifting the burden of non-idempotent transaction retries to the SQL client. Sadly, CAP Theorem postulates we can’t have it all ways. In this case, owing to (partial) unavailability of the network, the transaction coordinator cannot verify, with any deterministic time bound, whether the transaction committed. We conclude by noting that while the Parallel Commit protocol was verified using TLA+, the model is an underapproximation of the actual implementation. Specifically, the TLA+ specification doesn’t model the above scenario.

Bugs are compounded by the number of distinct nodes operating in a distributed system, each providing their own sources of nondeterminism with thread timings, network conditions, hardware, and more. Finding and fixing these bugs requires new approaches to testing and debugging. At a recent seminar on Database Reliability and Robustness , industry practitioners summarized the state-of-the-art,

The current state-of-the-art is often simply rerunning a test a large number of times (e.g., 1000x), potentially after augmenting the system with additional logging, a slightly modified configuration, runtime sanitizers, or with changes to the system or test workload to increase the likelihood of perturbing the issue.

Like any emerging technology, the Antithesis platform is not without rough edges. Deterministic replay doesn’t immediately get you a reproduction, particularly across distinct code changes as you might see with a unit or integration test. In our experience, a significant amount of effort was invested in instrumenting the logs, as well as reasoning about injected failure states in order to recover the state machine which reproduces the bug. The rinse-and-repeat cycle means that a modified binary (with new instrumentation) may not always hit the same terminal state. Although, in practice determinism between runs is very high assuming the code changes are localized. (Recall that the retired conditional branches counter models a logical clock; thus, straight-line code tends to preserve determinism.)

Unlike rr , the Antithesis platform doesn’t support step-through debugging during replay. Thus, the ability to observe internal state outside of logging is missing. This feedback loop could reduce the rinse-and-repeat cycle and shorten the time to reproduction.

Despite the rough edges, the Antithesis platform remains a promising technology, with the potential to neutralize many hard-to-detect lurking bugs. It’s our belief that deterministic debugging is the future, and Antithesis is paving the way toward that goal.

Root Cause Bird’s-eye View

The sequence diagram below illustrates the bug scenario. The crux of the issue is an ambiguous write , denoted by the first attempt of txn.Batch{CPut(200, ‘y’)} . In other words, an RPC failure - the RPC performing the write on key y can time out or fail to respond, and if so the node performing the role of the transaction coordinator will not know if the first attempt succeeded to update ‘y’.

Immediately after the first write attempt fails due to the network failure, the leaseholder moves from n2 to n3 . Subsequently, the second write attempt reaches a fresh leaseholder on n3 , which results in requiring the transaction coordinator to move the transaction’s timestamp using something called a  “read refresh” . The injected network failures also cause the transaction coordinator to miss heartbeats of the transaction’s record. Simultaneously, a contending transaction triggers a “transaction status recovery” process, which races with the transaction’s own retries. The former succeeds, marking the transaction record explicitly committed. The latter - i.e. the transaction’s retry after the ambiguous state - results in the transaction coordinator panicking.

Parallel Commits

In more technical detail, we can understand what caused this bug if we look deeper into the Parallel Commits protocol used in CockroachDB, with particular consideration for its Transaction Recovery mechanism and the race conditions that arise from it. Consider an implicit transaction like the following SQL statement:

INSERT INTO accounts (account_id, name) VALUES (100, ‘x’), (200, ‘y’)

In CockroachDB, rows are stored as key-value pairs, partitioned into many ranges - for example, we could have 100 <= account_id < 200 in one range, and 200 <= account_id < 300 in another, with leaseholders for these ranges spread across various nodes in the cluster. This requires usage of an explicit transaction record in order to ensure that the writes happen atomically; i.e. that they can be made visible to other reads at the same time, using an explicit transaction timestamp. This can look something like the following:

We’ll leave detailed description of the protocol to the previously mentioned blog post, however in short: while a traditional two-phase commit (2PC) makes writes visible by marking a transaction record as COMMITTED , and does so only after all writes have been acknowledged, CockroachDB’s Parallel Commits protocol works a bit differently. In addition to writes being visible once their transaction record is marked explicitly as COMMITTED , it also introduces a new state known as implicitly committed, where a transaction’s writes can be read if the reader can verify that all writes have been acknowledged. This looks instead like the following:

This allows the transaction coordinator to write the transaction record in parallel with the transaction’s writes, and instead leaves the final step of marking the transaction as explicitly  COMMITTED as post-transaction follow-up work that can happen asynchronously, decreasing transaction latency experienced by clients and improving throughput. In terms of CockroachDB’s underlying Key-Value Storage (KV) Operations, this process can look something like the following:

In order to ensure that all transaction records are eventually marked as explicitly COMMITTED , a “Transaction Status Recovery Procedure” had to be introduced; the TLA+ Specification (mentioned previously) formally verifies that all implicitly committed transactions will eventually become explicitly committed, and is explained further in the Parallel Commits blog post. The Recovery Procedure ensures that a transaction coordinator that dies before finishing the asynchronous follow-up work can still result in an explicitly COMMITTED record by allowing any other transaction that performs reads or writes on these keys (and thus encounters the transaction record) to kick off recovery. Once the Recovery Procedure has been initiated, the database can ensure that the keys noted in the transaction record were either correctly and durably written, in which case the transaction can be marked COMMITTED , or they were not, in which case the transaction must be marked ABORTED . This is an all-or-none proposition, of course, in order to ensure transaction atomicity.

Unexpected Commits

How does this lead to a bug in which the transaction coordinator doesn’t realize its transaction was already committed, you might ask? Well, recall that we mentioned RPC failures earlier. In the case that one of the RPCs for performing one of a transaction’s writes fail, the transaction coordinator literally does not know if that write is durable or not. It is possible that the remote side of the RPC performed correctly, durably wrote the new value to disk, and the node simply lost power or network connection before returning its gRPC codes.OK response. In the terminology of the 2PC protocol, the write has not been acknowledged.  So the transaction coordinator must re-attempt the write, sending a new RPC - if the value is already durably written, we simply validate it, this is called an idempotent replay . If the value was not durably written, the write is re-attempted. In KV operations, this looks like the following:

As mentioned above, however, once a transaction’s writes are durably written and the record is marked as STAGING , it is considered implicitly committed by other transactions. This means that it is possible for the RPC failure of a transaction’s writes to cause the transaction coordinator to be out of sync with the correct state of the transaction, as it is viewed by other transactions operating in the database.  Additionally, once a transaction is implicitly committed, it may be eligible for the Transaction Status Recovery Procedure, initiated by other operations in the database. Hence, not only can the transaction coordinator have an ambiguous state, but it is possible for another operation to correctly interpret the “implicitly committed” state of the transaction, and mark it explicitly committed before the transaction coordinator can verify the writes and attempt to finalize the transaction itself - essentially losing a race and ending up finding that the transaction was unexpectedly committed !

Fixing Idempotency

Once a transaction is committed - either explicitly or implicitly - any changes to that transaction would be illegal, causing breaks to the rules of transaction atomicity and isolation. This makes sense - once some other operation performs a read at timestamp ts=6 and sees the following query results:

With account_id=100 having value=‘x’ as written by TxnID=1 , it should be illegal for TxnID=1 to later perform additional operations like writing value=’z’ . Similarly, it would also be illegal for TxnID=1 to later rewrite the transaction’s timestamp to ts=10 , as it would also retroactively change the query at ts=6 to have the following results:

These behaviors are not allowed in CockroachDB, as they could cause significant bugs in client applications if our guarantees around transaction isolation were not respected. This is what the transaction coordinator is asserting when it validates its expected transaction status, and why the transaction coordinator would crash if it found itself in an unexpected state.

It turns out that the tricky part is the definition around the idempotent replay that happens when the transaction coordinator retries a failed write RPC. Generally, the idempotent replay is just validating that if we wrote value=’x’ for account_id=100 , we are still writing the same value, regardless of the timestamp, since the transaction isn’t yet committed. In most cases, the timestamp of a transaction’s writes are fungible prior to the transaction being committed - the timestamp can be incremented, provided any prior read operations in the transaction could be validated via an operation known as a Read Refresh. However, once it is possible for a transaction to be considered committed, its writes become visible to other readers - and thus, changing the timestamp of a write is actually breaking idempotency by having a side effect.

How can we fix this? If the transaction coordinator is in an ambiguous state due to RPC failures, we can essentially incorporate that into our evaluation of the idempotent replay. If we are attempting to change the timestamp of a transaction for some reason (such as the start of a new range leaseholder), and the transaction coordinator isn’t sure if the transaction could be considered committed by other readers, rather than attempting to break our guarantees or panic, we should instead acknowledge that ambiguity and instead return SQL error 40003 statement_completion_unknown . This allows the client to determine how to proceed in the face of RPC failures - the transaction can be verified externally, and potentially reattempted if it did not complete successfully. In terms of KV operations, this looks like the following:

• engineering

About the authors

Stan rosenberg.

Stan is the Director of Test Engineering at Cockroach Labs, the company behind CockroachDB. Previously, he was the VP of Engineering at Inpher and Forensiq. He earned a PhD in Computer Science from Stevens Institute of Technology.

Alex Sarkesian

Alex is a Brooklyn, NY based software developer and former CockroachDB Engineer. He has previously worked across the tech industry in growing and established organizations like Dropbox, Spotify, and Bloomber LP.

Keep Reading

If you’ve ever read the section on transaction isolation in your database documentation, you’ve probably seen some …

Would you fly in an aircraft that wasn’t tested? Get behind the wheel of a car whose model hadn’t been crash-tested? …

What does a Test Engineer do?

The Test Engineering team (TestEng) is a new and exciting team embedded within …